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FOREWORD 
At one level this is a straightforward and not-
too-complex account of political divisions between and 
amongst 'rich' and 'poor' workers in the cargo-handling 
industry of Lagos, Nigeria. The descriptive and his-
torical chapters (1-3, 6-7, 10-11, and 14-15) can thus 
be read by the motivated and primary-educated labour 
activist, whether in Nigeria or elsewhere. 
At another level it is an analysis or interpreta-
tion of such divisions, making use of a wide range of 
recent marxist and radical literature that has attemp-
ted to come to terms with the problem of division 
amongst workers and their organisations, and with the 
specificity of working-class formation in peripheral 
capitalist societies. The theoretical and analytical 
chapters (4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13, 16) can be read by those 
familiar with the language of social science (or marx-
ism) and interested in the analysis of this problem, 
whether in Nigeria or elsewhere. 
At a third level it is part of a theoretical and 
political debate amongst marxists (and other radicals) 
concerning the working class, the labour movement and 
the struggle for socialism. This debate (mostly in the 
Introduction and Conclusion) should be of particular 
interest to those in Nigeria, Africa or elsewhere 
concerned with furthering popular struggles against an 
increasingly militarised, unequal, hierarchical and 
competitive world order. Although more complex than 
the descriptive/historical material, I would expect 
self-educated labour leaders, as well as formally-
trained intellectuals, to be interested in this 
material. 
The same material is also part of my own political 
struggle to come to terms with the marxist tradition 
- a struggle by no means completed with this book. 
Thus, I began by rejecting labour aristocracy theory as 
a crude over-simplification of the classical marxist 
approach to the working class. I then cast around for 
a richer and finer set of concepts within the marxist 
tradition. But, in applying and reflecting on these 
concepts, I began to realise that labour aristocracy 
theory was not so much a deviation from orthodox marx-
ism as an expression of a major shortcoming within it. 
In the Conclusion I attempt to come to terms with this 
both theoretically and politically. 
I hope that the whole will be as educative to the 
reader as it has been to me. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This is a study of political divisions between 'rich' 
and 'poor' workers in the Lagos cargo-handling indus-
try. It is situated within a particular debate amongst 
radical scholars working on labouring people in Africa. 
And this debate itself relates to an older and inore 
fundamental one, going back to the beginning of marxism 
itself. Section 1 considers this background. Section 
2 deals with the African debate. Section 3 introduces 
the case itself. Section 4 places this in the context 
of Nigerian labour studies. Section 5 presents the 
general approach adopted. Section 6 deals with re-
search strategy and techniques. And Section 7 presents 
the structure of the rest of the work. 
1. Handling non-revolutionary behaviour amongst workers 
Of all the classes that stand face to face 
with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat 
alone is a really revolutionary class. The 
other classes decay and finally disappear in 
the face of modern industry; the proletariat 
is its special and essential product ... All 
previous historical movements were movements 
of minorities, or in the interest of minori-
ties. The proletarian movement is the self-
conscious, independent movement of the im-
mense majority, in the interest of the im-
mense majority ... The advance of industry, 
whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeois-
ie, replaces the isolation of the labourers, 
due to competition, by their revolutionary 
combination due to association. The develop-
ment of modern industry, therefore, cuts from 
under its feet the very foundation on which 
the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates 
products. What the bourgeoisie therefore 
produces, above all, are its own grave-
diggers. Its fall and the victory of the 
proletariat are equally inevitable. (Marx 
1935:216-8). 
The above extracts from the Communist Manifesto of 1848 
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are still articles of faith for roost radical socialist 
movements today. They are also a major source of 
problems for both movements and theorists. Why has the 
bourgeoisie not yet been buried? Is the proletariat 
really revolutionary? Do other classes finally dis-
appear? What if the proletariat is a minority? And 
acts in its own interest? It might be considered 
unfair to pose such questions of a merely agitational 
pamphlet, and one written before Marx had reached 
intellectual maturity. But such questions were posed 
- at least implicitly - by Marx, Engels and Lenin 
themselves. And, as we will see in the Conclusion to 
this study, such questions are being explicitly raised 
by committed socialists and thoughtful social scien-
tists still today. 
Marx, Engels and Lenin considered the physical 
expansion and political consolidation of the prole-
tariat equally inevitable. When they found the working 
class to be non-revolutionary, they explained this 
largely in terms of its domination by a 'labour aristo-
cracy' . [1] 
The expression 'labour aristocracy' is not of 
marxist origin. It was one current in mid- and late-
19th century Britain, being applied to the highly-
skilled and (consequently) strongly-unionised stratum 
of the working class (Hobsbawm 1964:272-343). In 1858 
Engels referred to the English proletariat as 'becoming 
more and more bourgeois' (Marx and Engels 1953:491-2), 
and in 1892 to the skilled artisans in the 'great 
Trades Unions' as 'forming an aristocracy among the 
working class'. In the latter item Engels referred to 
the working class as a whole as having shared to some 
extent in the benefits of Britain's industrial mono-
poly, this explaining why 'since the dying-out of 
Owenism, there has been no Socialism in England' (28, 
30-31). In a letter in 1889, during which the phrase 
'aristocracy of labour' was specifically used for the 
first time, Engels referred also specifically to the 
'bourgeois respectability* of the socialist leaders of 
the new and militant unskilled workers' unions (522-3). 
Lenin picked up and developed this notion during 
the First World War. Explaining the reformism and 
nationalism of the majority of European labour move-
ments faced by the war, he argued that a 
privileged upper stratum of the proletariat 
in the imperialist countries lives partly at 
the expense of hundreds of millions of mem-
bers of uncivilised nations. (Lenin 1959: 
312) . 
In Lenin's presentation (321-4), both economic and 
political mechanisms are at work: 
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1) Colonial super-profits make it possible to bribe 
labour ministers, 'labour representatives' 
... labour officials, workers belonging to 
the narrow craft unions, office employees, 
etc... 
2) Parliamentary democracy makes it necessary that 
'political privileges and sops' are granted, such as 
Lucrative and soft jobs in the Cabinet, in 
Parliament and on diverse committees, on 
the editorial staffs of 'substantial', 
legally published newspapers or on the 
management councils of no less substantial 
'bourgeois-serving' trade unions... 
and that there be issued 
all sort of reforms and blessings to the 
workers...fairly large-sized sops for obe-
dient workers in the form of social re-
forms (insurance, etc.)... 
Thus, labour aristocrats could apparently be 
either the working class as a whole, a section of the 
working class proper (skilled artisars), other sorts of 
wage-earners (clerks), members of certain unions, or 
trade union and other labour leaders. Furthermore, the 
concept could be used to explain conservatism both in a 
working class and of a working class. Since Lenin the 
term has repeatedly been used in these varied ways and 
for these different purposes, when discussing the 
European and American working-class or labour movements 
(Nicolaus 1970; Hobsbawm 1970; Poulantzas 1973). It 
has also been employed explicitly or implicitly in 
discussing conservatism or self-interest amongst wor-
kers at the periphery of capitalism (Harris 1970; NACLA 
1973; Breman 1976:10-12; Leitner 1977:101; Cox 1977: 
391; Malaba 1980:25-6). 
If the labour aristocracy forms a problematic top 
layer to a national or international working class, 
there is also for marxists a problematic bottom layer, 
the 'lumpenproletariat'.[2] Lumpen, in German, liter-
ally means 'rag, tatter', and the term could therefore 
be translated as 'ragged proletariat'. But a lump, in 
German, is also a 'rascal, blackguard', and transla-
tions are more often in terms of 'rascally' (Post 
1978:150) or 'loafer-proletariat' (Bukharin and Pre-
obrazhensky 1969:99). The Communist Manifesto again 
uses a popular 19th century term, speaking of the 
'dangerous class', described as 'the social scum, that 
passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers 
of old society' (Marx 1935:216). The social charac-
teristics of this category are filled in in Marx's 
Eighteenth Brumaire and Class Struggles in France. But 
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in both cases the image is solely one of the 18th 
century pre-industrial city poor 'sharply differen-
tiated from the industrial proletariat' (Marx and 
Engels 1951:142). However, in Capital, Marx treats this 
category within the context of an analysis of the 
'relative surplus population' created and required by 
the development of industrial capitalism. Here he 
identifies the lumpenproletariat much more narrowly. 
Having distinguished a pauper stratum from the floa-
ting, latent and stagnant layers above it, he distin-
guishes within the pauper stratum itself between the 
'actual lumpenproletariat' of vagabonds, criminals and 
prostitutes and three other categories of paupers (Marx 
1976:797) . 
If Marx, in Capital, made such fine distinctions 
between categories of the urban poor, none such were 
made when talking of their political behaviour. Here 
'lumpenproletariat' appears a more general category for 
those on or beyond the periphery of urban wage labour. 
The Communist Manifesto says that the dangerous class 
may, here and there, be swept into the move-
ment by a proletarian revolution; its condi-
tions of life, however, prepare it far more 
for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary 
intrigue. (Marx 1935:216). 
The Class Struggles in France speaks of it as 
at the youthful age...thoroughly malleable, 
as capable of the most heroic deeds and the 
most exalted sacrifices as of the basest 
banditry and the foulest corruption. (Marx 
and Engels 1951:216) . 
So far we have an image of a manipulable mass, avail-
able to either the proletariat or its enemies. But, in 
another communist classic, The ABC of Communism, it is 
actually given its own ideology and ideologists. A 
distinction is made between the ideology of the prole-
tariat - proletarian communism or socialism - and that 
of the lumpen proletariat - 'lumpenproletarian socia-
lism' or 'anarchism'. The Russian anarchists, it is 
said, do not 
represent the interests and aspirations of 
the working class; they represent those of 
what is termed the lumpenproletariat, the 
loafer proletariat; they represent the in-
terests of those who live in bad conditions 
under capitalism, but who are quite incapable 
of independent creative work. (Bukharin and 
Preobrazhensky 1969:122). 
The precise structure, ideology and political role 
of the urban poor has remained a problem for socialist 
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activists and theorists. Indeed, it has become a 
greater problem than it was for the classical marxists. 
This is not only because of the relatively small pro-
portion that the proletariat represents within the 
cities of the capitalist periphery. It is also because 
of its general refusal to play its required role both 
here and within the centres of world capitalist indus-
trial development. There have, thus, been repeated 
attempts to conceptualise the urban poor of peripheral 
cities in the classical marxist terms, but also to 
consider whether it's positive capacities ('heroic 
deeds and most exalted sacrifices') do not outweigh its 
generally recognised negative ones (Fanon 1967; Allen 
1970; Worsley 1972; Cohen and Michael 1973; Franklin 
1970; Post 1978). As Post, who has made an extensive 
and sensitive attempt at concrete analysis of this 
category in marxist terms, says: 
The class position of the lumpenproletariat 
has remained a problem for both marxist and 
non-marxist writers. (Post 1978:149). 
He continues: 
The whole question is made even more complex 
when we turn to the consciousness and politi-
cal action of the lumpenproletariat. There 
are passages in Marx's work, indeed, which 
seem to indicate that he thought of the cate-
gory 'lumpen'...as a potentiality for all 
classes, as when he spoke of such elements in 
the peasantry and bourgeoisie, and apparently 
linked this with a failure to act in accord 
with the expected 'true' historical role of 
one's class. (150). 
This is both revealing of the looseness of the category 
and suggestive of a mode of operation common to the 
previous one. First the 'true' role of the class is 
indentified, then behaviour which deviates from this is 
identified in terms of peripheral economic categories. 
If we can conceive of the labour aristocracy as a 
problematic layer above the 'really revolutionary' 
proletariat, and of the lumpenproletariat as a proble-
matic layer beneath it, we can possibly conceive of the 
'semi-proletarianised peasantry' as a - perhaps 
slightly less problematic - category beside it. The 
category may have been used in discussion of class 
struggle by earlier marxists, but the best-known use is 
in Lenin. Although the term is never precisely defined 
and its proportions never clearly indicated, what Lenin 
is concerned with is primarily the process of rural 
proletarianisation and the political role of those 
being proletarianised. Occasionally, however, he also 
shows awareness of the problem of the recently or 
peripherally-urbanised worker. Himself discussing 
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rural proletarianisation, he asks: 
Who works on the building of railways? Who 
is fleeced by the contractors? Who does the 
unskilled work in the towns and the ports? 
It is always the rural poor, the peasants who 
have no horses or only one each... (Lenin 
1976:46). 
Lenin also recognises another aspect of semi-prole-
tarianisation when he cites a letter from Moscow Dis-
trict comrades in 1905: 
'the overwhelming majority of our "prole-
tariat" have not yet become divorced from the 
land...A weaver employed in a mill hires a 
labourer to till his patch of land. His wife 
(if she is not working at the mill) , his 
children, and the ages and invalid members of 
the family work on this same piece of land, 
and he himself will work on it when he be-
comes old or maimed, or is discharged for 
violent or suspicious behaviour.' (123-4). 
The consciousness and political behaviour of such 
labourers is also to be found in the cited letter: 
'...such "proletarians" can hardly be called 
proletarians. Their economic status is that 
of paupers; their ideology is that of petty 
bourgeois. They are ignorant and conserva-
tive. It is from such that Black-Hundred 
elements are recruited.' (123-4). 
If Lenin here recognises the appeal of the police-
backed, monarchist and anti-semitic terrorists to these 
people, he also recognises that they could be curious 
about and sympathetic to the struggles of the workers 
(18). In terms of revolutionary strategy, moreover, he 
presents them primarily as allies of the proletariat: 
...the proletariat must accomplish the socia-
list revolution, allying to itself the mass 
of the semi-proletarian elements of the 
population so as to...paralyse the insta-
bility of the peasantry and the petty bour-
geoisie. (119-20. Original stress). 
After the 1917 Revolution, Lenin was faced by the 
reluctance of the peasantry to deliver such little 
grain as it had to cities that had nothing to give in 
return. He proposed that 'iron detachments' (245-52) 
of workers be dispatched to work with the semi-
proletarianised peasants and force the rich ones to 
disgorge hoarded grain. But here he was forced to 
recognise, at least implicitly, the problem of the 
semi-proletarianised within the very heart of the 
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working class. Appealing to the Petrograd workers to 
take part in the grain crusade, he noted that even in 
the Putilov Works - the hearth of the Revolution - only 
15,000 of the 40,000 workers were real proletarians. 
Famine and the breakdown of production had led the 
others to quit the factory. And he quoted a leader of 
the Putilov workers to the effect that 'the majority of 
them were "temporary" workers, not proletarians, an 
unreliable, flabby lot' (249). 
Since Lenin, we have become used to the growth of 
rural pauperisation, to the continual growth and exten-
sion of casual and temporary labour, to migration -
national and international, cyclical or longterm. This 
has again led to discussion of the revolutionary capa-
city of the semi-proletarianised peasantry, even if the 
term iself may be less employed and have gained less 
currency than the two previous ones (Petras 1978; 
Omvedt 1980; 1981; Sengupta 1981). 
For many contemporary marxists, 'the proletariat 
alone' remains the 'really revolutionary class'. 
Reformist, anarchist, conservative or downright re-
actionary behaviour amongst urban wage-earners is 
therefore frequently still explained in terms of the 
existence above, amongst, beside or beneath them of the 
labour aristocracy, the lumpenproletariat or the semi-
proletarianised peasantry. The suggestion here is that 
if and when labour is truly and sufficiently prole-
tarianised it will become really revolutionary. Others 
have adopted another conceptual solution. Considering 
the whole proletariat as a labour aristocracy, they 
seek revolutionary agency amongst the peasantry, the 
lumpenproletariat or the semi-proletarianised.[3] 
Let us now move to Africa in the colonial and 
post-colonial period. Here we find Frantz Fanon, a 
revolutionary activist and theorist, drawing on marxist 
categories yet abandoning all faith in the proletariat, 
metropolitan or colonial. He was the first to treat 
the whole of Africa's tiny working class as a labour 
aristocracy and to seek revolutionary agency amongst 
the peasantry and (in the cities) amongst the mass of 
lumpens and the semi-proletarianised: 
In the colonial countries the working class 
has everything to lose; in reality it repre-
sents that fraction of the colonised nation 
which is necessary and irreplaceable if the 
colonial machine is to run smoothly: it 
includes the tram conductors, taxi drivers, 
miners, dockers, interpreters, nurses and so 
on. It is these elements which constitute 
also the 'bourgeois' fraction of the colo-
nised people. (Fanon 1967:86). 
Fanon recognised the capacity of the lumpenproletariat 
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to serve as 'hired soldiers side by side with the 
colonial troops' (109), but he also argued that 
The lumpenproletariat, that horde of starving 
men, uprooted from their tribe, and from 
their clan, constitutes one of the most 
spontaneous and most radically revolutionary 
forces of a colonised people...It is within 
this mass of humanity, this people of the 
shanty towns...that the revolution will find 
its urban spearhead. (103). 
The fanonist argument was best developed by Giovanni 
Arrighi and John Saul (197 3). Their separate or joint 
formulations and reformulations of this position led to 
a controversy known as the labour aristocracy debate, 
which this study attempts to both conclude and sur-
pass. [4] But, before dealing with this debate, and 
situating my own work in relation to it, we should also 
note the continuities between the orthodox and unortho-
dox marxists here. This continuity lies not only in 
the use of marxist-leninist categories, nor only in the 
notion that labour aristocrats live 'at the expense of' 
the mass of labourers, but also in the search for one 
principle gravedigger of capitalism/imperialism (prole-
tariat? lumpens? peasantry?), and one privileged grave-
yard (industrialised metropolis? (neo-) colonised 
periphery?). There are thus broader underlying issues 
to the debate, issues to which attention will later be 
drawn and to which we must return in the Conclusion. 
2. Labour aristocrats and labour plebeians in Africa; 
an unfinished debate 
Let us consider in turn the manner in which Arrighi and 
Saul conceptualised and used the terms 'labour aristo-
cracy' and 'semi-proletarianised peasantry'.[5] They 
did not confine the first term to the regularly-
employed industrial working class. Rather did they 
consider the 'proper proletariat' (1973:141) to be part 
of a more general labour aristocracy of the salaried in 
post-colonial Africa. Behind this assertion lie three 
interlinked assumptions about the fundamental struc-
tures and processes of capitalist accumulation in 
Africa. The first is the 'primacy of the contradiction 
between international capitalism on the one hand, and 
any given African territory on the other' (Saul 1975: 
303) . Connected with this is the notion of capital 
accumulation implying primarily the extraction of 
surplus from the periphery and its concentration in the 
metropolis (with peripheral societies having their own 
métropoles and peripheries at the bottom of the extrac-
tive funnel): 
One does in fact find the productive poten-
tial of African societies...constrained by 
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the present pattern of world and domestic 
economy and society; the available surplus is 
ill utilised - drained away as the repat-
riated profits of overseas firms, or consumed 
by self-indulgent domestic elites ... On the 
domestic scene, one faces the problem of the 
relationship between 'town', the centre of 
administration and of such industrialisation 
as takes place, and 'country', an inter-
action. . .which all too often defines the 
split between unequal and unconnected spheres 
of a society falling short of genuine trans-
formation. (1973-12). 
Already implied in the above is the third element: the 
notion of fundamental dichotomies between 'traditional' 
and 'modern' sectors, peasant and industrial produc-
tion, capital- and labour-intensive industry (13-20) . 
Considering the impact of capitalism primarily at the 
level of exchange relations (surplus extraction), 
Arrighi and Saul see class formation primarily as 
functional to surplus extraction, finding a 
similarity, historically, between the struc-
tural position of the 'elites' (and 'sub-
elites') in bureaucratic employment and of 
the wage workers, both supplying their 
labour-power to service imperial exploita-
tion... (Saul 1975:304. Original stress). 
They also considered that the 'proper proletariat' 
differed from the classical European one in its 'volun-
tary proletarianisation' and 'discretionary consump-
tion' (1973:20). The fully-proletarianised worker, in 
other words, was someone who chose to cut off his rural 
ties, and who was also in a position to choose what to 
consume out of his high wages. The distinction between 
this wage-earner (incorporated into the modern indus-
trial sector, serving surplus extraction, and attached 
to the local elites) and the others depends on a dis-
tinction between the needs of labour-intensive and 
capital-intensive industry. the first requires pre-
dominantly the combination of a few skilled with a mass 
of unskilled labour. The latter requires a combination 
of high-level and semi-skilled labour. The typical 
colonial enterprise in Africa, large or small, engaged 
in primary mineral or agricultural production, relied 
on labour-intensive techniques. It therefore required 
the mass of low-paid and unskilled labour provided by 
the migrant labour system. The typical post-colonial 
enterprise in Africa, however, is the capital-intensive 
import-substituting plant producing for consumption or 
the intermediate sector. This sort of industry re-
quires semi-skilled labour which it can afford to grant 
relatively high wages, job security and modern labour 
relations. As a consequence, the 'main characteristics 
of the waged working class are: relatively static 
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numbers and rising incomes' (1973:117). This economic 
privilege is seen as leading to a 
consistency between the interests of inter-
national capitalism...the African elite, 
sub-elite and proletariat proper (i.e. ex-
cluding migrant labour) which we shall col-
lectively refer to as the 'labour aristo-
cracy' of Tropical Africa. (141. Original 
stress). 
Out of the social community thus formed flows a common 
political conservatism: 
Even though the 'labour aristocracy' may not 
be opposed to state ownership and management 
of the means of production, it can be expec-
ted to resist that reallocation of the sur-
plus on the part of the state which must be 
an essential component of the strategy for 
the transformation in the total situation of 
the societies of Tropical Africa. (142).[6] 
This conservatism is not simply a matter of attitudes. 
Many of the 
best organised and articulate African trade 
unions have been, historically, those repre-
senting civil servants - the 'bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie' on the rise, as it were (1975: 
309, f.n.7). 
Not surprisingly, 
trade unions have come to encapsulate (quite) 
precisely the bargaining concerns of these 
strata in their most narrowly 'consump-
tionist' definition. The 'more-privileged* 
and better organised workers have been en-
couraged to identify upwards - to become 
partners (albeit the most junior of partners) 
in the jostling for surpluses among the 
internationally and domestically powerful... 
rather than to identify downwards with the 
even more 'wretched of the earth', the urban 
marginals and the average inhabitant of the 
untransformed rural areas. (1975:305. Ori-
ginal stress). 
So much for the labour aristocracy. But behind any use 
of a labour aristocracy thesis is the suggestion that 
there exists somewhere - nationally or inter-
nationally - a majority of 'labour plebeians' who are at 
least potentially revolutionary and who are being held 
back from fulfilling the historical proletarian role by 
the conservatism of the aristocratic minority. 
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This other face of the thesis is made explicit by 
Arrighi and Saul with the concept of the 'semi-prole-
tarianised peasantry' (1973:118). Having distinguished 
between the typical colonial and post-colonial enter-
prise, they note that unskilled, low-paid, migrant 
labour is to be found also within the labour-intensive 
operations subcontracted to local businessmen by the 
large-scale post-colonial enterprise (Arrighi and Saul 
1973:128). Labourers in the latter sector are said to 
earn only a fraction of those in the former, and to be 
in a separate and non-competing labour market. Given 
the inability of the casual labourers to become fully 
proletarianised, it is felt reasonable to consider them 
as a part of the peasantry that participates in the 
wage economy through migration (69) . Arrighi and Saul 
consider the role of the semi-proletarianised within 
the capitalist mode of production to give them a more 
rebellious attitude than the peasantry in general, even 
if such rebellion is liable to manipulation or collapse 
(82). They recognise, however, that precisely the lack 
of employment stability militates against the capacity 
to organise and protest (124). On the other hand they 
declare that such radical union action as has occurred 
in independent Tropical Africa 'may also reflect' the 
presence within the unions of the semi-proletarianised 
'who retain strong links with the peasantry...and... 
interests antagonistic to the present order' (81). It 
is suggested that the contradiction between the in-
terests of the aristocrats and the plebians within the 
unions has been occasionally overcome by certain labour 
leaders, who have been 'articulating the most aggres-
sively radical philosophies on the continent'. And it 
is suggested that insofar as this occurs it may be due 
to such leaders' relative independence from the upper 
stratum of the working class and identification with 
the interests of the semi-proletarians (81). 
The first response to Arrighi and Saul was in 
terms of an empirical refutation. Initially this 
refutation was addressed to the assertion that proper 
proletarians were labour aristocrats - i.e. rich, 
conservative, identified with international capital and 
national elites, opposed in attitude or behaviour to 
the rest of the poor. A new generation of radical and 
socialist researchers (Allen 1972; Hinchliffe 1974; 
Peace 1975; Jeffries 1975) produced convincing evidence 
to undermine the economic, social and political argu-
ments of the labour aristocracy theorists. Much of the 
evidence are summarised in Waterman (1975:64-7): the 
urban-rural labour income gap are not widening; bene-
fits to workers spilled over to urban petty-commodity 
producers/traders; values were shared between both 
urban sectors; unionised workers had been the most 
effective critics of elite wealth, corruption and 
authoritarianism. The evidence was largely accepted by 
John Saul (1975), leading him to considerably qualify 
(though not to abandon) his position. On the basis of 
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the new evidence there was created a new image of the 
African workers and their unions. The workers were now 
seen as emerging from the urban and rural poor, sharing 
both egalitarian and entrepreneurial values with them, 
and yet being able to play a leadership role amongst 
them precisely because of their position within capi-
talist industrial production. The unions were now seen 
as complex and multi-levelled organisations, playing an 
ambiguous role between the workers on the one hand and 
the employers and state on the other. 
Whilst this group of researchers based themselves 
primarily on data concerning proper proletarians, 
Sandbrook and Arn (1977) explicitly addressed them-
selves to relations between these and the rest of the 
urban poor. Operating with a three-level index of 
political orientation - acquiescent, populist and 
class-conscious - they surveyed two popular urban 
settlements in Southern Ghana. In the course of a 
debate around their work, their findings were thus 
summarised: 
Nearly three-fifths of the employed workers 
in the sample expressed views which could be 
characterised as demonstrating either a 
populist or a class orientation. Those with a 
populist orientation were twice as numerous 
as those with a class orientation, as defined 
by the authors. The labour-aristocracy 
thesis was not supported by the interview 
data, since skilled workers were, on the 
whole, more likely than others to have a 
class orientation, and thereby constituted a 
politically conscious section of the emerging 
working class. Marx's European-based hypo-
thesis that class consciousness increases 
with the scale of social production was 
supported, in that both skilled and unskilled 
workers in largescale industrial enterprises 
were more likely to have developed a class 
orientation than workers in small enterprises 
in the informal sector. Furthermore, the 
'labouring poor' of all strata were more 
likely to develop a class orientation in a 
neighbourhood...comprised primarily of wor-
kers in large-scale enterprises, than in a 
neighbourhood...with a large proportion of 
petty traders, businessmen, white-collar 
workers and informal sector workers. In 
general, Muslim skilled and unskilled workers 
were less likely to voice a populist or class 
orientation than their non-Muslim counter-
parts. Finally, populist and class orienta-
tions tended to be more common among skilled 
and unskilled workers with more formal educa-
tion. (Jorgensen 1977:113. Original stress). 
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This was in effect an empirical critique of the other 
half of the labour aristocracy thesis - that the semi-
proletarianised peasantry are more radical than the 
proper proletariat. Sandbrook and Arn generalised from 
their findings to attack the simplistic notion behind 
the labour aristocracy thesis, that one could read off 
political attitudes from positions in an incomes heir-
archy. 
Although the empirical criticism demonstrated that 
the industrial proletariat as a whole was not a labour 
aristocracy, no case was made concerning other wage-
earners, or unionists, or the conceptualisation of the 
problem. It was therefore still possible to explain the 
conservatism of the unionised workers in terms of 
aristocratic or privileged strata amongst the workers 
- clerks, state-sector employees, professional leaders 
(Woddis 1972:123; Allen 1972:76; Williams 1974; Peace 
1975) . It is thus necessary to consider the value of 
the crucial concepts in the debate, such as labour 
aristocracy, semi-proletarianised peasantry and con-
servatism. 
One criticism of the labour aristocracy concept is 
in terms of its ambiguous referents: 
As in the classical marxist writings, parti-
cipants in the debate have referred variously 
to 1) the regularly-employed industrial 
working class as a whole, 2) a stratum of 
skilled and better-paid manual workers, 3) 
clerks and other salary-earners, whose pro-
letarian status is problematic, and 4) paid 
trade union officials, who cannot be con-
sidered as proletarian even if (as rare in 
Africa) they are drawn from the proletariat. 
(Waterman 1975:70-71). 
On the basis of evidence from Britain, Hungary and 
Germany, Rosenberg (1976:11-12) demonstrates that it 
was frequently the most privileged workers who were the 
most radical. It is therefore reasonable to argue that 
the notion of the labour aristocracy is 
as useless analytically as it is striking 
metaphorically. It is useless analytically 
because it does not tell us the conditions 
that are necessary for certain attitudes or 
behaviour to exist. (Waterman 1976:183) . 
Criticism can also be made of the concept of the 
semi-proletarianised peasantry. Arrighi and Saul 
construct a category that includes two rather different 
types of unskilled labourer in two different periods 
(the cyclical migrant of the colonial period and the 
longterm urban casual labourer of the post-colonial 
one) . It also excludes the regularly employed and 
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unionised, although even 'this stable work force re-
mains only partially proletarianised' (Sandbrook 1981: 
2) , retaining extensive and crucial economic and cul-
tural ties with the villages. There would also seem to 
be a contradiction between the asserted incapacity to 
organise and the capacity to develop movements of 'real 
menace'. Arrighi and Saul attempt to resolve this 
contradiction by suggesting that 1) union militancy is 
due to the presence of the semi-proletarianised within 
the unions, and 2) aggressively radical labour leader-
ship comes from leaders who have separated themselves 
from the upper strata and identified themselves with 
the semi-proletarians. Apart from the speculative 
nature of this argument, no reason is given for why the 
relative ideological independence of labour leaders 
should lead them to identify with the semi-proletarians 
rather than with the labour aristocrats. In sum, this 
concept appears to be a logical category produced by 
negation, rather than a sociological one drawn from 
research and analysis. 
In re-asserting the leading role of the industrial 
working class in social protest in tropical Africa, 
critics of the labour aristocracy thesis had recognised 
different kinds of radicalism. They had seen working-
class radicalism as being of a 'populist' rather than a 
'revolutionary' type (Jeffries 1975; Peace 1975; Sand-
brook and Arn 1977). This was in itself subversive of 
simple oppositions and correlations such as those 
between the labour aristocracy (conservative or self-
interested) and the semi-proletarianised (radical or 
rebelious). The concept of conservatism, however, had 
been considered unproblematic in the debate, the ques-
tion rather being one of who was conservative. Yet, if 
one considers as conservative all ideas conservative of 
the existing social order in Africa (Waterman 1976: 
160) , then one would have to include not only the 
reformist idea of incremental change (which is what the 
labour aristocracy theorists were identifying) but also 
'traditional' deference and clientalism, and the 
liberal idea of competitive individualism. These have 
different sources in popular experience, have different 
implications for mass expectations, and are differen-
tially distributed amongst the urban labouring people. 
Insofar as this is so, any simple correlation between 
privilege (or deprivai) and conservatism begs more 
questions than its answers. 
The identification of numerous conceptual short-
comings leads to the question of whether there are not 
methodological ones underlying these. Two of these 
were partially recognised by Saul in his initial reply 
to the critics. The first was the manner in which 
'despite its utility for many purposes' the concept of 
labour aristocracy could - like others - 'freeze a 
reality which is in flux' (Saul 1975:305). The second 
was the tendency to dichotomise, 
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rather than to merely emphasise the placing 
of all workers - whatever the differences 
between them - on a continuum between urban 
and rural settings and identifications. (310, 
f.n.13) . 
We may extend and develop such criticism (as has 
Jeffries 1978:171-2, on the basis of a Ghanaian case 
study). Firstly, the simple division and opposition of 
any social process or structure would seem foreign to a 
dialectical approach to history and society. The 
particular process that Arrighi and Saul had taken upon 
themselves to so split was that of proletarianisation. 
The particular structure they had chosen to similarly 
split was that of the working class. The presentation 
of any social structure or process in terms of binary 
opposition discourages consideration of mutual inter-
relation and of the internal composition of each part. 
With respect to proletarianisation and the working 
class (or the labouring people more generally) such 
dichotomising would seem to better express what capital 
accumulation and state formation implies for labour, 
than how such labour experiences this and attempts to 
resist or overcome it. A critical social science 
(particularly a socialist one) would seem rather to 
need an approach that both expresses such labour ex-
periences and facilitates such labour struggles. 
Secondly, there is, underlying the concept of a 
labour aristocracy, an economic determination of con-
sciousness. This is implied in the Sandbrook-Arn 
criticism. They criticise the crude correlation bet-
ween higher income and greater conservatism. And they 
offer instead a correlation between proletarianisation 
(employment and residential) and radicalisation. This 
is, indeed, close to Marx's 'European-based hypothesis' 
and considerably more sophisticated than an income 
determinism. But it would seem to me to be a broader 
type of economic determinism that could be called class 
reductionist (i.e. reducing all contradictions in 
capitalist society to the worker-capitalist one). As 
suggested at the beginning of this chapter, Marx's 
European-based hypothesis has not been substantiated 
even in Europe. Rather than a re-assertion of Marx 
against Arrighi and Saul, it would seem to me that we 
need to recognise shortcomings common to both, and to 
surpass these. If proletarian radicalism in Africa can 
be restricted to 'militant economism' (Sandbrook 1975), 
and if popular conservatism is as ambiguous as I have 
above suggested, then any direct correlations between 
proletarianisation and radicalisation (or conservatism) 
are likely to be inadequate. If we can free ourselves 
of economic determinism, then we might also be free to 
investigate consciousness and behaviour within the 
working class, or among labouring people generally, in 
terms of its specificity rather than an assumed or 
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asserted superiority. 
Just as these two points interconnect with each 
other, so do they with the following ones. It has 
already been suggested that the identification of a 
labour aristocracy and semi-proletarianised peasantry, 
and their placing in a binary opposition, is more a 
matter of assertion and speculation than of direct 
observation and analysis of the identified categories. 
This conceptualisation, in other words, is dependent on 
or required by some more general theory or model. This 
underlying model is, of course, that of dependency 
theory (Frank 1969), which sees capitalism primarily in 
terms of market relationships and its international 
development in terms of the core's extraction of sur-
plus from the periphery. The key premises of this 
model are made explicit by Arrighi and Saul and have 
been set out at the beginning of this section. Such a 
model tends to reduce all relations and contradictions 
to functions of the surplus extraction process, and to 
see nations and classes as hierarchically arranged on 
the ladder between the poorest and the richest. As 
Peace (1975:283) says of the Arrighi-Saul model, ex-
ploitation occurs between the peasant mode and the 
capitalist mode of production rather than within the 
capitalist one. And, as Rosenberg (1976:34) points 
out, such a model tends to emphasise 'relations of 
distribution and wage forms over the relations of 
production'. It is, thus, excessive surplus consump-
tion rather than exploitative class relations that are 
the obstacle to increased production, the 'discretio-
nary consumption' (Arrighi and Saul 1973:20) of the 
labour aristocrats that brings them into conflict with 
the semi-proletarianised (Touray 1978) . Once again, it 
is evident that labour aristocracy theory has a signi-
ficance for social theory and socialist policies that 
goes beyond the immediate implications. If we do not 
recognise the methodological roots of the error then we 
will run the risk of reproducing it in new ways.[7] 
One last area of criticism of the labour aristo-
cracy theory before stating why it is nonetheless to be 
taken seriously. This is for its political implica-
tions. If the working class is conservative or self-
interested, and the semi-proletarianised rebellious but 
unreliable, who is to initiate and guide change in a 
socialist direction? The answer seems to be progres-
sive bureaucrats (reallocating the surplus from urban 
worker consumption to rural peasant production), 'revo-
lutionary intellectuals'[8] (raising protest to the 
level of significantly revolutionary praxis), the 
progressive tendency within the petty-bourgeoisie (more 
radical than the workers and capable of mobilising them 
for socialism), and ideologically independent union 
leaders (capable of expressing the most radical philo-
sophies on the continent) . In class terms, this would 
seem to imply that the leading role in the building of 
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socialism is largely assigned to one or other fraction 
of the intermediate salaried strata: to the leading 
personnel of the state or to some kind of socialist 
intelligentsia or vanguard. Such a privileging of the 
progressive state and an intellectual vanguard in 
socialist struggle in Africa is a position Arrighi and 
Saul share with the 'proletarian messianists' they set 
out to criticise. [9] It also echoes the position of 
such convinced anti-socialist and elite theorists as 
Clark Kerr (Kerr et.al. 1973) who believed that the 
leading role in industrialisation would inevitably be 
played by such modernising elites as state bureaucrats 
or revolutionary intellectuals. To say this is not 
merely to assert an affinity but to identify a certain 
tradition amongst theorists of 'development' that cuts 
through distinctions between liberals and socialists, 
marxists and non-marxists (Gould 1979). This is not 
simply a theoretical affinity either. The argument of 
an opposition of interests between urban wage-earners 
and the peasantry was first articulated by colonial 
administrators (Peace 1975:282; Rosenberg 1976:10). 
And such arguments were being put forward forcefully by 
both conservative politicians and their intellectual 
supporters shortly after Independence in Africa 
(Waterman 1975:61-2). The most direct political con-
nection, however, is between the position of Arrighi 
and Saul on the one hand and the Tanzanian state 
(Bienefeld 1975:245,250) and its consultants (Rosenberg 
1976:12-14) on the other. Although not numbered 
amongst these, Arrighi and Saul both worked in and on 
Tanzania and believed in the progressive role of its 
state and intellectuals. Saul continued to do so even 
after the first major worker movement against the 
Tanzanian state in the early 1970s. Thus, even in 
extensively qualifying his labour aristocracy theory, 
Saul still argues that 
In Tanzania, struggle within the petty bour-
geoisie and the attempt by the more progres-
sive tendency within that stratum to (among 
other things) mobilise the workers and maxi-
mise the likelihood of their making a posi-
tive contribution to the country's move 
towards socialism has been, if anything, even 
more important than any pressure for radical 
solutions arising from the working class 
itself. (Saul 1975:307. Original stress). 
In sum, there would seem to be a danger inherent in 
African labour aristocracy theory of encouraging 
bureaucrats and intellectuals to impose their develop-
ment strategies or political perceptions on those most 
capable of resisting (the workers) , in the name of 
those least capable of doing so (the semi-proletari-
anised and the peasantry).[8] If this would seem to be 
a severe commentary on this pair of socialist writers, 
then consider Brenner's conclusion on the dependency 
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school more generally. He argues that the consequence 
of the theory is to support political conclusions that 
its authors would certainly oppose: 
So long as incorporation into the world 
market/world division of labour is seen 
automatically to breed underdevelopment, the 
logical antidote to capitalist underdevelop-
ment is not socialism, but autarchy. So long 
as capitalism develops merely through squeez-
ing dry the 'third world', the primary oppo-
nents must be core versus periphery, the 
cities versus the countryside - not the 
international proletariat, in alliance with 
the oppressed people of all countries, versus 
the bourgeoisie. In fact, the danger here is 
double-edged: on the one hand, a new opening 
to the 'national bourgeoisie'; on the other 
hand, a false strategy for anti-capitalist 
revolution. (Brenner 1977:91). 
So if the African labour aristocracy thesis is so 
full of errors and dangers, why is it worth treating 
seriously at all? Firstly, because it is, in both its 
African and classical formulations, an attempt to come 
to theoretical and political terms with a fundamental 
problem. The problem is that of 'uneven proletarian 
consciousness and industrial sectionalism' (New Left 
Review 1973:38-9) - that proletarianisation is a matter 
of both unification and division of the wage employed, 
both gain in and loss of mass capacity for social 
control. The thesis therefore requires an empirical 
investigation of such phenomena - preferably carried 
out in more adequate terms and in a non-polemical 
spirit. Secondly, the African thesis addresses itself 
directly to the trade unions, and to the role within 
them of the differentially proletarianised. As Pou-
lantzas has pointed out (1973:36), if we want to under-
stand differential consciousness and behaviour amongst 
workers, then we will need to consider not only posi-
tion within the division of labour but also 'positions 
within the division of labour that exists inside the 
working-class movement' itself. Thirdly, the thesis 
addresses itself not only to the industrial prole-
tariat, but raises questions concerning the role of 
those non-industrial wage-earners who form the over-
whelming majority of the working class in Africa. 
These issues have not so far been adequately dealt with 
in African labour studies. And criticism of the labour 
aristocracy thesis has tended to negate it, rather than 
to surpass it. Such a surpassing would seem to require 
1) recognition of the problem that the thesis attempts 
to handle, 2) the development of a more adequate con-
ceptualisation, 3) analysis of relevant evidence in the 
new terms, and 4) the indication, explicit or implicit, 
of alternative implications. 
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All this, moreover, would seem to be in a spirit 
suggested by Arrighi and Saul themselves. Thus, in 
their 197 3 work, they stress that their essays are 
intended to provoke 'constructive criticism from con­
cerned radicals' (8), and even in employing the concept 
of labour aristocracy, they say they would welcome 
another and recognise the necessity for a 'clearer 
conceptualisation of the African class structure' (98, 
f .η.69) . In his 1975 re-consideration, Saul not only 
recognises the shortcomings of the concept of labour 
aristocracy, but urges the necessity for 'concepts 
which illuminate processes without denaturing them' 
(308) . Agreeing that the role of the working class is 
far from frozen by history or determined by any inter­
nal logic of the current African socio-economic struc­
ture, he calls for concrete analysis of the economic, 
political, organisational and ideological conditions 
for the development of radicalism in the proletariat, 
and its alliance with other progressive elements. 
Finally, he suggests the necessity for a 'downward 
identification' of the securely employed and unionised 
workers 'not only with peasants, but with other, less 
stabilised, members of the urban work force' (310, 
f.n.13) - and the necessity to develop a conceptuali­
sation adequate for the analysis of class solidarity or 
its absence. It is to such a purpose and in such a 
spirit that this work is undertaken. 
3. The case considered 
The present study attempts, thus, to come to more 
adequate terms with the very real problem underlying 
the labour aristocracy myth. The case considered is 
that of the Lagos cargo-handling industry in the 1970s. 
Here one could find, side by side, both the 'labour 
aristocrats' regularly employed by the Nigerian Ports 
Authority (NPA), and the 'semi-proletarianised pea­
sants' employed casually by the local dock labour 
contractors. The NPA (or port) workers were for the 
most part at least primary-educated, trained, per­
manently-employed, urbanised, unionised, and carrying 
out the clerical, administrative and technical tasks 
required to provide the industrial infrastructure, 
maintenance and accounting. The contract (or dock) 
workers were for a large part uneducated or illiterate, 
untrained, casually-employed, semi-urbanised, barely-
unionised, and carrying out the unskilled manual labour 
of loading and unloading from ships, lighters, stacks, 
sheds, trucks and railway wagons. Not only were the 
two categories represented within the one industry and 
on the one site, but their behaviour appeared to con­
firm the 'labour aristocracy' thesis. The NPA workers 
had been increasingly organised in unions espousing 
liberal industrial relations ideology, affiliated to 
the right-wing national union centre, and through this 
to reformist Western unions, the International Labour 
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Organisation (ILO) and the multinationals. [10] The 
contract labourers had increasingly come to be led by 
radical activists of the left-wing union centre, itself 
affiliated to the international communist movement. 
The study will attempt to go beneath such first appear-
ances, and also to consider the other significant 
divisions amongst the workers. 
It should be made clear what the study does and 
does not cover. It is concentrated on worker organi-
sation and collective protest action. It will be seen 
that this provides more than enough material for re-
flection on the division/unity dialectic. It is also 
limited to an eight to ten year period, mostly in the 
1970s. An earlier publication covers the period from 
the 1940s to the late-1960s (Waterman 1982). This 
means that the present work falls entirely within the 
period of military rule in Nigeria and of increasing 
state intervention in labour relations and trade union 
affairs. This situation, however, brought out features 
of worker and union behaviour that had been concealed 
during the previous liberal period. The concentration 
on worker organisation and action implies that little 
attention can be given to the precise manner in which 
the Nigerian state and local capitalists attempted to 
organise, divide and control labour in the Lagos Port 
(this is dealt with in detail in Waterman 1979h: Chs. 
1-3). However, this essential background is presented 
in summary in Part I of this work. 
Although primarily concerned with a general theo-
retical problem for marxist theory and a general stra-
tegy problem for the socialist and labour movement, 
this study is also meant to make a contribution to 
Nigerian labour studies in particular. It is thus 
necessary to place it in relation to such studies. 
4. Nigerian labour studies 
Most writing on labour in Nigeria has been liberal in 
ideology, positivist in methodology and managerial in 
purpose or effect. Most of it focuses on industrial 
relations, collective bargaining, labour law and per-
sonnel management, rather than on workers, unions or 
strikes. The classical industrial relations study is 
that of Yesufu (1962), bearing all the predictable 
marks of a British colonial training. It is based on 
the assumption that British industrial relations are 
mature or developed, and that Nigeria is adopting or 
should adopt that model. There is an inevitable con-
centration on the formal framework of bargaining at the 
expense of the patterns of ownership, the nature of 
wage labour, the character of the workers. It is, 
nonetheless, an original piece of scholarship. Its 
neo-colonial descendants are frequently written without 
concrete Nigerian data (apart from the legal) and where 
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they do have this it is commonly dependent on other 
writers (Ubeku 1975, Offiong 1973, Damachi 1973, Udofia 
1976, Fashoyin 1977a). This suggests the under-
development of academic studies on labour and labour 
relations in Nigeria. Such original writing as there 
is is usually based on large modern foreign or public 
enterprise, and is by non-academics - or non-Nigerians. 
The only Nigerian book to concentrate on labour rela-
tions in local capitalist enterprise is written by a 
Nigerian capitalist (Onyemelukwe 1973) . The only one 
to deal with these within multinationals (banking) is 
by an officer of an employers* federation (Etukudo 
1971) . The single most important liberal study on 
labour relations in Nigeria since Yesufu is by an 
American scholar (Kilby 1969) and is but one chapter in 
a general study of industrialisation. Whilst this 
criticised the optimistic illusions of its predecessor, 
it was united with it in its search for a means to 
control labour - for a proper role for workers and 
unions within the existing system. Another item on 
labour in local captialist industry is again by an 
American and is just a part chapter in a work the 
intention of which is to help 'develop indigenous 
entrepreneurship in Nigeria' (Nafziger 1977:251). 
There is but one recent glimmer of light from liberal 
scholars of Nigerian labour relations: the textbook of 
Tayo Fashoyin (1980) . Dependent for much of its his-
torical material and its norms on the traditional 
sources, this is a competently-written synopsis, which 
additionally provides useful charts and diagrams, and 
which makes use of newspaper and magazine coverage of 
strikes and other developments in the mid- and late-
1970s. There can be little doubt that the under-
developed condition of Nigerian labour relations stu-
dies reflects on the level of Nigerian labour protest. 
So far it has been possible for capital and state to 
control labour through ideological persuasion, labour 
legislation, collective bargaining institutions and the 
techniques of personnel management. Even basic infor-
mation on working-class conditions, attitudes and 
behaviour has not been needed. 
The major original works on trade unions are those 
of Ananaba (1969), Cohen (1974), Smock (1969), Melson 
(1967), and Smyke and Storer (1974) . It is remarkable 
that so few books should have appeared on what must be 
the largest permanent working class in tropical Africa. 
The explanation above holds here also. As to the 
orientation of these works, those of Ananaba, Smock and 
Melson, and Smyke and Storer, are marked by the 
liberal-positivist syndrome. The works of Smock and 
Melson are traditional US theses, in which the labour 
movement is simply used as case study material to make 
some point or test some hypothesis about 'conflict and 
control' (Smock) or 'ideology' (Melson). Both are 
limited theoretically by their acceptance of an exist-
ing system as their point of reference. Yet both carry 
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out original empirical research, either amongst mine-
workers (Smock) or national labour leaders (Melson), 
and thus yield reinterpretable data. 
The books of Smyke and Storer and Ananaba are 
trade union histories written by union officials. The 
first falls into the category of 'official history', 
being an account of the Nigerian Union of Teachers 
inspired by no critical vision whatsoever and evidently 
motivated by American trade union paternalism. Al-
though also written by an international union officer, 
the second is informed by the author's experience as a 
Nigerian union leader. Whilst he accepts uncritically 
all the norms and values of liberal industrial rela-
tions theory, Ananaba retains some sense of labour not 
simply as a 'factor of production' or an 'interest', 
but as a movement. 
The work of Cohen provides us with the only book 
that distances itself from traditional industrial 
relations analysis, from identification with the exis-
ting system in Nigeria, from identification of that 
system as simply 'developing' or 'underdeveloped'. He 
specifically rejects the 'crude notion of the state as 
neutral referee and arbiter' (Cohen 1974:263), and 
places labour within a political-economic totality 
defined as 'neo-colonial' or 'dependent capitalist' 
(41, 46). Cohen's generally socialist position, his 
sympathy for the workers and antipathy for successive 
ruling elites, did not (at this time) lead him to break 
sharply with liberal theory, nor to attempt a systema-
tically marxist approach. Placing itself between 
conventional liberal approaches and a marxist one, 
Cohen's work was one of the contributions to a distinc-
tive 'radical' or 'socialist' school of labour studies 
on the peripheral capitalist societies (PCSs) that is 
still flourishing today.[11] 
Only a small number of writers on labour and 
capital in Nigeria have attempted to employ more syste-
matically the concepts of 'social relations of produc-
tion', 'social formation', 'class', 'exploitation', 
'oppression', and others familiar from the vocabulary 
of even popularised marxism. The best is the now 
classical booklet of Eskor Toyo (1967). A bitter and 
accurate political critique of the competing union 
leaderships, inspired by a familiarity with marxist 
writing, Toyo's work nonetheless fails to consider the 
socio-economic limitations on the capacity of the 
working class to 
destroy the Balewa regime or anything like it 
and erect on its ruins a government favour-
able to the people, a government on which the 
people have real control (112) . 
The first attempt at a Nigerian marxist book on the 
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economy (Oni and Onimode 1975) is also limited by its 
primarily polemical-programmatic character, its assump-
tion that a 'socialist alternative' is feasible in 
contemporary Nigeria, and its concentration on pro-
ducing an economic programme for a 'socialist' govern-
ment. It contains little analysis of the structure and 
dynamic of capitalist development in Nigeria, of capi-
talisation and proletarianisation in industry, of 
peasantisation and de-peasantisation in agriculture, of 
urban petty-capitalism. Seeing the fundamental contra-
diction as lying between the Nigerian nation and im-
perial core, concentrating on a moralistic critique of 
local capitalism, offering a programmatic alternative 
to neo-colonialism, the work remains ideologically 
radical-nationalist (despite its marxist terminology), 
and likely to serve better for a state-capitalist 
alternative than a socialist one. Regrettably, we thus 
still lack even an introductory study of the modes of 
production, distribution and exchange in Nigeria. 
Nonetheless, a start has been made (again by non-
Nigerians) to sketching out the class structure and 
political relationships of Nigeria as a social forma-
tion. But in the absence of the necessary analysis of 
economic relationships such an exercise is bound to be 
more suggestive than definitive (see Williams 1976; 
Williams and Turner 1978; Williams 1980; Beekman 
1981a,b). 
As for studies of workers themselves, the only 
Nigerian to have contributed more than an occasional 
paper is Olatunde Oloko (1971, 1972, 1973). But in his 
case the role of social researcher as a servant of 
national or international management is made quite 
explicit: 
In 1973, the present writer at the request of 
a major manufacturing concern in the Western 
State, carried out an extensive socio-psycho-
logical survey of the factors which affect 
the extent to which its employees discharge 
their role obligations in ways that would 
enhance the effectiveness of the company. 
(Oloko 1977:61) 
There exist, however, a number of case studies (once 
more by non-Nigerians) of workers and industrial pro-
test, using marxist concepts or within a marxist 'uni-
verse of discourse'. These are the studies by Adrian 
Peace (1974, 1975, 1979) of industrial workers in the 
large foreign factories on the Ikeja estate, Lagos, by 
Dorothy Remy Weeks (Weeks 1975; Remy 1975, 1976) of 
workers in a large foreign-owned factory in the nor-
thern city of Zaria and the wives of these workers, by 
Paul Lübeck (1975a,b, 1979, 1981) on workers in the 
locally-owned and labour-intensive factories in the old 
Northern trading city of Kano. All are concerned with 
the relationships between the waged and low-skilled 
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factory workers on the one hand and the other classes 
or strata with which they are in daily intercourse. We 
thus obtain study of the following crucial relation-
ships: 1) worker to peasant (Lübeck, Remy), 2) worker 
to urban petty-bourgeois (all three) , 3) male worker to 
female (Remy), 4) low-skilled worker to higher-skilled 
(all three), 5) worker to supervisor/manager/employer 
(all three), 6) worker to paid or unpaid union officer 
(all three). Whilst the last two relationships have 
been the customary stuff of labour studies in Nigeria, 
attention to the first three has implied a radical 
breakthrough. The studies will be described at greater 
length in Chapter 1 of this work. Here I would like to 
deal critically with their findings, theoretical 
approaches and ideological-political implications. 
First a note on the significant findings. We see the 
workers as emerging from a non-class-conscious peasan-
try (except in the Kano case, in which rural class 
stratification and consciousness does exist). We see 
that even in the Ikeja case, working-class conscious-
ness and action is limited by the literally petty-
bourgeois aspirations of the workers. We see a male-
female split in which the customary capitalist family 
split between waged and unwaged labour is reinforced by 
the split into worker and petty-bourgeois employment. 
We see a split between the low-skilled and higher-
skilled worker. We see multiple splits between wor-
kers/unpaid leaders/paid leaders. 
What are the shortcomings of these studies? 
Firstly, they are limited by the very fact that they 
are on factory workers! The seedbed of the Nigerian 
working class has been less the factory than the rail-
ways, ports, public works yards, shops and offices 
(Peace 1979:86,111,172). These studies therefore leave 
out at least one half of the Nigerian working class, 
that half being also the most experienced part with the 
longest-lived and best-structured national trade 
unions. 
A second shortcoming follows from this: that the 
relationship between workers in different sectors of 
wage employment is missing. Without this element, any 
generalisations that might have been attempted about 
class formation or class consciousness amongst Nigerian 
workers must inevitably be limited or misleading. 
A third shortcoming of these studies is that 
whilst we see the emergence of a specifically worker 
consciousness and action despite all the divisions, we 
are also shown the labour movement (at either enter-
prise, locality or national level) as incorporated into 
the exploiting and oppressing order in Nigeria.[12] 
Only Lübeck seems to have a positive orientation toward 
professional trade unionists. The negative assessment 
of the labour movement can be partly explained as due 
to the short timespan and limited locale of these 
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studies. The role of a national trade union movement 
in laying a basis for the existence of local unions, in 
preparing the ground for wage demands, and in ensuring 
continued worker organisation after strike waves, all 
this is inevitably excluded. It can also be partly 
explained as due to the failure to fully settle 
accounts with the 'labour aristocracy' thesis. It 
seems to me to be one of the characteristics of a 
consistent marxist approach to the working class that 
it should - implicitly or explicitly - equip it to 
release the possibilities that analysis has uncovered. 
Evidently, even this most radical group of studies 
still had some distance to travel in this respect. 
Back to my own work, a work stimulated by that of 
the trio, and intended to go further along the path 
that they have opened. Evidently it is meant to com-
plement the work of the three insofar as it adds analy-
sis of a virtually unstudied sector of the working 
class - that within state enterprises. It also adds 
analysis of workers within solely local capitalist 
employ (the Kano enterprises were of mixed ownership). 
Further, the study of the relationship between workers 
in different ownership sectors should be suggestive in 
understanding the process of working-class formation in 
Nigeria. Finally, there is the attempt to trace out 
the mutually-determining relations between workers and 
leaders. 
5. Analytical categories and fundamental approach 
It will by now be evident that this work not only 
places itself within the framework of a socialist 
debate but also within a more specifically marxist 
universe of discourse. It does so at the level of 
analysis rather than of general theory. Whilst some of 
the concepts used may be my own, the work makes no 
claim to theoretical originality. I have attempted, 
rather, to draw selectively and critically from the 
writings of such contemporary marxists (and other 
radical scholars) as have themselves tried to come to 
terms with divisions within classes, divisions within 
the labour movement, and the specificities of peri-
pheral capitalist formations. Beginning with an as-
sumption that 'European' marxism would be irrelevant or 
inadequate, I repeatedly found theory and analysis of 
European - and American - phenomena enlightening for 
analysis of the Nigerian. Beginning, again, with an 
assumption that I could draw my approach and categories 
from the structuralist marxists (such as Poulantzas and 
his followers), I increasingly felt that this obscured 
the ambiguity, double-faced - dialectical - nature of 
phenomena that I wanted to stress. I have added to the 
Euro/American-based theories and concepts. I have 
retained certain structuralist formulations. Such 
theory will be introduced in the introductory chapters 
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to Parts II, III and IV as it becomes relevant. Since 
drawing from diverse sources implies a danger of eclec-
ticism, I would like to set out here the initial as-
sumptions underlying this work. 
Capitalism is a social system based on the private 
ownership of the means of production. The capitalist 
class exploits a class of workers who - deprived of 
other means of production - are forced to sell their 
labour power. This is the source of profit, the stimu-
lus to and purpose of capitalist production. Capita-
lism implies the increasing organisation and division 
of labour, nationally and internationally. The arche-
typal capitalist productive unit is the factory. The 
archetypal capitalist labourer is the factory prole-
tarian. The proletarian-capitalist conflict is the 
archetypal form of class struggle under capitalism. 
With the development from individual capitalist to 
social capital, the concept of capitalism must shift 
from production (the factory) to reproduction (the 
total society). We need to recognise that education, 
the family, culture and science are internal to capital 
accumulation, and that struggles within and around them 
are also anti-capitalist struggles. Recognising the 
increasing incorporation of peasant and urban petty-
production within capitalist accumulation internatio-
nally, means recognising struggles against this as 
anti-capitalist also. 
The state must be understood historically as both 
outcome and source of socio-economic differentiation 
and hierarchy, providing both the coordination and 
coercion necessary for the general reproduction of 
class-divided societies. The specificity of the state 
in capitalist society is its formal separation from the 
economy. Separation is an ideological requirement, 
presenting an appearance of neutrality and common 
interest within a competitive and class-divided 
society. It is, however, a political requirement of 
capitalist development that the state intervene into 
ever more spheres of social life. This is to ensure 
the coordination, hierarchy and subordination that the 
market itself cannot. Thus we get state intervention 
not only in education, the family, etc., but also in 
production and in worker-capitalist relations them-
selves. Increasing sections of labouring people find 
themselves confronted in increasing areas of everyday 
life by the state, either as direct guarantor of capi-
talist reproduction or (as in communist states) a 
guarantor of coercion, inequality and hierarchy - which 
also mediates between them and international capita-
lism. 
Socialist struggle is struggle against both capi-
tal and state, both competition and hierarchy. The 
bearer of this struggle is the working class, the 
crucially exploited and oppressed class of capitalism. 
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The assumption that the working class is the fundamen-
tally revolutionary one within capitalist society is 
not something that forecloses on research, but an 
assumption that makes research into the nature of 
capitalism and the working class possible. 
It is within such a framework that I intend to 
carry out my specific, local-level, limited-time, study 
of workers. And since marxism asserts the inevitable 
inter-relatedness of theory and action (research and 
policy making) , I also hope to contribute to the self-
liberation of the working class (and allied categories 
of the labouring population) from capitalist exploita-
tion and oppression. 
If such a general statement of marxist assumptions 
seems distant from empirical social research on labour 
problems, consider how it is presented by Richard 
Hyman, who specialises on this area of social practice. 
Hyman (1972:72) argues for the necessity in labour 
studies of a dialectical sociology to capture the 
dynamic interaction between social structure and social 
consciousness that other contemporary sociologies 
(stressing one or the other) miss. Spelling out what a 
marxist perspective implies, he sums it up with four 
words: 'totality, change, contradiction and practice' 
(Hyman 1975:4). Totality implies the necessity to 
relate any part system or process to the whole. This 
means that one cannot, for example, carve out 'indus-
trial relations systems' without referring to the 
social whole within which they exist, or study the 
'industrialisation process' as if undetermined by the 
growth and decline of capitalism. Change implies the 
necessity to see any totality historically. Thus, 
contemporary Nigeria has to be understood not as simply 
'developing' or, 'underdeveloped' in the abstract, but 
m relation to the past development of the capitalist 
world system, and also by reference to a possible and 
necessary socialist alternative to it. Contradiction 
implies a predisposition to recognise that qualitative 
change in any 'thing' requires that certain of its 
components develop at the expense of others. Capital, 
for example, has as its significant class components, 
capitalists and workers in a contradictory relation-
ship, with the capitalists superordinate within it. 
The contradiction develops with capitalism (over the 
whole world and through a whole historical epoch) and 
its resolution destroys capitalism as a social rela-
tionship (although capital may continue to exist in 
other forms or relationships). Practice means under-
standing human beings as makers of their own future out 
of the materials and circumstances provided by the 
past. It is this that requires Hyman (and us) to be 
aware of the policy relevance of research. In Hyman's 
case, the policy implications are neither precise nor 
detailed, nor meant to be of application outside the 
industrialised capitalist democracies he has concen-
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trated on. Yet, they are not without relevance to this 
study. Beyond a stress on the crucial importance of 
'economistic' union action, and of autonomous rank-
and-file movements as a stimulus to advance beyond 
this, we can find such elements as a stress on the role 
of socialist minorities amongst the generally non-
socialist workers (1975:176), of an organised marxist 
political force as providing ideological leadership to 
the trade union movement (1971:52) , of the role of 
non-union protest movements (women, student, black, 
anti-imperialist) as undermining capitalist legitimacy 
and stimulating alternative social ideas (1978:177), of 
the consciousness-raising value of reforms presented as 
invasions of (rather than admissions to) capitalist 
territory (1971:51), and of socialism as a worker-
controlled polity and economy (rather than as natio-
nalisation and a one-party state) (1975:201, 203). 
6. Research strategy and techniques 
It is necessary to say a few words about the research 
strategy and techniques used in this study. Most 
social science research techniques have been developed 
by liberal social scientists who either do not recog-
nise fundamental contradictions within capitalist 
society, or who are specifically concerned to 'solve 
social problems' or prevent social revolutions. 
Marxists therefore evidently need to be certain that 
both their general research strategy and the specific 
techniques they use are appropriate to their theore-
tical approach and to a 'subject matter' understood as 
makers of history. Such issues have been a matter of 
primary concern both for radical and libertarian an-
thropologists/sociologists and for socialist and 
marxist historians/sociologists working on - and fre-
quently with - labouring people in peripheral capi-
talist societies.[13] 
The first question which arose for me in carrying 
out my research in Nigeria was to surpass the obvious 
identification as a rich, white, foreign academic. I 
say surpass because there was no way these distinctions 
and oppositions from those I was studying could be 
denied. I was able to introduce myself as a European 
socialist and trade unionist and as someone opposed in 
his own country to capitalism, imperialism, racism 
- and ivory-tower academicism. I was also able to 
introduce myself as a former employee of the communist 
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) who had left it 
because of its statism and its manipulative attitude to 
the African trade union movement. I stayed in a cheap 
hotel near the docks, where I could eat and drink with 
workers and unionists, rather than the elite hotels in 
the city centre (where, as a right-wing union leader 
pointed out, both European and African union officers 
customarily stayed). I made clear both publicly and 
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privately that I was an independent socialist and that 
the purpose of my study was not to support one tendency 
or organisation against another but to assist trade 
union unity. I also said that since government and 
employers could obtain all the advice they needed to 
use against the workers, they would get none from me. 
But since government and employers seemed impressed by 
precisely the identification I was concerned to over-
come amongst the unionists I was quite prepared to take 
advantage of this to obtain information from them. 
I promised the unionists that the results of their 
cooperation (for which I never had to ever offer more 
than fares, photocopying costs and hospitality) would 
be returned to them. This was not only a matter of the 
discussions on drafts mentioned below (and which were 
of as much benefit to me as to them) . It was also a 
matter of newspaper and magazine articles accessible to 
them. And of the final products of the project. Apart 
from this work, the length and complexity of which make 
it practically inaccessible, I have therefore produced 
a comparatively cheap and not too complex history of 
the unions in the industry (Waterman 1982). And I have 
managed to complete a tape-and-slide show on the theme 
of this present work. Whilst the microfiche archives 
(Appendix 4:1-5) are unlikely to be perused even by 
Nigerian union research officers at present, I hope 
they will later be valued by the labour movement in 
Nigeria. 
It has been asked whether we should not 'rather 
than studying our friends, study the enemies of our 
friends, who perhaps are also our own enemies' (Huizer 
1979:31). Certainly we should, and I hope that I will 
be able to complete and publish later a study of la-
bour-control strategies in Lagos Port. But one cannot 
stop producing analytical or theoretical studies such 
as the present one, even when one knows that it is 
going to be read first and used first by the 'enemies 
of our friends'. All one can do is to avoid producing 
work which is addressed only to one's peers, which can 
only be used by capital and state. I am confident that 
my friends in Lagos Port will struggle to conquer this 
work, and that the friends of my friends will help them 
to do so. Having done so, I expect them to be able to 
make more effective use of it than their oppressors and 
exploiters. 
Let us move toward techniques. It is evident from 
the marxist distinction between appearance and essence 
that there can for us be no simple 'facts'. We are 
faced, as Post (1978:466-7) puts it, with either raw or 
semi-processed (i.e. ideologically, methodologically or 
theoretically organised) material, on which we have to 
work theoretically to produce our facts. Other socia-
list scholars concerned with studying worker behaviour, 
have stressed the necessity for a multi-methods 
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approach (Lübeck 1979, Kruijt and Vellinga 1979). 
Whilst Lübeck considers this strategy to be required by 
the nature of his subject (worker protest at the peri-
phery of capitalism) , Kruijt and Vellinga consider it 
to be required by the nature of marxism as a general 
social theory. What both propose is the combination of 
techniques customary to the anthropologist (observa-
tion, participation and informal, unobtrusive inter-
viewing in a customary setting), those customary to the 
social surveyor (formalised interview or questionnaire 
techniques producing data subject to statistical 
analysis), and the kind of historical methods indicated 
by Post. The use of multiple methods permits the 'data 
collected by each method to correct and to influence 
the assumptions and questions posed by all the others' 
(Lübeck 1979). The purpose is to provide new evidence 
for, and a new specification of, the general marxist 
assumptions with which research must begin. The origi-
nal problem is to be reconstituted in a richer and more 
precise manner. 
The self-conscious and systematic manner in which 
these researchers have carried our their research on 
workers in peripheral capitalist societies does, I 
think, provide us with a model, but should not blind us 
to the value of studies based on poorer resources, more 
limited access, or a single technique.[14] The techni-
ques of observation, participation and informal inter-
view are those closest to the daily practice of working 
people. In oral history, furthermore, 
those interviewed enjoy a very real equality 
if not superiority vis-a-vis the interviewer 
in terms of being able to determine the 
length, scope and content of the conversa-
tion. (Jorgensen 1978:113). 
I would add that, unlike survey methods, such techni-
ques require little technical skill or equipment. They 
are immediately comprehensible to working people, who 
can also rapidly master them. They run far less danger 
than do others of intimidating those interviewed, of 
making them feel their knowledge is of an inferior 
quality to that of the social 'scientist'. Unlike 
statistical analysis, moreover, the raw data and final 
outcomes of such methods are accessible to ordinary 
people. 
Marxist researchers, concerned with helping wor-
kers to make their own lives and history, evidently 
need to weigh the precision of statement available 
through statistical analysis against the inevitably 
alienating result. The danger is of taking away from 
working people their own lives and history so that 
these can only be made by professionals. Scholars 
concerned to bridge the gap between mental and manual 
labour need to recognise this problem and take deci-
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sions about methodology based on the purpose or 
audience they have in mind. 
For this work I used a combination of the techni-
ques customary to the anthropologist, social surveyor 
and historian, if in a less rigorous manner than those 
I have cited. The short time I had for on-site in-
vestigation (a total of 11 weeks, divided over three 
visits in 1975, 1976 and 1977) made it impossible to 
develop the overview necessary for a rigorous social 
survey. Such structured interviewing and surveying as 
I was able to carry out nonetheless provided me with at 
least sketch maps through the sociological wilderness 
that Lagos Port would otherwise have been. The limited 
period on site was compensated for by exceptional 
access to library resources in the UK, to archives and 
documents in Nigeria. The Institute of Social Studies 
(which financed the whole project) provided generous 
funding to allow the transporting of documents from 
Nigeria (as well as the return of certain unique ones 
generously lent to me). The ISS funds also permitted me 
to have almost the whole Nigerian daily and periodical 
press scanned and clipped for port and general labour 
news for almost one year (Waterman 1980e) . The long 
periods between visists enabled me to process the 
survey and interview data, to make maximum use of 
collected documents, to write up and circulate to 
specialists within and outside Nigeria my drafts for 
comments. 
Within Lagos itself I was able to take advantage 
of a familiarity with Nigerian workers and unions going 
back to 1968, when I had run a course for the leftwing 
Nigerian Trade Union Congress (NTUC) on behalf of the 
WFTU. Whilst these contacts gave me easy access to the 
leftwing unions, contacts with the International 
Transport Workers Federation (ITF) in London, Accra and 
in Lagos itself gave me good access to the rightwing 
ones. Before, during and after the on-site research, I 
benefitted greatly from the presence at the ISS of both 
national- and port-level union leaders from Nigeria. 
In this manner it has, I hope, been possible to 
use the various methods employed not only as a reli-
ability strategy but for the reasons, and in the spi-
rit, of Kruijt and Vellinga: 
Classical Marxist theory offers a fruitful 
point of departure [for a multi-level 
analysis of working class formation], sugges-
ting a research design which: a) emphasises 
the study of macro-structures and processes, 
b) combines more detailed analyses on the 
economic, social and political levels, c) 
prefers historical-interpretative analyses 
over more situational diagnoses. 
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There is one more possibility of worker studies that 
should be mentioned. Given the customary capacities of 
worker leaders, and the ability of workers to under-
stand the value of a book that identifies with their 
interests, there does arise the possibility for feed-
back from the subjects of the study during the field-
work stage. For marxists this should not be simply 
another reliability strategy but a requirement flowing 
from recognition of the necessity to overcome such 
divisions of labour in society as have been mentioned 
above. The requirement is, then, not just to establish 
the kind of human sympathy that anthropologists always 
attempt with their subjects, but of demonstrating the 
role of the marxist intellectual toward (or inside) the 
working-class and labour movement. For myself in Lagos 
at this time it implied not only attempting to break 
down the traditional opposition of intellectual and 
worker but also exploiting the advantages which I had 
as someone specialised in research and free of the 
specific organisational loyalties required of the 
activists. The earlier-mentioned seminar not only 
provided me with feedback, but also taught me in prac-
tice what I had been intending in principle.[15] 
7. Structure 
The work is divided into four main parts. Part I 
provides the social setting, with chapters on the 
Nigerian working class and its environment, on the 
cargo-handling industry itself, and its labour force. 
It ends with a brief analytical chapter. Part II is 
concerned with the 'external relations' of the trade 
unions, with how they relate to capital and state. It 
has a theoretical introduction, which is followed by 
case material set out in a structured but - I hope -
not tendentious manner. This form has been chosen in 
order to allow readers to see exactly what I am arguing 
with the concepts introduced, and to therefore allow 
them to make a different analysis of the same material. 
It also makes the material accessible to the general 
reader. Part III deals with the 'internal relations' 
of the trade unions, with how they relate to each other 
and to their own members. It follows the same pattern. 
So does Part IV, on collective protest action. The 
Conclusion considers the implications of the case 
studied. It also returns to this Introduction to 
consider the wider implications of the 'labour aristo-
cracy' thesis, and to consider the adequacy of the 
alternative approach applied. 
NOTES 
1. The argument here is adapted from Waterman (1975). 
2. I have found Post's (1978:149-50) note on the 
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lumpenproletariat most useful, although my argu-
ment and purpose differ somewhat from his. 
There is a basis in Lenin's work for such thin-
king. This lies not only in his opposition of the 
European labour aristocracy to the 'hundreds of 
millions of members of uncivilised nations'. It 
is also to be found in Lenin's shift in interest 
and hope from the West European working class to 
the Asian masses after the Russian Revolution. 
Lenin's whole argument for revolution in backward 
Russia was based on the assumption that it would 
trigger socialist revolution in Europe, which in 
its turn would provide a proletarian counterweight 
to Russia's peasant population. We can find this 
argument being used by him in 1903, 1905, and 
after the February and October Revolutions in 1917 
(Lenin 1976:28, 110, 230, 240). When the European 
working class failed to play its predicted role, 
Lenin turned his eyes and hopes from the prole-
tariat of the West to the labouring masses of 
Asia: 
In the last analysis, the outcome 
of the struggle will be determined 
by the fact that Russia, India, 
China, etc., account for the over-
whelming majority of the population 
of the globe. And during the past 
few years it is this majority that 
has been drawn into the struggle 
for emancipation with extraordinary 
rapidity, so that in this respect 
there cannot be the slightest doubt 
what the final outcome of the world 
struggle will be. In this sense, 
the complete victory of socialism 
is fully and absolutely assured. 
(431). 
My ambition here may be contrasted with that of 
Janice Perlman in her work on marginality in Latin 
America (Perlman 1976). Her purpose was to em-
pirically refute and theoretically criticise the 
'myth of marginality', but not to present an 
alternative approach, nor to analyse her own 
material within such a framework. 
The source for this is primarily the collection 
edited by the pair (Arrighi and Saul 1973) . This 
contains jointly- and individually-written items, 
but these are presented in the Introduction as 
contributions to collective reflection, and I have 
not felt it necessary to distinguish separate 
items or authors. Only Saul's (1975) reply to his 
critics is distinguished. 
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My understanding of 'conservatism' will be clari-
fied below. For me it includes reformism and thus 
covers the behaviour imputed to the labour aristo-
cracy by Arrighi and Saul. They seem here to be 
suggesting a certain ambiguity in the behaviour of 
this category - that it 'may not be' opposed to 
nationalisation but 'can be expected' to resist 
state reallocation of resources to other social 
groups. They might therefore characterise the 
labour aristocracy as self-interested rather than 
conservative. Be this as it may, they clearly see 
the proper proletariat as an obstacle to 'trans-
formation in the total situation'. 
A point well established by Brenner in an analo-
gous case. Analysing the marxist dependency 
theorists, he says: 
It has been their intention to 
negate the optimistic model of 
economic advance...whereby the 
development of trade and the divi-
sion of labour unfailingly bring 
about economic development. 
Because they have failed, however, 
to discard the underlying...pre-
suppositions of this model, they 
have ended up by erecting an alter-
native theory of capitalist deve-
lopment which is, in its central 
aspects, the mirror image of the 
'progressist' thesis they wish to 
surpass. (Brenner 1977:27). 
I may have encouraged such a notion in earlier 
work on Nigeria, in which I suggested that a 
constraint on the radicalism and effectivity of 
the communist Nigerian Trade Union Congress was 
the absence of a 'revolutionary intelligentsia' 
capable of providing it with a 'scientific analy-
sis' (Waterman 1973:307-8). John Saul (1975:307) 
seems to have understood this as supporting his 
position on the leading role of such intellec-
tuals. This is a reasonable interpretation of my 
position at that time. I hope that the present 
work will reveal in both analysis and conclusions 
another orientation toward intellectual or poli-
tical vanguards. 
Jack Woddis, a prolific communist writer on Africa 
and the third world fits this category. In the 
absence of a revolutionary working class, he 
speaks of a 'principal revolutionary force which 
elaborates policy and provides the ideology and 
organisational experience and capacity' (Woddis 
1972:174) , i.e. an intellectual/organisational 
vanguard. He also believed that workers and 
35 
peasants should support regimes in which 'pro-
gressive groups of the petty-bourgeoisie have 
formed the independence government', in order to 
•weaken the foreign monopolies and make possible 
the building of a balanced economy and the winning 
of economic independence' (147). Arrighi and Saul 
also shared with Woddis the notion that the radi-
cal petty-bourgeoisie was capable of fulfilling 
such a task. 
The identity here suggested is precisely due to 
the role of the ILO as the international mediator 
of the labour/capital conflict. Significantly, it 
was created in the wake of the Russian Revolution 
and with the evident purpose of preventing further 
such ones. Its philosophy was one of a compromise 
between labour and capital under the benevolent 
eye of a 'neutral' state (tripartism) . This is 
the 'ideology of the structure' (for which see 
Harrod 1977), since it is formally composed of 
groups of employers, unions and states. With the 
movement of the major locus of capitalist instabi-
lity from Europe to the capitalist periphery after 
World War 2, the activity of the ILO has moved 
largely from the sphere of law and institutions to 
that of economic and social structures. The new 
philosophy is developmental ism (Harrod's 'ideology 
of the programmes'). Conflicts between workers 
and capitalists, or unions and national capital, 
are largely ironed-out or mystified by the ILO, 
which acts as a transnational network of associ-
ation and ideology, dispensing patronage and trai-
ning labour department officers, academics and 
union leaders in the ideologies of liberalism and 
developmentalism. See further on this issue 
Waterman (1979j:Part 4). To see how in 1957 a 
prominent portworker union leader was incorporated 
into the capital-state-union network at the ILO in 
Geneva, see Waterman (1982:116). 
For an attempt to identify different radical 
approaches to the study of African labour history, 
see my review of a collection co-edited by Robin 
Cohen (Waterman 1980b). 
Concerning officials and members, the Zaria study 
indicates a conflict between members and voluntary 
officials, the Kano study one between members and 
both workplace and paid local officials, the Lagos 
study one between members and local officials on 
the one hand and the national leadership on the 
other. All three show us the member-official rela-
tionship dialectically, enabling us to see how 
worker inexperience creates dependence on privi-
leged and qualified strata which can easily be 
detached from their followers. The Lagos study 
also shows how a more experienced wage labour 
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force is able to exercise considerable control 
over local officials. But the national leader-
ships are presented in the Lagos study largely as 
exploiters unrelated to the workers. My past 
findings (Waterman 1976) suggest there was both 
criticism of and dependence on headquarters offi-
cials. And this in turn suggests that the member-
official relationship at the higher level is 
analogous to that at the lower one. The universal 
dependence of the Lagos leaders (at least until 
recently) on external sources of finance, patro-
nage and ideology does not imply that they have no 
roots in the class they rest on, nor that they 
provide no service for it. The problem is whether 
the service is relevant or not. What of their 
findings with respect to the different radical 
(Nigerian Trade Union Congress) and moderate 
(United Labour Congress) tendencies within the 
national trade union movement? Adrian Peace's work 
condemns both leaderships indiscriminately. 
Dorothy Remy does not comment on either, but we 
may note that the successive self-seeking leaders 
of the Zaria union were affiliated to the radical 
NTUC. Paul Lübeck's criticism is, in fact, based 
on three officials leading the Kano branch of the 
United Labour Congress, one being a public sector 
clerk and a wealthy trader, the other two waiting 
to receive advanced training at labour relations 
institutes in Israel, Western Europe or the US. 
Workers' attitudes towards these was a 'fee for 
service' one. My own past findings allow for the 
evidence revealed by the trio, but also distin-
guish between the ULC leadership, as 'active 
agents of conservatism amongst the workers', and 
that of the NTUC, possessed of at least a 'radical 
rhetoric and ideology' (Waterman 1976:183). 
13. For the first case I have in mind the major col-
lection on this issue by Huizer and Mannheim 
(1979), for the second case the various writers to 
be named. In· the Introduction to his volume, 
Gerrit Huizer deals, amongst other matters, with 
the following issues: the self-identification of 
the researcher; whether one should be studying 
one's friends or one's enemies (the rich and 
powerful); with which techniques and to what 
specific end should the study be carried out (the 
problem of action research); the nature of the 
product and to whom it should be made available. 
It is noteworthy that it has been anthropologists 
who have paid the most attention to such problems. 
It is further noteworthy that this particular 
study has as subject matter primarily studies on 
rural people or on cultures, defines its targets 
as imperialism and patriarchalism, and has as its 
aim 'a view from below'. What worker studies (or 
the worker studies I will be referring to) would 
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seem to add here is the target of capital and 
state and the aim of socialism. I see the two 
perspectives as complementary but do not have 
space here to develop the point or investigate 
possible contradictions. 
Studies by Krawchenko (1979) on worker protest in 
the Soviet Union and Moorsom (1979) on Namibia 
show what can be done with the most limited and 
partial primary or secondary printed sources and 
with no access to the site. The work of Shaheed 
(1977, 1979) shows that can be achieved basically 
with anthropological techniques. Whilst the 
methods of the first two were borne of necessity, 
there is an argument for the techniques used by 
the third. 
One union leader refused to attend on the grounds 
that I had written damaging things about him and 
made these available to his international patrons. 
I persuaded him that the seminar was the place to 
put me publicly right on any possible falsehoods 
or misinterpretations, and he not only attended 
and contributed positively but continued to co-
operate fully on later occasions. Another leader 
was informed by someone who had attended the 
seminar that I had slandered him as a tribal ist. 
As a result, I was not only subjected to a public 
display of this leader's wrath but required (since 
I wanted to restore my previously good relations 
with him and his union) to stand in virtual 
silence whilst receiving several unionists' lec-
tures on research ethics! On carefully re-examin-
ing my material I discovered (to my relief) that 
my statement was not legally actionable, but also 
that it could lend credence to the accusations of 
tribalism against this man and his union. I felt 
required to carry out further work on this issue 
and my findings and conclusions turned out to be 
far more complex. I would like to think that both 
the unionists and the research benefitted from 
these experiences. On the one hand I hope to have 
established with them the necessity for revealing 
evidence they would rather not have brought to 
light, and of making judgements inspired by the 
earlier mentioned motives. On the other hand I 
hope to have demonstrated that unionists can make 
their own history not only by submitting them-
selves passively to researchers, but by a dialogue 
in which they argue their own interpretations 
against those of the professional. 
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PART I 
THE SETTING: 'GREATER GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT 
IN SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT' 
Chapter 1: Industry, labour relations and workers in 
the 1970s 
Chapter 2: The Lagos cargo-handling industry 
Chapter 3: NPA and dock labour: a direct comparison 
Chapter 4: Discussion: shaping, dividing and control-
ling 
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Chapter 1 
INDUSTRY, LABOUR RELATIONS AND WORKERS 
IN THE 1970s[1] 
We can distinguish three major periods in the develop-
ment of Nigerian capitalism. The colonial period was 
one of primary agricultural and mineral production. 
Colonial capitalism stimulated local trading, peasant 
agriculture and the urban petty-commodity sector. It 
also required a comparatively large state sector 
charged with providing the necessary physical infra-
structure, as well as the legal, administrative, muni-
cipal and repressive institutions. The Lagos cargo-
handling industry dates from this period. The period 
of decolonisation (1950s to mid- or late-1960s) was one 
in which the main interest of an increasingly trans-
national monopoly capitalism was in import-substituting 
production of consumer, intermediate and producer 
goods. This further stimulated rural and urban petty-
commodity production, and both permitted and required a 
considerable expansion of state employment. It was 
during this period that the number of dock labour 
contractors multiplied from one or two to a dozen or 
more, and that the Marine Department developed into the 
Nigerian Ports Authority. 
The present period is that of a specific peri-
pheral capitalist industrial development, and dates 
from the end of the Civil War (1967-70). It is closely 
connected with the oil boom that began at that time. 
The primary stimulus from international monopoly capi-
talism in this period was obviously the demand for oil. 
Characteristic of oil extraction is its minimal impact 
in terms of labour required, forward or backward link-
ages, and the massive revenue it provides to the host 
state (at least when the state personnel begins to play 
the market in a national capitalist spirit). These 
massive revenues stimulated an explosive growth in the 
importation of both consumer and producer goods from a 
capitalist world faced with a shrinking world market, 
as well as providing a basis for the development from a 
primarily commercial capitalism locally to an indus-
trialising one. Thus, we see in Nigeria not only motor 
assembly but also the beginning of petro-chemicals and 
iron and steel production. The oil boom put tremendous 
stress on Lagos Port and led to a dramatic growth in 
its capacity, equipment and - eventually - throughput. 
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At the present period we can distinguish at least 
four wage-labour sectors 'occupying structurally dif-
ferent positions in the national political economy' 
(Remy 1975: 161). Firstly, there is the monopoly 
capitalist sector, consisting of the local subsidiaries 
of the transnational companies (TNCs), owned and con-
trolled by the TNCs and top Nigerian manager/share-
holders. We may include within this sector the in-
creasing number of joint state-foreign enterprises 
since these are, effectively, state subsidised rather 
than state controlled. The capital-intensity and/or 
protection from foreign competition enjoyed by these 
firms has made them (until the late 1970s) prepared to 
pay high wages and favour Anglo-American personnel and 
labour relations policies in order to stabilise a small 
and comparatively well-educated labour force. This 
sector is, however, subject to market vagaries, imply-
ing rise and fall in labour demand. And it has been 
(possibly with a view to a future export role for 
Nigerian industry) decreasingly liberal toward its 
labour force. 
Secondly, we have the state sector proper, con-
sisting of the ministries, corporations, servies 
(teaching is still the largest single occupational 
category in Nigeria), at national or local level. Into 
this sector has been brought the complex British ap-
paratus of public sector grading, training, promotion 
and negotiation. Workers are protected from most 
changes in market conditions and enjoy high job se-
curity. They have usually been the first to benefit 
from national wage awards. This is where we find the 
NPA. 
Thirdly, the Nigerian capitalist sector, con-
sisting largely of smaller-scale, simpler-technology, 
consumer goods industries (e.g. sweets, footwear, 
printing, baking, kitchenwear), small-scale processing 
(cement blocks, groundnut crushing, wood sawing), 
transportation (ships, buses, trucks, taxis), commerce 
and services, construction and labour-contracting (for 
construction, dock labour). The larger companies are 
often those taken over (formally) from the 'third 
world' (e.g. Indian, Hong Kong, Lebanese) capitalists 
under indigenisation. They are often partly owned or 
managed by such 'expatriates', or still largely owned 
by foreign capitalists or by the different Nigerian 
states. Smaller size and simpler technology implies a 
more competitive market situation. They tend to oper-
ate below government minimum pay and conditions, accep-
ting a high turnover amongst a generally uneducated 
work force. They are hostile to unions, the management 
style being personalistic. Here we can find the Lagos 
cargo-handling contractors. 
Lastly, there is the petty-entrepreneurial sector, 
in which the 'owner' may or may not employ his immedi-
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ate family and one or more apprentices. One survey 
(Aluko et.a 1.1972) suggests an average of 1.5 employees 
per enterprise (excluding the owner). The most common 
trades were tailoring, carpentry, goldsmithing, car and 
cycle repairing, in that order. Evidently, such enter-
prises operate in a highly-competitive market, with 
tiny profit margins, requiring a working week 30 per-
cent longer, at pay possibly 50 percent less, than the 
capitalist sector. Despite the modern nature of many 
of the activities, the labour relations are frequently 
of a pre-industria 1 type, with employees often having 
apprenticeship status, paying fees, receiving not a 
wage but the right to use equipment in their own time 
for their own clients. 
Given the conventional conceptualisation and the 
dubious quality of Nigerian statistics, it is almost 
impossible to be sure of even orders of nagnitude for 
the working class or its component parts. However, we 
will draw on what is available in order to make the 
above account a little less impressionistic. (FRN Plan 
1975: Table 32.7). 
With a total population estimated at some 70 
million in 1975, Nigeria was reckoned to have a labour 
force of over 29 million. How does this break up? The 
figures below have been rounded and do not add exactly 
but they speak clearly enough for our purposes. Of the 
29 million, some 17.8 million (61 percent) was in 
agricultural seIf-employment. Some 7.8 million (26.8 
percent) was in non-agricultural self-employment as 
'self-account, unpaid household workers and unpaid 
apprentices'. Whilst some of these might be in rural 
areas, most would have been in the cities. 1.3 million 
(4.4 percent) was listed as unemployed. Again these 
would have been primarily in the cities. Only some 2.2 
million (7.5 percent) of the labour force was in wage 
labour - over 90 percent of these being in the cities. 
Within the wage-employment sector we can, unfortun-
ately, only distinguish between those employed within 
establishments employing 10 or more (thus including 
Nigerian capitalists and petty-capitalists, as well as 
the Nigerian state and the TNCs) and those employed in 
establishments with less than 10 workers (thus includ-
ing both petty-capitalists and petty-bourgeois employ-
ers). The 'medium and large' category employs some 1.5 
million, the 'small' some 680,000. If only 1.5 million 
are in the 'medium to large' sector, than those in 
establishments employing over 100 are evidently much 
less. Amongst the 1.5 million, one million are in the 
public sector, some half million in the private. Thus, 
despite the growth of private capitalist employment, 
there are still twice as many in the private sector. 
We can conceive of Nigerian wage-earners as surrounded 
by an urban sea of petty-producers and unemployed, this 
being surrounded by a rural ocean of peasants. 
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There have been identified two periods within the 
history of industrial relations in Nigeria. The first 
is that of the 'Anglo-Saxon Model' identified by Peter 
Kilby (1969) , although it should, perhaps, be more 
properly described as a Liberal-Paternalist Colonial 
model. The second period has been identified in the 
literature negatively, in terms of what has been 
'eroded away as a result of increased government in-
terference' (Fashoyin 1977a), rather than positively, 
in terms of some new model. But we can recognise it as 
a clear tendency toward the Corporatist model common to 
much of Latin America. Let us now examine and compare 
the two periods. 
The first model, which was in operation from 
colonial days through till the middle of the Civil War 
in 1968, was appropriate for the period of commercial 
capitalism, during which there was little industrial 
working class, and the working class was virtually 
untouched by radical ideas or organisation. It could 
appear and continue under authoritarian colonial rule 
precisely because there lay behind it the iron fist of 
crude imperial military power. The second period began 
with the legislation during the Civil War and was still 
intensifying, although uncompleted, in 1977. It was 
inspired by the failures of the old model, and required 
by the ambition to make Nigeria into a capitalist 
productive power, capable of competing internationally. 
Such an ambition implied a control over wage costs not 
previously necessary. This new tendency was marked by 
the following features. 
The old ideology changed only slowly. The first 
clear indication of change here was the declaration on 
labour policy made by the Commissioner of Labour just 
before the formation of the Nigerian Labour Congress 
(NLC) in 1975. This not only indicated a future 
orientation. It was also in many ways a comment on the 
changes in labour relations that had been taking place 
since 1968. The two key emphases were on 'the right to 
take the necessary measures to guarantee public order 
and national security' (Adefope, December 4, 1975), and 
on the active role of the Labour Department where there 
is a 'development-oriented administration and greater 
government involvement in social and economic develop-
ment'. Commissioner Adefope declared the necessity for 
'limited government intervention' in order to provide 
for the 'effective prevention and expeditious settle-
ment of labour disputes'. He proposed positive action 
to restructure unions on industrial lines, introduction 
of compulsory check-off, the prescribing of all acti-
vities and influence of the international trade union 
organisations in Nigeria - the Organisation of African 
Trade Union Unity (OATUU) apart. 
The legislation since 1968 has been of an increa-
singly directive and restrictive nature (Davison 1975). 
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The Trade Disputes (Emergency Provisions) Decree No. 21 
of 1968 gave the Conunissioner of Labour the right to 
intervene in any dispute, set out a clear procedure for 
their settlement, and made the reporting of disputes 
obligatory after a set period. Decree No. 53 of 1969 
cleared up the ambiguity over whether there remained a 
right to strike. It became known as the 'strike ban' 
and, in addition to making strikes illegal, it also 
made it an offence to instigate tham, or to present 
them in the press in such a manner as to cause public 
alarm. Although introduced during the Civil War for a 
12-month period. Decree 53 was repeatedly extended, 
marking a sharp break with the previous period and a 
turning away from the liberal model of the Inter-
national Labour Organisation. 
The wave of restrictive and directive legislation 
grew into a tidal wave in the period 1973-77. Decrees 
in 1973 and 1974 'rationalised' and consolidated old 
legislation but also implied greater legal controls on 
unions. They further raised the numbers required to 
create a union, prohibited security and other key state 
employees from joining unions, etc. In 1976 and 1977 
there were issued two decrees which created complex 
hierarchies of bargaining institutions and procedures, 
and severely restricted both the right to strike and 
the freedom of worker leaders. 
The significant development in the role of the 
police in industrial relations during this period has 
been underlined by Adeogun (1979) . The pattern of 
arrests suggested a continuation of the traditional 
bias against the radicals and in favour of the moder-
ates in the unions. This was confirmed by the con-
tinuation of the practice of the appointment to board 
posts and regional commissionerships of leading moder-
ates. 
The creation in December 1975 of the united 
Nigerian Labour Congress must be considered under the 
rubric of labour control institutions since it was in 
good part a product of government encouragement. A 
rationalisation of national union structures was a 
requirement for greater state control. When, however, 
the trade union leaders of all tendencies themselves 
proved capable of creating such an organisation, gov-
ernment reacted with considerable ambiguity. On the 
one hand the founding conference was honoured with the 
official greetings of the Commissioner of Labour, and 
on the other hand government issued in February 1976 an 
order for a 'Tribunal of Inquiry into the Activities of 
Trade Unions'. Foreshadowed in the Commissioner's 
statements in December, the tribunal was to inquire 
into the financing of the old trade union centres, the 
assets of officers, the activities of foreign union 
organisations, and compliance with the wartime emer-
gency legislation banning strikes. Although the out-
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come of the tribunal was by no means a foregone con-
clusion, the intention behind it must have been that of 
discrediting the leaders of the new Congress, or at 
least of publicly demonstrating that they were tarred 
with the same brush of mismanagement and financial 
duplicity as the senior service and former commissio-
ners had recently been shown to be. This the tribunal 
certainly achieved. The leading officers were shown to 
have misappropiated or mishandled thousands of nairas 
of foreign money sent from New York, Prague, Brussels 
and elsewhere. The tribunal then recommended, and 
government accepted, that a dozen trade union leaders 
should be banned from office-holding in the movement 
- thus escalating further the assault on the tradition 
of trade union autonomy (Abebiyi Report 1977; FRN Views 
1977). 
Having first pushed the unions toward creating a 
new united central body, and then having discredited 
the traditional national union leaders of both tenden-
cies, the way was now open for a new Trade Onion Ad-
ministrator to restructure the hundreds of unions left 
over from the liberal period into a handful of 'indus-
trial' ones. 
Despite the virtual transformation of the pattern 
of labour control, the Nigerian state had not by mid-
1977 managed to establish adequate control over the 
Nigerian working class. Neither new legislation, nor 
wage 'concessions', neither the discrediting of the 
traditional union leadership, nor promises of 'assis-
tance' in creating a new one, none of these had managed 
to curb the traditional autonomy of spirit and capacity 
for enterprise- or industry-level action. In order to 
understand the reasons for this - and its limitations 
- we need to consider both the nature of the trade 
union movement and of the working class itself. First 
the union movement. 
During the current period of peripheral capitalist 
industrialisation (from 1970) one notices the increas-
ing density of the factory working class, as well as 
its geographical spread to cities like Ibadan, Kano, 
Zaria (Figures 1.1 and 1.2). The growing strength of 
industrial trade unionism (inside and outside the 
public sector), plus the decreasing purchase of both 
social-democratic and communist ideology on an increas-
ingly unfamiliar reality, led also to a decline in the 
importance of the dominant national centres. Experi-
enced professional unionists with a career commitment 
and closer contact with workers began to dominate the 
movement. The growing importance of the factory work-
ing class was symbolised by its domination of the Adebo 
(1969-70) and Udoji (1975)[2] strike movements - move-
ments largely carried out on local initiative and 
taking place forcefully in Kano as well as Lagos. 
Although there was no such clear political undertone 
Figure 1.1 Nigeria; Ethnie groups and the pre-1967 regions 
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to these two movements as there were to those 
of 1945 and 1964, the strikes were aimed at foreign and 
local capitalists as well as at the state. The uneven-
ness of organisational growth, and the rise and fall of 
overtly political protest, must sensitise us to the 
manner in which unionism unites workers according to 
the contours imposed on them by the capitalist system. 
The changing nature and ideologies of worker leaders 
likewise reflect the problem of the division of labour 
within the trade unions - with leaders defining strate-
gies and organising or literally disorganising the 
movement largely on their own initiative. 
Convincing evidence of this is provided by the 
struggle over the creation of a single, united national 
trade union organisation in the mid-1970s. The crea-
tion of the NLC was due in the first place (as we have 
seen) to an initiative of the state. Can we say that 
it was due for the other part to popular working-class 
pressure, that it was an attempt to transform the 
evident autonomy of spirit and capacity for enterprise-
or industry-level struggle into a solid and responisve 
national-level organisation? There is no evidence for 
this, and ordinary trade union members have few, if 
any, means for exercising such influence. 
The creation of the new state-approved industrial 
unions and the new state-approved NLC (February 1978) 
was, in fact, largely a matter of negotiations between 
the state on the one hand and the paid and unpaid union 
officers on the other. Within the new industrial trade 
unions, the struggle for leadership was often between 
the traditional left and right, or between radicals and 
moderates regardless of traditional affiliation. At 
the level of the NLC itself, the traditional left 
considered itself well-pleased with the number of 
positions it had won, putting this down to its mili-
tancy and cohesion in the face of the division and 
weakness of the traditional right. However, the actual 
distribution of top offices within the new NLC was a 
result of closed-door negotiations amongst leaders of 
the new industrial unions, with trade-offs between left 
and right, and with the knowledge that the state held a 
final power of again refusing recognition to the new 
NLC. 
The continued shortcomings of the national union 
leadership in Nigeria should not be misinterpreted in 
terms of its 'petty-bourgeois' nature, 'bureaucracy', 
or 'reformism and opportunism'. It is also in large 
part expressive of the nature of the Nigerian working 
class. This is suggested by the three recent studies 
of Nigerian workers referred to earlier. Let us con-
sider these in turn. 
Dorothy Remy (1975:161) states a position common 
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to all three researchers when she argues that 
the behaviour of industrial workers is 
strongly influenced by the type of industry 
in which they are employed and by the nature 
of the wider urban environment in which they 
live. 
In her case the factory (Nigerian Tobacco Company) is 
more capital intensive than most of the TNCs. The 
petty-entrepreneurial sector in Zaria is still domin-
ated by local residents and oriented towards the agri-
cultural sector. Unskilled migrants are unable to 
enter the petty-entrepreneurial sector and are 
attracted by high wages in the one major factory. 
Competition for scarce jobs implies the use of ethnic 
patronage networks to obtain them. The patrons tend to 
be the better-educated, better-qualified, English-
speaking workers, the mechanics amongst whom also tend 
to become worker-spokesmen or union officials. But, in 
Zaria, these skilled men have opportunities for per-
sonal advancement both in large-scale enterprise and 
through petty-entrepreneurship. The protests of the 
unskilled and uneducated fail because their natural 
leaders are able to advance personally, inside or 
outside the factory, through education or through the 
ethnic networks. Remy concludes (176) 
As long as economic security remains bound to 
schooling and patronage in Zaria, working-
class solidarity cannot develop. Industrial 
unions become then not an expression of a 
class interest, but rather another institu-
tion within which conflicting interests can 
be pursued. 
The Kano bazaar economy is (as Lübeck 1973; 1975a, b; 
1979 shows) of a similar type to that of Zaria, but on 
an infinitely larger scale. However, the factories 
differ, being Asian capitalist or locally owned, labour 
intensive, paying below the official government mini-
mum, and accepting a high turnover amongst the illite-
rate peasant youths who work in them. In this situation 
formal and nationally-affiliated trade unions tend to 
be organised from above and outside by educated busi-
ness-minded individuals who do not bother with the 
factories. unions built from inside tend to be domin-
ated by supervisors, who frequently have extracted 
kudin sarautu (office money customary amongst the 
Hausa) from workers in exchange for jobs, and who 
continue to extract payments in trade union forms. As a 
widely-spread pre-industrial ideology with an emphasis 
on rights and duties, Islam provides the illiterate 
Kano worker with ' the only known and accepted standard 
of legitimacy'. Deference is paid by the poor to the 
Islamic learned man, or mallam, as someone able to 
'question the legitimacy of established authority... 
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and sanction movements designed to redress grievances'. 
In one case a dispute was caused by the disciplining of 
a worker caught praying without permission, in another 
a key role was given to and played by a conservative 
Imam (prayer leader). Despite the common scorn of 
workers for unions organised from outside, or by poli-
tical parties, they managed in the situation of high 
expectations aroused by the Adebo award, to develop 
their own strike committees, led by headmen (lower-
level supervisors engaged in the productive process). 
These turned protest from destructive into constructive 
and effective channels, and took forms that were open 
and democratic in nature. 'Promote or fire' policies 
of the employers prevented strike committees from 
developing into permanent organisations. Lübeck's 
conclusions (1973) point in two directions. On the one 
hand he agrees with Remy that 
As long as the mass of workers believe that 
mobility is possible either outside the firm 
in the commercial sector or within the fac-
tory organisation...it will be difficult to 
maintain class-based, rank and file workers' 
committees. 
On the other hand he points to the possibility of a 
'viable understanding' or 'at least a marriage of 
convenience' between the workers and the paid outside 
union officials. This could, he believes, be achieved 
if the officials addressed themselves to the over-
riding local problems: job security, benefits, etc. 
Adrian Peace (1974, 1975, 1979) is concerned with 
workers in Nigeria's largest industrial estate, at 
Ikeja on the edge of Lagos. The TNCs that have their 
factories here practice Western-style industrial rela-
tions. The local bazaar economy is geared to the needs 
of the large numbers of factory workers. The findings 
of Peace are as follows. Firstly, the rural and urban 
poor (from whom the workers spring or amongst whom they 
live) are not themselves conscious of being exploited, 
but recognise the existence of exploitation in the 
factory sector. Secondly, the national trade union 
leaderships are ineffective (although their head 
offices are only five or ten miles away), exploitative, 
and are widely distrusted by the workers. As for the 
industrial workers themselves, they see no future 
within the 'closed system' represented by the indus-
trial sector (higher positions depend on education, and 
access to this is closing in southern Nigeria), and 
they generally aspire to become small-scale entrepre-
neurs within the 'open system'. This, however, stimu-
lates militancy for if they cannot save they cannot 
obtain the capital necessary for entry into trade. 
Because of this, and because they live at the hub of 
Nigerian political life, they are exceptionally poli-
tically conscious. They are capable of creating and 
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Controlling their own local-level leadership, in which 
they have considerable confidence - and of taking 
powerful and sustained industrial action. The rest of 
the poor benefit from working-class action, sympathise 
with it and support it. Therefore: 
The Lagos proletariat is best viewed as the 
political elite of the urban masses, a refer-
ence group in political terms for other urban 
strata, who substantially rely on the pre-
vailing wage structure for the satisfaction 
of their own interests in the urban area, and 
furthermore look to the wage-earning class 
for expressions of political protest against 
a highly inegalitarian society. (Peace 
1975:289) . 
What becomes evident from all three studies is the 
importance of the residential milieu for an understand-
ing of worker behaviour and consciousness. Given the 
virtual absence of direct information on this for our 
case, it is important to add what we know about Lagos 
worker residential patterns more generally. 
From surveys (Peil 1973; Papohunda et.al. 1978) it 
is possible to obtain the following picture. Lagos is 
a fast-growing African commercial, administrative and 
industrial metropolis. Its population has grown from 
around half a million in 1952-53, to around 1.5 million 
in 1963 and over 2.5 million in 1973. Lagos is ethni-
cally heterogeneous, with native Lagosians representing 
only about one-quarter of the population. Whilst a 
further third may also be Yoruba speakers, yet another 
third are from other parts of Nigeria. The hetero-
geneity is due, of course, to massive immigration. 
Half the population has lived there less than 10 years, 
12 percent for less than three. Within the poor resi-
dential areas, anything from 25 to 33 percent of the 
population will be in the petty-capitalist or petty-
commodity sectors as traders or craftspeople. Up to 17 
percent may be unemployed. Around one half will be in 
waged labour, manual or clerical. Over half will be 
sharing one room with two or more others. 
The physical conditions in areas inhabited by many 
port and dock-workers are sketched in Fapohunda et.al. 
(1978:67-8): squalid housing without equipment or 
facilities; an absence of paved roads; footpaths that 
serve as drains; poor transportation and consequent 
traffic jams. One could add the alternation of floods 
and water shortages, the lack of garbage disposal, the 
repeated power cuts, and the universal open drains. 
For an image of social relations within a Lagos resi-
dential area we must go again to the work of Adrian 
Peace. Although Peace is writing about Agege, a Lagos 
suburb adjacent to an estate consisting largely of 
subsidiaries of multinationals (and one that is pre-
53 
dominantly Yoruba in ethnic composition) what he says 
is suggestive of 'working-class' Lagos more generally: 
Agege...continues to grow today in laissez-
faire fashion presenting an immediate appear­
ance of chaos and confusion...[I]η and around 
the Market...are located hundreds of small 
shops, stores, canteens and bars...Food­
stuffs, clothing, household equipment, liquid 
refreshment, as well as more costly consumer 
goods, can all be purchased within a few 
dozen yards of one another. So too can a 
variety of urban services...Entrepreneurial 
activity and residence frequently occur under 
the same roof. So one is never left in any 
doubt that the economic and social climate is 
set and dominated by the independently em­
ployed men and women engaged in a myriad 
ways, making a living. As a result the 
minority of wage-earners spend much of their 
time when not at work in the company of 
traders, blacksmiths, bar-owners, carpenters, 
seamstresses, electricians and others, as 
well as that of their fellow workers. (Peace 
1979:8-9). 
Peace reveals the ambiguities of working-class con­
sciousness in such an environment. The exclusion from 
such areas of the factory managers is said to reinforce 
the common consciousness of the workers: 
the fact that all wage-earners, whether 
skilled, white collar or from the shopfloor, 
reside together in the Town is in certain 
respects a counter to the divisions of occu­
pational rank as these find expression within 
the context of the Estate. (97). 
Yet the multi-class nature of these areas encourages 
petty-bourgeois aspirations amongst the workers: 
Within any neighbourhood in the Town there 
also reside the owners of tenement buildings 
who, beside being urban landlords, are parti­
cularly successful transporters, storeowners, 
contractors and traders. These are invariably 
self-employed men and women...They are impor­
tant points of reference to the factory 
workers. (9). 
Before concluding this section, it may be worthwhile 
drawing from Peace another element on which we have 
little evidence from the port case - the 'class element 
of everyday life' (94-105). The 'unambiguous two class 
folk model' of both work and residence finds expression 
not only in the overt protest action of factory workers 
or in their union organisation but also in the follow-
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ing everyday behaviour: 1) the use of class-war lan-
guage when speaking of worker-management relations; 2) 
acts of insubordination and sabotage - or approval of 
these; 3) the proletarian norms of solidarity, unity, 
collective action; 4) a 'folk-lore' of opposition and 
resistance, drawing on the major strikes of the past. 
Despite the stress of Peace (1979) on the speci-
ficity of worker consciousness and behaviour in Agege, 
he nonetheless permits us to recognise its ambiguities. 
Despite the revelation by all three authors of the 
capacity for effective local-level working-class pro-
test, they nonetheless help us to understand why they 
have not yet been able to translate this into class-
conscious and representative national leadership. And 
despite the limitation of the studies to factory wor-
kers at one particular point in time, they nonetheless 
sensitise us to the complex structure and process of 
working-class formation in Nigeria more generally. 
NOTES 
1. For more on this topic see Waterman (1979h) . For 
the preceding period see also Waterman (1982: 
Ch.l). For analysis of general economic develop-
ment during this period, see Williams (1976) and 
Lübeck (1977a). Björn Beekman's two papers 
(1981a, b) were received too late to be drawn on 
for this chapter. They should, however, be noted 
for the manner in which they surpass earlier 
marxist writings on the political economy of 
Nigeria. Their focus on the manner in which 
capital and state are actually developing in 
Nigeria (rather than whether these can develop, or 
are really capitalist) is, I think, consistent 
with my own orientation in this study. 
2. The strike movements are named after the chairmen 
of the two commission reports which led to the 
strikes. See Adebo Report (1970) and Udoji Report 
(1974). For the Nigerian tradition of discontent-
commissions-awards-strikes, see Cohen (1974:Ch.6 
and 233-39) . For more detailed accounts of the 
Adebo strikes at local level, see Peace (1979: 
150-73) and Lübeck (1975) . 
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Chapter 2 
THE LAGOS CARGO-HANDLING INDUSTRY[1] 
Before dealing with our two sectors it is necessary to 
note the others alongside which they exist. There are 
the shipping companies, owning or chartering the ships 
that berth at Lagos. Traditionally this was the pre-
serve of the colonial or multinational companies. But 
alongside these (and usually in dependence on them) 
there developed in the 1970s a number of Nigerian 
capitalist shipping companies. There are also the 
shipping agencies that act as ship representatives in 
port, taking care of the labour connected with loading 
and unloading, usually subcontracting the manual labour 
to the stevedoring contractors. Originally in the hands 
of the old shipping concerns, these have also been 
increasingly Nigerianised. A third type is the clearing 
and forwarding company, clearing cargos through customs 
and the NPA. Alongside a number of recognised companies 
there mushroomed in the 1970s literally hundreds of 
petty agencies in the streets around the port. The last 
type is the Customs Service, the government department 
charged with collecting revenues and preventing smug-
gling. The simple task of transporting cargo through 
the port thus requires four different agencies in 
addition to the NPA and the dock labour contractors. 
Apart from the two state monopolies (NPA and Customs) , 
These tasks are being carried out by anything from a 
dozen to over a hundred companies. The 'vertical' 
disaggregation is compounded by the 'horizontal' frac-
turing. 
It is also necessary to remember that Lagos (see 
Figure 2.1) was a boom city in the 1970s. New motorways 
were built down to and around the port, these being 
immediately blocked with the thousands of cars and 
trucks being imported. The neighbouring industrial area 
of Apapa was described in 1971 as a 'Showpiece of 
Squalor' (Daily Times, April 24, 1971). An atmosphere 
of dog eat dog commercialism, of lawlessness and viol-
ence surrounded and penetrated the cargo-handling 
Figure 2.1. Lagos Harbour, 1975. 
Source: Nigerian Mapping Co., Lagos. (Reproduced with 
permission) 
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industry. Widespread theft, smuggling and piracy were 
met by ineffective police action, or large-scale and 
bloody military operations. When dealing later with 
worker behaviour it will be necessary to keep in mind 
the fractured, competitive, lawless and violent social 
and industrial setting in which the workers found them-
selves thrust. 
In the following, a sketch will be given of each 
of the two sectors of the industry with which we are 
concerned, the NPA and the dock labour contractors. In 
each case we will deal in turn with the industrial 
structure, the nature of the labour force and the pat-
tern of labour control. We will see major differences 
between the two, differences which had a major impact 
on the nature of trade union development in each. 
Finally a more detailed and direct comparison of port 
and dock labour will be made. 
2.1. The Nigerian Ports Authority. 
The headquarters of the NPA are to be found in a 
multi-storey block on the waterside of Lagos Island, 
the political and commercial centre of the city, over-
looking almost the whole Port of Lagos. The authority 
consists of a General Manager's Department (responsible 
for overall control, and containing departments cover-
ing security, fire service, industrial relations, 
training and the biggest computer in West Africa), an 
Administrative Department (management services and work 
study), a Personnel Department, a Development Depart-
ment (statistics, planning, etc.). Operations Depart-
ment (cargo-handling and facilities), Engineering 
(maintenance and new construction). Harbours (pilotage, 
towage, etc.), Dockyard (maintenance of boats, etc.), 
as well as a number of others. 
Lagos Port itself is owned and controlled by the 
NPA. It is in fact the largest in West Africa. It 
consisted in the 1960s of the Apapa Quay, an 8,000-foot 
finger-shaped jetty capable of accommodating simul-
taneously 14 to 20 ships, (see Figure 2.2) , the Customs 
Quay (1,500 feet), and a number of others the names of 
which speak for themselves Fishery Wharf, Petroleum 
Wharf, Ijora Coal Wharf, Bulk Vegetable Oil Wharf. 
An extension was added to the back of the main 
Apapa Quay in the mid-1970s, and the oil boom required 
the addition of a ten-berth 'instant harbour' before 
the decade was out. None of these measures, however, 
was adequate for meeting the uncontrolled inflow of 
cement and other imports financed by the oil bonanza. 
The frequently displayed incompetence and wastefulness 
of the authorities during this period did not escape 
the attentions of the NPA workers. 
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Behind each of the berths of Apapa lies a transit 
shed for storage. One of them is used for both general 
export cargo and dry bulk cargo imports and exports 
from silos. This one has elevators and shiploaders 
connecting it with the silos of the Nigerian Flour 
Mills, which has its plant just beyond the port peri-
meter. Several warehouses are hired out to marketing 
boards and used for the handling of cocoa and ground-
nuts for export. Running through and round the Apapa 
Quay are the railway lines of the Port, equipped with 
shunting engines and wagons, and connecting with the 
marshalling yards and sidings of the Nigerian Railway 
Company outside. 
In 1966, as one of the series of probes into 
Nigeria's much-criticised public corporations, the new 
military regime of General Gowon appointed Justice J.O. 
Beckley to head a tribunal of inquiry into the affairs 
of the NPA. This stated that 
the Nigerian Ports Authority has, by and 
large, at all relevant times performed its 
duties and functions in accordance with the 
enactment under which it was established and 
in the best interests of the State and, as it 
may be, the general public. (Beckley Report 
1967:233) 
This sanguine judgement is, however, not one 
apparently shared by the general (i.e. literate) pub-
lic, or the state, nor is it borne out by the Beckley 
Report itself. The NPA has been under almost continuous 
criticism throughout its history. Beckley found the 
following shortcomings in NPA organisation: (1) Redun-
dant services, where the authority was providing ser-
vices irrelevant to its purpose or duplicating those 
provided at least as effectively or cheaply elsewhere; 
(2) Passenger carrying, where the wrong man (or mana-
ger? PW) was put in the wrong job, the job was then 
tailored to fit the inadequate man and additional 
individuals were assigned the rest of his work; (3) 
Inefficient methods, from faulty techniques and pro-
cesses to outmoded or inadequate equipment. 
The Beckley Report also uncovered a series of 
gross inefficiencies and malpractices, the one being 
difficult to distinguish from the other. Problem areas 
included the nature of the Board, the nature and be-
haviour of the General Manager and top management, the 
awarding of contracts, the organisation of dock labour, 
and financial and land policy. Corruption, tribalism 
and favouritism were evidently rife among the senior 
staff and directors of the corporation. 
Figure 2.2 Apapa Wharf and Industrial Area, 1975. 
Source: Based on maps drawn by Nigerian Federal Sur-
veys, Lagos. 
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It is not clear to what extent the cautious recom-
mendations of the Beckley Report were ever carried out. 
Many of those criticised were still there in the mid-
1970s. After the fall of the Gowon regime in 1975 there 
was a purge of some 600 NPA employees throughout 
Nigeria. But the purge was carried out by a top manage-
ment which was primarily responsible for the previous 
shortcomings of the organisation. Moreover, a review 
procedure shortly followed, reversing or reducing a 
number of the punishments. The public exposure of the 
dirty linen of the NPA nonetheless encouraged at least 
some union leaders in their criticism of the corpor-
ation. 
The Nigerian Ports Authority employs in Lagos 
around 10,000 workers. The port is dominated by the 
Traffic Department, with some 40 percent of total 
staff, and the Engineering Department with another 25 
percent. In terms of employment status we need to 
distinguish not simply between officers ('senior 
staff') and the ordinary workers ('junior staff). This 
latter category is itself subdivided into the 'per-
manently employed', the 'daily-paid', and two cate-
gories of even lower status, the 'temporary' and the 
'casuals'. 'Casual workers' are known colloquially as 
'hire-and-fire'. Casual labour is supposed to be labour 
engaged on capital projects of limited duration. It is 
con-centrated in the Engineering Department because 
this is the one responsible for construction. 'Tempor-
ary workers' do not appear as a category on any other 
tables of NPA staff, nor is it possible to find any 
definition of their status in the voluminous reports or 
regulations of the NPA. The category seems to provide a 
formula for taking on staff on a casual basis for other 
than capital works. It has apparently been used for the 
employment of clerks on a trial basis, after which they 
are supposed to also be converted to permanent status. 
The 'daily-paid' category is a much more familiar one, 
having an important place in the history of wage labour 
in Nigeria. At the time of the Morgan Report (1964), 
there were in NPA daily-paid workers who had been in 
the category for 20-25 years. It was apparently agreed 
between management and the unions that all daily-paid, 
with the exception of unskilled labour, should be 
converted to permanent establishment within five years. 
Despite this apparent agreement little was done to 
convert them in the 1960s. 
There exist hundreds of separate job designations 
for established junior staff within NPA and no break-
down of these in terms of numbers is available. It is 
clear, however, that the NPA is dominated by semi-
skilled or skilled manual workers and by different 
types of clerks (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2). 
The only departments with a significant proportion 
of unskilled labour are Engineering and Estates. The 
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Table 2.1 Permanently employed junior staff of Traffic 
Department, Lagos Port, by designation and salary grade 
1973 
GRADE 
A 
В 
С 
D 
E 
DESIGNATION 
Chief CU'rk 
Sh('d/Qu<iy Supervisor 
Ycird iàupcrvjsor 
Diesel Engine Supocvisor 
Quay Staff Grade I 
Asst. yard Supervisor 
Diesel Eng. Chargeman 
Senior Clerk 
Quay Staff Grade II 
Diesel Engine Driver 
Senior Shunter 
Motor Driver 
Junior Clerk 
Shunter Grade I & II 
Chief Porter 
Senior Porter 
Porter 
Shedman 
Messenger 
Senior Security Staff 
Security Staff 
Terminal Attendant 
TOTAL 
NUMBER 
1 
111 
6 
1 
404 
8 
3 
β 
2018 
24 
24 
BO 
21 
86 
4 
14 
404 
61 
124 
8 
80 
θ 
3500 
GRADE 
TUTAL 
3 
113 
423 
2167 
709 
SALARY RANGE 
IN NAIRA P.A. 
16.36-2140 
1260-1764 
960-1380 
536-1082 
698-1118 
638-1082 
536-1082 
548-740 & 364-596 
406-740 
364-596 
364-548 
364-596 
406-740 
364-596 
364-548 
Sources; R&PT&CSU Conference Documents 1973; NPA Depart­
mental Salary Structure: Staff: 1973 
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Table 2.2. Junior staff of Dockyard Division, Lagos 
Port, by designation and salary grade[a] 
GRADE 
A 
В 
С 
D 
E 
Daily-
Paldc 
TOTAL 
DESIGNATION 
Chief Clerk 
Assistant Supervisor 
Marine Eng. Asst. I 
Snr. Tech. Asst. 
Asst. Chief Clerk 
Marine Eng. Asst. II 
Technical Assistant 
Senior Clerk 
Copy Typist 
Junior Clerk 
Ambulance Attendant 
Overseer 
Roneo Operator 
Battery Charger 
Greaser/Firemen 
Asst. Overseer (Floating Dock) 
Plant Operator II 
Skilled Tradesman 
Senior Leverman 
Slipway Overseer 
Saw Doctor 
Donkeyman 
Senior Overseer 
Senior Foundry Fumaceman 
Manne Eng. Assistant III 
Messenger 
Blacksmith/Striker 
Capstanman 
Foundry Furnaceman 
Leverman 
Polisher 
Tool Issuer 
Dockman 
Semi-skilled Tradesman 
Semi-skilled Tradesman 
Clerk/Typist 
Unskilled 
NUMBER 
(1975) 
3 
16 
33 
2 
2 
23 
5 
3 
6 
17 
2 
1 
2 
1 
96 
1 
2 
190 
1 
1 
2 
4 
1 
1 
39 
2 
11 
1 
7 
1 
2 
4 
19 
37 
4 
5 
86 
63 3 
GRADE 
TOTAL 
54 
30 
3 
367 
84 
95 
SALARY RANGE IN 
NAIRA P.A. ('073) 
1,636-2,140 
1,260-1,764 
If 
960-1,380 
536-1,082 
II 
я 
» 
« 
638-1,082 
536-1,082 
698-1,082 
63R-1,082 
536-1,082 
830-1,118 
698-1,118 
Ν 
698-1,380 
364-596 
364-740 
480-740 
364-596 
406-740 
364-548 
330-393 
312-346 
Notes; a) This table is based on incompatible and 
incomplete sources and must therefore be taken as only 
approximate. b) Assistant Supervisors may also be in 
Grades В and С. c) Daily rates have been multiplied by 
26 χ 12 to reach the annual sum here. 
Sources; NPA Departmental Salary Structure; Staff 1973; 
Interview notes, August 1973. Dockyard Division Daily 
Strength Statement, August 1975. 
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Traffic Department is dominated by just one grade of 
clerk, Quay Staff II. The much smaller Dockyard is 
dominated by skilled and semi-skilled tradesmen, of 
whom around half are fully skilled. The Dockyard is, in 
fact even more heterogeneous than it here appears. The 
division contains shops for blacksmiths, boilermakers, 
coppersmiths, platers, shipwrights, patternmakers, 
foundrymen and several others. Engineering is, like the 
Dockyard, divided into separate workshops concerned 
with civil engineering, mechanical repairs, woodwork 
etc. It is also dominated by skilled and semi-skilled 
tradesmen. But alongside these there also work an 
almost equal number of unskilled labourers. With the 
exception of Harbours (mostly qualified ableseamen and 
semi-skilled labour), the other departments consist 
basically of clerks, typists and office machine opera-
tors. 
Departments differ also in ethnic composition. 
This is, as one might expect, a highly sensitive issue 
within NPA and it is difficult to obtain accurate 
evidence on it. Explanation for a particular composi-
tion may lie in recruiting policy (past or present), in 
educational development, general migration trends or a 
number of other factors. The virtual absence of nor-
therners is certainly due both to the low number of 
northern migrants in Lagos, and to the low level of 
both clerical and technical education in the north 
(educated northerners thus having little difficulty 
finding jobs locally). 
NPA wage scales have always been extremely varied 
and complex, with each of the several main scales 
broken down into sub-scales, each of these having its 
own pattern of annual increases. Individual occupations 
often had their own starting and finishing points. And 
there could, in the 1970s, still be found wage rates 
marked 'personal to holder'I 
The Udoji Commission of 1974 led to a certain 
'rationalisation' of the wage structure within NPA. 
This enables us to identify a distinct top managerial 
stratum of not more than 34 officers within the NPA in 
Lagos. At the other end of the scale, it appears that 
over two-thirds of the NPA established staff fell 
within three of the lower scales. Whilst junior/senior 
differentials appear to have fallen since colonial 
times, the real wages of the unskilled port worker had 
risen only one percent from I960 to 1975. 
The conditions of service laid down by the NPA 
shortly after its creation in 1955 give some idea of 
the formal rights and privileges of its employees, as 
well as of differences between employees (see NPA 
Conditions of Service 1957). We may note as we look at 
a few of the different headings the distinctions made 
on grounds of employment status (established versus 
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unestabiished staff), of position on the pay scale 
and, in one case, of skill. 
Within NPA, as within the civil service and other 
corporations in Nigeria, salaries were reviewed annual-
ly and subject to increases on the recommendation of 
the departmental head. Medical and dental treatment was 
provided free to both established and unestablished 
staff. Leave and travel allowance could be granted at 
the Chairman's discretion for exams, sports, studies 
and trade union business. Five days per annum on full 
pay could also be granted for personal reasons. Skilled 
unestablished workers were permitted 15-30 days paid 
leave (depending on grade), whilst other unestablished 
staff could get seven days and - after three years - 14 
days paid leave. 
Chapters 12 and 13 of the conditions of service 
dealt with termination of employment and discipline. 
Notice was of one month for established staff, two 
weeks for monthly-paid unestablished, and one week for 
daily-paid. Punishments for misconduct began with the 
withholding of increments or other measures and went up 
to dismissal for behaviour 'prejudicial to the proper 
working of the Authority'. A procedure for appeal 
against such actions was allowed for. There was also 
provision for suspension in the case of an official 
against whom a serious or criminal charge had been 
laid. 
In almost every one of these points there was a 
clear formal difference with the conditions laid down 
for senior staff. Informal rights varied even further. 
Yet the departmental, grade, occupational and employ-
ment-status differences amongst the ordinary workers 
often obscured the significance of the junior-senior 
differentials. 
The official industrial relations ideology of the 
NPA management was in large part the liberal one of its 
counterparts in Great Britain and the United States, 
and as propagated by the state in Nigeria up to 1968. 
The intention of management was clearly to reproduce at 
NPA level the self-image of the state as a neutral 
broker between the interests of management and workers. 
The industrial relations function and department 
only emerged gradually during the 1960s. In 1967 the 
NPA Chairman himself felt required to declare that 
A Labour or Industrial Relations machinery 
should be created possessing some scientific 
equipment and able to operate with rather 
more than hit and miss primitive techniques 
...The directive force of this machinery 
should be pitched at [staffed by? PW] top 
management cadre ... (Beckley Report 1967: 
160) . 
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In the following 10 years there was little evi-
dence, in either its staffing or institutions, that the 
NPA was really concerned to move from 'hit and miss' to 
'science' in labour relations. Gradually a negotiation 
structure was built up within NPA, but the effective 
bargaining depended on regular or irregular meetings at 
the Marina headquarters of the corporation. The exis-
tence of this formal structure was possibly less impor-
tant than the informal handling of minor disputes 
between union officers and ex-union industrial rela-
tions officers. But neither of these prevented the 
unions from transforming individual grievances into 
collective protest action. On the other hand, such 
occasional breakdowns did not seem to seriously bother 
the NPA, which regularly reported on the satisfactory 
state of industrial relations within the corporation. 
The NPA had at its disposal, of course, a series 
of additional devices for containing collective protest 
action within tolerable limits. Although these were 
not part of the formal - or informally recognised -
regulations, institutions or procedures, they were 
nonetheless a vital part of this machinery. These were 
the rewards and punishments handed out to individual 
workers, individual union leaders and whole unions for 
docile or hostile behaviour. The use of such devices 
suggests the reproduction within the NPA of the posi-
tive and negative stimuli for moderate or radical 
individuals and unions that existed on the national 
level. Within the NPA, however, it is to be noted that 
they were applied in a somewhat more subtle form. 
2.2 The dock labour contractors 
The Lagos dock labour contractors have traditionally 
carried out either one or both of two porterage tasks 
- stevedoring and lighterage (shipboard) or wharfage 
(shorehandling) . These are services provided to two 
different principals - the shipping companies or agen-
cies for stevedoring and lighterage, and the Nigerian 
Ports Authority for shorehandling. The three or four 
big and 20-30 smaller contractors fought each other 
openly and bitterly in the 1960s and 1970s, particu-
larly for the major shorehandling contracts of the NPA 
(see Table 2.3). Regionalism, nepotism and corruption 
frequently determined the distribution of contracts. 
Most of the companies were owned and run by traders 
with an eye to quick gross profits. The damage and 
inefficiency were tolerated by the shipping companies 
since their contracts covered them against these. But 
the NPA was not so covered - or not so concerned to 
make its contractors meet their obligations. One reason 
for NPA liberality in this respect was revealed when 
the Beckley Report showed the corrupt relations between 
an NPA Board member and a particular contractor. 
Table 2.3 NPA contract awards for 1963 
Finns 
West African Development 
and Stevedoring Co. 
Associated Stevedoring 
Services 
W. BineyC 
S.B. Bakare 
Bambadoo 
United Stevedoring Co. 
S.D. Akere 
'mi'AL CONTRACT VALUE 
Directors 
B.E. Njoku 
J.E. Ofongbu 
A. Nkwazema 
B.O. Kadirid 
R.A. Gbajabiamala 
Dr. J.A. Doherty 
Oladega Odutola 
H.K. Biney 
J.L. Smith 
H.O. Davies 
S.B. Bakare 
Alhaji Bambadoo 
Alhaji Yahaya Madawaki 
B.O. Kadiri 
B.U. Etukudo9 
Hallara A. Dikko 
S.D. Akere 
И. Akere 
Region of 
origin 
East 
East 
East 
North 
West 
West 
Ghana 
Unknown 
West 
West 
North 
North 
North 
Mid-West 
North 
West 
West 
NPA Contract 
numbers & areas 
1) Berth I & 
Transit Shed 
& Lighter 
Berth 
2) Berths 2, 2a, 
3 
3) Berths 4-6 & 
Transit Sheds 
4) Berths 7, 8, 
9 & Transit 
Sheds 
5) Warehouses A, 
В, С 
6) Offloading s 
Warehouse D 
7) Customs Quay 
NPA estimated 
value of con­
tract (EN) 
37,Э90 
* 
91,183 
107,537 
83,792 
53,636 
59,287 
99,125 
532,450 
Sources; Beckley Proceedings 1967:13:16; Beckley Report 1967:24:278-9. The first 
source contains numerous errors and omissions and has had to be corrected and exten­
ded by reference to the second. 
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The labour-contracting industry can be said to 
have been created by the foreign shipping companies and 
kept as such by the Nigerian state. When the NPA took 
over the quays on its creation in 1955, the labour 
suppliers were supposed to take on responsibility for 
the work organisation also. Despite 20 years of com-
plaints about the quality of their work and the con-
ditions of their labourers, the state authorities 
resisted the nationalisation or restructuring of the 
industry. The reason for this resistance is that top 
national political leaders and administrators also had 
personal interests in contracts (Beckley Report 1967). 
Whilst entrepreneurial self-interest argued for a 
continuation of the maximum amount of sub-contracting, 
longer-sighted bureaucrats argued for a re-structuring 
of the contract labour system. The argument was not 
only of technical efficiency but also of coming to 
terms with waves of forceful protest amongst the crude-
ly exploited contract workers. 
Although reorganisation only occurred at the end 
of the 1970s, its threat or promise has been a con-
tinual factor in union demands and actions. After 10 
or 15 years of inquiries, reports, pledges and post-
ponements, the new Integrated Cargo Handling Scheme 
(ICHS) was introduced in February 1977. The intention 
was to combine stevedoring and shorehandling in one 
operation, to reduce the number of thus integrated 
contractors to five, and to make one of these a 'model' 
employer (Patinson 1970). The model employer was to be 
the new state enterprise, the National Cargo Handling 
Company (NCHC). 
Despite the great reduction in contractor numbers 
and the technical advantages of integration, the new 
scheme seemed to be suffering from both old and new 
problems. The major old one had to do with the nature 
of the successful contractors, since at least one 
appeared to be a traditional 'paper company', and only 
one of the four was considered by shipping agencies to 
be working successfully. The major new problem was the 
NCHC itself, a company begun from scratch and with a 
top management largely consisting of inexperienced 
government appointees. This had nonetheless been given 
the lion's share of the new contracts. By offering 
better pay and improved conditions it had managed to 
attract specialised staff from other contractors. Yet 
it was at first unable to carry our lighterage opera-
tions within its area. And on its first few paydays 
there were major disturbances due to the inability of 
the company to make out pay for its thousands of wor-
kers (Business Times, March 15, 1977) . Finally, the 
old implicit collusion of the NPA with the contractors 
continued. The NPA was offering rates too low for 
contractors to operate efficiently and make an 'honest' 
profit, thus encouraging the contractors to illegiti-
mately reduce costs on wage labour. 
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An indication of the labour intensity of the dock 
labour operation may be provided by the NPA rates for 
contractors. These assumed a 50 percent element for 
direct labour costs and another 50 for overheads 
(equipment and offices) and for profit. However, the 
labour contractors had very little equipment even in 
the 1970s. Most stevedoring equipment was provided by 
shipping agencies, which used this as the justification 
for the low share of their charges to shipping com-
panies that they passed on to the stevedores. Since 
the contractors had virtually no equipment, the only 
way to increase their profits was to directly squeeze 
their labour force. 
The dock labour force consisted of some 10,000 or 
more unskilled manual labourers (general labour, se-
curitymen), semi-skilled winchmen and forklift drivers 
(mostly trained informally on the job), tally clerks 
(formally numerate and literate and also trained infor-
mally) , and headmen (gang foremen, usually more-
experienced labourers). In the absence of figures one 
is obliged to guess at proportions. Extrapolating from 
Biney's (the biggest and best-organised of the shore-
handling-and-stevedoring contractors), one would guess 
that of the total dock labour force (i.e. including 
contractors' own staffs), general labour and security-
men account for not less than 70 percent, whilst head-
men, winchmen and tally clerks account for not more 
than 15 percent (see Table 2.4). Separate from these, 
on the staffs of the contractors themselves, are the 
ancillary clerical, mechanical and junior supervisory 
personnel (perhaps 10 percent), and the senior super-
visors, accountants, etc. (one or two percent) (see 
Table 2.5). Of the total labour force, 70 percent or 
more are clearly unskilled, perhaps 20 percent could be 
considered semi-skilled, five percent skilled and one 
or two percent high-level. 
In terms of employment status amongst the ordinary 
dock labourers we need first to discuss the difference 
between 'preference' and 'non-preference' labour. The 
distinction is more theoretical than real. Although 
two-thirds of the workers registered against any con-
tractor are supposed to have preference and be guaran-
teed 15 days work per month or cash equivalent, even 
the official figures of the Ministry reveal that the 
proportion has varied between 26 and 53 percent (Labour 
Reviews 1965, 1969, 1970). In 1973, the Personnel 
Manager of Biney's stated that the number of preference 
workers was 'around 10 percent'. In 1975, S.D. Akere 
described his workforce as divided into 15 gangs of 
preference, 10 of non-preference and 35 'casual' - a 
category with no legal existence J 
The second distinction to be made is that between 
the ordinary labour directly employed by contractors 
and those in the 'pools' created under the Port Labour 
Table 2.4 W.H. Biney's total dock labour force and the number employed on one day, late 1976 
Area and labour type 
Apapa total 
Shore (for NPA) 
Preference 
Non-Preference 
Casual 
On board (for shipping 
agents) 
Preference Winchmen 
Non-Preference Winchmen 
Casual Winchmen 
Preference Labour 
Non-Preference Labour 
Casual Labour 
Sea School Jetty (for AIMS) total 
Casual Winchmen 
Casual Labour 
GRAND TOTAL 
Labour employed 21.11.76 
gang size 
12 max 
12 " 
12 " 
av. 12 
" 12 
" 12 
" 12 
" 12 
" 12 
av. 21 
16 
no. gangs 
210 
(29) 
(14) 
(37) 
(5) 
(2) 
(21) 
(2Ì) 
(12) 
(67) 
109 
(13) 
(96) 
319 
men (approx.) 
2520 
(348) 
(160) 
(444) 
(60) 
(24) 
(252) 
(276) 
(144) 
(804) 
1809 
(273) 
(1536) 
4329 
Labour list, August - Sept. 1976 
gangs 
¿lo 
100 
318 
men 
3725 
1635 
5361 
recruits 
232 
absentees 
189 
Sources: Interviews with Biney's General Manager, and the Biney Labour List (1976). 
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Table 2.5 Junior staff of W.H. Biney & Co. Ltd., Lagos, 
November 1976 
Group 1: Manual and Mechanical 
Carpenters 10 
Gear Store 11 
Mechanics 21 
Drivers (lorry) 14 
Drivers (forklift) 22 
Canteen 16 
Wharf cleaners 3 
Sub-total 97 
Group 2; 
Personnel office 4 
National Provident Fund office 3 
Allocation clerks 13 
Labour records clerks 4 
Labour checkers 5 
Record clerks 55 
Tally clerks 11 
Medical section 8 
Haulage section 31 
Time office clerks 21 
Revenue clerks 17 
Audit section 11 
Securitymen 15 
General Manager's office: stores and purchases 9 
Sub-total 207 
Group 3; Operations 
Stevedores 12 
Foremen 9 
Supervisors 33 
Quay staff 26 
Work and Coordination staff 17 
Sub-total 97 
Group 4 ; COWAC 
Drivers (forklift, tractor, crane) 57 
Sub-total 57 
GRAND TOTAL 45 8 
Source; Information provided by company. 
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Office (PLO). Pools were created for tally clerks in 
1964 and for securitymen in 1968. Demanded by these 
workers in order to strengthen their security and 
bargaining position vis-a-vis the contractors, pools 
were possibly granted to prevent contractors have 
complete control over workers responsible for checking 
and protecting cargos. The workers in the pools are 
employed and paid by the contractors, but for the 
purposes of discipline and dismissal they are under the 
PLO. In 1975 the tally clerks were themselves divided 
in status into the 'listed' and 'unlisted'. Amongst 
the listed were 221 'registered' and 67 'unregistered', 
the difference between them being one of implied pre-
ference for the first. The third group, the 'unlisted' 
or 'casual' tally clerks again seem to have no legal 
existence. 
The 5-600 headmen are an important category since 
they are appointed to this position from amongst ex-
perienced labourers by contractors and are responsible 
for the gangs. In the past they were virtual sub-con-
tractors to the contractors. Even in 1976, in the 
words of one operations manager, 'the headman is with-
out exception the king' of the gang. He is also paid 
so little that 'he is obliged to take bribes' from the 
workers he employs. Although placed in a position of 
privilege and power over the ordinary worker, the 
headman is himself a casual labourer and is - with 
respect to the contractor's own staff - in much the 
same position as the ordinary labourer. 
Official wage rates for general dock labour have 
been more or less linked to the official minimum for 
government-employed unskilled labour. Thus, at least 
the 26-5 3 percent of preference workers employed for 
over 14 days per month were said to be averaging above 
the government-employed minimum (Labour Reviews 1965, 
1969, 1970). However, dockers have been deprived of 
what they are said to earn by 1) having to pay dash (a 
bribe) to obtain and keep work, 2) receipt of less than 
the published wage for overtime or standby (during 
enforced idleness). The differential between the rate 
of the general labourer and the headman is only some 10 
percent, and the differential between the general 
labourer and the most highly-paid docker is only some 
30. 
If wage differentials did not significantly separ-
ate dockers, neither did working conditions. Consider-
ing the conditions that led up to the 1968 dockers' 
strike (Waterman 1982: Section 3.2.2), the Urhobo 
Report (1971:62-6) gave this detailed catalogue of 
common traditional troubles: (1) working hours exceed-
ing those agreed with the union and contrary to the 
Factory Act and Labour Code; (2) employment of short-
gangs of eight men instead of the required 16-20; (3) 
the lack of welfare facilities; (4) non-compliance by 
74 
some employers with the Workmen's Compensation Act, 
employers failing to compensate those injured; (5) 
non-compliance with the National Provident Fund (NPF) 
Act, the NPA admitting 'that even where there were 
violations of these provisions by an employer, no 
employer had been penalised for disregarding the pro-
visions, even when the NPA recommended that such an 
action should be taken against such employer'; (6) 
violation of Dock Labour Regulations on safety, health 
and welfare, employers seizing job cards to make il-
legal entries on them, charging for free gate passes, 
depriving workers of wages due; (7) short payment by 
many contractors; (8) payment through headmen: despite 
the fact that the Port Labour Officer had warned con-
tractors against a practice that permitted abuse, there 
was 'no guarantee that the practice has stopped since 
no effective authority to penalise defaulting employers 
has been established for this purpose'; (9) non-payment 
of wages to stand-by gangs despite the provision for 
this in the NPA contract; (10) unsatisfactory nature of 
the Dock Labour Registration Scheme: the dependence of 
registration on contractor recommendation encouraged 
bribery; and contrary to the purpose of the scheme, 
contractors were continuing to use unregistered workers 
with the consent of the PLO. 
Common conditions and limited wage differentials, 
however, are no guarantee of a united labour force. 
Different places of origin, different periods of ur-
banisation and different languages keep workers apart. 
One-time or cyclical migrants have long been a major -
even the major - element in the dock labour force. 
Recently they have been coming either from the Hausa 
north or from outside Nigeria altogether. At the other 
extreme of the dock-labour industry can be found the 
'poolworkers', who are a significantly more urbanised 
group, including second-generation workers and native 
Lagosians, many with some schooling. 
The multiplicity of companies, the difference 
between company and industry level, and the lack of 
bureaucratic, formal and legal relations within the 
sector, all make it difficult to generalise about 
industrial relations ideology and institutions within 
it. 
In terms of ideology, however, it is possible to 
identify in the 1960s a clear difference between the 
contractor level and the industrial one. Hamilton 
Kweku Biney, son of the pioneer contractor, William H. 
Biney, inherited the philanthropic and patriarchal 
mantle of his father (Waterman 1982: Sections 1.3.2 and 
3.3.1; Daily Times, February 21, 1973). H.K. Biney 
obtained for himself a Lagos chieftancy and seems to 
have run his company as feudal or tribal polity (Nka-
mare 1964). He evidently considered himself the father 
of his workers, encouraged them to approach him per-
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sonaily, played them off against his own senior staff. 
He also encouraged the development of a union (at least 
amongst the junior supervisory workers), and assisted 
successive union presidents to make the haj (pilgri-
mage) to Mecca. Whilst there may seem to be a contra-
diction between the desire to retain or encourage 
personal relations and the sponsoring of unions, it was 
a combination of the two that was Biney's own formula 
for the control of his labour force and the prevention 
of collective protest. 
The company-centred and personalised labour rela-
tions ideology of Biney evidently could not be repro-
duced at industrial level. Although it failed at the 
time, the attempt to create an industry-level indus-
trial relations ideology in the mid-1960s was signifi-
cant for the future. It was the personal vision of the 
contractor U.U. Nkamare (1964), and found expression in 
the short-lived Association of Nigerian Dock Labour 
Contractors (ANDLC to Urhobo Tribunal, April 19, 1969). 
Nkamare had studied in the United States and been a 
Port Labour Officer within the Ministry of Labour. His 
was a nationalist entrepreneur's vision, proposing a 
radical restructuring of the industry, stabilisation of 
employment, rationalisation of union structure, isola-
tion of Nigerian unions from their foreign trade union 
sponsors, and inculcation of a class-collaboration and 
nation-building ideology amongst union leaders. Much 
of this programme was achieved in the late-1970s with 
the creation of the ICHS and the administrative re-
structuring of the Nigerian unions. 
We can make related distinctions between regula-
tions and institutions at the two levels. Biney has a 
preference for sittings 'under the shade of the mango 
tree' at his own mansion (Biney Minutes, January 13, 
16, 17, 1969). These take more the nature of a royal 
court than a bargaining session. The more formal type 
of negotiations structures have never really taken root 
at Biney's. Between the 'traditional' court which 
functioned and the 'modern' institutions that remained 
on paper we can find the 'industrial relations consul-
tant', Chief O.A. Fagbenro Beyioku. Beyioku is an 
ex-NPA union leader and politician who acts as a paid 
consultant both to Biney and to the Biney Staff Asso-
ciation (BSA). Although Beyioku*s role depends on the 
continued confidence of both management and union, he 
receives twice as much money from the former. And he 
was clearly playing for Biney the role of a salaried 
industrial relations officer within the NPA. 
Most striking at the industrial level during our 
period is the lack of coordination, coherence and 
direction in industrial relations policy. In large 
part this was due to the breakdown of earlier efforts 
to create a dock-level structure on the national pat-
tern and the Anglo-Saxon model. This collapse was a 
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result of the 1968 dock strike, which was as much 
against the Western-backed and state-sponsored union as 
against the employers and state themselves (Urhobo 
Report 1971). Given the development of an unrecognised 
but radical general union amongst the dockers, and 
given the consequent strike waves of the 1970s, the 
contractors, the Ministry of Labour, the NPA and the 
police were all forced to respond. Whilst the contrac-
tors always attempted to pass the buck to the NPA - as 
principal - they were occasionally forced to deal with 
the radical union collectively. The Ministry satisfied 
itself with the repetition of formalities and homilies 
on free collective bargaining, whilst attempting re-
peatedly to breath life into the discredited moderates. 
But it was also occasionally forced to deal directly 
with the effective leadership. Unlike the Ministry, 
the NPA could not hide behind legalities. It was 
prepared, once worker complaints were translated into 
industrial action, to obtain and impose new pay rates. 
The police, finally, were forced by the ineffectivity 
of the other agencies, to play an active role in dock 
labour relations. This implied spying, threatening 
potential or actual strike leaders, beating, tear-
gassing and arresting strikers. Despite the inco-
herence of action by the various state agencies, they 
do have characteristics in common. These are 1) con-
tinual reference to laws, regulations and institutions, 
even when - as with collective bargaining - they had no 
real existence in the docks; 2) the ineffective appli-
cation of such laws and procedures as did exist, either 
against the employers or against the unions; 3) the 
pragmatic acceptance of union power, even when this 
meant de facto recognition of the feared militants and 
their unacceptable argument that dock wages had always 
been settled between unions and government directly. 
NOTES 
1. This chapter draws on Waterman (1982) but has been 
extended to cover development in the 1970s. For a 
more detailed treatment, see Waterman (1979h: Chs. 
1, 2, 3). 
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Chapter 3 
NPA AND DOCK LABOUR: A DIRECT COMPARISON 
The contrast between the conditions of the least-
privileged portworkers (hire-and-fire, daily-paid) and 
the most-privileged dockworkers (contractor staff, pool 
labour) is evidently sharp enough. When we consider 
that between the typical portworker (manual or cleri-
cal) and the typical dockworker (pool or general 
labour, more-regularly or less-regularly employed), it 
would seem appropriate to talk of a gulf. These are two 
different worlds of wage labour. Firstly, there is the 
nature of the task itself. Most dock work is physical 
labour of the simplest and most primitive kind; most 
port work requires skill and literacy. Then there is 
the extent and nature of the division of labour. Dock 
labour is divided into a relatively few categories and 
levels; port labour is divided into hundreds of desig-
nations and tens of skill levels. The homogeneity of 
dock labour and heterogeneity of port labour lies, 
however, in the nature of the task, not in the nature 
of the labour force nor in the unit of employment. The 
labour force in the docks is evidently divided by the 
number and types of employer, as well as by ethnicity. 
The port labour force is under one single employer, and 
united by literacy and the common use of English. The 
exercise of power over dock labour is direct, personal 
and arbitrary; that over port labour is formalised and 
limited by both bureaucratic procedures and liberal-
democratic norms. The difference between the working 
conditions and benefits of the two sectors hardly needs 
emphasising. Perhaps it shows itself most clearly in 
the relative staff turnover: possibly 40 percent 
amongst dockworkers (if we base ourselves on the month-
ly four percent at Biney's), less than one percent in 
the NPA. 
The comparison and contrast so far, however, has 
been based mostly on labour considered as a force of 
production, and mostly on sources made available by, or 
gleaned from, management. The comparison, moreover, has 
inevitably been indirect. A possibility for a more 
direct comparison is provided by a survey carried out 
in August 1975. This not only permits a more systematic 
comparison, it also permits us to fill in certain gaps 
in the previous sources, and to consider the two labour 
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forces more sociologically - as segments of an emerging 
working class. 
The Port and Dockworker Survey (see Appendix 1) 
was intended to compare the social and organisational 
characteristics of dockworkers and portworkers. Dock-
workers were defined to include both pool and general 
labour, but to exclude contractor staff. Port labour 
was defined to include Grades D and E (70-80 percent of 
Port Staff) , but to exclude the causal and daily paid 
(20-30 percent) and higher grades of even junior staff. 
The intention was to compare the central and typical 
categories within the two sectors - the contract dock 
labourer and the manual or clerical portworker. Second-
ly, the survey was confined within NPA to the Traffic 
and Engineering Departments (80 percent of Lagos Port 
staff), and within the docks to pool labour (eight 
percent of registered labour) and the labour of three 
large NPA contractors on the regular quays with differ-
ent areas of origin within Nigeria (40 percent of 
registered labour). Thus excluded were stevedoring-only 
contractors, and all 'jetty' labour. These decisions 
were taken for practical reasons, neither time nor 
finance permitting sampling from the total populations. 
Given the uncertainty of even NPA labour statistics, it 
was decided to assume in each industrial sector a total 
population of 10,000 and to draw a rough five percent 
sample from each. Although 194 NPA workers and 206 
dockworkers were surveyed, these were not in proportion 
to the NPA occupational groups, nor to the labour force 
within the different dock groupings. Moreover, selec-
tion of interviewees was on a non-systematic basis, 
rather than by rigorous random sampling. The questions 
were written in an English comprehensible to a primary-
educated Lagosian, then translated by native speakers 
into Yoruba and Hausa. The survey was carried out in 
these languages or in 'the general language' (the term 
preferred to 'Pidgin' by those who use it) by an ex-
perienced Lagos University graduate, assisted by two 
native Yoruba- and Hausa-speaking secondary school 
students. Coding and tabulating were done by hand. The 
restricted nature of the two populations, the non-re-
presentativity of the samples, and the crudity of the 
interviewee selection make it impossible to produce 
confident generalisations about 'the portworker' or 
'the dockworker', or to seek statistical relations 
between answers. 
Before reporting on the survey results, let us 
again make clear to whom they refer. The two NPA cate-
gories distinguished are the permanently-employed 
manual and clerical workers in the two lowest salary 
grades within the Traffic and Engineering Departments. 
The 112 clerical workers are overwhelmingly Quay Staff 
II from the Traffic Department, plus a few general 
clerks from Engineering. The 82 manual workers consist 
for 33 percent of unskilled porters and labourers 
(mostly from Traffic), 13 percent semi-skilled and 48 
79 
percent skilled workers (all from Engineering). The 
clerical workers are mostly engaged in filling or 
checking the dozen or more forms involved in the load-
ing or unloading, storing, delivery, import and export, 
pilotage and 'parking' of ships. Most of them are at 
the bottom of at least the clerical hierarchy (they may 
be giving orders to NPA manual labourers or dockwor-
kers). They sit at the end of the noisy and dusty sheds 
of the NPA, under the supervision of senior clerks, 
endlessly engaged in a largely unnecessary process of 
form-filling and paper-chasing (in Ghana the endless 
copies are avoided by use of a single-sheet Dual Pur-
pose Delivery Order). The porters and labourers are 
largely involved in fetching, carrying and cleaning 
tasks not very different from those of the dock wor-
kers. The semi-skilled and skilled workers from Engi-
neering are mostly maintenance men, involved in the 
repairing of cranes, forklift trucks and other vehicles 
belonging to the NPA. Many of them are carrying out 
their specialised and non-routine tasks at their own 
pace and without too close supervision. We will later 
see that the Mechanical Workshop was to play an inno-
vating role within NPA unionism. 
The 204 dockworkers are divided into two cate-
gories, pool labour and contract labour employed on the 
quays by three NPA contractors. The pool labour sub-
divides into 13 tally clerks and 40 securitymen (thus 
under-representing the clerks). The contract labour was 
employed by Akere, a western Yoruba contractor (53 
respondents), Mainland, of south-eastern Efik origin 
(68) , and Ramallam, of northern Hausa origin (31) . The 
tally clerks work on ship, shore or in sheds, checking 
the descriptions and quantities of goods being shifted 
by the labourers. The securitymen are supposed to 
prevent theft from ships. Both are forced through 
under-employment to spend much of their time in the 
shed used for the pool by the PLO. The pool is thus 
also an information pool and place for discussion 
amongst men who work in every corner of the port. The 
contract labourers are more identified with a parti-
cular employer, or a particular headman and gang. They 
are for the most part simple porters, shifting loads 
with their hands, on their backs, or with handtrucks. 
The headmen amongst them work along with the gangs. 
Only the winchmen, operating the ships' winches, have 
powered equipment at their disposal. 
The survey may permit us to establish an initial 
image of certain main types of worker in the two sec-
tors and to consider certain hypotheses about them. It 
also requires us to be sceptical of any attempt to 
generalise about 'dockworkers' and 'portworkers'. The 
internal heterogeneity of the two categories was con-
firmed by a first analysis of the results. For both 
this reason, and because of the nonrepresentativity of 
the samples, the data below is presented in terms of 
separate categories for each of the sectors. 
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The NPA Clerk; This is the only group with a 
substantial proportion of wage-earning fathers (and 
thus the only group with a substantial proportion of 
second-generation wage-earners), but this whole 36 
percent of fathers are white-collar workers. The ma-
jority of the clerks are from non-wage-earner families, 
19 percent of their fathers being petty-traders or 
craftsmen and 39 percent farmers. Half of the eldest 
brothers, however, are wage earners, 42 percent being 
white-collar workers. In terms of region of origin, 
these are overwhelmingly southern Nigerians, only three 
percent coming from the six northern states. Almost 
half come from the three eastern states, just over 
one-third from the west and under one-quarter from 
Lagos itself. The low proportion of northerners is 
certainly in part due to the distance of the north from 
Lagos and the under-development of education there. The 
high proportion from the east is less easy to explain. 
By way of comparison, a general survey of non-elite 
Lagos residents revealed the following proportions: 
Lagos, one-quarter; west, 34 percent; mid-west, 14 
percent; eastern states, 18 percent; north, seven 
percent (Peil 1973). 
Half of the clerks are in the 25-39 age group, 
most of the rest (39 percent) being under 25. The 
relative youth of the clerks tends to lend weight to 
evidence that this is a temporary occupation for 
school-leavers with 'their eyes and their minds else-
where' . 
The clerks are, in fact, the most educated of 
the four groups, averaging 12 years education. 77 
percent have secondary education and 16 some kind of 
post-school training. A secondary school leaving certi-
ficate is now a requirement for clerical positions at 
NPA, so this 77 percent must have actually completed 
secondary school. 
What of work experience and job stability? For 
two-thirds of the clerks the NPA has been the sole 
employer, over three-quarters have never lost a job or 
been unemployed, and 62 percent have been employed 
within their present industry for under six years. It 
is hardly surprising that the relatively young clerks 
have less experience of other employment, less experi-
ence of job loss and a shorter experience in NPA than 
others. The small proportion with long experience, 
however, may in part be explained by a greater mobility 
upwards within NPA (most senior posts requiring cleri-
cal rather than manual skills), or outwards from it. 
The advancement opportunity for clerks within wage 
employment is familiar to students of Nigerian labour 
(see Williams 1976:38-9). 
What can we add to what we already know of wages 
and conditions? The clerks average N94.80 per month, or 
81 
N3.64 per day (if we divide by 26). This puts them well 
above the dockworkers, but well below the NPA manual 
workers. Half of them are paying N10.14 per month rent, 
whilst 26 percent are paying more, and half of them are 
paying 40-70 kobo daily in fares. The significance of 
this will come out when we make comparisons below. A 
clerical family background, secondary education and 
clerical employment appears to be correlated with a 
certain present way of life. Thus, whilst a high 44 
percent of married clerk's wives are solely housewives, 
an exceptionally high 22 percent are wage-earners - all 
white collar. A low 17 percent are engaged in crafts 
and petty trade. Best friends are overwhelmingly white-
collar workers (79 percent), negligible proportions 
being found elsewhere. Just over three-quarters of the 
clerks are members of the 'respectable' colonial chris-
tian churches (for which, see Lloyd 1967:262), only 17 
percent being musi im and a negligible proportion non-
believers. The high proportion of protestants and 
catholics is no doubt influenced in part by the fact 
that secondary education in Nigeria has mostly been in 
the hands of christian missions. In terms of mother 
tongue, Ibo predominates (47 percent), being followed 
by Yoruba (30 percent) , Edo (13 percent) and Efik 
(eight percent). At work, however, the clerks are 
naturally almost 100 percent English speakers. 
The NPA Manual Worker; This group is overwhel-
mingly of non-industrial origin, 61 percent of fathers 
being farmers and 17 percent craftsmen and petty-tra-
ders. Only 2 0 percent have wage-earner fathers, these -
interestingly enough - being equally divided between 
clerical and manual employ. In this case just under 
half of eldest brothers are wage-earners, with clerks 
(31 percent) greatly predominating over manual workers 
(14 percent). In terms of family background, this group 
is hardly more proletarian than the clerks. 
The region of origin shows similar proportions to 
the clerks as far as the north (five percent) and Lagos 
(22 percent) are concerned, but there is a more equal 
balance between west (24 percent) and the three eastern 
states (29 percent). 
Whilst around half of the manual workers are, like 
the clerks, in the 25-39 age group, 36 percent are 
above. They are thus much older than the clerks. 
Although the manual workers average only nine 
years of education (three less than the clerks) , and 
the majority (56 percent) have only primary schooling, 
22 percent have had some kind of post-school training. 
This would be required for certain skilled posts at 
NPA. 
What of work experience and job stability? These 
workers have much more experience of other employment 
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(66 percent) and of unemployment (33 percent) but over 
half of them have been with NPA for more than 10 years. 
They thus have greater experience both of wage-emp-
loyment in general and of the NPA itself. They would 
also seem to be more attached to NPA - possibly because 
of the lack of promotion opportunities and/or of 
attractive possibilities outside the corporation. 
The manual workers are averaging N146.70 per month 
(N5.64 per day) - which is some 50 percent more than 
the clerks. This cannot be due only to the difference 
in wage scale between a Quay Staff II and a skilled 
manual worker, since this is not very significant. It 
is probably also due to the fact that most of the 
manual workers would be at the top of their scale 
whilst most of the clerks would be near the bottom of 
theirs. Annual increments can add 20 percent or more to 
the minimum on each scale. The manual workers are 
paying rents and fares in the same ranges as the 
clerks. 61 percent are paying rent of N10-14 per month, 
whilst 21 percent are paying more, and half of them are 
paying 40-70 kobo per day in fares. It appears that 
whilst the majority of clerks are paying 11-15 percent 
of monthly wages on rent and 11-19 percent of daily pay 
on fares, the majority of manual workers are paying 
7-10 percent and 7-12 percent respectively. 
To what extent, however, does the way of life of 
manual workers vary from that of the clerks? Whilst a 
comparable proportion of wives (39 percent) are house-
wives only, almost half (45 percent) are in crafts and 
petty-trading, and only nine percent in wage labour -
overwhelmingly white collar. The higher proportion in 
petty-entrepreneurship may again be due to age, since 
it is women with grown children (to look after smaller 
ones) who have more opportunity for other occupations. 
The low proportion in wage employment is certainly due 
to the lower educational levels of manual workers' 
wives: there is as yet little call from the wage sector 
in Lagos for other than white-collar labour from women. 
As for best friends, the majority are in wage labour, 
more or less evenly divided between clerical work (35 
percent) and manual work (32 percent). Another 21 
percent are petty-entrepreneurs. It would seem that 
whilst clerks might well be incorporated into a cleri-
cal worker network, NPA manual workers are far from 
incorporated into one of manual workers. As far as 
religion is concerned, we find smaller proportions in 
the 'respectable' christian churches (67 percent) and a 
larger proportion of muslims (27 percent). These dif-
ferent proportions are evidently related to ethnicity, 
since amongst the manual workers there is a greater 
proportion of the more-muslim Yoruba (44 percent) than 
of the mostly-christian Ibo (27 percent). At work, a 
smaller proportion claim to speak Pidgin and seven 
percent Yoruba. In reality the percentage of Pidgin 
speaking is likely to be higher, given that this is the 
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normal language of the primary educated in Southern 
Nigeria, even if they do not care to admit it. 
The Pool Dockworkers; As with the NPA manual 
workers, 7 8 percent of the fathers are non-industrial. 
Far less are in wage employment (eight percent) -
overwhelmingly clerical. A similar proportion of eldest 
brothers are in wage employment (42 percent) , but with 
a bigger proportion in manual occupations (18 percent). 
The difference from the manual portworker is thus not 
so striking. 
The region of origin is more distinctively dif-
ferent. There are, as with both previous groups, few 
northerners (six percent), but also few easterners 
(also six percent) . The sector is dominated by wes-
terners (39 percent) and Lagosians (28 percent). The 
low proportions of northerners and easterners are sug-
gestive of a monopolisation of opportunities here by 
Yoruba indigenes - a matter to be returned to below. 
As far as age is concerned, half are also in the 
25-39 group. All the other half are 40 or older. This 
is again suggestive of a monopolisation of the rel-
atively-privileged pool positions by early comers. It 
may also be that older men can easily continue in the 
non-strenuous pool jobs. This category claims an aver-
age of seven years education, little under that of the 
NPA manuals. This comparatively high level is due to 
the fact that over half (57 percent) claim secondary 
education. It is evident that this could not have been 
completed, otherwise they would have been in more 
regular employ. 
Whilst a high 87 percent have experience outside 
dock labour, and 44 percent have been unemployed (as 
distinct from being under-employed within dock labour), 
an exceptionally high 61 percent have been over 10 
years in the industry. However, the difference from 
manual portworkers still appears to be one of degree. 
The gap becomes a chasm only when we come to 
living standards. Poolworkers average N2.50 per day, 
or N65 if working a 26-day month. On this basis pay is 
less than half of what an NPA manual worker gets, but 
over three-quarters of what an NPA clerk does. As we 
know, however, many dockworkers do not get a full 
month's work. We can still consider rents and fares on 
the assumption of full employment. Whilst 39 percent of 
pool workers were paying under N10 per month rent, half 
were paying rents in the same range as half the port-
workers, N10-14. Half were also paying fares in the 
same range as half the portworkers, 40-70 kobo. But, in 
this case, rent is equal to 15-22 percent of the full 
month's income and fares are equal to 15-22 percent of 
the daily one. Given the endemic under-employment of 
even poolworkers, the majority of them must be spending 
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at least 30-50 percent of earnings on housing and 
transport alone! 
To what extent does this difference in living 
standards find expression in the poolworkers' way of 
life? Only 14 percent of wives are solely engaged in 
housework - the lowest of all four groups by far. A 
negligible number are in wage labour (six percent) -
mostly clerks. And an exceptionally high 79 percent are 
engaged in petty-trading and crafts. While age might 
make this possible, the low and irregular income of 
husbands would seem to make it necessary. 
As for best friends, a greater proportion is in 
wage employment than amongst NPA manual workers, but 
whilst almost the same proportion are manual workers 
(34 percent), almost half of total friends are white-
collar workers (46 percent). Only 15 percent are 
petty-entrepreneurs. No easy explanation comes to mind 
for this distribution. 
Whilst a lesser proportion than the portworkers 
are catholics and protestants (53 percent), a larger 
proportion are muslim (31 percent) and a small but not 
insignificant number (12 percent) belong to the 'low-
class' Nigerian christian churches or sects, such as 
the cherubim and seraphim. Whilst the higher proportion 
of Muslims is explained by region of origin, membership 
of the sects may represent a deliberate rejection of 
the high-class established churches (see Lloyd 1974: 
200) . 
The poolworkers are overwhelmingly Yoruba (72 
percent), the only other group significantly repre-
sented being the mid-western Edo (22 percent). Whilst 
13 percent claim to speak mostly Yoruba at work, 81 
percent claim to speak English (again, probably Pid-
gin) , and another seven percent Pidgin. This is the 
group in which a single ethnicity most predominates. 
However, the high proportion of English/Pidgin speakers 
prevents this group from being cut off from commu-
nication with each other or with the portworkers. 
The Experienced Dockworker on the Quays: Fathers 
are distributed as with the poolworkers, 64 percent 
being farmers, 16 percent in petty-entrepreneurship, 
seven percent in wage employment - as usual mostly as 
clerks. 
This category shows the lowest proportion of 
native Lagosians (10 percent) and a fairly even dis-
tribution between easterners (26 percent), westerners 
(31 percent) and - for the first time - northerners (2 8 
percent). The high proportion of easterners is due to 
the special composition of the workers for Mainland, 
and the northern proportion is lower than it would have 
been in the northern dry season and if jetty labour had 
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been surveyed. The relatively low proportion of 
Lagosians suggests the low status of dockwork in their 
eyes. 
Half are, as usual, in the 25-39 age group, but 
whilst only 21 are over 39, 28 percent are under 25. 
This makes them much younger than the poolworkers. 
With an average of only four years education, this 
category has almost equal numbers with primary edu-
cation (47 percent) and with none at all (43 percent) . 
The educational distance from the poolworkers is great 
enough, that from the portworkers is enormous. 
This group has considerable experience of other 
employment (58 percent) and unemployment (44 percent), 
and half of them have been employed in the docks for 
under five years. Whilst their employment and unem-
ployment experience is comparable with that of the 
poolworkers and manual portworkers, they have a much 
shorter experience in their present job. 
The general dockworker averages N2.34 per day, or 
N60.84 in a 26-day month. Whilst we know that such a 
26-day month is purely hypothetical, we will still 
assume full employment in order to assess living costs. 
Half are paying under N10 rent, half are once again 
paying N10-14, and half are again paying 40-70 kobo 
fares. In this case rent is equal to 16-23 percent of 
the full monthly wage, and fares to 17-30 percent of 
the daily one. This group is in its majority thus 
spending at least 33-53 percent of earnings on housing 
and transport! Since we can assume that the general 
dockworker is less employed than the poolworker, the 
gap between them may be somewhat larger. But the 
distance from the portworker must again put them in 
another world. 
Is their social world that different either from 
the port or from the poolworkers? Whilst a considerable 
proportion of wives (65 percent) are in petty-trading 
and crafts, almost one-third are housewives only. 
Almost none are in wage employment. Again, the rela-
tively high proportion of housewives may be explained 
by the age factor. The difference from the poolworker 
is one of degree. The general dockworkers have a lower 
proportion of best friends in wage employ than the 
poolworkers (54 percent), but they have the highest of 
all four groups in manual employ (34 percent). They 
have 26 percent in crafts and petty-trading, and are 
the only group to claim a significant number in farming 
(10 percent) . Again the differences seem to be only 
slight. 
As for religion, muslims are in a majority (57 
percent), protestants/catholics being only 39 percent -
more or less reversing the proportions for poolworkers. 
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Only five percent belong to the christian sects. Both 
the high proportion of muslims and the low proportion 
of sect members is probably explained by the lesser 
urbanisation of this category. 
The majority of the general dockworkers are again 
Yoruba (61 percent), a significant proportion being 
Efik (16 percent) , Hausa and Ibo accounting for nine 
percent each. The high proportion of Efik is again 
accounted for by Mainland, and the low proportion of 
Hausa by the factors mentioned for northerners in 
general earlier. At work, however, a majority speaks 
Yoruba (56 percent), 26 percent claiming (dubiously) 
English and 14 percent Pidgin. It is noteworthy that 
even our more-experienced sample of dockworkers pro-
duces only 40 percent of English/Pidgin speakers. 
Whilst we cannot assume that the other 60 percent 
understands no English, it is evident also from the 
percentage without schooling, that a high proportion of 
even the more-experienced general dockworkers may be 
cut off from communication with the three other ca-
tegories. However, they are not so much cut off from 
these categories (amongst whom those speaking Yoruba or 
Hausa can easily be found) , as from their f e 11 ow wor-
kers. This is even more true of communication with and 
amongst the jetty labour, which we have not so far 
considered. 
Before attempting to summarise the survey, it may 
be worthwhile adding a little extra evidence about this 
important missing category. After all, whilst the 
poolworkers are important both for their role as a 
leadership base and as a sociological link between 
ordinary dockers and others, they represent only a tiny 
proportion of the dock labour force as a whole. What I 
have called 'jetty labour* however, represents a very 
considerable proportion. At Biney's 41 percent work on 
the Sea School Jetty, and in late 1976 a considerable 
proportion of this 'savanah-sahel' labour was also 
working on the regular quays. The evidence concerning 
this type of labour is not closely comparable and is 
based on no more than two or three individual or group 
interviews carried out on Sea School Jetty or Force 
Road Jetty in late-1976. The interviews were with two 
headmen and one labourer from Niger, with a Hausa head-
man from Zaria and with a group of labourers from near 
Gao in Mali. All the interviews but one were in French. 
An attempt will be made to present it here in an order 
that does make some kind of comparison possible with 
the already-described groups. 
The Migrant Dockworker on the Jetties; In terms of 
background, all but the Hausa headman came from farming 
or herding families, in which in most cases brothers 
are similarly engaged. With the exception of the two 
headmen, who appeared to be aged between 30 and 40, and 
one who was older than this, all were under 25. All but 
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the Hausa were illiterate in the colonial languages, 
although several were literate in Arabic. Even the 
French-speaking headmen could not write, although they 
could count and sign their names. A few mentioned the 
sahel drought (for which see Meillassoux 1974) as the 
reason they had left home to seek work and money. 
Whilst for most of the labourers this was the first 
experience of employment, one or two had worked in 
cities as petty-traders previously. Two headmen had 
experience as dockers in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. The 
Hausa had worked as a seaman and could swear like one. 
Most of the workers expressed their intention to work 
for just a few months before returning to their farms. 
Two headmen made N80 in 12-hour shifts during one month 
on the Sea School Jetty. One made N140 working 9-10 
24-hour shifts on the Force Road Jetty. Labourers 
reported earning N3-4 for a 12-hour shift or 8-10 for a 
24-hour one. Two of the headmen were paying N10-11 for 
their rooms, one was staying free with a friend. Most 
of the labourers were sleeping in compounds, behind 
stores or under bridges with village or ethnic bro-
thers. They were either paying nothing or 10-20 kobo 
fares to the jetties, sometimes coming but not finding 
work. Many were living on the jetties themselves, 
either completely unprotected or in makeshift straw, 
stick, cardboard and plastic constructions. Those 
living on the jetty would wait till their names were 
called for work before sending one of their number to 
buy 5-10 kobo of meat and garrì for each to take on the 
lighters. All were without exception muslim, and one 
headman reported that many workers turned to the mallam 
(a learned man and spiritual leader) also with their 
non-spiritual problems (c.f. Lübeck 1975a,1975b). The 
Hausa headman communicated with his superiors in Eng-
lish, with his (ethnically-mixed) labour in their own 
tongues, and with their supervisors in Hausa. The 
isolation of this type of docker from the rest and from 
the general population in Lagos was emphasised by 
their complaints concerning the behaviour toward them 
not only of their supervisors but also of the food-
sellers and others on the jetties, 'who won't even let 
you drink water from the pipe', and 'who treat us like 
dogs*. 
Let us now try to summarise all the new evidence 
we have. It is clear that there is a major difference 
in living standards between even the best-off dock-
workers and the poorer portworkers. It is clear, also 
that there is a major difference between background and 
way of life of the NPA clerks - much surrounded by a 
white-collar network and culture - and the bulk of the 
dockworkers, on the quays or on the jetties. In fact, 
the clerks appear by these tokens isolated also from 
the NPA manual workers. But the NPA clerks and manual 
workers have much else in common. The educational gap 
is not so great, and they share a common language. 
Whilst one can find similar common features in the way 
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of life of dockworkers in the pool and on the quays, 
and whilst the living-standard gap between them may be 
less than between the two NPA groups, they do not 
really share a single language. And when we reach jetty 
labour we find a group as distinct as the clerks, and 
at the other extreme of a whole series of axes - urban-
rural, southern-northern, literate-illiterate, Anglo-
phone-non-Anglophone, etc. Evidence of the portworker-
dockworker gap is here in abundance. But this must not 
be permitted to conceal the significant differences 
between portworkers, or between dockworkers, nor the 
considerable linkages that exist between the way of 
life of at least the manual portworkers and the dock-
workers in the pool. 
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Chapter 4 
DISCUSSION, SHAPING, DIVIDING AND CONTROLLING 
Although the two previous chapters are meant - like the 
first - to serve primarily as background for what 
follows, their largely descriptive character does call 
for some interpretation. This will be carried out in 
the terms indicated in Section 4 of the Introduction. 
Some key concepts will be briefly explained, but any 
more extensive theorisation will be reserved for the 
introductory chapters of the following parts of this 
study. The three areas to be considered will be those 
of industrial structure and organisation, of labour 
relations and of the labour force. 
4.1. TNCs, local capital and state 
The absence of the transnational companies (TNCs) from 
either of our two sectors during this period should not 
conceal their symbiotic relationship with foreign 
capital. This is not only in the sense that both NPA 
and contractors provide a crucial service to foreign-
or Nigerian-based shipping or industrial TNCs. It is 
also a matter of their historical origins and con-
tinuing dependency. Ever since colonial times foreign 
capital has wanted the Nigerian state to bear the costs 
(from taxes on peasant production) of a low- or non-
profit service to themselves. In the NPA case it has 
been primarily an interest in avoiding the massive 
investment and running costs. The interest in a local 
capitalist contractor sector was probably twofold. In 
the first place, it seems likely that the shipping 
companies did not wish to be confronted with control-
ling a mass of low-paid, unskilled and uncommitted 
labour. In the second place, by divulging themselves of 
this task they could also stimulate the growth of a 
local capitalist stratum too weak to challenge them yet 
sharing their fundamental values.[1] 
What of the relationship between the state and 
capitalist sector in the Port? The state sector was the 
first and best developed in Nigeria and has always 
provided the major basis and stimulus for local capi-
talist development. The creation of the Integrated 
Cargo-Handling Scheme (ICHS) and the National Cargo-
Handling Company (NCHC) appears to have been a movement 
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in the other direction. The different attitudes of 
state officials expressed here have been interpreted in 
terms of a conflict between generalist and profes­
sional-technocratic administrators (Turner 1978; 
Williams and Turner 1978), a conflict that was taking 
place more broadly in Nigeria at this time. However, 
this victory for the latter fraction within the bureau­
cracy must be qualified in two ways. In the first 
place, it was a comparatively easy victory: neither the 
contractors nor their bureaucratic sponsors were will­
ing or able to fight openly for the continuation of the 
old pattern. In the second place, state action was not 
against capitalism but against petty-capitalism. Along­
side the NCHC it in fact created four capitalist con­
cerns out of the 20-30 that had previously existed. The 
possibility of corrupt relations between administrators 
and contractors therefore remained. 
The anarchy, waste, corruption, inefficiency and 
foreign dependency of the Lagos cargo-handling industry 
at this period should not be considered obstacles to 
its development in Nigeria, nor as symptomatic of some 
deviation from an abstract model of capitalist or 
bureaucratic behaviour and development. If the industry 
appears to be suffering from 'underdevelopment', then 
it is as a result of the production of such under­
development by (and in) the industrialised capitalist 
industries, states and international agencies them­
selves. What we are looking at is the manner in which 
capitalist development is occurring in Nigeria. 
Before moving on to the matter of labour rela­
tions, we need to recognise that these include what we 
have been dealing with above. We cannot take the owner­
ship pattern as a given setting, level or structure 
within which - or beneath which - labour relations 
occur. Both the number of changes identified and the 
manner of their occurrence require us to remember that 
labour relations in the industry begin here. Conflicts 
over NPA inefficiency or the restructuring of the dock 
labour sector were not simply between different frac­
tions of the bureaucracy, between bureaucrats and 
capitalists, or between foreign and local capitalists. 
They were also struggles оbetween capital and state on 
the one hand and labour on the other. This is not only 
in the sense that the Beckley Tribunal had to come to 
terms with resistance to bureaucratic norms within NPA, 
or that the ICHS was a response to decades of dock-
worker rebellion. It is also in the sense that control 
and organisation became - as we will later see in 
detail - issues for the unions in both sectors. In both 
the above cases, however, we must recognise that 1) the 
labour-capital contradiction did not predominate, 2) 
labour's positions did not go beyond or outside the 
terms proposed by capital and state, and 3) these 
struggles were carried out independently of each other 
by the two major fractions of labour in the industry. 
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4.2 Labour-control strategy 
Whilst we must speak of ownership and organisation as 
crucial aspects of labour relations, we now have to 
consider the latter in its more conventional sense. 
Although the conventional term used for this is 'in-
dustrial relations' I prefer to speak of the 'labour-
control strategy' proposed or practised by capital and 
state. This is to avoid the aura of science and norm of 
compromise that inevitably surround the traditional 
liberal term, and also because I wish to examine the 
capitalist project in this area (Waterman 1979h: Intro-
duction, Section 3.4). It is evident that labour-con-
trol strategies will vary not only between successive 
phases of capitalist development in one social forma-
tion, but also between formations in the present capi-
talist-dominated world, between particular modes within 
one formation, and particular sectors within one 
mode. [2] The three national-level strategies to be 
mentioned here (or which already have been earlier) are 
the non-interventionist, competitive type associated 
with the ideology of laissez faire, the liberal-pater-
nalist one of positive state intervention in economy, 
welfare and conflict-regulation, and the corporatist 
one which only recognises a labour interest as sub-
ordinate to an all-encompassing state. 
Within a national Nigerian setting marked by a 
certain movement from a liberal-paternalist to a cor-
poratist labour-control strategy, and with this new 
strategy meeting vigorous local-level worker resis-
tance, what was happening within the Port? 
Within the NPA, the liberal-paternalist pattern 
was continuing to develop throughout this period. And 
it has been suggested that despite challenges there was 
no generalised breakdown of labour-control strategy 
within NPA at this time. The relative success of NPA 
strategy cannot be simply explained in terms of the 
relative privilege of its labour force. Both the suc-
cess - and its evident limits in the mid-1970s - re-
quire reference to politics and ideology. The success, 
such as it was, should rather be seen as due to the 
following factors. Firstly, the NPA strategy was con-
sistent with the traditional national one, thus giving 
it the legitimacy accruing to the 'neutral' state (if 
not to its 'greedy and corrupt' functionaries). Second-
ly, this traditional pattern was one approved by both 
Western unions and the ILO, which had high moral autho-
rity amongst Nigerian unionists. Thirdly, the notion of 
an NPA 'family' had been built up during the common 
struggle of senior and junior staff for Nigerianisation 
in the 1950s, and by the widespread and rapid promo-
tions of the 1960s. The consequent individual mobility 
undermined collective mobilisation because even those 
left in the union or worker ranks could feel that they 
had friends in high places within NPA. The increasing 
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challenge to NPA control strategy in the 1970s was 
due - as we will later see - to developing contra-
dictions here rather than to any simple economic fac-
tor. 
Within the contractor sector we have to consider 
both the company level (as represented by Biney's) and 
the industrial one. We have seen how Biney's ideology 
of patronage was supplemented by institutions of a 
conventional liberal-paternalist type (unions plus at 
least the forms of collective bargaining) , as well as 
one which seemed to bridge the two (the consultant) . 
The inadequacy of the patron-client strategy within 
Biney's is due to the fact that it is transferred from 
a rural situation in which individualised clients are 
in a one-to-one and face-to-face relationship with the 
patron (c.f. Sandbrook 1975) . The socialised nature of 
wage-work and the common large scale of industrial pro-
duction are thus subversive of the bases of patron-
client relations. The development of common protest 
action within Biney's required him to make gestures in 
a liberal-paternalist direction. 
At industrial level we contrasted the aspirations 
of Nkamare with the incoherence in practice. Nkamare's 
was not only a nationalist-capitalist position but one 
which went beyond the current national strategy and in 
the direction of the corporativism of the 1970s. What 
took place at the dock labour industry level in prac-
tice was a conflict between different levels and in-
stances of labour control. One can thus find elements 
of a laissez faire ideology, in which non-institu-
tionalised conflict between dockers and contractors is 
being permitted, with the police being brought in to 
preserve life and property. The incoherence can be 
explained in terms of relations between the three major 
forces present: the state, the contractors and the 
labourers. In the first place, the liberal-paternalist 
strategy was inappropriate to the needs and capacities 
of either the petty-capitalists or the contract labour-
ers. The Ministry of Labour was totally oriented toward 
the large-scale modern sector (class relations within 
which provide the historical stimulus to liberal-pater-
nalist strategy). The petty-capitalists were too hos-
tile to each other to combine - either with or against 
the capitalist Biney. And whilst the labourers were 
capable of articulating a forceful 'no', they were not 
yet capable of imposing a desired alternative. Thus, 
despite the militancy of the dock labour force, the 
Nigerian state could for most of this period afford 
incoherence in its control strategy. 
If we contrast NPA strategy with that of our 
sample contractor, W.H.Biney, we would seem to have 
precisely that contrast between 'responsible autonomy* 
and 'direct control' identified by Andrew Friedman 
(1977:6). The first is reserved for those workers whose 
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skills, knowledge or control role make them crucial to 
management, and for those able by collective action to 
win this status. The second is reserved for those 
workers who do not have such skills or roles and who 
are unable to collectively defend themselves. However, 
one can accept such a conceptualisation only on re-
cognition that there is no wage-labour relationship 
that does not include both these elements. At the 
'bottom' end, Biney jetty labour is not only subjected 
to close supervision through headmen and supervisors, 
but also to significant ideological appeals. At the 
'top* end, even senior NPA staff are subject to crude 
financial and disciplinary sanctions. A conceptua-
lisation in terms of historically-rooted strategies may 
seem preferable, although we should also avoid opposing 
the patron-client strategy of Biney to the liberal-
paternalism of the NPA management. 'Patron' and 'pa-
ternal', after all are etymologically linked with 
'father', and both managements were concerned to pre-
sent their enterprises as families, under the bene-
volent but strict control of a natural head. 
4.3 Differential proletarianisation 
In turning now to the workers we need to concentrate on 
the process of proletarianisation. I use this word to 
mean what capital attempts to do to labour - to reduce 
it to a factor of production, lacking in control over 
capital, means of production or the labour of others. 
The production of such a homogeneity amongst wage-
labour in general actually requires a heterogeneity 
that disguises the process from individual workers and 
groups of workers. The increasing technical capacities 
and collective consciousness of workers over time 
requires that such heterogenisation be repeatedly 
reproduced. Let us consider this process by first 
comparing our two sectors and then examining each of 
them separately. 
If wage-labour implies a general process of pro-
letarianisation - a division between a decreasing 
minority of capitalists and a majority of proleta-
rians - then we must note that in the NPA the capi-
talist is missing and that in the contractor sector the 
workers are not yet completely separated from other 
means of production. It is easy for us to see within 
NPA an opposition between some 9,500 workers and the 
three or four top managers with significant control 
over capital, means of production and the labour of 
others. Yet these top managers are not owners and the 
state they represent presents itself to the workers as 
either the neutral organ of Nigerian society or even 
the collectivist force within it. Whilst there would 
seem to be a classical capitalist-worker relationship 
in the contractor sector, we must note that 1) most 
owners were petty-capitalists, 2) they were all sub-
contractors, mediating between their workers and their 
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principals, and 3) dock labourers were dependent to 
differing degrees on petty-commodity production - of 
their wives at home, of themselves in town, or as 
cyclical or one-time migrants from farming. Thus, even 
an initial specification of class relations suggests 
the complexities of the wage-labour relationship at the 
level of the industry. When we consider the internal 
differentiation of each labour force the picture be-
comes yet more complex. 
Here it is necessary to explain the concepts of 
fraction, segment and stratum that have been developed 
precisely to deal with divisions within classes. By 
fractions I mean class elements involved in different 
economic instances within a social formation. The 
significant fractioning amongst workers is likely to be 
between economic sectors by ownership or scale, but can 
also be by product or activity. By segments I mean 
class elements distinguished by such non-economic 
criteria as region, tribe, religion or age. By strata I 
mean class elements with differential access to control 
over capital, means of production, labour power and -
consequently - income (c.f. Post 1978:84-6). 
The NPA workers belong to the fraction of the 
Nigerian working class employed by the state, this 
being the largest such fraction in Nigeria, and one 
enjoying considerable relative benefits and oppor-
tunities. The most significant fractioning amongst them 
is by department and designation due to a considerable 
overlap between department and designation (Harbours 
with 'floating staff', Engineering with manual workers, 
Traffic/ Operations with clerks), powerful bases for 
separate identities existed. Perhaps the major seg-
mentation was the ethnic one - particularly where it 
was reinforced by department and/or designation, as 
with the 'floating staff'. As for stratification, this 
is highly developed and complex within NPA, involving 
employment status, skill/education and wages/condi-
tions - although these are commonly correlated and 
mutually reinforcing. The only major division amongst 
NPA workers of which we have much direct evidence is 
that between the clerical and manual workers. This is a 
fractioning with a historical basis in stratification 
(mental/manual). Although in income terms the clerks 
today can hardly be considered a superior stratum, the 
historical origin of clerical labour, the family back-
grounds of clerks, and their present incorporation into 
a white-collar culture, provides plentiful material for 
differential consciousness, organisation and action. 
This should not be understood as a division between 
middle-class clerks and proletarian labourers within 
NPA. The labour of the clerical workers is customarily 
more divided, standardised and routine than that of 
most NPA manual labourers. Part of NPA manual labour 
retains features of artisan production, with workers 
having considerable control over the labour process, 
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speed and quality of work (which is frequently of a 
non-standardised and non-repetitive type). Some workers 
even have their own tools. And, as we have seen, they 
are incorporated outside work into a petty-commodity 
rather than a working-class milieu. The major homo-
genising factors within NPA may have been not so much 
the traditional senior/junior gulf as the closing down 
of promotion possibilities and the consolidation of a 
bureaucratic, authoritarian and self-interested senior 
staff. 
The contract workers belong to the small - if 
growing - fraction of the working class employed by 
local capital. If their common characteristic is their 
casual employment and partial proletarianisation, they 
are nonetheless significantly divided. The most obvious 
fractioning is by company and headman, with each offer-
ing somewhat different conditions. The second is by 
job, but here there are only four identified tasks 
rather than hundreds. Segmentation, however, is much 
more marked than in NPA, with ethnic differentiation 
between employers, gangs, worksites - and strata. Stra-
tification by employment status is significant, with 
three categories between contractor staff workers at 
the top and jetty labour at the bottom. Jetty labour, 
moreover, was being paid on a piecework rather than a 
time basis. The major obstacle to homogenisation would 
seem to be the linguistic/ethnic segmentation, parti-
cularly where this overlaps with the more important 
employment status differences (pool, quay, jetty). The 
major stimulus to common consciousness, organisation 
and action is the common insecurity of the mass of 
labourers, and the relative lack of wage differenti-
ation between employment strata and job designations. 
One must hope that this treatment of the multiple 
divisions within each of our two labour forces will 
subvert the notion of a dichotomy between them. Further 
assistance in this task is provided by Bromley and 
Gerry (1979:5). Concerned precisely with breaking down 
the wage-employment/self-employment dichotomy, they 
offer the following spectrum of positions: 1) inde-
finite wage-work; 2) short-term wage-work; 3) disguised 
wage-work; 4) dependent work; 5) true self-employment. 
Since our contract workers fall under Category 2, we 
can see how close they stand to the 'indefinite wage-
workers' who form the majority in the NPA. The close-
ness is due not only to the wage-form and the type of 
workplace, but also to the collective nature of most 
casual labour and (unlike the other three forms) its 
common recognition as wage-work in law. 
What we have so far been looking at is the attempt 
of capital and state to shape, divide and control the 
wage-labour force. This is not a matter of capitalist 
conspiracy, nor of a common project of capitalists and 
bureaucrats (since they usually conflict on this 
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issue) . It lies in the nature of capital and state as 
forms. Capital - the commodity form - implies division 
of labour, individualisation, competition, hierarchies 
of knowledge and power. The state as a form provides 
both the basis for the reproduction of capital and the 
means for concealing/overcoming market anarchy. This 
implies the necessity for repeatedly re-dividing the 
mass of labouring people, who potentially or actually 
threaten to reconnect the 'economic' and the 'poli-
tical' and to thus distribute social control amongst 
themselves. 
Having looked at the capital-labour relationship 
from the side of capital, and having seen what this 
implies for the multiple divisioning of labour, let us 
now consider the division/unity dialectic from the side 
of labour - in terms of its union organisation and its 
collective protest action. 
NOTES 
1. For an analogous relationship in the early 20th 
century Nigeria, consider the use of contractors 
and contract labour in railway construction (Mason 
1979). In this case, of course, the principal was 
the colonial state. 
2. The concept 'social formation' is not a critical 
one for this study yet requires at least some 
specification. It refers to the historically 
concrete and specific combinations of modes of 
production (slave, feudal, capitalist, etc.) that 
can be identified in the past or present-day 
world. Says Martha Harnecker (1974: 132) : 
This concrete, historically-determined, 
social totality, may correspond to a 
particular country or to a series of 
countries with a common history and more 
or less similar characteristics. One can 
thus speak of the Chilean or Mexican 
formation, etc., as well as of the Latin 
American social formation. (My tran-
slation. PW) . 
I would not myself use the term of a particular 
country, a category primarily determined by the 
state. I might use it of a series of countries, 
insofar as such a grouping would be determined -
as Latin America is - by a multiplicity of common 
forces and by a common position within the world 
capitalist system. How I do, in practice, use it 
here and below is for the three major socio-poli-
tical-economic groups within the world today -
more familiar as the first, second and third 
worlds. 
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Chapter 5 
THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION: UNIONS, CAPITAL AND STATE 
Part II of this work is concerned with the 'external 
relations' of the unions, with how they relate to 
capital and state. It considers union strategy (or 
leadership ideology), the levels and types of worker 
organisation. The basis is a survey of organisations in 
each sector, presented in historical perspective. This 
permits us to see the changes that occurred over a 
decade or so. Whilst we will inevitably touch on the 
'internal relations* of the unions and on collective 
protest action, detailed treatment of these is reserved 
for Parts III and IV respectively. 
The conceptualisation presented in this chapter 
may be more than is needed to cover the subject matter 
of Part II. What it is intended to do is to provide a 
synthesis of labour movement theory. As such it will 
not only provide a source for the analysis carried out 
in Chapter 8, but a historical and social context 
within which our subject matter can be placed. It will 
also provide a source for analysis in later parts of 
this work. 
In what follows we will consider in turn 1) the 
general phenomenon of trade unionism, 2) its historical 
development internationally, 3) the socio-political 
contexts of union activity, 4) its socio-economic 
contexts, 5) levels of worker struggle, 6) types of 
organisation, and 7) leadership strategies. Before 
beginning this theoretical exposition some explanation 
of the exercise might be in order. Each separate piece 
of conceptualisation provides us not simply with tools 
but also with standards - explicit or implicit. These 
standards are intended to be future-oriented without 
being teleologica!. This means that they are recognised 
as being persuasive in nature, but that the future 
possibilities or necessities suggested are rooted in 
study of working-class history. It is hoped that they 
will prove in application to reveal latent possibili-
ties within the movement studied. Secondly, a word of 
justification for the order of presentation. It could 
be reasonably argued that the order should be reversed, 
or that one should start with points 5 and 6, since 
these are 'closer' to the subject matter. I have, 
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however, followed another logic - of moving from the 
most general statements and the longest historical view 
to the local and particular. It is no doubt true that 
the workers in this study are unaware of being part of 
an international labour movement, or of a process of 
struggle to overcome capitalist exploitation and state 
oppression. But I wish both to argue that they are such 
a part, and to recognise the precise nature and sig-
nificance of their non-awareness of this. I hope that 
my order of presentation will assist such an analysis. 
5.1. Trade unionism as a general phenomenon[1] 
The initial and general marxist position on trade 
unions is thus expressed by Richard Hyman (1971:8): 
The evolution of industrial capitalism pro-
vides the preconditions of collective organi-
sation by throwing workers together in large 
numbers, and creates the deprivations which 
spur them to combination. This unity, by 
transcending competition in the labour mar-
ket, in itself threatens the stability of 
capitalism: it also develops workers' class 
consciousness and trains them in methods of 
struggle. The limited economic achievements 
of their unions lead workers to adopt poli-
tical forms of action, and ultimately to 
challenge directly the whole structure of 
class domination. 
However, he notes with Gramsci that trade unionism also 
reflects capitalist division and competition. It 
organises workers, not as producers but as 
wage-earners, that is as creations of the 
capitalist system of private property, as 
sellers of their labour power. Unionism 
unites workers according to the tools of 
their trade or the nature of their product, 
that is according to the contours imposed on 
them by the capitalist system. (Cited Hyman 
1971:12) 
Moreover, it is evident that capital and state are not 
neutral in the face of trade union development: they 
may either tempt or force the unions to directly serve 
them instead of the workers. Trotsky (1972:5) noted as 
a common feature of trade union development in the 
1930s 
their drawing closer to and growing together 
with the state power. This is equally charac-
teristic of the neutral, the Social-Demo-
cratic, the Communist and 'anarchist' trade 
unions. 
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These quotations provide us with an introduction to 
marxist conceptualisation and analysis of the basic and 
quasi-universal organisation of the working class. The 
initial one may be taken as a general one, i.e. meant 
to be true for the capitalist mode of production as a 
whole and for the historical epoch of struggle to 
overcome capitalism. The following ones embody a series 
of qualifications, revealing the obstacles to the 
movement of the working class from the basic and quasi-
universal organisation (and forms of struggle) to those 
essential if they are to 'challenge the whole structure 
of class domination'. These suggest to me the necessity 
to consider such qualifications and obstacles in more 
detail. 
5.2. Trade unionism as an international movement 
It is necessary to periodise union struggle inter-
nationally in order 1) to be able to place the be-
haviour of the unions we are concerned with in terms of 
the international movement, and 2) to be able to under-
stand the nature of international trade union influen-
ces on our particular organisations (a matter to be 
pursued in Part III) . There can be identified three 
phases in the development of trade union internationa-
lism: 
an initial period...starting in about 
1860, during which trade union and 
political organisations participated 
jointly in an internationalisation of 
the working-class movement; 
a second period from about 1890 during 
which separate attempts were made to 
achieve trade-union internationalisation 
at the level of national central orga-
nisations and branch/industrial unions; 
a third period from about 1965 charac-
terised by the introduction of new forms 
of trade union internationalisation at 
the level of the corporation or business 
(in addition to the traditional dual 
structure). (Olle and Schoeller 1977:59) 
For the particular place and time we are concerned 
with, only the second phase is crucial. Mention of the 
nature of the first one is however, necessary to put 
the second one in historical perspective. The common 
concern and joint action of socialist parties and trade 
unions during the first period was in the legalisation 
of worker organisation and protest action. The very 
achievement of the right to organise, strike and bar-
gain within specific nation states at different times 
implied 1) a loss of interest in the international 
means for achieving it and 2) a separation between the 
industrial and the political within the workers* move-
ments, in terms of organisation, consciousness and 
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action. During the second period we therefore see the 
creation of purely union internationals: 
Whereas in the previous period trade union 
internationalisation covered issues from the 
political rights of the worker to the re-
presentation of his economic interests, the 
economic interests themselves now come to the 
fore. (Olle and Schoeller 1977:62). 
This confining of international trade union work 
To the field of representation of economic 
interest has determined the content and 
procedural form of trade union inter-
nationalisation ever since. (Ibid. Stress in 
original. 
Olle and Schoeller stress that the nationalistic and 
economistic content and procedure was the fundamental 
feature of international trade unionism for the fol-
lowing 75 years or so. Except during periods of inter-
national economic downturn, there was no real progress 
in trade union internationalism. Even such organisa-
tional developments as the creation of the World Fede-
ration of Trade Unions (WFTU) and International Con-
federation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) in the post-
World War II period led to no breakthrough in working-
class internationalism. Generalising over this second 
period, the authors conclude (63) that 'the content of 
trade union internationalisation can be described as 
being a trade union form of "national protectionism"'. 
This political-economic interpretation of the develop-
ment of the international trade union movement is 
important because it helps us to understand the re-
stricted structure and aims of the Nigerian trade 
unions, formed entirely within the second period.[2] 
5.3. Socio-political contexts of union activity 
The third problem is that of the general socio-politi-
cal context of working-class struggle. It is evident 
that the forms and nature of working-class struggle 
will (even at a given level of industrial development) 
be in large part determined by the type of socio-econo-
mic formation and its political forms.[3] Here we may 
return again to the terminology of labour-control 
strategies. Whilst recognising that these are not the 
only situations, we can nonetheless suggest that 
liberal strategies are typical of the core capitalist 
formation (with even such semiperipheral formations as 
Spain, Greece and Portugal being forced by popular mass 
protest to adopt these recently), state-collectivist 
ones being typical of what I will call the post-capi-
talist (i.e. Soviet type) formation, corporativist ones 
increasingly typical of the peripheral capitalist 
formation. Let us consider the implications of the 
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liberal and corporativist strategy for worker organisa-
tion and action. These are suggested by Hyman (1979a). 
Firstly, 
where unions and employers are obliged to 
initiate a bargaining relationship (since 
neither is able to ignore or eliminate the 
other), there may commence a mutually re-
inforcing cycle of declining union radicalism 
and employer (and governmental) hostility. 
This is the pattern for a successful liberal-democratic 
polity. However, 
for a ruling class pursuing rapid capital 
accumulation within the constraints of an 
imperialist world economy the options are 
clearly limited... 
In the absence of liberal-democratic practices, 
There is no reason to expect much latitude 
for trade unions to build up membership 
loyalty within the workplace...Without stable 
organisation at the point of production, 
workers' ability to struggle collectively -
and the character of such struggles - will 
owe much to broader comniunity solidarities 
and linkages. And union leaders who derive 
little support from governments or employers 
will be ill-placed to control and contain 
workers' actions... 
Hyman is here evidently thinking of a 'pre-' rather 
than the 'post-liberal' situation that corporatism 
customarily implies. In the latter situation, there may 
well be stable organisation at the point of produc-
tion - sustained by union leaders deriving much support 
from governments and employers. However, the conclusion 
remains valid: effective autonomous working-class 
action will (much more than in the liberal-democratic 
situation) require borader community solidarities and 
linkages. 
5.4. Socio-economic contexts of union activity 
In dealing, fourthly, with the socio-economic contexts 
of union activity, it will be necessary to take more 
space. By socio-economic context I mean those provided 
by different sectors within the capitalist mode of 
production. Richard Edwards (1979) has gone further 
than the earlier-mentioned works of Friedman and of 
Bromley and Gerry (Chapter 4 above), in demonstrating 
the inter-relation of control strategy, labour market 
situation, and the existence of working-class fractions 
with different needs, demands and organisational forms. 
Although Edwards considers all working-class groupings 
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as fractions, and although his work is both more com-
plex and problematic than I can here show (see discus-
sion in Reich 1980 and Nichols 1981) , even the follo-
wing schematic presentation will already suggest its 
value. On the basis of American evidence, Edwards 
identifies three significant sets of control strate-
gies, market situations and fractions, each with roots 
in a specific phase of capitalist development, yet each 
still existing as a significant and distinct sector 
today. Although he does not restrict himself to a 1:1:1 
fit, he does suggest the following common correlations: 
Control Strategy Labour market Fraction 
Simple Secondary Working Poor 
Technical Subordinate Traditional 
primary Proletariat 
Bureaucratic Independent Middle Layers 
primary 
Simple control means the personal power of the 
owner, intervening directly in the labour process to 
exhort, bully and reward, combining incentives and 
sanctions in an unsystematic and arbitrary manner. It 
was born with the small, competitive firm at the begin-
ning of industrial capitalism. It developed with the 
expansion of such companies, into a hierarchy of hired 
supervisors, substituting for the owner but lacking his 
direct authority, and coming into conflict with the 
workers - and the owners. The system still exists in 
the individually- or family-run firm. The secondary 
market is the preserve of casual labour, of low-skilled 
jobs in manufacturing, services, and seasonal agri-
cultural work (cf. Linhart 1978). It requires little 
or no training or skill, offers low pay and security, 
little or no advancement, and implies high labour 
turnover. The working poor consists of migrants, ethnic 
minorities, women, and (in the city) is concentrated in 
inner-city slums. It is largely un- or underemployed. 
Technical control is brought about by assembly-
line production that defines the exact task and con-
trols the speed of the workers, thus reducing drama-
tically the control function of the foreman. It de-
veloped with the continuous-flow production of large-
scale manufacturing, and in response to the rebellion 
provoked by the earlier system. Technical control 
within the firm was at first combined with secondary-
market type casual labour outside it (as in Brazil and 
South Korea today) . But it so concentrated and homo-
genised labour as to give rise, typically, to unions. 
Struggles of these have brought about the conditions of 
the primary labour market. This implies a certain 
security of employment, higher wages, well-defined 
occupations and established advancement paths. The 
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subordinate primary market today includes unionised 
production jobs in mass-production industry, sales, 
clerical and administrative work in the major service 
and retailing companies, and production-type activities 
in transportation, services and retailing. There are 
substantial returns to age and experience and to 
schooling. Dismissal is due less to indiscipline than 
to economic recession, and seniority provides some 
protection against dismissal. The traditional prole-
tariat (hereditary proletariat? PW) is so named be-
cause of its working-class descent as well as its 
extensive continued occupation in traditional indus-
tries. Its relative wealth and security is, however, 
combined with routinised and machine-paced work. 
Bureaucratic control means control through exten-
sive rules concering job categories, grades, promo-
tions, discipline, conditions, etc., and replaces ne-
gative sanctions by the positive one of advancement 
ladders. Like technical control, it grows out of the 
formal structure of the firm rather than the personal 
worker-employer relationship. It is intended to hetero-
genise labour and individualise protest. It was born in 
(or borrowed from the bureaucracy by? PW) high tech-
nology firms that wished to prevent unionisation of 
technical and clerical workers. It is spreading down 
and out to include production workers and well-
unionised factories attempting to undermine existing 
union power. The independent primary market differs 
from the subordinate one in implying general skills 
allowing for career movements between firms, freedom 
from machine-pacing, and consequent reliance on in-
dependent initiative and self-pacing. The job groups 
covered are 1) middle-level technical and clerical 
staff and supervisors, 2) highly-skilled manual craft 
workers, 3) waged professionals such as scientists, 
engineers, doctors and lawyers. The state sector plays 
a major role within the market since it employs a large 
proportion of such professionals and technicians. The 
middle layers play the crucial articulating role be-
tween capitalists/managers and the mass of manual and 
administrative workers. Whilst they have more autonomy 
than this mass, they have no direct control over their 
own product or the labour process. They are meant to be 
organisation men, applying rules and criteria esta-
blished higher up. 
What are the implications of the three different 
situations for labour protest and organisation? Histo-
rically, simple control implied (particularly as firms 
became larger and hierarchies extended) strikes against 
the direct supervisor and then - in the face of bitter 
employer resistance - militant unionism. Oppressive 
conditions provoked wages and hours movements, which in 
turn undermined employer control. Today, simple control 
exists in the small peripheral firms that are the most 
difficult to unionise. The protest of the working poor 
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therefore tends to find expression outside the work-
place, in health, housing, education and social secur-
ity struggles. Technical control historically meant the 
technical interdependence of labour in massive fac-
tories, and thus implied a homogenisation of the work-
force and company- or industry-wide collective action. 
Unions were eventually accepted. Today's traditional 
proletariat still presses for high and guaranteed 
wages, lifetime security and extensive pensions. The 
bureaucratic control that has come to replace this 
system in the central capitalist companies implies 
contradictions at workplace, firm and private-sector 
level. Rule by rules encourages 'work-to-rule' actions. 
The security and commitment of the workers increases 
their interest in the quality of working life and 
control over the work they will spend their lives 
'doing. At the firm level, the high-wage/high-security 
bribe converts a variable into a quasi-fixed cost. And, 
at the private sector level, the replacement of the 
boss by the rule, tends to extinguish the private/ 
public distinction, and to make the private sector 
increasingly a matter of public policy and political 
struggle. Given their comparative privilige and secur-
ity, middle-layer workers show particular concern for 
such issues as taxation levels, peace, the environment, 
consumer rights and higher education. 
t 
Edwards understands the distinct and separate 
demands of his three fractions as representing their 
individual experiences of capitalism. He sees that such 
demands are occasionally a source of conflict between 
fractions, yet finds a general class interest in each 
of them. He argues that each makes demands on capital 
and state, not on the other fractions. Nonetheless, the 
absence of a working-class party has preven-
ted the conjoining of all fractions' demands 
into a class agenda, and the divisions 
amongst workers have opened great possibili-
ties for capitalists to play off one fraction 
against another (Edwards 1979:209). 
5.5. Levels of worker struggle 
The fifth problem is that of levels of working-class 
struggle. The classical and quasi-universal distinction 
is between 'economic' and 'political' struggle (Lenin 
1970:68-142), the first associated with trade unionism, 
the second with revolutionary action. It is necessary 
to surpass this dichotomy and to explicitly distinguish 
between at least three or more levels. [4] I suggest 
that we need to distinguish between industrial, politi-
cal and social struggle, with the latter two seen as 
including the former level(s). By industrial struggle 
is meant that which takes place within the workplace or 
enterprise, which is aimed against the direct employer 
(or his agent), and is concerned with better conditions 
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for the sale of labour power and/or control over the 
labour process. It is evident that such struggle is 
both the most primitive and the most basic type of 
labour struggle - the one most directly and immediately 
affecting the worker. By the same token, it is one that 
is or can be carried out by infinite separate strata, 
fractions or segments of the working class. By politi-
cal struggle is meant that which takes place against a 
government or regime, which is concerned (additional to 
industrial demands) with pressing a defined labour 
interest on or through the state. The definition of the 
labour interest can be narrow (one pressure group 
amongst others) or broad (the major and fundamental 
social class). It evidently requires more complex and 
powerful organisations. Finally, although struggle at 
this level may take place by stratum, fraction or 
segment, it also provides a possibility for overriding 
some of the divisions implied by capitalist ownership 
patterns and the division of labour. By social struggle 
is meant that which is directed against capital and 
state, which is concerned (additional to industrial and 
political demands) with pressing the interests of the 
working class, understood as a hegemonic force (repre-
senting the interests of society as a whole) . Evi-
dently, this requires yet more complex and powerful 
organisations, capable of formulating an alternative 
social vision and of organising all oppressed classes 
and other groups for its realisation.[5] 
5.6. Types of organisation 
The sixth problem is that of the types of organisation 
necessary to raise struggle through the levels earlier 
mentioned. At the lowest level of consciousness and 
protest we will find at least the informal workgroup, 
delegation or strike committee. However, protest beyond 
the workplace customarily requires the trade union - a 
form of organisation that can evidently have an in-
finite variety of constituencies (e.g. enterprice, 
craft, industrial, general), of geographical coverage 
(e.g. sub-national, national, supra-national) and 
internal structures, not to speak of strategies, acti-
vities and leadership types. The extent and limits of 
trade union activities have been suggested in our 
initial quotations. Even if unions can 'lead workers to 
adopt political forms of action', they still unite them 
'according to the tools of their trade or the nature of 
their product'. Like the most primitive type of collec-
tive worker protest organisation, they organise the 
working class along fraction, segment or stratum lines. 
Evidently, political struggle can be organised by trade 
unions, either where worker parties are illegal, or 
where the working class is still largely in the grip of 
bourgeois ideologies (e.g. the USA). In the one case, 
the union might play the role even of a workers' party 
(e.g. Poland) , in the other it is likely to play that 
of a bourgeois pressure group. Typically, however, 
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legal or illegal parties will be formed claiming to 
represent the masses and/or seeking their support. 
Without wishing to disguise the differences between 
them, I would group here the labour party with the 
populist party. The first is based on recognition of a 
national worker interest, the second on one of the 
'popular masses'. Common to them is precisely their 
failure to recognise the primacy of the labour-capital 
contradiction and their consequent inability to defeat 
capitalism (even when it is recognised as an enemy) . 
Common to them also is their limitation to the nation 
state (populist parties) or to a particular grouping of 
them (labour parties). Despite all the experience and 
wealth of the latter, they have in practice been unable 
to establish themselves beyond the core capitalist 
social formation which provides the appropriate condi-
tions for their existence. The transformation of what 
is still the limited political struggle of a nationally 
or regionally limited segment of the working or popular 
classes into the social struggle of one internation-
ally-defined working class has so far seemed to require 
a socialist revolutionary party. In a series of crisis 
situations - though only in peripheral capitalist 
formations - communist parties have shown the capacity 
to link, incorporate and articulate the working-class 
and popular protest that has customarily been both 
expressed and confined within other types of organisa-
tions. This is how the communist party is seen by 
Petras (1978:56): 
It...incorporates the experience of class 
struggle in the cities, forms the cadres in 
the fields, mines and armies, and organises 
the diffusion of collectivist ideology and 
practice throughout the countryside, analy-
sing the basic coordinates of the situation 
and intervening in the crucial political, 
economic and military structures to detonate 
revolutionary struggles...Without such a 
party, the objective situation of common 
oppression can be dissipated into a thousand 
secondary struggles involving communal, 
ethnic or sectoral interests. (My stress. 
PW) . 
We should add the capacity which these parties have 
- occasionally - shown to create effective inter-
national structures and generate international working-
class action.[6] 
5.7. Labour leadership strategies 
Lastly, the question of leadership strategy. I would 
identify in the contemporary world the following: 1) 
the clientalist, or company unionist, in which the 
leader's sole point of reference is the interests of 
the company or its owner; 2) the corporativist (clien-
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talism on a national scale) in which sole reference is 
to the capitalist state; 3) the business unionist, (the 
truly 'economistic' union leader) selling his members' 
labour power on liberal capitalist principles; 4) the 
reformist (moderate or radical), seeking equality 
through incremental change within the accepted politi-
cal framework; 5) the radical-democratic, seeking 
equality through a fundamental change of the political 
framework; 6) the state-socialist, (clientalism within 
a post-capitalist state), in which workers' interests 
are identified with interests of the 'socialist state'; 
7) socialist-revolutionary, seeking worker control of 
both production and state in order to abolish both 
market and bureaucracy.[7] Evidently, particular 
labour-control strategies will be concerned with pro-
ducing or encouraging a particular type of leader. 
Indeed, each labour-control strategy has implicit 
within it a certain model of labour leader behaviour. 
The liberal-democratic strategy assumes reformist 
leaders, the state-coïlectivist one assumes state-
socialist ones, the corporativist strategy assumes 
corporativist ones. But even in the most repressive 
situations, labour protest tends to call forth leader-
ship of other types, subversive of the existing model. 
Conversely, a particular leadership ideology assumes 
(or seeks to bring about) a certain labour relations 
pattern. Reformist leaders implictly or explicitly 
assume the existence or possibility of a liberal-
democratic polity within a successfully expanding 
capitalist society. State socialist and corporativist 
leaders assume backing by the repressive apparatus of 
the state. Socialist-revolutionary leaders assume that 
no labour control system can serve the working class, 
and work to bring workers themselves to this reali-
sation. [8] 
NOTES 
1. There is surprisingly little general theoretical 
work on trade unionism by either the great Marxist 
scholar/activists, or by their successors. Richard 
Hyman (1971) produces a useful summary, criticism 
and attempted synthesis, from which much of my own 
argument is drawn. Hyman suggests that there were 
conflicting elements within Lenin's writings on 
trade unionism at different periods. He has been 
criticised for this by Ghotbi (1978:23-38), who 
stresses the necessity precisely to understand the 
historical specificity of the particular writings. 
The same point could be made about the conflicting 
elements Hyman identifies in the writings of Marx 
and Engels over time. In other words, neither Marx 
and Engels nor Lenin found it necessary to produce 
a general work on trade unionism. Despite the rich 
historical evidence accumulated since they died, 
and despite the possibility of examining trade 
union behaviour in the three major world social 
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formations, the task has not yet been attempted. 
The Nigerian unions were not only formed in this 
period but also on this model. The model, more-
over, was introduced to Nigeria by British union-
ists together with the British imperial state. The 
spontaneous protest of Nigerian wage labour, 
therefore, had little time to develop before being 
channelled into national union forms and an inter-
national labour movement deeply compromised with 
the nation state. Indeed, it is necessary to go 
further than Olle and Schoei 1er do and to specify 
the different political/ideological tendencies 
within the international trade union and labour 
movement at this time (for which see further in 
this chapter) . It is also necessary to go further 
than them in spelling out the implications of 
'national protectionism' when expressed inter-
nationally. I have elsewhere suggested that in 
looking critically at claims of 'internationalism' 
or 'solidarity' within the international labour 
movement, we need to distinguish between 'inter-
national relations' (on the inter-state or inter-
bloc model), 'international trade union relations' 
(relations between national union leaderships 
which show some independence of capital and 
state), and 'international working-class solidari-
ty' (relations between workers which directly 
challenge capital and state) (Waterman 1979j: Part 
4). 
The classical Marxist distinction was between 
conditions in Russia and those in Western Europe, 
a distinction developed by Gramsci, and currently 
the basis of much Marxist discussion on strategy 
for revolution under authoritarian and liberal-
democratic regimes (see, for example, Anderson 
197 8) . The significance for worker organisation 
and strike action is discussed by Ghotbi (1978: 
27-29), who points out that 
The absence of 'political emancipation' 
makes the workers move quicker to the 
struggle against the ruling class com-
pared with those who have 'political 
emancipation'. We know that it is easier 
to agitate the workers in a country 
where 'political emancipation' has not 
been achieved. 
Whilst the 'East-West' distinction was recognised 
and discussed by the classical scholar/activists, 
the specific features of the 'South' were not. The 
only one to recognise the specific environment of 
labour struggle in any peripheral capitalist 
society apart from pre-revolutionary Russia was 
Trotsky, in two pregnant paragraphs in a paper 
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found unfinished on his desk after he was murdered 
by Stalin's agent in Mexico. (Trotsky 1972:7). 
The uniquely difficult conditions for auto-
nomous working-class organisation and action in 
post-capitalist societies began to be recognised 
even before the Polish workers' movement of 1980. 
The exact nature of the restrictions have been 
dealt with for Russia by Krawchenko (1977) , for 
Hungarian factories by Haraszti (1977), and for 
Poland by Green (1977). Here we certainly cannot 
say that the absence of 'political emancipation' 
makes it easier to agitate the workers! 
Even Ghotbi, whose identification with Lenin is 
complete, at least recognises the necessity to 
distinguish between 'economic', 'political' and 
the 'socialist political' struggle (1978:15). Post 
(1978:181-2) carries out a more conscious reformu-
lation, distinguishing between the spontaneous 
'economic struggle', 'trade union politics' (i.e. 
pressure-group politics), the 'politics of labour' 
(recognising a distinct national labour interest) 
and 'revolutionary struggle' (against capital and 
state) . My feeling is that we probably need to 
reject the economic-political dichotomy, however 
'dialectically' expressed. I find the very concept 
of 'economic' working-class struggle misleading. 
Contemporary Marxist writings on the capitalist 
labour process (Braverman 1974; Marglin 1974, 
Friedman 1977) all suggest the extent to which 
early, local and unorganised labour struggle is as 
much one for control over the process as for 
better terms of sale within it. 
The political/social distinction is evidently not 
between reformist and insurrectionary strategies, 
but neither is it simply between political revolu-
tions (anti-fascist, anti-imperialist) and 
'socialist' ones. The problematic nature of the 
latter type is increasingly recognised amongst 
marxists. In the blunt words of one East European 
scholar: 
Development comes first, socialism only 
afterwards...Hence, the major trans-
formations that have taken place since 
1917 in Russia and subsequently Eastern 
Europe, can be described more accurately 
as a model of development strategy... 
than one of socialism. (Brucan 1979:73). 
Although Petras recognises the deterioration of 
revolutionary parties once in power, he denies 
that this process was 'inherent' in the revolu-
tion. However, one is obliged to recognise that 
the communist type of revolutionary socialist 
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party has only been successful in agrarian socie-
ties, under authoritarian regimes, and in combined 
nationalist and anti-capitalist revolutions. I 
would suggest that the authoritarian and chauvi-
nist nature of most communist parties once in 
power must be inherent both in the pre-existing 
social structure and in the type of socialist 
revolutionary party appropriate to that situation. 
This raises a further question of whether the 
classical model of the socialist revolutionary 
party is appropriate for industrialised capitalist 
countries - or others for that matter - in the 
present or future. 
Evidently these types overlap at the edges. Just 
as evidently the typology is static. It may be 
less evident that this is not an evolutionary 
typology. The overlap is made explicit in the case 
of the clientalist, corporativist and state-
socialist strategies but is implicit elsewhere. 
The typology is static in the sense that it does 
not indicate any direction of possible movement. 
This is unlike the typology of struggles, in which 
a rising level of struggles was suggested. The 
frequent use of typologies in this chapter re-
quires some comment. It would seem to me that the 
development and use of these is justified provi-
ding 1) a consistent methodology underlies their 
construction, 2) an explicit norm informs them, 3) 
they aid labouring people to recognise forms of 
exploitation and oppression, and to overcome 
these. Other typologies, it seems to me, are 
likely to be formalistic, obfuscating and conser-
vative (in the sense of preserving the existing 
political order). These reflections here have, 
like my conceptualisation of the socio-political 
contexts of union activity, been much stimulated 
by the efforts of Cox and Harrod (e.g. Cox 1971) 
to develop a non-marxist but universal typology of 
labour relations. 
It is the problem of socialist revolutionaries in 
bringing this about that forms the core of Marxist 
discussion of trade unionism. Usually this has 
been to the exclusion of other aspects, which is 
why I have here placed little emphasis on it. 
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Chapter 6 
PORTWORKER UNIONISM: THE SURPASSING OF GRADES AND 
TRADES 
This chapter reveals the impasse of moderate reformism 
within the NPA unions, the increasing dissatisfaction 
of members of moderate unions, and the rise to pre-
dominance of a union that adopted a more radical 
stance. It begins with a short historical background 
and an overview of the large number of organisations 
within NPA in the 1970s. It then considers in turn the 
moderates, the splitters, the radicalised union, and 
their development during the decade. 
Portworkers have been unionised since at least the 
1940s, organisations within the old Marine Department 
and Nigerian Railways Corporation (NRC) truly providing 
the initial base of national industrial trade unionism 
in Nigeria (Hughes and Cohen 1978). [1] The portworkers 
were affiliated to the African Civil Servants Technical 
Workers Onion (1941), the first federation of manual 
workers in Nigeria, which itself gave birth to the 
first Trades Union Congress (1943) and which helped 
organise the first General Strike of 1945. Port and 
rail unions dominated the united All Nigeria Trade 
Union Federation (1953 to 1957-9) that successfully 
fought several major national campaigns in the years 
leading up to independence. Although the portworkers 
were in the late 1950s and early 1960s divided in their 
national affiliation between competing moderate and 
radical centres, they nonetheless played an active role 
in the united national Joint Action Committee that 
organised the 1964 General Strike. Until it was dis-
solved, the NPA unions were affiliated to the moderate-
reformist United Labour Congress (ULC), of which rail 
and port union leader H.P. Adebola himself was Pre-
sident (1962-69), and of which other port union leaders 
were prominent officers. 
Despite their contribution to national-level 
unionism, the NPA unions have been seriously split 
since the 1940s. The process of division is best 
followed in Figure 6.1. This shows that there was 
originally but one union within the Marine Department, 
which came to be known as the Nigerian Maritime African 
Workers Union (NMAWU). By independence in 1960 there 
were around seven. The figure peaked at around eight 
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or nine in the mid-1960s. The divisions multiplied and 
unions resisted amalgamation despite the moderate-
reformist ideology, national and international affili-
ation shared by all of them except for short periods or 
minor organisations. 
Splits and splinter unions were based on occupa-
tional category, on department, on status. One union 
reported seven unconstitutional factions within 12 
years. Personality conflicts amongst union leaders were 
rife. These were only added to when the two railway 
unions became railways-and-ports unions on the forma-
tion of the NPA in 1956. To the dominating personality 
of Chief O.A.F. Beyioku, leader of the NPA Workers' 
Union (NPAWU), there was now added the even more power-
ful personalities of M.A.O. Imoudu and H.P. Adebola. 
Imoudu, President of the Railways and Ports Workers 
Union of Nigeria (R&PWUN), was the first national 
working-class leader in Nigeria, universally known as 
'Number One'. He was also a symbol of a radical and 
plebian nationalism. H.P. Adebola, General Secretary 
of the Railways and Ports Transport Staffs Union 
(R&PTSU), was the rising star of moderate, rightwing 
unionism. As Nigeria moved toward independence, and as 
international political and ideological rivalries 
impinged on Nigeria, Imoudu identified himself with 
socialism and revolution, Adebola with liberalism and 
reform. 
To the factionalism of the workplace and of per-
sonality, there was therefore added that of ideology 
and politics. Although Imoudu identified himself with 
socialism and revolution, he had no organisational 
links with the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) 
or the international communist movement. And, although 
he was associated with various marxist groupings, the 
Nigerian Labour Party and a loose independent union 
federation called the Labour Unity Front (LUF), his 
socialism was of a declamatory variety, his militancy 
erratic. On the other hand, both Beyioku and Adebola 
were parliamentary politicians, and both became identi-
fied with the International Confereration of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU) and with the 'free-worldism' of the Cold 
War. They used anti-communism deliberately and effec-
tively to undermine Imoudu within the NPA. They were 
helped by the inability of Imoudu to 1) translate his 
'scientific socialism' into a meaningful strategy in 
the era of independence, 2) surpass a personal ist 
leadership style, and 3) overcome divisions amongst 
portworker - or port and dockworker - unions. 
Since such divisions continued into the period 
with which we are concerned, we will have to analyse 
them later. We will also have to consider the changing 
nature of the divisions and the manner m which they 
were simplified into a major conflict between the 
moderate majority within the Nigerian Maritime Trade 
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Union Föderation (NMTUF) and the radical minority 
represented in the mid-1970s by the Railways and Ports 
Transport and Clerical Staffs Union (R&PT&CSU) of 
one-time moderate, H.P. Adebola. 
We will be examining the development of some of 
the bodies listed in Table 6.1. Although there are 
gaps in the sources, the material is sufficient for us 
to gain an impression of the rise and fall of many of 
the unions, as well as of the relations between them. 
The table also reminds us of the constituencies of the 
unions, suggests their relative size, and lists the 
major portworker leaders. Although the issue of lea-
dership-membership relations only arises in Part III, 
we cannot avoid here noting the very different member-
ship bases of the organisations. Thus, in 1973, the 
R&PT&CSU of Adebola consisted largely of clerical 
workers in the Traffic/Operations Department, workers 
who were not only better educated but also considerably 
Figure 6.1. The origin of trade union organisations 
amongst NPA workers in Lagos in the 1970s 
Key: ER&DRAWU; Engine Room and Deck Ratings African 
Workers Union; ERRAW(NM)U; Engine Room Ratings African 
Workers (Nigeria Marine) Union; FGT&GWU; Firemen Grea-
sers Technical and General Workers Union; MD-PWU; 
Marine Daily-Paid Workers Union; MEA&AWU; Marine En-
gineering Assistants and Allied Workers Union; MESAN; 
Marine Engineering Staff Association of Nigeria; MFSU: 
Marine Floating Staff Union; NMAWU; Nigerian Marine 
African Workers Union; NMERRAWU: Nigerian Marine Engine 
Room Ratings African Workers Union; NMWU; Nigerian 
Maritime Workers Union; NPACWU; NPA Clerical Workers 
Union; NPAC&AWU; NPA Craftsmen and Allied Workers 
Union; NPAETTU; NPA Engineering Technicians Trade 
Union; NPAWU: NPA Workers Union; NPAJSSAN: NPA Junior 
Supervisory Staffs Association of Nigeria; R&P&DWUN: 
Railways and Ports and Dock Workers Union of Nigeria: 
R&PT&CSU: Railways and Ports Transport and Clerical 
Staffs Union; R&PTSU: Railways and Ports Transport 
Staffs Union; R&PWUN: Railways and Ports Workers Union 
of Nigeria; RSSU: Railway Station Staffs Union; RWUN: 
Railway Workers Union of Nigeria. 
Notes : This table was drawn up in an attempt to dis-
cover the origins of the najor portworker unions active 
in the 1970s. Given the frequent comings and goings, 
splits and mergers, it cannot, unfortunately, be con-
sidered complete and accurate even for the organisa-
tions it shows. It ignores a number of 'associations' 
(for the fire service, patrol staff and officers) 
recognised by NPA but not functioning as unions in the 
mid-1970s. It also ignores the common bodies created 
to represent them by the unions. These can be found in 
Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1 List of unions and associations within NPA nationally, 1973. 
Name and Officer Membership Remarks 
Rail. & Ports Trans. 
& Clerical Staff U. 
Sec. H.P.Adebola 
Pres. J.O.Adegbesan 
NPA Workers Union 
Sec. C.A.Nwankwonta 
Pres. A.Agbomkhena 
Nigerian Maritime 
Workers Union 
Sec. O.Zudonu 
Pres. S.E.Omerua 
Marine Engineering 
Staff Association 
Sec. J.O.Nwanze 
Pres. A.Ademola 
NPA Firemen, Greasers, 
Tech. & General W.U. 
Sec. S.S.Okezie 
Pies. I.Dike 
4,523 
Check-off 
3,800 
Check-off 
1,790 
Check-off 
190 
Check-off 
180 
Check-off 
Mostly Traffic and General 
Manager's Departments. Quay 
staff, clerical and accounts. 
Also wharf plant drivers. 
Mostly Engineering and Stores 
Departments. Skilled and un­
skilled manual workers. 
Harbours Department.'Floating 
staff: Quartermasters, Masters, 
Able Seamen, unskilled workers 
Dockyard Department. Skilled 
Engineers. Split from NMWU 
Mostly Dockyard Department. 
Semi- or unskilled 'floating 
staff. Split from NPAWU 
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ΝΡΑ Junior Supervisory 
Staff Association 
Sec. R.P.Onochie 
Pres. L.B.Sanusi 
NPA Fire Service 
Association 
Sec. O.ShoVinka 
Pres. S.Akinbayo 
NPA Craftsmen and 
Allied Workers Union 
Sec. S.A.Osayande 
Pres. S.A.Lisk 
67 
Check-off 
223 
? 
Mostly Engineering Department. 
Foremen. Split from NPAWU 
Not a registered trade union 
Split from NPAWU 
NPA Patrol Service 
Association 
Sec. P.C.Okure 
Pres. F.Odemola 
150 Not a registered trade union 
NPA Officers Associ­
ation 
Sec. O.B.Sarumi 
Pres. 0.Akindahunsi 
550 
Check-off 
All officers except top manage­
ment 
Sources: NPA Trade Union List 197 3; Interviews with NPA industrial 
relations officers and trade union leaders, 1975-77. 
Note; The broken line suggests the uncertain relation of the R&PT&CSU 
to the NMTUF during the 1970s. 
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younger than the manual workers. The NPA Workers Union 
(NPAWU) of Nwankwonta and the Nigerian Maritime Workers 
Union (NMWU) of Zudonu both consisted largely of the 
somewhat older manual workers, skilled and unskilled, 
and divided from each other by department (as well as 
the ethnic identity of the 'floating staff*). The 
other minor organisations were either stratum or frac-
tion based. Whilst in 1973 the R&PT&CSU had a proble-
matic relationship with the NMTUF, some of the smaller 
splinters were outside it and seeking salvation through 
the Joint Committee for Representation (JCR) and its 
doughty consultant. Chief O.A.F. Beyioku. 
Having made this initial specification, let us 
turn first to the traditional moderates of the NPAWU 
and NMWU, and the NMTUF they dominated. 
6.1 The traditional moderates[2] 
It should first be said that the formal industrial 
relations ideology of the NPA management was formally 
accepted by all the NPA unions. They also shared the 
management belief that it was possible for the Indus-
trial Relations Department to play a role as inter-
mediary between management and unions. They even 
believed they had the right to nominate candidates for 
the post of Assistant Industrial Relations Officer. 
During a December 1976 Seminar, NMWU Secretary Zudonu 
quoted approvingly the words of an Industrial Arbitra-
tion Tribunal (IAT) officer that recourse to it was a 
symptom of breakdown in industrial relations. Said 
Zudonu, 'There is no need to go to the IAT and I have 
never had to go to it'. 
A more nuanced statement of general union atti-
tudes can be found in an article by a leading NPA trade 
unionist, J.E. Bone Okoro (1974) . Okoro begins with the 
declaration that there is a crisis in Nigerian indus-
trial relations, so that 
The natural development of a sound industrial 
relations system is subsequently obstructed, 
and there is no peaceful co-existence in 
industry. 
He criticises employers and management for being more 
concerned with finance, marketing, production and 
administration, than with developing 'effective indus-
trial relations policies which command the confidence 
of employees'. He gives management the prime responsi-
bility for good relations, and then recommends it to 
organise work effectively, to define responsibilities, 
and to give the employee a 'sense of achievement in his 
job'. He considers that unions also have a responsi-
bility for good relations and ends with the declaration 
that 
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Labour's view is that both sides in industry 
are equally responsible to each other in 
promoting the well-being of the industry by 
ensuring maximum productivity and economic 
efficiency. 
The unions did not accept the formal ideology of 
management passively and unconditionally. In making a 
general statement of position on industrial relations, 
Okoro himself stressed the greater concern of labour 
for the equitable division of income, for security and 
rewards. Furthermore, the unions tended to criticise 
management for not putting the shared ideology into 
practice. But whilst the radicals were prepared to 
exploit the ideology to its limits, to use to the 
maximum every possibility provided by the institu-
tions - and to go beyond them if necessary - the moder-
ates seemed to have an unshakeable faith in the 
ideology of 'peaceful co-existence' with management. 
If we examine the conference documents and other 
papers of the NPAWU in the 1970s, we get the impression 
of an organisation with little sense of direction, more 
engaged in internal politicking than in fighting the 
NPA. 
Despite the fact that this organisation apparently 
gained the members of the Railways and Ports Workers 
Union of Nigeria (R&PWUN) in 1968, and that the splin-
ters that left it around that time rejoined it in 1974, 
the NPAWU seems never to have regained its former 
prominence within the NPA. When Chief O.A.F. Beyioku 
resigned his position as General Secretary, his place 
was taken by C.A. Nwankwonta. Nwankwonta was a skilled 
millwright fitter at NPA who previous to his appoint-
ment had been a branch secretary of the NPAWU. Nwank-
wonta, an Ibo, was caught in the East by the Civil War 
from 1967-70, and the union had to make do with tem-
porary secretaries during this period. Neither Nwank-
wonta nor his temporary substitutes had the qualities 
or stature of Beyioku. Nwankwonta's abilities were 
administrative ones. He had neither the mass appeal of 
some of his opposite numbers, nor the political skills 
that would have raised him to leadership in one of the 
national centres. Moreover, there was frequently open 
tension between him and his Executive Committee. 
Nonetheless, the elected union leaders evidently found 
his qualities suitable for the job. 
Whilst there might have also been other reasons 
for divisions within the NPAWU, the major criticism 
seems to have been for its lack of effective leadership 
and of industrial militancy. At the 1973 council 
meeting in Port Harcourt, mention was made of a 'rift 
which was a threat to the Union's solidarity in Lagos'. 
This referred to the Mechanical Workshops. Apparently 
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some NPAWU members had previously left the union and 
joined in the Joint Committee for Representation (JCR), 
the consultant to which was the redoubtable Chief 
Beyioku. The branch leadership now wanted the NPAWU to 
take Beyioku as its consultant. When this was refused 
by the union leadership, the branch insisted that 
Beyioku remain as its consultant. The reason for the 
friction was that the branch 'charged the union for 
lacking sufficient bargaining power'. This was in 
respect of the 'one-eighth award' (of which more will 
be said later) that Alhaji Adebola of the R&PTS.CSU had 
managed to win for his members. Eventually the leader-
ship expelled three officers (R.L. Okoya, a former 
NPAWU President, H.O. Enwereonye, Branch Chairman and 
Okeke Ugwuanyi, the Branch Secretary). As a result of 
this, 487 members quit the union in protest. 
In the first part of 1974 it appeared as if the 
NPAWU was on the up-turn. The unions grouped within 
the JCR had decided to rejoin the organisation. This, 
according to Nwankwonta, ended '10 years of industrial 
strife' within the union. It is, however, to be noted 
that the agreement between the NPAWU and the returning 
bodies stipulated that Beyioku become consultant to the 
union. This seems to have been a popular notion 
amongst the union branches also. Resolutions from two 
ports to the 1974 conference mentioned Beyioku, one 
asking that he be included in a tour of all branches, 
the other moving not only that he become the consultant 
but that the conference itself should immediately 
settle on his fee. Although it was by now evident that 
Adebola's union was undermining the NPAWU by its mili-
tant tactics, Nwankwonta still felt it necessary to 
conclude his report to the 1974 conference by stating 
his 
belief that the modern trade unionist should 
share the fundamental philosophy of Mahatma 
Gandhi. He should be a man of peace, man of 
freedom and a man who abhors violence... 
In 1976, disaffection boiled over again amongst 
members in the Mechanical Workshops. In early 1976, 
Ugwuanyi (then Acting General Secretary in the absence 
of Nwankwonta) wrote to the other port unions talking 
of the need for a merger. He referred to the recent 
formation nationally of the Nigerian Labour Congress 
(NLC) and to a merger process said to be taking place 
on the railways, and stated that given 'the move to 
restructure the present trade unions on industrial 
basis, we need not wait to be told of what to do from 
outside' (NPAWU to NMTUF, January 17, 1976). Possibly 
due to the failure of this initiative, Ugwuanyi (now 
speaking as Lagos District Secretary of the NPAWU) 
criticised the leadership for its 'sluggish approach', 
complained that 'the dynamism of the past...is no more 
there', and suggested immediate negotiations for a 
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merger with the R&PT&CSU (NPAWU Lagos District Secre-
tary Statement March 3, 1976) . One month later, the 
Mechanical Workshops Branch declared that its members 
had resigned 'en masse' from the NPAWU in order to join 
the R&PTStCSU (NPAWU Mechanical Workshops Branch to 
NPAWU, April 14, 1976). From now on the NPAWU was 
fighting a rearguard action against the increasing 
encroachment of the R&PT&CSU. 
The NMWU was the second largest of the traditional 
NPA unions, firmly based in the Harbours Department, 
and long-led by a veteran of national trade unionism, 
0. Zudonu. Yet, despite its adoption of its new broad 
title in 1971, and despite the often critical and 
farsighted pronouncements of its General Secretary, the 
Nigerian Maritime Workers Union was only able to put up 
a defensive battle against the depredations of the 
R&PT&CSU. 
The pronouncements and analysis of its General 
Secretary make the NMWU appear much more radical than 
the NPAWU, and even than the militant R&PT&CSU. A 
one-page long statement on 'Nigerianisation' at the 
1973 conference was a diatribe against the rich in 
Nigeria. Despite the fact that, according to Zudonu, 
85% of senior service in the public and private sector 
rose from the junior service 'they have been very 
callous and indifferent' to the workers, who have been 
regarded as 'second class citizens'. Coupled with this 
view was a critique of a demands strategy based on the 
fight for promotions. And this in turn led Zudonu to a 
criticism of the labour movement. He accused the 
unions of shortsightedly focusing on such incentives as 
promotion and overtime, instead of increasing worker 
purchasing power, improving housing, transport, educa-
tion and leisure facilities. Zudonu argued for a 
•legally enforceable National Minimum Wage' (Zudonu 
1974), and his union demanded of the Udoji Commission a 
reduction in the existing number of wage grades. The 
required change in the movement was not seen as simply 
affecting its outdated demands but also its 'conser-
vative and outdated' structure. The solution was for 
the Trade Unions to amalgamate into larger, stronger 
and financially self-supporting Trade Unions 'that can 
evolve completely new objectives, structures and poli-
cies...' (Zudonu Statement, September 18, 1974). 
One must not exaggerate this radicalism. As his 
frequent references to 'national objectives' might 
suggest, the necessary changes were seen as compatible 
with the intentions of government. Moreover, when 
Zudonu was talking on wage policy, his references were 
to British textbooks, and his norm appeared to be that 
of Great Britain (Zudonu 1974). 
Of more import, however, is what happened when 
this egalitarian and democratic ideology was translated 
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into a programme and the programme into action. The 
programme was - at the very least - ambiguous. Thus, 
of some 70 detailed demands made by the 1973 conference 
(NMWU to NPA, May 12, 1973), at least 50 were typical 
'grades and trades' demands (the term used in the NPA 
for narrow group demands) that were in the interests 
not even of floating staff in general, nor the union's 
membership as a whole, but of smaller groups, or even 
of individuals. No doubt the 50 points covered (and 
were meant to cover) the direct self-interest of all 
influential individuals and groups in the union, but 
they did not begin to make the kind of general demands 
which Zudonu himself considered necessary for Nigerian 
workers as a whole. Indeed, the only undeniably 
general demand was one for the conversion of daily-paid 
workers to permanent establishment after three years. 
Despite Zudonu*s criticism of the fight for promo-
tions, we find him boasting at the 1973 conference that 
'Promotions for our members...was the highest in the 
history of our Union', and at the 1976 conference that 
one of the 'longest and most decisive struggles...since 
1952' was the training of nine men subsequently pro-
moted as pi lots 1 Amongst those promoted to senior 
staff in this period was the union's longstanding 
President, S.E. Omerua. But here the union's egali-
tarian ideology seemed to reassert itself: unlike the 
R&PT&CSU, a senior staff position was seen as dis-
qualifying a member for this post. 
A further contradiction between NMWU theory and 
practice is found in the area of industrial relations. 
The general attachment of Zudonu to the principles of 
liberal industrial relations theory has been mentioned. 
This general attachment led him to a specific objection 
to the notion of national wage-setting by commission. 
According to the union, 
the workers have lost faith in Public Service 
Commission as a means of determining the 
wages and conditions of service in the Public 
Service. This is because it deprives the 
workers and their organisations of their 
democratic right to collective bargaining as 
contained in ILO Convention 98, Article 4, 
which is the best means of determining wages 
and conditions of service and which has been 
ratified by the Federal Government. (NMWU 
Conference Documents 1976). 
One is here again aware of the contrast between the 
R&PT&CSU, which we will see pragmatically adjusting to 
and imposing itself within a Nigerian reality, and the 
NMWU attempting to act according to some British ideal. 
Now for the Nigerian Maritime Trades Union Feder-
ation, the organisation that aspired to represent all 
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maritime unions, not only those within the NPA. The 
gap in source materials on the NMTUF in the period 1965 
to the early 1970s is explained by its virtual stag-
nation at that time. Its last conference in the 1960s 
was held in 1964, but the newly-elected officers found 
that their predecessors had made away with its proper-
ties. Then came the Civil War and its conference was 
postponed even longer. 
It required action by NPA management to bring 
about the 1972 conference, a fact acknowledged at the 
event by the NMTUF itself. This conference seems to 
have marked the revival of the NMTUF, a revival poss-
ibly stimulated by the success of the R&PT&CSU over the 
one-eighth award. The retiring President felt called 
upon to 'congratulate once more the R&PT&CSU for this 
singular achievement' which formed the basis for the 
NMTUF's later gains on behalf of the rest of the NPA 
workers (NMTUF Conference Documents 1972). 
The warm relations of the NMTUF with management 
were revealed at this conference and on other occasions 
during succeeding years. In addition to its services 
in solving a dispute with Adebola, management had also 
made money available to the federation which enabled 
the conference to be held. Indeed, when the NMTUF 
approved the new negotiation and consultative machinery 
in 1974, it appeared that its relations with NPA man-
agement in Lagos were better than with its own local 
officers in Port Harcourt. A seven-man delegation of 
the NMTUF together with NPA industrial relations offi-
cers was touring the provinces to inaugurate the new 
machinery when it ran into the bitter opposition of the 
Port Harcourt branch of the NMTUF. The local officers 
claimed that they had not been consulted about the 
document, which was entirely new to them. President 
Agbonikhena conceded that they had not been consulted 
but said there was room for amendment and persuaded the 
NMTUF officers to attend the opening ceremony. When 
they did so it was only to stage a protest walkout. 
Agbonikhena felt it necessary to condemn this behaviour 
to the Port Manager as 'unwarrented and most unguided* 
and to add that it 'did not conform with the practice 
of modern Trade Unionism'. The Manager in his turn 
commended the 'mature sense of responsibility' of the 
Lagos delegates, stated that the document was not 
subject to discussion and assured them that it would be 
strictly adhered to. The launching ceremony then took 
place in the absence of the local NMTUF officers but 
'with smiles from both sides' (NMTUF Memorandum, Novem-
ber 1974) . Whether this tour was paid for by NPA man-
agement is not stated. It seems likely that all such 
tours were because the following year the NMTUF was 
claiming N20 transport costs for federation officers 
returning from a tour 'on management's assignment' to 
the Delta, seeking industrial peace (NMTUF to NPA, July 
2, 1975) . 
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'Modern trade unionism' did not seem an adequate 
defence for the NMTUF, which was now under attack from 
the outside by the militant R&PT&CSU. In December 1976 
it felt obliged to appoint Michael Imoudu - himself the 
radical scourge of the NMTUF unions in the 1950s and 
early 1960s - as its Patron. This is a position giving 
prestige but no power, commonly used to dispose of 
difficult veteran union leaders in Nigeria. 
The occasion on which Imoudu was introduced to 
NMTUF supporters in the NPA canteen on Apapa Quay could 
be considered either as tragedy or farce.[3] A somewhat 
surreal situation, with Imoudu being praised by his 
moderate former critics for his past militancy, was 
only compounded when the aged, exhausted and confused 
Imoudu himself spoke: 
My aim is to know your problems and raise 
them one by one with management in a peaceful 
way...I am 76 years old but still strong 
[cries of 'Imo, Imo']...I went to China. In 
China, the Soviet Union and Britain you have 
one united trade union...Who followed Murtala 
Mohammed, the murdered leader of this coun-
try? We must carry out his assignment.. .In 
Nigeria despite riches we are suffering. 10 
million a day from oil and you never enjoy 
it...You are the people to organise the 
peasants so that when the military hands over 
power - to mei [mixed laughter and shouts of 
'Number One']...Who is going to rule Nigeria? 
Army, navy, airforce, peasants, workers! We 
are all united! 
It cannot be said that Imoudu's speech held the 
audience riveted. They were amused and enthusiastic 
but continued eating and talking, so that only those at 
the table could have fully heard Imoudu's rather frail 
voice.[4] 
The conflict with the R&PT&CSU was taking place as 
government was announcing its intent to legislate for 
the creation of industrial unions. This was a step 
against which neither side in the dispute had any 
objection, although each was evidently anxious about 
who should control such a body. The new NPAWU (which 
will be called the NPAWU2 to distinguish it from the 
old one) eventually consisted of a cross-section of 
union leaderships, and therefore of departments and 
skill levels, as well as of the ethnic groups of south-
ern Nigeria. The successor to the NMTUF was under the 
firm leadership of H.P. Adebola. Although the new body 
was the creation of the Trade Union Administrator, and 
although its officers were initially appointed in 
closed-door negotiations, there can be no doubt that 
Adebola won this position by his popularity amongst the 
NPA workers. 
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6.2 The splitters 
Before turning to Adebola and his union, however, we 
must consider the significance of the Joint Committee 
for Representation.[5] The creation of the JCR was the 
first clear organisational indication of the growing 
dissatisfaction of NPA workers with their traditional 
unions. Its particular structure and short life are of 
equal significance. What distinguishes the organi-
sations within the JCR is that (with one possible 
exception) they all consisted of NPA workers who had 
split off from other unions, particularly the NPAWU. 
To those JCR members listed in Table 6.1 we need only 
add the Mechanical Workshops Branch of the NPAWU that 
associated itself with the JCR in 1972-73. What dis-
tinguishes the JCR itself is that it was led by Chief 
Beyioku, a man to whom the individual groups had turned 
for leadership even before the JCR was created in 1972, 
The benefits that the JCR unions obtained from 
their special form of organisation were mixed. Beyioku 
had personal relationships with Minister of Labour 
Enahoro, and with other national figures. His files 
(Waterman 1979b) contain letters to 'Dear Tony' (Ena-
horo) and to or from other past or present acquain-
tances. Conferences of his unions received messages 
not only from NPA management but also from such men. 
Attention was drawn to Beyioku's contacts at the con-
ferences themselves. Beyioku was successful in getting 
the NPA to withdraw or significantly modify its demands 
for paper qualifications. But in another case his 
experience and contacts were apparently of no avail. 
This was a dispute that began in 1969 between the NPA 
Junior Supervisory Staffs Association of Nigeria 
(NPAJSSAN) and the NPA. When it could not be settled, 
the matter was taken by Beyioku to the newly-created 
Industrial Arbitration Tribunal. The IAT apparently 
reported to the Ministry in 1970. But, despite the 
personal appeals of Beyioku to Enahoro, it was imposs-
ible to get the Ministry to release the result. Des-
pite further personal letters, the issue dragged on 
through 1971, the Ministry writing that the report was 
delayed because of legal technicalities. In 1972 the 
union appealed to the Head of State on the issue. 
Letters from the union (always devoid of any specific 
threat of industrial action) and from the Ministry 
(continually avoiding a decision) flowed backwards and 
forwards until the union was finally informed that its 
claim had been turned down flat. 
Given the demand of the JCR that Beyioku become 
the NPAWU consultant on merging with that union in 
1974, it would be evidently wrong to assume that it was 
disappointment with him that caused the dissident 
workers to rejoin. It seems more likely that it was 
due to the experience that, despite his qualities, 
small groups could not achieve their demands on their 
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own. The major advance in the positions of workers led 
by Beyioku would have come, after all, not from his 
activities in pressing their special interests, but 
from the Adebo award of 1970-71 and the Udoji award of 
1975. When dissatisfaction amongst these workers broke 
out again within the NPAWU, they turned not back toward 
separate organisation under a consultant, but toward 
affiliation with what they considered to be a more 
dynamic and successful union, the R&PT&CSU. 
6.3 The new radicals 
The transformation of the R&PTSU into the R&PT&CSU[6] 
seems to have been the beginning of its expansion 
within NPA. It came about on merging with the NPA 
Clerical Workers Union in 1968 (NPA News, March 1968: 
12) [7]. But even in 1971, it still hid only 3,001 
members nationally in the railways and ports combined 
(Registrar of Unions Returns 1971). However, between 
1971 and 1972, over 564 workers in the Traffic Depart-
ment are said to have signed check-off forms in favour 
of the union (RStPT&CSU Conference Documents 1973). 
Most of these were former members of the NMWU. And it 
seems to have been mostly by this process of growth 
that the R&PT&CSU reached a membership of 4,523 members 
in the NPA nationally by 1973 (Table 6.1) and nearly 
4,000 within the NPA in Lagos alone by 1977 (Table 
10.1). 
The growth of membership does not imply that the 
union was without its internal weaknesses or conflicts. 
Adebola was at pains to point out at the 1973 con-
ference that large numbers of union 'members' (by which 
he meant all workers within departments his union 
claimed to represent) were not 'financial' (meaning 
they had not signed check-off forms). More positively, 
the General Secretary proposed at the same conference 
the necessity to increase the numbers signing check-off 
forms, and to base elections only on financial members. 
Moreover, the union should become involved in a build-
ing project, increase its fulltime staff, pay essential 
benefits, form a cooperative society and insurance 
company, take out company shares for 'commercial parti-
cipation for progress and stability', and create a 
whole series of specialised committees on education, 
propaganda, social questions, etc. There is little 
evidence that the union carried out these ambitious 
plans. An explanation for the attraction exercised by 
the union over NPA workers outside its ranks can hardly 
be found here. 
The type of demands being made by Adebola on 
behalf of his members appear not to have been very 
different from those of other union leaders. Thus, in 
a supplementary submission to the Beckley Tribunal 
(Beckley Exhibits 1967: No. 426), we find the union 
complaining about corruption and supercession in pro-
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motions, the violation of agreements, wastage by man-
agement, NPA officers acting on behalf of transport 
contractors, and making demands for a 39-hour week and 
night-duty allowance for quay staff (this last issue 
developed into what later became known as the one-
eighth demand and will be dealt with in Chapter 14) . 
With the exception of the one-eighth demand, these 
tended to be typical grades and trades issues. And 
whilst the one-eighth issue turned out to be generalis-
able to many, if not all, portworkers, it was initially 
put forward on behalf of the union's own members on the 
rails and in the ports. Even given the impact of the 
one-eighth award on non-R&PT&CSU members, it seems 
unlikely that it was the nature of the union's demands 
that won them over. 
We have seen that in general the NPA unions accept 
liberal industrial relations ideology, accept the NPA 
management version of this and are oriented towards the 
reformist trade unionism of the industrialised capi-
talist democracies. Did the R&PT&CSO distinguish 
itself from them in this sphere? A useful place to 
examine this question might be the one issue of a 
RStPT&CSU publication that we have (Spark, August 1972) . 
This suggests that the union shared the same ideology 
as its competitors. It identified with the united 
Labour Congress (ULC) belief that 'employers have the 
right to exist and are not necessarily exploiters'. It 
attacked the 'dirty treatment' handed out to the multi-
national companies when their operations were taken 
over by Iraq and Libya, claiming this would alienate 
'foreign investors and entrepreneurs or business part-
ners' and suggesting they be taken to the International 
Court in The Hague. It characterised Nigeria as having 
'a democratic form of government' and Nigerians as 
enjoying 'the highest standard of living in black 
Africa'.[8] It attacked the non-aligned Labour Unity 
Front as a 'handful of self-opinionated Half-Politi-
cians Half-Trade Unionists', and the 'socialist-
inclined organisations' for 
claiming that the Pro-West trade unions are 
being controlled by the United States of 
America and that their activities are con-
tinually under the close study of the CIA. 
It identified, finally, with the ULC, which 
has no systematic ideology other than the 
Broad Generality called free Trade Unionism. 
At the Heart of the idea of free Trade Union-
ism are genuine freedom of Association, 
Collective Bargaining Agreements freely 
arrived at with employers and freedom from 
political domination. 
Whilst conferences did not necessarily describe 
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Nigeria under military rule as 'democratic', they did 
identify unconditionally with successive regimes. 
Speaking of the Gowon regime in 1973, the General 
Secretary's report stated that after the Civil War 
The leaders of the country, with courage and 
faith in God, rose up to expectation. The 
programme of rehabilitation went on smoothly 
and today everybody knows that the programme 
of reconstruction and National Development 
have reached a peak that gives credit to our 
great country, Nigeria. (R&PT&CSU Conference 
Documents 1973). 
Two years later the totally discredited Gowon 
regime collapsed in a bloodless coup. And at the next 
union conference, the General Secretary was now saying 
of it that 'corruption was becoming widespread and 
honest people were pushed into the background'. He 
spoke of Gowon's replacement, Murtala Mohammed, as 
'this beloved darling of Nigerians' and declared that 
he had achieved in 201 days 'what the Gowon regime was 
unable to do in five years' (R&PT&CSU Conference 
Documents 1976) . 
In his subservience to the regime in power Adebola 
may have even surpassed the other NPA unions. But in 
his attitude to Western governments he began to differ 
from them. Although Adebola might have earlier been 
bitterly anti-communist and pro-Western, he had begun 
to criticise united States influence in the ULC even 
whilst President of that organisation. More recently 
it has been possible to find him (in a personal capa-
city) himself denouncing to the Adebiyi Tribunal the 
CIA connections of US unionists working in Nigeria 
(Adebola Memorandum, March 22, 1976). None of this, 
however, implies that the ideology of the R&PT&CSU was 
significantly different from that of the other NPA 
unions. Even if one were to believe that portworker 
unionists were open to ideological appeals, it would 
appear that there would be no basis on which workers 
could make such a distinction. 
The only area in which the R&PT&CSU appears to 
have differed sharply from the other portworker unions 
is in that of strategy - meaning by this the manner in 
which it sought to achieve its ends. 
It may be worthwhile beginning with the attitude 
that the union had toward management. This may not 
have been part of the clearly-articulated political 
ideology we have identified in Spark, but it was some-
thing that clearly distinguished it from the other NPA 
unions and that did inform its activities. On the one 
hand, the union declared its identification with the 
tasks of management. Thus, when NPA declared itself in 
serious financial straits in the early 1970s, the 
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R&PT&CSU decided that the theme of its conference 
should be 'Need for Increase in Revenue for Security of 
Service and Continuity of Unionism' (R&PT&CSU Con-
ference Documents 1973) . It also issued at one time 
the 'Ten Commandments of a Devoted Worker*. Finally, 
Adebola was quite capable of upbraiding NPA workers for 
laziness and asserting that wage demands were only 
justified by higher productivity (Daily Times, July 16, 
1971). Whether these declarations had any implications 
for action by either the union or its members is doubt-
ful. The other element clearly had. This was the 
belief of the union in its independence of and equality 
with management. According to one of its officers, 
The union took NPA management as equal part-
ners in the progress of the Authority and 
presented its demands on the basis of equali-
ty. The union looked on workers as free 
agents who were in the position to give or 
withhold their cooperation. (Ugwuanyi 1978). 
The belief of Adebola and his officers in their equali-
ty with management found expression in the public 
criticism which they showered on NPA with increasing 
pace during the 1970s. 
In an apparent attempt to restore a past golden 
age of equality between management and union (or a 
future golden age, when there would be a management 
that workers could follow and trust) the R&PT&CSU 
accused either individual managers (up to and including 
the General Manager), or certain levels and branches of 
management, or the NPA in general, of incompetence, 
corruption, tribalism and other shortcomings. Whether 
there was such a past of mutual respect (perhaps during 
a period in which Nigerian senior staff and union 
officers had similar backgrounds and felt themselves in 
equal opposition to a colonial management) is uncer-
tain. The fact is that Adebola acted as if the Beckley 
Tribunal had never come to an end and as if it was his 
responsibility to continue its work. 
In 1975 we see Adebola claiming to the Statutory 
Corporations Service Commission that on a number of 
occasions officers had accepted bribes in order to 
obtain promotion or regrading. Similar accusations 
were made in 1976 to the Public Services Review Unit 
(PSRU). 
In the same year, during the course of a bitter 
industrial relations dispute, a direct attack was 
launched on the top management and on the General 
Manager himself, this time in very strong language 
indeed. Passages from the relevant letter (R&PT&CSU to 
NPA, August 25, 1976) - which was widely circulated 
later - follow: 
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We are watching how far your officers will 
push you and how you will wield your alleged 
almighty influence...We have confronted you 
personally with making improper use of the 
names of the Chief of Staff...and the Federal 
Commissioner for Transport...One of your 
officers once told us that they were all 
afraid of you because...you have very strong 
connections...We, on our side, believe that 
if a person has an acquired power and he does 
not use it in a judicious manner, God the 
Giver of Life and Ruler of Destinies, will 
surely take it away from him. 
The campaign escalated with a long letter, includ-
ing six appendices, rehearsing the union's criticisms 
of management. In answer to accusations of irrespon-
sibility against his union, Adebola declared that 
Nobody in the Nigerian Ports Authority...can 
claim to have greater interest in the affairs 
of this country as well as those of the 
Nigerian Ports Authority than our own. Near-
ness to the hierarchy is not an indication of 
unalloyed loyalty...and the General Manager 
or any of his officers cannot claim to have 
reached the level of our commitment to the 
progress, stability and prosperity of this 
nation. 
If the above illustrates the fearlessness of the 
union toward a management it appeared to consider not 
so much its equal as its moral inferior, what we report 
below will well illustrate its aggressive style of 
bargaining. Whilst Zudonu proudly declared that he had 
never 'had to' go to the Industrial Arbitration Tri-
bunal, we see Adebola repeatedly boasting of the fre-
quency with which he has gone to the IAT since its 
creation in 1969. By 1973 it was already three times, 
by 1976 eight. Where the existing labour relations 
institutions seemed inadequate, he went to litigation. 
As an example of successful use of what was by now 
the Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP), we may take the 
dispute the union brought before it late 1976. This 
concerned a number of issues: 1) NPA termination of a 
senior clerk, Bamidele Akinwamide, who was also an 
activist in the union; 2) salary gradings said to have 
been influenced by bribery; 3) implications of the 
five-day week for those the union represented; 4) 
failure to promote to appropriate positions those in 
possession of certain marine engineering certificates; 
5) failure to pay to staff a fair amount of the over-
time charges paid by shippers; 6) double overtime for 
weekends and public holidays; 7) arrears following 
from the one-eighth award. Argument concerning the 
issues themselves began on December 6, 1976.[9] What 
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was striking at this sitting was NPA management's 
unwillingness to give their real reason for the sacking 
of Akinwamide. It was evident, both from the union's 
evidence and from interviews with unionists and manage-
ment officers, that Akinwamide was suspected of leaking 
to the union the contents of an NPA letter. This was 
said to have denounced Adebola to the Supreme Military 
Council and called for the union's banning. Since the 
R&PT&CSU had members in key clerical positions, and 
since the union was always remarkably well informed 
about confidential goings-on at NPA headquarters, such 
suspicions are not surprising. Management, however, 
was evidently unwilling or unable to provide proof that 
Akinwamide had leaked this document. 
In June 1977 the Ministry of Labour issued the 
decisions of the IAP. The union won the issue on 
Akinwamide, on the marine engineers and on the one-
eighth arrears. On the other issues the union was 
directed to resubmit to NPA, and NPA to forward this 
document with its comments within 30 days to the PSRU. 
The conflict was by no means over, but the union could 
feel well pleased with its work. 
Litigation has been resorted to both before the 
existence of the IAT and since. In 1955 the union's 
solicitors were threatening action for breach of con-
tract over a collective agreement (Beckley Tribunal 
1967: Exhibit 426). In 1973 the union was threatening 
legal proceedings over NPA refusal to transfer the 
check-off payments of the transferred NMWU members to 
itself. Management settled out of court at a cost of 
some N1,848. 
Although the actual industrial actions of the 
R&PTStCSU will be dealt with in Chapter 14, it is neces-
sary here to deal at least with its attitude toward 
strikes and stoppages. One would have expected the 
aggressive bargaining strategy of the union to express 
itself in a favourable attitude toward strikes. Its 
attitude was, however, more nuanced - not to say con-
tradictory. In its 1976 Conference Report we find 
Adebola declaring that 
In the transitional stages of the change that 
is taking place in our economic life today, 
we as trade unions will be called upon to 
exercise much patience and to make real 
sacrifice, even where our legitimate claims 
are in question, in the interest of our 
nation. It is because of this that our Onion 
decided to declare a strike-free period. 
He was referring to a six-month strike truce declared 
in the previous year (Daily Times, April 11, 1975) as 
the union's contribution to the anti-congestion exer-
cise. Although the union seems to have kept to its 
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promise, the conference report did not draw any lessons 
from its experience. And, when Adebola next spoke on 
the topic, it was to insist on the right to strike. 
The occasion was his submission to the Adebiyi Commis-
sion (Adebola Memorandum, March 27, 1976). Here he 
declared that the union had both ' respected the two 
Decrees' outlawing strikes in Nigeria and 'gone on 
strike on [a] few occasions'. The explanation for this 
self-contradictory behaviour lies in Adebola's asser-
tion that the decrees permitted managements to feel 
that 'unions have been rendered impotent' and that 
government never did anything to managements that 
ignored justified complaints. Adebola declared that 
the decrees were justified during the Civil War (when 
his union indeed appears to have rarely struck) but 
that the strike ban should be ended. Furthermore, 
No cumbersome decision-making process should 
be imposed on any trade union. Some Manage-
ments are very good and can understand the 
feelings of the workers. But there are 
others that are wicked and are very fond of 
victimising workers. A strong union will not 
like to wait for a Management to disorganise 
the plan of the Union to strike. It will 
like to take the Management by surprise in 
order to teach the Management a lesson. 
It thus appears that whilst the union was prepared to 
voluntarily shelve strike action for the 'national 
good', it would not accept obligatory bans. And whilst 
it was prepared to make such concessions for the 
nation, it believed in their necessity in order to deal 
with recalcitrant managements. Although there is no 
evidence that Adebola himself was a strike-broker by 
nature, it is clear that he considered the strike 
weapon essential in the union struggle to be treated as 
an equal by management. Since the NPA management was a 
'wicked' one, his organisation was prepared to openly 
flout successive anti-strike laws and take such indus-
trial action as it considered necessary to bring it to 
heel. There can be little doubt that this attitude 
found an echo amongst the frustrated NPA workers. 
6.4. Summary 
First of all let us consider the constituencies, 
or membership bases, of the various unions. We noted 
in the introduction to this chapter the extent of 
division that occurred in the 20 proceeding years, such 
organisational splits being based on a broad variety of 
imaginable worker self-identifications. Such divisions 
not only continued into the 1970s but seemed even to 
multiply with the creation of the JCR. The JCR repre-
sented almost the most extreme form of factionalism, 
with tiny groups seeking their self-interest not 
through their own efforts, but through the services of 
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a professional intermediary. Yet such splintering was 
evidently expressive of a dissatisfaction with the 
effectivity of the traditional NPA union leaderships. 
And it is certainly not without significance that 
shortly after rejoining the NPAWU, the troublesome 
Mechanical Workshops Branch transferred itself to the 
RStPT&CSU. Although this latter organisation might have 
been traditionally marked by the kind of limited con-
stituency characteristic of the other NPA unions, it 
was able to act as a vessel for the discontent within 
the NPA, thus beginning to make itself into the kind of 
NPA-wide union that the NMTÜF had failed to provide. 
The NMTUF seems to have never been more than the sum of 
its parts, its low level of activity in the 1970s 
reflecting the impasse of the majority of unions within 
the NPA. 
The question of why the R&PT&CSU was able to 
transform itself into such a challenge to the others 
requires a consideration of the nature and form of 
union demands. We have seen the prevalence within NPA 
unions of grades and trades demands, and of demands for 
individual promotion into senior staff - even where the 
self-defeating nature of these was clearly recognised. 
We have noted that the demands of the R&PT&CSU were 
little different, and that even the one-eighth demand 
originated as a grades and trades one. We have sug-
gested that the major difference from the other unions 
was not so much its policy as its strategy - the manner 
in which it sought to achieve its ends. This involved 
1) aggressive verbal attacks on managerial attitudes 
and behaviour, 2) an aggressive bargaining strategy, 
exploiting existing institutions to the maximum, break-
ing laws where considered necessary, and rejecting in 
practice the ideology of liberal-paternalist industrial 
relations, 3) disregard for the traditional inter-union 
relations that had preserved the old constituencies and 
prevented the creation of an NPA-wide organisation. 
So seriously did the Nwankwontas and Zudonus take 
the ideology of liberal-paternalist industrial rela-
tions that they rejected even the liberal-paternalist 
institutions (the IAT/IAP), and failed to copy the 
behaviour of their trade union mentors in Europe and 
the US. Formally dependent on the same ideological 
sources, Adebola nonetheless developed an independent 
and aggressive strategy. The limits of Adebola's 
militancy are suggested in his consistent subordinacy 
to the Nigerian state - whoever happened to be in 
charge of it. Adebola legitimised his aggressive 
behaviour toward both foreign trade unions and NPA 
management precisely by reference to a presumed common 
interest of workers and state in Nigeria. We are left 
with Beyioku, the ex-trade union leader, ex-politician, 
and professional broker. Accepting the ideology of 
industrial relations, he tried to operate partly on 
this basis and partly on the basis of personal contacts 
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with the leadership of state. Whatever the possibili-
ties for such brokerage relations between a dock con-
tractor and his workers (which we will be able to 
consider in a moment), this was evidently impossible 
between NPA workers and NPA management, or NPA workers 
and the Nigerian state. It was partly a matter of the 
unwillingness of NPA and state to grant more than 
crumbs in answer to his appeals, and partly the dis-
satisfaction of the NPA workers with such crumbs as 
were granted. But this kind of leadership seemed to 
have little future amongst portworkers. 
Bearing in mind these major characteristics of NPA 
union organisational development in the 1970s, we must 
now consider those of the dockworker unions. 
NOTES 
1. For a detailed account of portworker unionism 
1940s-1960s, see Waterman (1982:Ch.2). 
2. Zealous readers are reminded that detailed 
references can be found in the long draft from 
which this work has been condensed, and that the 
original documents can be found in the microfiche 
archives (Waterman 1979b,e,f and 1980c), where 
they are structured chronologically and by union, 
company or government department. 
3. I was fortunate enough to be present at this event 
on December 16, 1976. The account is drawn from 
my notes. 
4. While Imoudu was speaking there took place, un-
commented and probably unnoticed by anyone apart 
from myself, the following spectacle: 20 ragged 
dockworkers staggered through the canteen from a 
store-room, carrying bundles of stinking and 
insect-covered stockfish. It was part of the 
government fixed-price supplies which the NPA had 
somehow forgotten to distribute. Imoudu did not 
see this section of the Nigerian working class, 
and they responded by showing no sign of recog-
nising him. 
5. Although we have no sources for one of the three 
bodies affiliated to the JCR - the NPA Fire Ser-
vice Association (NPAFSA) - we have plentiful 
material on both the other - the NPA Junior Super-
visory Staff Association of Nigeria (NPAJSSAN) and 
the NPA Craftsmen and Allied Workers Union 
(NPACSiAWU) . We likewise have more than sufficient 
material on the JCR itself, this covering groups 
of workers who at one time allied themselves to it 
directly and informally. 
137 
Almost all my documentation on the R&PT&CSU is on 
the period since 1973. This is the period in 
which that union established its predominance 
within NPA. For the period before 1973 I am 
largely dependent on indirect evidence from other 
sources. 
I know of this organisation only that it was in 
existence in 1957, that it applied to join the 
International Transportworkers Federation in 1958, 
obtained check-off rights in 1962 and made a 
submission to Beckley in 1967. 
Nigeria was at this time in its sixth year of an 
increasingly unpopular military regime and suffer-
ing a rapidly rising rate of inflation. The 
somewhat eccentric characterisation of the country 
therefore requires explanation. The article from 
which the quotations are taken is one on why 
workers should pay union dues and is written by 
the magazine's editor, Augustine Ayo. The explan-
ation that suggests itself from the style of the 
article is that its editor lifted it from an 
American source, simply changing the names of the 
countries and the organisations. Perhaps the 
editor was under more direct America influence, 
since his implicit denial of US and CIA influence 
is in striking contrast with the position of 
Adebola himself reported below. 
I was present at this sitting and the following 
account is from my notes. 
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Chapter 7 
DOCKWORKER UNIONISM: MODERATE IMPOTENCE; 
RADICAL SUICIDE 
This chapter reveals the rise of a militant general 
workers union amongst the dockworkers, but also the 
crisis of that organisation and strategy. It begins 
with a short historical background. It then considers 
in turn two enterprise unions and the two competing 
general unions - one moderate and one radical. 
Given the fractured nature of the docklabour 
industry and the casual nature of dockwork, it is not 
surprising that the creation of stable organisations 
has been much more difficult than with portworkers. 
Rather than trace here the complex historical develop-
ment of dockworker unionism (see Table 7.1), I will 
mention briefly the types of organisation that appear 
to have existed before 1968. The basic units were 
either 1) classical company unions like the Biney 
Workers Union (BWU) or the Bakare Dockworkers Union 
(BDWU) ; or 2) 'craft' unions like the Union of Tally 
Clerks (UTC), the Customs Casual Shipping Labour Union 
(CCSLU), the Nigerian Boardship Ports Security Workers 
Union (NBSPSWU); or 3) multi-enterprise unions like the 
Asajoquan Dockworkers Union (ADWU) combining workers of 
Assaf, Johnson, Quayside (or Quick) and others. 
The rise and fall of industry-level amalgamations 
is more difficult to follow than the careers of the 
major dockworker leaders. At the level of the Port 
there arose in the 1950s a number of resilient trade 
union leaders still active even in 1977. The first was 
A.E. Okon. He set up a tally clerks union around 1950 
and two successive amalgamations of dockers unions in 
1950 and 1961. He was the first Secretary of the NMTUF 
in 1955, and visited the British unions, the British 
Dock Labour Board and the headquarters of Elder Demp-
ster in Liverpool in 1956. In 1959 he was elected to 
the Central Working Committee of the newly-created, 
moderate-reformist, TUC of Nigeria. In 1961-2 Okon was 
the Nigerian representative to the Congress of the ITF, 
where he was elected as one of two Africans to its 
Executive Board. Okon was always a moderate reformist, 
as his national and international affiliations might 
suggest. He was a convinced believer in the industrial 
relations ideology of the British government, manage-
Table 7.1. List of Nigerian dockworker organisations (1948-77), with available details 
Name Abbrev-
iation 
Reg. 
No. 
Reg. 
Year 
Check-
Off 
Dockworkers Union of Nigeria 
Customs Casual Shipping Labour Union 
Union of Tally Clerks of Nigeria 
Biney·s Workers Union 
Amalgamated Dockworkers Union of Nigeria and the Cameroons 
Nigerian Boardship Ports Security Workers Union 
Nigerian Maritime Trade Unions Federation 
Nigerian Stevedores and Dockworkers Union 
Biney Workers Union 
Nigerian Dockers Transport and General Workers Union 
a 
Nigerian Stevedoring African Workers Union 
Bakare Dockworkers Union 
Nigerian Union of Ship Cleaners 
National Council of Nigerian Dockers and Seamen 
b 
General Contractors and Stevedoring and Dockworkers Union 
DWUofN 
CCSLU 
UTC 
BWU 
ADWUofN&C 
NBPSWU 
NMTUF 
NS&DWU 
BWU 
NDTSGWU 
NSAWU 
BDWU 
NUSC 
Council 
GC&S&DWU 
144 
190 
200 
203 
216 
405 
464 
216 
600 
602 
784 
1948 
1950 
1950 
(1955) 
1956 
1956 
1961 
1962 
(1963) 
1963 
Federation of Nigerian Dock Worker Union 
b 
Mid-West Dockworkers Union 
Joint Committee of Dockworkers 
Joint Action Committee 
С 
Railway and Ports and Dockworkers Workers Union of Nigeria 
W. Biney Youth Association of Nigerian Dock Worker 
Federation of Nigerian Dockworkers 
Asajoquan Dockworkers Union 
Amalgamated Dockworkers Transport and General Workers Union 
Biney Staff Association 
Akere Dockworkers Union 
Amalgamated Dockworkers Transport and General Workers Union 
(NTUC affiliated) 
Amalgamated Dockworkers Transport and General Workers Union 
(ULC affiliated) 
FNDWU 
M-WDWU 
Joint 
Committee 
JAC 
R&P&DWUN 
WBYA 
FNDW 
ADWU 
ADWTSGWU/ 
Amalgamation 
BSA 
ADU 
ADWT&GWU(N) 
ADWT&GWU(U) 
1 
1090 
1169 
1396 
(1963) 
1963b 
(1963-4) 
(1964) 
(1964) 
(1964) 
(1965) 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1971 
(1968) 
(1973) 
1968 
1970 
Sources; These are extremely varied and contradictory, but include Labour Reports, the 
Urhotra Report (1970: 7-9), documents of the Registrar of Trade Unions, letters and 
interview material. 
Notes: a) Port Harcourt based; b) Sapele based; c) actually the R&PWUN led by Imoudu 
and registered as No.l in 1940; d) brackets indicate foundation dates of unregistered 
organisations (these are usually amalgamations, which cannot be registered under law-
note that both the ADWUofN&C and the ADWT&GWU were nonetheless both registered thé 
latter even being granted check-off rights). ' 
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ment and unions. unfortunately for him, however, he 
could convince neither the Nigerian government nor the 
contractors of his ideology. Moreover, he was unable 
to translate his successes at national and inter-
national level into solid organisation or undisputed 
leadership at the industrial level. He was challenged 
not only by certain radicals, but also by men who 
shared his ideology but disputed his position. 
The radical opposition that existed for three or 
four years in the 1960s was in the hands of Jonas Abam 
and Sidi Khayam. Abam went to Britain in 1949, working 
in engineering and training as a printer. Whilst in 
Britain he came in contact with Sidi Khayam. With 
Abam, Khayam seems to have been associated first with 
the Young Communist League and then with the (Trot-
skyist) Socialist Labour League. Khayam and Abam 
returned to Nigeria at the end of the 1950s. Whilst 
still in Britain, Khayam became General Secretary of 
the Nigerian Union of Seamen. He was a leader of the 
leftwing Independent United Labour Congress in 1961 and 
of the communist-linked Nigerian Trade Union Congress 
(NTUC) in 1963. Around I960 Abam became the leader of 
the Nigerian Stevedores and Dockworkers Union (NSbDWU). 
Khayam and Abam worked together in a council to create 
the basis for a major dock strike in 1963. Considering 
that the left had failed to support the 1963 dock 
strike and to fully exploit the 1964 General Strike 
(Kiomenesekenegha 1966:182) they abandoned it and began 
to seek for leadership of the dockers within the right-
wing United Labour Congress of Nigeria (ULC). They 
achieved their aims through the Amalgamated Dockworkers 
Transport and General Workers Union (ADWT&GWU), with 
Khayam as General Secretary and Abam as National 
Organising Secretary. However, in the 18 months pre-
ceding the 1968 dock strike that destroyed it they were 
unable to convert the warring factions and money-
seeking officers into a viable organisation. 
The various dock union amalgamations built by such 
men suffered from a very high death rate, since they 
had no effective means of collecting funds or imposing 
any discipline on their member organisations. Given 
that the latter were frequently themselves of a dubious 
reality, the amalgamations tended to be so as well. 
Such power as the amalgamations had came from their 
association with the national trade union centres, and 
with the foreign and international trade union centres 
beyond. For many years A.E. Okon had just this kind of 
moral and financial backing. The International Trans-
portworkers Federation (ITF) claims the credit for 
having helped create the ADWTbGWU in 1966 (ITF 1976). 
The brief radical challenge by Sidi Khayam and Jonas 
Abam was likewise based on national and international 
backing (although one doubts whether they got much 
money from abroad). 
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Many of the problems revealed here continued into 
the 1970s. Vie will see the continuing weakness and 
dependency of basic-level organisations, the domination 
of port-level dockworker organisation by a few leaders, 
and continuing conflict between competing amalgama-
tions. But in this period we will see the division 
into a continuing moderate-radical split at port level 
echoing that of the portworker unions. The nature of 
this development and reasons for the parallel will have 
to be considered in the next chapter, as will the 
continuing absence of common organisation and action 
between port and dockworkers. 
Our account of dockworker organisation must begin 
in the later 1960s. This was a crucial turning point 
for Lagos dockworkers, not so much because of the 
transformation of national labour control strategy that 
began with the Civil War, as of the new organisations 
that came into being at this time. These organisa-
tions, at both company and port level, continued in 
existence throughout the 1970s. 
7.1. Enterprise unions 
Whatever Table 7.1 might suggest, or that competing 
leaders might claim, there were practically no basic-
level unions in existence in the mid-1970s. The only 
ones for which it was possible to find any evidence 
were the two enterprise-based organisations to be dealt 
with here. 
Whatever the reasons for the disappearance of the 
Biney Workers' Union (Waterman 1982:Section 3.1.2), it 
did not take long before it was considered necessary to 
revive it, if under the new name of Biney Staff Asso-
ciation (BSA).[1] By 1968 the new organisation was 
officially registered, its initiators being largely the 
same junior supervisory staff as previously. What is 
remarkable about the BSA is not only this continuity 
with the BWU, but the relative absence of change in its 
leadership, strategy and activities during the follow-
ing ten years. The confinement of the organisation to 
the one company, its absence of any significant rela-
tions with others outside, and the failure of the 
outside organisations to make any significant attack on 
this fortress - all these elements removed those stimu-
li to change that one finds elsewhere amongst port-
worker and dockworker unions alike. It appears as if 
Chief Biney and his junior supervisors had found a 
formula which neither outside forces nor internal 
discontent were able to alter. 
Given that Biney's actively sponsored its own 
unions, considered them a part of management, sought to 
isolate them from others, and had unlimited power of 
discipline and dismissal over its labour, one would not 
expect to find either the BWU (1950 to 1965?) or BSA 
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(1968-1978) holding distinctly different views from the 
Managing Director. We do, thus, find the unions prais-
ing the company as the Oldest and best-experienced' 
and the one that has trained most of the other dock 
labour contractors (BSA Registration Ceremony Documents 
1968), or calling for 'a day's work for a fair day's 
pay' (BSA Conference Documents 1969). Alhaji Vusufu 
Balogun, President of the BSA in 1976, echoed mana-
gerial views on the role of the unions: 'We are for the 
progress of the workers and of management'. When 
Biney's own staff went on strike during the Udoji 
disturbances of 1975, 
The Union President (Alhaji Katsina) after 
paying respects to the Managing Director and 
others on the management side expressed utter 
regret for the strike action which to his 
knowledge was the first time in the history 
of the company. 
He also 'prayed for continued progress of the company'. 
When management conceded a 40 percent wage increase (in 
face of a 100 percent initial request), 
An abundant amount of prayers were...showered 
on the Managing Director and the company for 
long life, health and continued stability for 
Biney organisation all over the wharves of 
the Federation. (Biney Minutes, February 18, 
1975). 
When a strike was called throughout the port in May 
1974, the BSA not only disassociated itself from it but 
declared 
that should any industrial action be precipi-
tated, it is prepared to carry on and ensure 
the smooth flow of traffic through the major 
ports of the country, provided it is given 
adequate and continued protection by the 
law-enforcing agencies. (Daily Times, May 
20, 1974) 
Hopes for the continued progress of the company were 
not expressed solely in pious form, nor addressed 
solely to otherworldly powers. In statements addressed 
to the government or public, unions at Biney's identi-
fied themselves with private ownership in general and 
with Biney ownership in particular. 
Whilst this reveals the general orientation of the 
BSA towards the company, it did make occasional efforts 
to present itself as a conventional Nigerian trade 
union. At its founding conference in 196 8, a headman 
delegate, Tijani Dada, 
stressed that the Union must be made a real 
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life wire for the workers. It should be 
dynamic and it should pursue the set down 
aims and objects without fear to gain the 
confidence of the workers, bearing in mind 
the fate of the former unions. 
A wharf labourer, Amusa Rufai, 
appealed to the leaders and all members to 
eschew back talks and betrayal attitude as 
members were still afraid they could be 
betrayed. 
Other leaders and delegates stressed problems of wage 
rates, overtime, sick leave, training, promotion, 
victimisation, etc. 
A major effort was made by the new organisation to 
create a conventional collective bargaining relation-
ship within the company. A formal grievance and ne-
gotiation procedure was being worked on at this time. 
And we know that the 1968 conference had drawn up a 
list of demands on the company. But it took another 
year, and the declaration of a trade dispute, before 
management finally agreed even to a negotiation pro-
cedure that was of little disadvantage to itself and of 
only symbolic advantage to the BSA. Nonetheless, the 
union leadership, company management, and the man who 
was consultant to them both - Beyioku - must have felt 
that the basis had been laid for effective bipartite 
collective bargaining within the company, with recourse 
to a tripartite relationship (appeal to government) in 
the case of deadlock. 
Any such hope must have been at least shaken by a 
protest movement of the ordinary labourers that took 
place in January 1969, almost directly after the con-
ference. This involved two separate strikes and it 
required Chief Biney to hold one of his extended 
courts/tribunals. Both the protest itself and the 
evidence that the inquiry provides on the nature and 
structure of the BSA will be dealt with later. What is 
significant for the development of the BSA as an or-
ganisation is the apparent lack of impact of the 
strike. Thus, the tone of the following conference 
seems rather to have been set by Chief Biney's opening 
address (BSA Conference Documents 1969). Despite the 
dramatic events of early 1969, this declared that 
To the best of the knowledge of the company, 
no appreciable disagreement has been reached 
on any important matter, other than the 
suspension of those matters which could have 
far reaching effect...on the general economic 
prospect of the company...both now and in the 
future. 
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The 'matters suspended' appeared from the General 
Secretary's report to include most of the issues on 
which management had stalled at the end of the previous 
year: pensions, annual leave, sick leave, increments 
for company staff, wages, staff overtime. Likewise, 
the union's successes appeared to be largely limited to 
what had been conceded at that meeting: restoration of 
leave for headmen, certain overtime arrears, etc. The 
major successes stressed by the union were those re-
garding appointments and promotions. Thus, EC members 
Lawal and Oshunsheyi had been appointed to senior 
grades, and the union was pressing hard for Karimu 
Katsina to be likewise promoted. A number of headmen 
had been promoted to the rank of supervisor, despite an 
'initial objection that they could not be said to be 
literate persons'. The union was also attempting 
continue the traditional veto on appointments exercised 
by the old BWU. Thus, it had challenged the promotion 
of a Mr Yankee to senior foreman, considering that he 
had been promoted not for his qualifications but for 
'extraneous considerations'. It had in June 1969 
complained at the 'irregular' promotion of certain men 
to headman category and managed to get these withdrawn. 
And it had managed to obtain the reversal of the sus-
pension of Mr Savage, an allocation clerk. 
The union was, however, apparently feeling the 
pressure either of the unofficial strikes that had 
occurred in January, or of the activity of the radical 
successor to the ADWT&GWU. This had raised general 
dockworker demands concerning decasualisation and taken 
strike action in July 1969. The 1969 Presidential 
Address, which one year previously had spoken favour-
ably of strike action, now actually drew back from it. 
Although distancing himself from militant action, 
President Katsina also felt it necessary to complain 
that the union was 'not altogether satisfied with the 
general put off attitude' of the management. He de-
clared that the union should 'steer clear of any aspect 
which could raise up any suspicion of its being a Home 
[house? PW] Union'. And this desire apparently led 
Katsina to now declare that things had developed to a 
stage at which ' the Union must exercise its rights of 
industrial action'. What these threats boiled down to 
was, apparently, the declaration for the first time in 
Biney union history of a trade dispute. The dispute 
had been declared in September, and concerned the 
failure to draw up the negotiation agreement, overtime, 
etc. This action was apparently sufficient to get 
management to finally sign a document on November 15, 
1969. 
Such information as we have for later years does 
not suggest any significant change in the nature or 
activities of the BSA. Attempts at negotiation on 
leave and the other traditional issues were repeated. 
The union leadership continued with its attempts to get 
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advancement or reinstatement for certain union officers 
or other favoured staff, and to obtain the dismissal of 
certain others. Although the evidence is inconclusive, 
it seems possible that the BSA was better able to get 
rid of someone it disliked than to obtain the appoint-
ment or promotion of someone it did like. It would 
have been easier for the headmen to passively obstruct 
the work of a given officer than to have actively 
demonstrated in favour or one. 
Perhaps the only occasion on which the union 
really began to go beyond its traditional role was 
during the nationwide euphoria of the massive Udoji 
awards in early 1975. It seems on this occasion to 
have actually demanded massive wage increases and to 
have organised a brief stoppage (see Chapter 15) . 
However, its extreme demands and initial militancy were 
rapidly replaced by deep apologies, massive concessions 
and expressions of deep gratitude for what Chief Biney 
eventually saw fit to offer. 
Later in 1975 we find the union once again denoun-
cing strike action and declaring that Biney's had given 
the workers their entitlements without force. Such 
sentiments were much more to the taste of Biney than 
the strike action to which the BSA had actually re-
sorted, and he once again complemented the union for 
demonstrating by 'eschewing undue force and bitter-
ness...your fitness to be reckoned with as a real trade 
union organisation*. By declaring a dispute in 1969 
and taking - however briefly - industrial action in 
1975, the union might appear to have been moving toward 
becoming just such a union. 
The major restriction on a movement away from 
clientalism would seem to have been not so much Biney's 
unrestricted power to hire and fire but the composition 
of the BSA as an organisation. Whilst this is a matter 
to be considered mainly in Part III, it must be stated 
here that - like its predecessor - the BSA was pri-
marily an organisation of headmen and junior super-
visors. 
The only other enterprise-based union on which we 
have evidence is the Akere Dockworkers Union (ADU).[2] 
Akere had a monopoly of shorehandling on Customs Quay 
until the quay was closed to make way for a new road in 
December 1976. Akere was also one of the larger and 
better-established contractors, employing a couple of 
thousand labourers. The ADU is the only claimed affi-
liate of the moderate ADWT£tGWU(U) for which any evi-
dence of existence can be found. Indeed, its existence 
and operation as an organisation (rather than just a 
group of leaders) is better attested to than that of 
the ADWTSiGWU(U) itself! This is, of course, because 
its Secretary was the redoubtable A.E. Okon. Thus, it 
was possible in 1975 to find a 1971 return for the ADU 
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in the files of the Registrar of Trade Unions. This 
indicated a membership of just over 1,000, an income of 
£N188, and a detailed list of expenses. Despite its 
experienced General Secretary, the union was not with-
out its difficulties with the Registrar. Correspon-
dence from 1973 suggested that it had had no bank 
account, and that it owed money to Akere himself for 
constitutions that the company had printed. However, 
the ADU seems to have been the only base union apart 
from the BSA that was capable of holding conferences. 
The 1974 conference was held at the Trade Union 
Institute of the AALC and ULC. The Presidential 
Address mentioned a number of disputes with management, 
concerning arrears of pay, National Provident Fund 
(NPF) benefits and nightwork. The arrears issue was 
taken to the Ministry, where the matter was resolved, 
workers eventually obtaining several hundred nairas of 
back pay. The union declared that 
The arrears we were entitled to collect was 
for one year but we had to take a number of 
issues into consideration and this made us 
collect from the management arrears for six 
months. (ADU Conference Documents 1974). 
Another 'burning issue' was that of the failure of the 
workers to receive any accounts for their NPF payments. 
This matter remained unresolved (as, of course, it did 
for all the dockworkers). The General Secretary's 
report raised the usual common dockworker grievances, 
and the old proposals for collective bargaining machin-
ery, a Dock Labour Scheme, welfare facilities, etc. 
Interviews with five or six voluntary officers of 
the ADU in 1975 showed them all to be headmen of pre-
ference gangs. They reported Akere's attitude toward 
them as being one of limited tolerance. On the one hand 
he permitted the union to function. On the other, he 
had sacked unionists without the required notice or 
benefits, and had suspended others following the Udoji 
strikes in January 1975. The officers claimed that, 
through fear of victimisation, most headmen did not 
support the union and that most support came from the 
regularly-employed general labourers. 
Whatever the dependency and weakness of this 
organisation, it seems to have been more independent of 
the contractor than the BSA. There is no reason to 
doubt the word of the officers concerning the base of 
the union. If, within Biney's, we see the leadership 
basically identifying upwards, then it is quite pos-
sible that this one (with no supervisors amongst its 
leaders) was identifying downwards. Enterprise-based 
unions are not inevitably clientalist unions. This one 
had more the characteristics of the typical Nigerian 
factory union. The limitations of this form in the 
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docks, however, were shown in dramatic and tragic form 
when Akere lost his contract and the union, consequent­
ly, its base. The ADU leaders then became, once again, 
casual labourers subject to the conditions common to 
all Lagos dockworkers. On June 20, 1977, 13 ADU mem­
bers who had obtained employment with the new NCHC were 
sacked. The 13 included the veteran moderate union 
leader, A.R.D. Oriola. It was rumoured within the 
industry that the men had used N7,000 of ADU funds in 
order to bribe NCHC management to promote them. They 
were detained for three days and were then released on 
bail whilst charges were considered. The charges were 
denied by Okon, who declared a trade dispute with the 
NCHC over the affair (Evening Times, August 18, 1977). 
Whatever the truth of this affair, the Akere unionists 
must by now have begun to consider the advantages of a 
portwide organisation. 
7.2 The traditional moderates 
If the two enterprise-based unions proved in this 
period to be inadequate instruments for the articula­
tion of dockworker needs, then we need to consider the 
capacity of portwide organisations to serve them. But 
first we need to distinguish between the original 
ADWT&GWU and what we will be calling the ADWT&GWU(U) 
and the ADWT&GWU(N). The original ADWT&GWU collapsed 
after a major dock strike in 1968. Its spiritual heirs 
then disappeared for some years from the Lagos scene. 
They revived their organisation in 1972-3, within the 
framework of the ULC (therefore the 'U')· The original 
organisation was taken over in 196 8-9 by a group of 
radicals, who affiliated it to the NTUC (therefore the 
•N'). In the account of the moderate ADWT&GWU (U) [3] 
that follows it will be necessary to go back to the 
original ADWT&GWU in order to understand the reason for 
the split and its consequences. The original amalga­
mation was created by the collaboration of the moderate 
dockworker unionists, with the blessings of the Minis­
try of Labour, and the support of the ULC, the Inter­
national Transportworkers Federation (ITF) and the 
African-American Labour Centre (AALC). The new leader­
ship was in crisis immediately after its creation due 
to constitutional and legal problems and leadership 
conflicts within the merging unions. 
The iden' •fxcation of this tendency with liberal-
paternaliGu n-rms -ч^ institutions was made clear -
frequently and publicly - as was its distaste for 
strikes. In reaction to a strike led by its radical 
opponents, the union declared: 
As long as there is no National Joint Indus­
trial Council for collective bargaining, so 
will industrial harmony continue to evade us 
in the industry and chaos shall continue. 
(ADWT&GWU(U) Petition, September 21, 1974). 
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On the occasion of another strike threat. Abara warned 
workers against it (Daily Times, September 30, 1974), 
stating, 
The wage talks will start when the dock 
labour scheme is introduced and accredited 
dock labour contractors registered with the 
government are known. 
He stressed that it was wrong to make workers feel that 
they could improve their conditions without such a 
scheme and a JIC and 
emphasised that violence was not the best 
method of settling industrial disputes and 
would not be to the best interest of dock 
workers. 
Whilst in the early 1960s its General Secretary, Jonas 
Abam, had favoured nationalisation of the dock labour 
industry, in May 1977 he declared in an interview that 
Now I will not say this openly because of the 
lack of understanding amongst dockworkers and 
also because of the government we have and a 
lot of interests involved. 
In examining the development of the moderate 
tendency, we must go back to the period running from 
its foundation to its temporary demise in early 1969. 
A useful way to do this is through examination of a 
remarkably frank, detailed and prescient document 
produced by Jonas Abam, then National Organiser of the 
original amalgamation (ADWT&GWU Memorandum, May 1967). 
The document begins thus ι 
It is five months since the Amalgamation took 
place. Since then, apart from the efforts we 
made towards the establishment of the Nation­
al Dock Labour Scheme, we have not done 
anything concretely to raise the standard of 
living and better the conditions of services 
for the dockworkers we represent. 
Abam went on to warn that if this was not done, the 
organisation would lose not only the support of the 
dockworkers, 'but also of our friends abroad'. He 
reminded the leadership of the conference decision that 
'we should derive our strength and support from the 
ranks of the dockers and not from middle class dockers 
and employers*. He declared that despite some opposi­
tion in the docks the rank and file dockers had accep­
ted the amalgamation. However, he added 'they are 
sceptical about both old and new organisations in the 
docks'. 
The most effort had been going, as Abam pointed 
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out, into the effort to create the DLB, the JICs and a 
compulsory Dock Labour Scheme. The aims of the organi-
sation had been set out once again right after its 
founding conference in a document submitted to the 
Beckley Tribunal (ADWT&GWU Memorandum, January 16, 
1967) . From this point on till the middle of 1968 it 
continued these efforts. Whatever success was achieved 
here was brought to an end by the 1968 dock strike. 
Indeed, the ineffectiveness of these institutions was 
considered by the Urhobo Tribunal (1971) to be one of 
the causes of the strike. Evidently the troubles of 
the ADWT&GWU were building up during the first half of 
1968. Member organisations were disaffiliating, some 
kind of committee of dockworkers was being set up 
alongside (or within) the amalgamation, and various 
officers were being suspended for 'subversion'. On 
July 24, according to Nkamare, Secretary of the ANDLC, 
the union submitted an 11-page memorandum of grossly 
unrealistic demands for a JIC meeting that was only a 
few days off. According to him, the circulation of 
such demands was indicative that the union was 'working 
under pressure'. Sometime in August the police felt it 
necessary to report to the Registrar of Trade Unions 
the complaint of a dockworker that in addition to being 
required to pay fees to the faction of the NBSPSWU led 
by A.O. Fakoya, they 'were forced to pay other Enrol-
ment and Membership Fees to the Amalgamation before 
they were issued Cards' (Urhobo Report 1971:19). 
The nature of the opposition groups that came into 
existence within the amalgamation is not entirely clear 
since several of them may have had overlapping 'member-
ships' as well as similar names. (For an attempt to 
unravel them see Waterman 1979h:Ch.4). The strike that 
occurred in 1968 was as much a protest against the 
leadership of the ADWT&GWU as it was against the con-
tractors or the government. This will be shown in 
Chapter 15. What is of significance here is that as a 
result of the splits and the strike the original lea-
ders, Jonas Abam and Sidi Khayam, lost not only the 
confidence of the rank and file activists, but also 
that of their erstwhile colleagues and - more impor-
tantly - of their national and international sponsors. 
Radicals grouped around a militant illiterate docker, 
Endeley Olagboshe, declared the deposition of the old 
leaders and their affiliation to the NTUC. 
Khayam and his supporters did not, of course, take 
their deposition quietly. In October there took place 
a two-day conference of the formal leadership of the 
amalgamation. This attacked dissidents, proposed an 
investigation into 'allegations of corruption and 
inefficiency', and called for a First Annual Conference 
in early January. Amongst the dissidents were evident-
ly two other veteran moderates, Okon and Onyewu, since 
Khayam felt it necessary to advise contractors to have 
no dealings with them and to disregard Okon's claims to 
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be the General Secretary (Khayam to Contractors, Novem-
ber 20, 1968). On January 9-11, 1969, Khayam and his 
supporters organised their own conference at Sapele and 
elected a new leadership. Those dropped from the 1966 
leadership included not only Okon and Onyewu but also 
such other moderates as Balogun, Ishola, Ayorinde, 
Eluma and Gbaminido. The new leadership appeared to be 
little more than the personal following of Abam and 
Khayam. Moreover, it was refused government recogni-
tion, and it looks as if both the ITF and the Americans 
had temporarily washed their hands of the organisation. 
Khayam seems then to have abandoned the dockers for his 
firmer base amongst the seamen. And Abam guit Lagos 
and unionism for several years. 
This was the end of another attempt at creating a 
moderate portwide organisation amongst the dockers. In 
a sense, the moderates can be said to have signed their 
own death warrant and written their own epitaph. But, 
in fact, they only went into retirement. There were 
few signs of their presence within the Port during the 
next two or three years. The first evidence that the 
organisation we are now calling the ADWT&GWU(U) was 
back in action came when it issued the first of many 
press statements on the sufferings of the dockers. The 
statement purported to have issued from a conference. 
Remarkable is its claim for the workers of the 'ba-
lance' of the 1971 Adebo award, and its complaint that 
certain international organisations which are 
interested in the good living of the Nigerian 
dockworkers such as the Afro-American Labour 
Centre, had donated essential materials to 
the management of the NPA for the provision 
of.. .significant factors to life in our 
docks, but up till today the Lagos dock-
workers have not seen these things being 
erected. (ADWRS.GWU (U) Statement, 1972). 
The demand for the Adebo 'balance' appears to have been 
a purely verbal attempt to outbid the radicals, who had 
led the dockworkers on one or two successful strikes in 
1971. The reference to the toilet facilities indicates 
how out of touch the moderates were with Apapa. The 
facilities were opened on December 15, 1970, but they 
were handed over to the NPA and its unions rather than 
to the dockers for whom they were meant (AALC Reporter, 
January 1971). In May we see Okon, supposedly as 
Secretary of the ADWT&GWU(U), again complaining about 
the toilets, and as always demanding the integrated 
dock labour scheme (New Nigerian, May 19, 1972). The 
moderates themselves held a conference on December 12, 
1973, at which the amalgamation was 'reconstituted'. 
Once again, this was done with the goodwill and encour-
agement of the Ministry, and the active assistance or 
finance of the ULC, ITF and the AALC. The leaders of 
the new body included such veterans of the 1950s and 
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1960s as A.E. Окоп, Jonas Abam, G.Α. Brown, Eluma, 
Oriola, Dianu, etc. The organisation could thus legi­
timately claim to be the continuation of the 1966 
amalgamation. 
1975 was the year of Udoji. Once again the radi­
cals led a successful strike and follow-up action, as a 
result of which the general labour rate rose from N1.32 
to N2.42 - with a massive lump sum in back pay. Abam, 
on the other hand, seems to have spent most of his time 
writing letters and organising meetings. There was a 
letter proposing negotiations to the Ministry of Labour 
in late December, a discussion with the Ministry on 
January 2, and an appeal to the Biney and Bakare unions 
on January 3. This was for a meeting to take place at 
Chief Beyioku's office on January 8. Meanwhile, 
we have asked all our branches to withhold 
any action until the outcome of the meeting 
...so that if the need arises, it will be 
effective throughout all the ports. (ADWT-
&GWU(U) to Biney and Bakare Unions, January 
3, 1975). 
Abam's union made a claim based on the new rate for 
NPA-employed dockworkers (a by-now non-existent cate­
gory) . This implied an increase from the current 
general labour rate of N1.32 to N3.05. Although the 
second of these letters spoke of an 'ultimatum' it in 
fact contained no threat of industrial action. 
Throughout 1975, the moderates were repeatedly protest­
ing that the 'wrong' anount had been paid to the dock­
ers, and that the 'right' rate was N3.05. 
1976 was a dramatic year for the trade union 
movement as a whole, with government moving towards its 
administrative restructuring. Within the Port there 
were increasing signs that the government was going to 
wipe out most of the contractors and finally introduce 
the Integrated Cargo Handling Scheme. There was also a 
major new dispute over wage rates. Before dealing with 
this last issue, it is important to consider the moder­
ates' position on the ICHS. Its document (ADWT&GWU(U) 
Statement, April 26, 1976) was, in fact the most so­
phisticated and technical one ever produced by a dock-
worker union, and one with a quite distinct radical-
nationalist tone. It stated that tonnage per hook had 
dropped from eight or nine tons in the 1950s to three 
in the 1970s. It blamed the shipping companies and 
agencies for taking the lion's share of the cargo-hand­
ling money, thus forcing the contractors to cheat the 
labourers 'in order to rake out some profit'. It 
attacked the 'imperialist shipping agents', and the 
'colonialist shipping companies of the Conference 
lines'. It also attacked both the 'mushroom contrac­
tors' and (without naming it) Biney's: 
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The Company which is dominated by a Ghanaian 
should not be considered, whether Nigerians 
have share or not. The bulk of the profit 
milked out from Nigerian dockworkers went to 
a Ghanaian who had no regard for Nigeria. 
In a stronger political tone than had been heard from 
Abam since his marxist days, the document continued as 
follows: 
The progressive policy of the government is a 
big threat to world imperialism and their big 
investment in Africa. The Imperialists will 
therefore find ways and means to sabotage our 
economy. We cannot be sure whom they will 
make use of. The treatment meeted on Niger-
ians by Ghana, Zaire and Sudan are very fresh 
in our minds. We have been over-generous to 
others while others have not reciprocated our 
generosity. 
In positive terms the ADWTStGWU(U) demanded preference 
to non-conference shipping lines (whether Nigerian or 
foreign was not specified), and contractors limited to 
but three private companies, these being reputable 
Nigerian 
employers ready to employ experts from over-
seas to make our dock effective. We should 
admit we still lag behind. The few dock 
labour employers should make it a point of 
duty to employ world renowned experts of dock 
operation with recommendation from the United 
Nations. 
This detailed and sophisticated case was probably not 
worked out by the union itself but obtained from an 
officer within a Nigerian shipping agency - and one 
that had no particular love for the company of W.H. 
Biney. Interviewing a foreign port labour specialist 
within this agency I heard similar arguments and exact-
ly the same figures used. 
Whilst this would seem to suggest the continuing 
dependency of the ADWT&GWU(U), it now began to change 
its attitude toward industrial action. Up until late 
1975 the ADWT&GWU(U) acted in strict character with its 
predecessor. As a result, it made no impact on the 
dockers, and neither the Ministry, nor the NPA, nor the 
contractors took it seriously. All of them knew that 
in practice they had to negotiate with the radicals. 
This, at long last, had a radicalising effect on the 
moderates and - as we will see - a moderating one on 
the radicals. 
In December 1975 Abam's group had distributed 
leaflets on the Udoji underpayment. It had also issued 
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a 21-day ultimatum threatening industrial action. When 
the General Manager of the NPA told it that it was a 
'grave offence for a union to deliberately incite and 
lead its members' against the government, the union 
backed down, apologised, and explained that the ulti-
matum was 'part of its strategy to prevent a strike 
action by the Dockworkers' (ADWT&GWU(U)-NPA Minutes, 
December 9, 1975). Despite this characteristic timi-
dity, the union persisted with its case, and NPA man-
agement was obliged to meet with it twice more before 
the year end. The issues being pressed by the union 
were the Adebo 'arrears' and Udoji 'underpayment'. The 
second meeting on this matter took place with only 24 
hours to run before the union's ultimatum to take 
industrial action expired. When the union refused to 
withdraw its ultimatum, the General Manager said that 
he would have to end the meeting so that management 
could take 'some pre-emptive steps to deal with the 
proposed strike action'. Faced with this threat, the 
union again backed down and 'assured the Chairman that 
it would not embark on strike action'. It settled for 
promises of action by the GM and a meeting at the end 
of the first week in January 1976. According to top 
leaders of the radical faction, Abam actually did try 
to organise a strike on January 12, 1976, this failing 
due to their advising workers against it. They did not 
only advise workers, since, according to Abam, he was 
in January 1976 arrested and accused of incitement to 
strike: 
This was on the denunciationn of Dediare 
[Lagos Port Manager. PW] and Odulana...Just 
because I was down at Akere's. Odulana and 
his friends were going around with plain-
clothesmen pointing out our people. (Inter-
view Notes, December 1976). 
We will see when we look at the radicals that there is 
reason to believe Abam's account. In April 1976 there 
began a dispute in the docks over the application to 
dock labour of the five-day week government had announ-
ced for the private sector. At the end of November, 
the moderates signed a settlement with the NPA on the 
basis of the NPA announcement that it was to pay the 
contractors new rates sufficient for them to pay five 
days as for six, the whole being backdated to April 1. 
Although they failed to get a deadline for the publi-
cation of the new races, the NPA listed this as Decem-
ber 14 in a later agreement signed with the radicals. 
Anxious to obtain credit for the new rates, the moder-
ates summoned the contractors to the Excelsior Hotel in 
Apapa, and called a 'mass meeting' at the Port Labour 
Office (which I observed to be actually attended by 
15-20 men). The moderates apparently treated December 
14 as the date the backpay would be issued to the 
workers, and the latter began to look forward to a 
grand Xmas bonus. When, on December 14, there was no 
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sign of it, the moderates used this as a pretext for 
calling their first dockwide strike. Details of this 
event will be given in Chapter 15, The speedy success 
of the strike, with contractors promising two days 
later that they would pay out the lump-sum back pay on 
December 20, must have been almost as surprising to 
these unlikely militants as it was pleasing to the 
Lagos dockworkers and frustrating to the traditional 
radicals. 
7.3. The new radicals 
Although we could trace the origins of the ADWT&GWU 
(N) [4] back to the early 1960s, it took its new form 
only with the 1968 dock strike. Before then, the NTUC 
could only claim the affiliations of the Nigerian 
Boardship Port Security Workers Union (NBSPSWU) and 
that of the Bakare Dockworkers Union (Urhobo 1971: 35) 
and both of these affiliations were disputed. 
Nonetheless, the NTUC cadre, Bernard Odulana, did 
have a toehold in the Port as leader of one faction of 
the NBSPSWU, and it was therefore natural that he 
should be given the secretaryship when the Endeley 
Olagboshe group turned to the NTUC in 1968. The worst 
that could be said about the role of the NTUC at the 
Urhobo inquiry was, in the words of one moderate trade 
unionist, that 
Endeley is being teleguided by the NTUC to 
create faction in [the ADWT&GWU]. There are 
respectable gentlemen in the NTUC to realise 
the importance that election such as the one 
they are now backing can never stand the test 
of time. The NTUC probably has an eye on the 
docks to swell its affiliation and prestige? 
(Urhobo 1971: 31). 
This judgement was wrong on every point except the 
last. Olagboshe had approached the NTUC, not the other 
way round, and the election stood the test of time 
rather well. The Olagboshe adhesion was a surprise 
windfall for the NTUC and the Beckley Tribunal provided 
the latter with a rare public stage from which to 
demand nationalisation of the industry, denounce the 
ULC and demand the expulsion from Nigeria of the AALC. 
Before dealing further with the development of the 
organisation, let us pay some more attention to its 
labour relations ideology. The attitudes of radicals 
in the 1970s differed clearly from Abam's on the ques-
tion of industrial structure and - less clearly - on 
forms of bargaining. Interviewed in summer 1975 on the 
organisation of the industry, Bernard Odulana, General 
Secretary of the AD.WT&GWU (N) declared: 
We are for total nationalisation. There is no 
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way to get contractors to meet worker needs. 
There must be a corporation on its own. It 
must be independent of NPA because of red 
tape. The NCHC could be a nucleus for this. 
The attitude to the forms of bargaining within the 
industry certainly differed in practice from those of 
the ADWT&GWU (Ν) , but is difficult to find stated. 
Whilst his organisation was being discriminated 
against, Odulana rejected out of hand the 'idea of 
negotiation with dock employers of labour as being 
suggested in some quarters' (New Nigerian, January 10, 
1975) , since this had never worked since 1947. On the 
other hand, once informal bilateral bargaining had been 
established, Odulana made a statement to the contra­
ctors that is worth quoting at length: 
We welcome you to this important meeting 
which we summon to find ways and means of 
achieving industrial peace in the docks....we 
are not abandoning our militancy. But we 
consider the country first and we know fully 
well that the gigantic programme of the 
Federal Military Government can only be 
successfully carried out if we have smooth 
working conditions in the docks. Our stand, 
like all other Nigerians is that we are 
committed to the fulfilment of the Third 
National Plan...We call on you to cooperate. 
For this period we can assure all concerned 
that there will be no stoppage of work. Any 
contractor whose behaviour is capable of 
leading to industrial unrest in the docks, 
rather than stopping work we shall call for 
his removal...We are happy to report that 
when we met the Commissioner for Transport on 
the provision of facilities, e.g. adequate 
toilets, water, etc., he promised taking 
action and we are convinced that he meant 
business. Please let us discuss frankly with 
a view to achieving our objectives. (ADWT-
£.GWU(N) Address, May 28, 1975. Stress in 
original) . 
It should be noted that unionists at industrial 
level commonly felt tb*» necessity to comment not only 
on a bargaining relationship between existing parties, 
but also on the industrial ownership pattern as a 
whole. Where unions confined themselves to the former 
issue, they tended to identify themselves with the 
concepts of government and the 'progressive employer', 
Nkamare. Whilst this would seem to put them in the same 
stance as the NPA unions, one must not forget that the 
Nkamare concept was not shared even by such a major 
employer as Biney. Their position was not so much an 
identification with existing employer ideology as a 
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plea for employers to adopt a new one. The radical 
programme, however, seems to have been moderated as the 
militants achieved de facto recognition over time. By 
1975 the militant ADWT&GWU(N) of Odulana was itself 
adopting the kind of attitudes that Nkamare had called 
for in 1964. We will see later than this put in ques-
tion its assurance that it was not abandoning its 
militancy. 
This, however, was not clear until the later 
1970s. During the period 1969-75 most of the energy of 
the radicals seems to have gone into the organising of 
strikes, with the immediate objective of increased pay, 
and the underlying one of both strengthening their 
position amongst the dockers and forcing the authori-
ties to recognise them de facto and de jure. The demand 
of the union for a general labour rate of 4 5s at a time 
when the actual rate was 8s.2d is evidence that at the 
beginning of its career the ADWT&GWU (N) was more con-
cerned at striking dramatic attitudes than in realistic 
demands and struggle. In both early and late 1971, 
however, the union was involved in strikes over the 
interim and final Adebo awards. 
Between the two events, we see it involved in 
building up a relationship with both its provincial 
affiliates and the NPA. Prom August 30 till September 
8, union leaders Odulana, Olagboshe, Adenekan and 
Wolseley went on tour of Warri, Sapele, Koko, Port 
Harcourt and Calabar, to explain the new integrated 
system to their members. The ICHS, as we know, was not 
in fact to be introduced until another seven years had 
passed, but the tour gave the delegation the oppor-
tunity of meeting both affiliated unions and Port 
Managers. The form and content of the tour report are 
reminiscent of those of NPA unions, right down to its 
complementary remarks about the Port Managers, and the 
comparatively mild requests for improvements. A later 
statement again suggests the efforts of the union to 
build bridges to the NPA (ADWT&GWU(N) Statement, Octo-
ber 21, 1971). Such efforts, however, did not prevent 
it from striking at the end of the year, nor again in 
May 1972. 
1974 was the year of the Udoji Report, and there-
fore of high agitation and expectations amongst the 
workers and unions. It was also the year in which the 
three major dockworker organisations (the two amalgama-
tions and the BWU) most clearly demonstrated their 
attitudes to industrial action, with the radicals 
pressing strikes through regardless of consequences, 
and both the others not only holding back but actively 
and publicly denouncing the radicals. On January 10, 
the radicals claim to have held a 'mammoth' meeting of 
5,000 dockers, attended also by the Port Manager, at 
which a demand was made for an immediate 50 percent 
wage increase, as well as for the other customary 
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reforms (ADWT&GWU(N) Statement, January 28, 1974). In 
February it issued two leaflets calling meetings, 
denouncing the moderates, and announcing the expiry of 
a 21-day strike ultimatum. Although it seems as if the 
industrial action was postponed, tension with the 
moderates reached a point at which the police brought a 
case of affray against eight men, including Abam from 
the one side and Kayode Benson from the other. In May 
and September the union threatened and carried through 
strikes despite the anti-strike legislation, the 
threats of the Labour Ministry, and police threats and 
arrests. 
All this agitation paid off when, after its cus-
tomary seven days notice, the union organised success-
ful industrial action to obtain for dockers the massive 
Udoji award and the lump-sum back-pay in January-
February 1975. The general labour rate rose from N1.26 
to N2.42 per day. Workers were to get arrears back to 
April 1974, implying that a labourer who had only 
worked 100 days since then would be getting a lump sum 
of around N116. It was this achievement that led work-
ers to reward the radicals in the traditional Nigerian 
manner, by dashing (rewarding) them with one or two 
naira on the glorious payday. It was the same action 
that endorsed the de facto control of the radicals over 
the workers, thus forcing contractors, NPA and the 
ministries to negotiate with them. It may have been the 
growing self-confidence accompanying these achievements 
that led the ADWTi.GWU(N) to apply to join the NMTUF -
an application that the NMÜTF felt unable to accept 
given the formal links of the radicals to the NTUC. 
And it seems to have been the same successes that led 
the radicals to adjust their posture in the manner 
revealed in the long quote from Bernard Odulana ear-
lier. 
The extent of the change in attitude by the radi-
cals became apparent in 1976. This is how Odulana 
denounced Abam's first strike threat to the workers: 
I...thank you for the support you have always 
given the Union... despite the fact that some 
irresponsible people wanted to deceive you... 
We are happy that you have shown them that 
they are not known to you...You have demon-
strated your confidence in us, we can assure 
you we will ntsvcsr disappoint you. We have 
taken up the matter [of wages and other 
demands] with appropriate authorities and 
shall be reporting the progress we have made 
to you soon. Don't let some few idiots incite 
you. We are happy that you have told them 
that they can no longer deceive you. (ADWT-
&GWU(N) Statement, January 26, 1976). 
One month later the union was welcoming the expulsion 
160 
of five leaders of its Calabar affiliate, apparently 
for having tried to organise a strike. The letter 
declared that 'there was no instruction from us to 
embark on any industrial action' and it 'implored' its 
affiliate to in future check any information with the 
headquarters (ADWT&GWU(N) to Cross-Rivers State Branch, 
February 16. 1976). The assasination of the Head of 
State, Murtala Muhammed, in February 1976 gave the 
union another opportunity to demonstrate its new-found 
identification with the Nigerian state. It now 
threatened a boycott of British ships unless former 
Nigerian head of state, Gowon, should be brought back 
to Nigeria to face government allegations of his res-
ponsibility for the attempted coup. The threat was 
immediately suspended on the basis of government assur-
ances of the efforts it was making to get Gowon back 
(West Africa, May 10, 1976). Although the five-day week 
issue would seem to have given the union an opportunity 
to once again demonstrate its militancy, we now find it 
for the first time negotiating the issue through the 
collective bargaining machinery and directing 'that all 
dockworkers should not take any action until the con-
clusion of the series of meetings' it was holding on 
the issue (ADWT&GWU(N) Statement, July 29, 1976). 
Negotiations with the authorities and assurances to 
dockers continued till the moderates put an end to them 
by taking over the traditional role of the radicals at 
the end of 1976. 
7.4 Summary 
With respect to the BSA, one must recognise both the 
development that took place and the limits to that 
development. The BSA did progress beyond the secret 
society characteristics and the gang warfare tactics of 
its predecessor. Organistionally it began to take on 
the appearance of a regular trade union, with con-
ference, elections, resolutions and some kind of 
accounts. In its relations with management it sought 
for the standard forms practised within the public 
corporations or the foreign private companies. And in 
1975 it even took recourse to strike action, the funda-
mental symbol of autonomous trade union organisation. 
Since the constituency of the BSA was effectively the 
junior supervisory dock staff, it makes more sense to 
consider its demands in relation to these rather than 
to general dock labour, or even Biney's quite numerous 
non-quay manual and clerical workers. Looked at in this 
manner, its combination of complaints against manage-
ment, of protection for threatened supervisors, and of 
wages and conditions demands is understandable. So is 
its combination of quite craven subordination to Biney 
himself, vociferous defence of the company against 
external threats, and occasional token gestures of 
independence. If these token acts were signs of in-
creasing self-confidence amongst a by-now very ex-
perienced leadership, they did not indicate any in-
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tention to demonstrate as much opposition as that of 
even the moderate NPA unions, nor to throw their lot in 
with the ordinary dockworkers. What prevented the BSA 
from becoming such an organisation was a complex of 
structural features which remained from the time of the 
BWU. These were the fact that it was limited to one 
local capitalist company, that its leadership was 
limited to the junior supervisors, and that these were 
largely of one ethnic group. None of these factors by 
themselves would necessarily have prevented the further 
development of the organisation, any more than the 
hostility of Biney toward such a union, or the pro-
company attitudes of the union. Together, however, they 
ensured that the new characteristics of the BSA would 
remain peripheral to its role as representative of the 
junior supervisory staff to Biney, and his instrument 
for control of his labour force. 
One's impression of the ADU is of the more cus-
tomary Nigerian enterprise union than the kind of 
company union represented by the BSA. If what its 
leaders claimed about general labour's support for the 
union was true, then it might well have been that in 
this case headmen - as the more-experienced workers -
were acting as leaders of the workers. But their de-
pendency on Akere for such limited privileges and 
security of employment as they might have enjoyed 
obviously put restrictions on their militancy. The 
price they eventually paid for constructing a union on 
an enterprise basis has been made clear. 
So much for the enterprise-based organisations. 
What of the attempts at portwide organisation? 
In discussing the collapse of the original AD-
WT&GWU in 1968, it was suggested that this made its own 
comment on the value of a moderate policy and strategy 
to dockworkers. Such a conclusion was not drawn by the 
moderates themselves, nor by their national and foreign 
patrons. The revival of the project in 1972-3 took 
place with exactly the same strategy. The major dif-
ference was that - Okon apart - the moderates had no 
unions in Lagos and that they were faced with an 
organised, determined and effective opposition. For two 
or three years the ADWT&GWU(U) remained a paper organi-
sation, making paper threats based on purely legalistic 
demands. 
What requires commentary is its conversion to 
radical nationalism in word and industrial militancy in 
practice during 1976. The 'radical nationalist* docu-
ment turns out on closer examination to be one that is 
in general accord with the interests of capitalists 
within the cargo-handling industry. It is not simply 
anti-imperialist, it is also chauvinist in its attacks 
on other African countries. It is not simply pro-
capitalist, it also favours some capitalists within the 
162 
cargo-handling industry against the one who actually 
had the best record both for working conditions and for 
efficiency. Indeed, its attacks on conference line 
ships, and its praise for foreign experts makes it look 
as if this document would be particularly pleasing to 
those amongst the contractors who were employing such 
foreign experts and who were either dependent on small 
foreign shipping lines, or were themselves involved in 
shipping. 
If the ADWT&GWU(U) was in 1976 championing the 
interests of Nigerian capitalists within the cargo-
handling industry, how are we to explain its industrial 
militancy? In the first place, we must recall that wage 
demands are demands on the Nigerian state and foreign 
shipping companies rather than on the contractors 
themselves. In the second place we must assume that 
Abam and his colleagues had finally learned the lesson 
that the only way to win recognition amongst the dock-
ers was by calling them out on strike. The fact that an 
organisation that for so many years had been denouncing 
strikes - an organisation deeply compromised with and 
dependent on external patrons - was forced to take this 
action tells us more about the irrelevance of its 
previous strategy than any commentary can. Lacking any 
political resource except strike action, and having 
little to lose by it, dockworkers followed only leaders 
who were prepared to back up the essential reform 
demands with effective industrial action. If this 
process of development (or temporary abberration, for 
that matter) shows that worker leaders can learn from 
workers, what are we to make of the reverse development 
in the case of the traditional radicals? 
Despite his communist background and occasional 
socialist declarations, Odulana's radicalism was of an 
essentially pragmatic nature. The demands of the ADWT-
&GWU(N) differed little, if any, from those of its 
opponent: it simply adopted an effective strategy for 
achieving them. This militant strategy was - no doubt -
more easily adopted by the leaders because of their 
communist connections. These both helped isolate them 
from liberal-paternailst influences (employer, state or 
union, national or international) , and brought them 
into continual relationship with the mass of dock-
workers. The limitations of a militant but (in reality) 
non-socialist union strategy are revealed by what 
happened when it was met by concessions. Already in 
1971, whilst it was still in the wilderness, it was 
prepared to collaborate with NPA management and make 
propaganda for the ICHS amongst its own followers. 
Given that the NPA and secure employment must have 
seemed like paradise both to dockworkers and their 
leaders, this is understandable. But the extent of the 
later change to ideological developmentalism and 
nationalism, and to denunciation of strikes, is remark-
able. It looks like a complete switch of roles with the 
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traditional moderates. The switch cannot be completely 
explained without going into the material of Chapter 
11, dealing with the nature of the union's organisation 
and its relationship with the dockers. In the meantime, 
we need to emphasise the difference between this 
attempt at a radical dockworker organisation and those 
of the early 1960s. Those had been brief attempts, led 
almost entirely by outsiders, and had foundered on 
failure. This one had lasted almost 10 years, had been 
led largely by dockworkers, and was foundering on 
success. 
Footnotes for Chapter 7 
1. Except where otherwise indicated, the sources for 
the following accounts are letters, memoranda and 
conference reports in the files of W.H.Biney or 
the BSA. These are comparatively rich for the 
later 1960s, rather meagre for the early 1970s and 
little less so for the mid-1970s. Since this is so 
for both sources, one's impression is that it may 
reflect an initial peak of union activity, fol-
lowed by a trough out of which the union had not 
yet climbed by 1975-6. 
2. The sources for the ADU are limited to a con-
ference document, material from the files of the 
Registrar, and interviews with A.E.Okon and union 
officers. 
3. Sources for this organisation include its own 
comparatively frequent publications and documents, 
reports of government inquiries, as well as inter-
views with its leaders and opponents. Ministry of 
Labour and NPA officials. 
4. Due to their lack of the trade union and indus-
trial training provided to their moderate oppo-
nents, and due to the absence of demands from 
external patrons, the radicals were more lacka-
daisical in their administration than the ADWT-
&GWU(U). Although we have some documents of the 
organisation itself to draw on, this account is 
more dependent on interviews, press reports, and 
on NPA or other official documents. 
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Chapter 8 
ANALYSIS: ORGANISING AGAINST THE CONTOURS OF CAPITALISM 
We have already summarised the findings concerning the 
two sectors separately. It is now necessary to compare 
them, to consider what the specific attitudes and 
strategies toward capital and state tell us concerning 
division and unity between portworkers and dockworkers. 
This will be done by examining the two sectors simulta-
neously in terms of 1) their similarities, 2) their 
differences, and 3) the unity/division problem. The 
chapter will end with some preliminary conclusions. The 
analysis will draw on the theory in Chapter 5. 
8.1 The similarities 
Firstly, then, the similarities between union strategy 
in both sectors. These are quite remarkable given the 
differences between the conditions within them that 
were initially stressed. Vie may, perhaps, begin with 
the reformism that predominated and provided the arena 
within which the major battles were fought between both 
port and dockworker unions. Then there is the common 
crisis of the moderate reformism inspired by the Anglo-
Saxon model. This was in both cases accompanied by a 
radical challenge, with radical reformism coming to 
predominate. In both cases the radicalisation implied a 
certain unification at the industry (or, rather, half-
industry) level. And in both cases the radical unions 
showed a growing nationalism and statism. 
These common features can, I think, be explained 
with reference to the general historical development of 
the international trade union movement, to the general 
socio-political setting of Nigerian trade unionism, to 
the specific socio-economic setting of Lagos Port 
unionism, and to the organisational options open to 
Nigerian workers at this point of time. 
If we place the unions in our industry within the 
particular period in the history of international 
labour, we can better understand both the general 
reformism and the nationalism and statism. Nigerian 
unionism developed during the second phase mentioned by 
Olle and Schoei 1er. In so far as at least the port-
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worker unions had had a previous ' po l i t i ca l -economic ' 
phase, t h i s had been not as an a n t i - c a p i t a l i s t and 
a n t i - s t a t e movement as in 19th century Europe, but as 
par t of a mul t i - c l a s s a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t movement, domi-
nated by (would-be) c a p i t a l i s t s and bureaucra t s . Within 
our per iod, the unions were faced i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y with 
two major competing labour movement ideologies and 
associa ted union models, the social -democrat ic and the 
communist. Both of these were, in t h e i r qui te d i f f e ren t 
ways, n a t i o n a l i s t and s t a t i s t , and r e s t r i c t e d union 
demands to what I have ca l l ed the i n d u s t r i a l level 
(because both believed in a d iv i s ion of labour between 
the 'economic' unions and the ' p o l i t i c a l ' p a r t y ) . 
The common features are a l so evident ly a product 
of the general s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l s e t t i n g . This was one of 
a ce r t a in movement a t n a t i o n a l - l e v e l from a l i b e r a l -
p a t e r n a l i s t to a c o r p o r a t i s t labour control s t r a t egy . 
On the one hand, increased repress ion a t a time of an 
o i l boom and massive i n f l a t i o n provoked the worker 
d iscontent expressed in increased union radica l i sm. On 
the other hand, i t demanded of union leaders e i t h e r a 
g rea te r submissiveness t o , or a sharp break with, the 
dominant ideology. The second opt ion (a radical-demo-
c r a t i c ideology and a s t ra tegy of mass a l l i ance ) was 
not an imaginable one in Nigeria a t t h i s t ime. The 
f i r s t option was made the only one by 1) the high s t a t e 
legi t imacy l e f t over from the n a t i o n a l i s t per iod, 2) 
the increas ing s t a t e domination of Nigerian society 
since independence, and 3) the high value put on s t a t e 
in te rvent ion within the i n t e r n a t i o n a l union t r a d i t i o n s 
mentioned above. 
The common fea tures can a l so be in par t explained 
by the spec i f i c socio-economic s e t t i n g within the 
cargo-handling indus t ry . If we consider the Edwards 
typology (pp.103-6 above), we would seem to find a 
r a the r c lose f i t between the dock labour sec tor and h i s 
simple control /secondary market/working poor type. The 
NPA, on the other hand, would seem to have no such f i t 
with one type , presenting r a the r the combination 
bureaucra t ic con t ro l / subord ina te primary marke t / t r ad i -
t iona l p r o l e t a r i a t . (This l a t t e r combination i s poss-
i b l y allowed for by Edwards, when he speaks of the 
genera l i sa t ion of bureaucrat ic con t ro l . ) Whilst t h i s 
would s t i l l seem to suggest two d i s t i n c t s i t u a t i o n s , we 
must recognise ce r t a in q u a l i f i c a t i o n s in the Lagos Port 
case . In the f i r s t p lace , much of the NPA labour force 
was, in f ac t , a f i r s t - gene ra t i on p r o l e t a r i a t , l ived in 
the same r e s i d e n t i a l a reas as the dockworkers, and some 
2 0 percent of i t was casual ly employed. In the second 
p lace , the con t rac to r sector s i t u a t i o n d i f f e r s somewhat 
from the Edwards model in e i t h e r i t s 19th century or 
contemporary ve r s ions . Cruc ia l ly , simple control was 
being applied to the cen t r a l ly -p laced dock labour 
force - and in the immediate proximity of the NPA and 
i t s workers. The dockworkers could da i ly see the NPA 
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model, and their leaders could see and appreciate the 
model of NPA labour relations. The dockworker unions 
were, in a sense, struggling to bring about a transi-
tion within the industry from simple to bureaucratic 
control. 
The similarities can possibly also be explained by 
the significant absence during this period of political 
parties. During the liberal-democratic period in Nige-
ria (till 1966) there had existed marxist political 
groups and parties that provided an alternative set of 
ideals, explanations and strategies to the Western 
social-democratic ones that otherwise predominated 
amongst Nigerian labour leaders. The ban on political 
parties made little difference to the moderates, since 
reformist ideas continued to be spread through the ILO, 
the AALC - and even through the Ministry of Labour. But 
it is at least possible to hypothesise that the insta-
bility of dockworker union radicalism was due to the 
absence of a sustaining marxist party. 
8.2 The differences 
Secondly, the significant differences. These were: the 
spectrum of union strategies within each sector, the 
generality of demands, and the implications of the 
similarities. Whilst moderate or radical reformism 
provided the main alternatives, we do find a marked 
clientalism (for which concept see further in Chapter 
9) within the contractor sector. And whilst general 
demands arose alongside small group demands in the NPA, 
they were permanent and predominant amongst the dock-
worker unions. Finally, whilst dockworker union demands 
implied a transformation to the NPA pattern, those of 
the NPA workers raised potentially more subversive 
issues. 
These differences can again be explained by re-
ference to the socio-economic and socio-political 
contexts. 
The simple control strategy of the contractors 
allowed for the existence of clientalist unionism. But 
the same strategy required the workers - if they were 
to express a minimal collective autonomy to adopt at 
least a radical reformist alternative. On reflection, 
indeed, we could see the real alternatives within the 
contractor sector as excluding the moderate reformist 
one, thus implying an even greater difference between 
the strategy spectrum in this and the NPA sector. The 
nature of the model clientalist union, however, is made 
even clearer when one recalls that the growth of scale 
within such companies implies the growth of a hierarchy 
of supervisors with an interest possibly distinct from 
that of both the boss and the workers. Biney's clien-
talist union had as its base rather these supervisors 
than the workers. And even the more-independent union 
at Akere's was headman dominated. The contrast between 
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the generality of dockworker union demands (also 
amongst the moderates) and the particularity of port-
worker union ones (also amongst the radicals) is again 
partially explicable by reference to control strategy. 
Any successful challenge to a simple control strategy 
requires a combination of workers across the separate, 
competing companies within the limits of which the 
strategy operates. Such a challenge was, of course, 
facilitated in the contractor sector by the state's 
imposition of homogeneity (not a feature of the Edwards 
model, past or present). On the other hand, the prin-
ciple behind bureaucratic control is both the hetero-
genisation of labour and the incorporation of unions. 
The function of unions within this model is to handle 
the individualised complaints of tens or hundreds of 
special interest groups. Even when Adebola was making a 
general attack on NPA management's corruption, authori-
tarianism and inefficiency, his union continued to 
concentrate on grades and trades demands. 
Differentiation is also explicable in part by the 
national socio-political context. One national labour-
control strategy obviously has different implications 
for workers in different market situations. Both the 
liberal-paternalist and the corporatist patterns assume 
the existence of unions that can represent/ control the 
workers. These existed within NPA, and the NPA unions 
were therefore faced not simply with state repression 
but also state mediation. Even when repression in-
creased, it did not significantly affect portworker 
unions. On the other hand, dockworker attempts to 
unionise in the face of contractor opposition had been 
faced with the mailed fist of state even during the 
liberal-paternalist period. Repression increased with 
the shift to corporatism, at a time when the state's 
interest in the velvet glove of free collective bar-
gaining was declining. Odulana was (at least while 
unrecognised) more or less forced to confront and 
challenge the state head on. 
Insofar as we have spoken of a similarity of port 
and dockworker union radicalism, we still have to 
recognise the different implications each had. Whilst 
that of the dockworker unions appears more signifi-
cant -in challenging the ownership pattern within the 
contractor sector - what it implied was incorporation 
into the 'traditional proletariat'. And whilst port-
worker union radicalism would seem to have been limited 
by its continued acceptance of management (as distin-
guished, again, from managers or mangements), can we 
not see here the beginning of those quality and control 
demands so subversive of domination by capital and 
state? 
8.3 The unity/division problem 
It is time to return to the question of division and 
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unity between port and dock workers. Moderate reformism 
lacks the concept of a single common working-class 
interest and therefore lacks the motivation for class 
unification. Indeed, it could be argued that it is 
premised precisely on interest divisions amongst work-
ers and is threatened by unity. Thus we find multiple 
and continuing cleavages amongst the moderate reform-
ists in both halves of the cargo-handling industry. 
Radicalisation and unification went together - but only 
within each half industry. The ADWT&GWU(N) request to 
join the NMTUF is significant both as indicating the 
greater interest of radical dockworker unions in cross-
industry unity, and as the only such expression of such 
an interest. This was both the extent and the limits of 
union awareness of the value of industrial unity. The 
common participation of unions in the Adebo and Udoji 
movements had few if any implications organisationally, 
because the activity was (as we will later see) serial-
ised and consecutive rather than coordinated and simul-
taneous. When the state legislated for single, united 
but separate unions for NPA and dockworkers, there was 
no complaint from any unionist within the industry. The 
persistence of division would seem to be adequately 
explicable in terms of what has already been said. Yet 
we may consider further the nature of the union as a 
type of working-class organisation. Exploitation within 
the wage-labour relationship provides the initial 
stimulus to combination and collective action - but 
does not unionism organise workers 'according to the 
contours imposed on them by the capitalist system'? 
Certainly it would seem to permit this, as the rich 
evidence of fraction, segment and stratum organisation 
in the industry suggests. Whether it requires that is a 
question we may need to return to. Certainly during our 
period one is rather aware of the unions overcoming 
such divisions. 
One final - if tentative - thought arises at this 
point: are the more-proletarianised workers more radi-
cal than the less so? This is what both I and others 
have previously asserted. But here, on the basis of 
organisational strategy, I have been only able to 
suggest the possibly radical implications of portworker 
demands. And any such implication is surely seriously 
qualified insofar as it is limited to the one cor-
poration, or the one working-class fraction. If we add 
this qualification of portworker union radicalism to 
that of dockworker union radicalism, then we will, I 
think, begin to recognise that there is no 'real' 
working class in existence, which either 'labour aris-
tocrats' or 'semi-proletarianised peasants' must join. 
Nor is there a vanguard segment, fraction or stratum 
which the others must follow. Should not the creation 
of a working class and the development of a working-
class movement rather be seen precisely as the struggle 
to overcome such divisions of labour? 
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Chapter 9 
THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION:UNIONS, WORKERS AND LEADERS 
Part III deals with the 'internal relations' of the 
unions within the Lagos cargo-handling industry. By 
'internal relations' is here meant those running 
across, up and down from the union leaderships. The 
first will be considered when we look at the structure 
and functioning of the unions. [1] The second will be 
covered when we examine the relations of union leaders 
with national and international union organisations. 
The third will be dealt with when we go into more 
detail on union leaders and compare them with their 
followers. 
In order to handle this material we will need some 
more theory. The rest of this chapter will therefore 
set out a conceptualisation of 1) consciousness amongst 
workers, 2) union structure and function, and 3) types 
of labour leadership. 
9.1 Consciousness amongst workers 
If we are to deal with class consciousness, we will 
need to deal with class structure and social stratifi-
cation first. So far we have only dealt with intra-
class structures (in terms of fractions, segments and 
strata) and then only in passing. We have been assuming 
the existence of a working class. Now we have to make 
the assumptions explicit. The subordinate cooperation 
of the workers with the capitalists is the basis of 
capitalist existence and development; it is working-
class rejection of this that undermines it. This must 
be considered in terms of a process by which capital 
continually attempts to bring productive resources 
under its control, thus incorporating means of sub-
sistence outside the wage sector, and reducing such 
autonomy as workers (e.g. skilled artisans, out-
workers) might have over the labour process (Braverman 
1974) . It is the existence of access to other means of 
subsistence and of a certain control over the labour 
process (or the memory of these) that fires early 
working-class protest (see Thompson 1963) . 
Although the capitalist class is the dominant one, 
the working class is not the only subordinate one. The 
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importance of an understanding of the other subordinate 
classes within the context of this work is not only due 
to their weight relative to that of the industrial 
proletariat in a peripheral capitalist society. It is 
also required by the focus of this work on a service 
industry (where, as Braverman (1974:Ch.l6) shows, the 
capitalist labour process is traditionally less de-
veloped) , and on the state sector. An understanding of 
the position of such other classes and categories 
relative to the working class, finally, helps us to 
understand the economic, political and ideological 
status of the working class relationally. 
There is, firstly a rural and/or urban petty-
bourgeoisie of peasants, craftspeople and traders. The 
petty-bourgeois is a controller or owner of means of 
production who combines these with his own labour 
power. The petty-bourgeoisie is in origin a pre-capi-
talist class, but one continually transformed by the 
needs of capitalism for a series of low-profitability 
goods and services. Its subordination is due to its 
exploitation through the process of exchange, the terms 
of which are determined by capital. Combining charac-
teristics of the capitalist and the worker, the petty-
bourgeoisie is in a contradictory relationship with 
each. But although the petty-bourgeoisie may come into 
political conflict with either, this conflict is not 
one which can overcome its subordination, far less lead 
to a society dominated by petty-property owners. Its 
•struggles can only contribute to those of one (or 
both!) of the fundamental classes. 
The other significant non-fundamental grouping 
consists of categories that sell their labour power but 
are not directly involved in the production (including 
transportation and preservation) of commodities (Post 
1978:82): managers and overseers; technical experts; 
surplus-realising workers (clerks, bookkeepers, shop 
assistants); personal-service workers; and those en-
gaged in the ideological-political-legal institutions 
(administrators, teachers, soldiers, judges, priests) 
necessary for the general reproduction of the capita-
list order. I will follow Wright in conceptualising 
these as categories occupying contradictory locations 
between the capitalist class, working class and petty-
bourgeoisie. Such a conceptualisation permits us to 
also place small capitalists and the 'upper' working 
class. Figure 9.1 is adapted from Wright (1976:37) and 
shows this diagramatically.[2] 
The criteria used are the three components of 
capitalist power; those of control over 1) investments/ 
accumulation, 2) means of production, and 3) the labour 
power of others. The capitalist has full control over 
all three, the worker over none, the petty-bourgeois 
over the first two but not the third. The contradictory 
locations are to be understood in terms of the develop-
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ment of capitalism. In the first place this implies the 
undermining of the petty-commodity mode (petty-bour-
geoisie) , allowing a few to rise in the direction of 
the capitalist class, whilst successively reducing the 
autonomy of others and thrusting them toward the work-
ing class. In the second place, it implies the creation 
of a hierarchy and differentiation of control between 
the foreman (closest to the working class) and the top 
manager (closest to the capitalist class). The develop-
ment of capitalism has successively removed control 
from the bottom and concentrated it at the top. We may 
consider the two processes in relation to the working 
class. Whereas at one time the clerk, accountant, 
engineer and manager stood (often literally) next to 
the capitalist, the growth of scale, division of labour 
and mechanisation has successively 'proletarianised* 
them. Whereas at one time the doctor, lawyer, archi-
tect, technician - or even manual artisan - had control 
over one or more of the three elements, capitalist 
industrialisation has been successively reducing their 
autonomy. It is evident that analysis of direct rela-
tionship to the mode of production is necessary but not 
sufficient for class analysis. Wright suggests that 
political and ideological relations have increased 
weight in determining the class positions of the inter-
mediate categories. Thus, the ideological division 
between 'mental' and 'manual' has been crucial in 
concealing their decreasing power and privilege from 
clerks. Employment within the state apparatus (the role 
of which is precisely the general reproduction of 
capitalist society) may likewise conceal their prole-
tarian position from public sector workers. 
How does this conceptualisation of the classes and 
categories surrounding the working class relate to our 
previous conceptualisation of its internal structure? 
What we have previously presented as a higher stratum 
of the working class is here presented as a low inter-
mediary category between the working and capitalist 
classes (junior supervisors) . And what we have pre-
viously considered as a fraction of the working class 
is here presented as a category intermediate between 
the working class and the petty-bourgeoisie (casual 
labourers). I see no necessary contradiction here. In 
the earlier approach we were looking at the internal 
relations of the working class, and here we are con-
sidering its external relations. In both cases we are 
concerned precisely with understanding the working 
class relationally and as a process. In both cases 
there is revealed the heterogeneity of labour under 
capitalism. In both cases the problem remains of the 
struggle to overcome such divisions of labour. In terms 
of internal relations we could speak of the problem of 
working class consolidation, in the second case of its 
expansion. This leaves us with the necessary task of 
conceiving segmentation of the working class in terms 
of its external relations. 
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Figure 9.1 Major classes and intermediate categories in 
a capitalist social formation 
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I earlier defined segmentation negatively and 
generally as referring to 'non-economic' divisions 
within classes, such as by region, religion, ethnicity, 
age group. To characterise these as 'non-economic' does 
not mean that they have no economic implications, but 
that they are inexplicable in terms of the relations of 
production alone. Segmentation within capitalist soci-
ety has its roots either in pre-class social divisions 
(by kinship, age, sex), or in pre-capitalist societies 
(caste, religion, ethnic group, language, etc.), or in 
the conditions necessary for the general reproduction 
of capitalist society as a whole (religion again, 
party, nation-state). It is evident that despite its 
claims to be universalistic, capitalism does not wipe 
out or even reduce such segmentation. Rather does it 
use and adapt it for the general aim of capital and 
power concentration and expansion. What capitalism 
tends to do is to turn every previously existing dif-
ference into a hierarchical one, and then to univer-
salise such differences: advanced and backward regions; 
men and women; whites and blacks; north and south; 
christian and pagan; etc. Whilst capitalism systemati-
cally denies and obscures its fundamental class rela-
tionship, it recognises, admits and 'condemns' (at 
least in its liberal form) discrimination based on 
race, sex, nation, age, religion, etc. Since these 
cleavages are commonly highly visible, traditional or 
institutionalised, it is common for exploited classes 
to experience and express their feelings of discontent 
in these rather than in universal class forms. We will 
have to return to this when dealing with consciousness 
directly. 
We have so far been generalising about capitalist 
social formations. Now we need to allow for the speci-
fic features of the peripheral capitalist society. Here 
a tiny and weak capitalist class is in most cases still 
in process of consolidation from pre-capitalist landed 
classes, or from categories that were intermediary 
between imperial capital, the colonial state and the 
local masses. It is still less evidently a crystallised 
class than a series of capitalist fractions (agri-
cultural, financial, commercial, industrial), usually 
dominated by the commercial one. Its development is 
largely limited by the domination of a metropolitan 
capitalist segment, and sometimes by the presence of 
other foreign capitalists (Chinese in South-East Asia, 
Levantines in West Africa, Indians in East Africa). 
A capital-intensive, narrow and export-oriented 
industrialisation implies a slow and sometimes negative 
growth of the working class relative to that of the 
petty bourgeoisie. This working class customarily lacks 
a solid industrial base. Its fractioning by activity 
(significantly, agricultural, commercial, industrial) 
is compounded by its division according to ownership 
sector (significantly, multinational, state, local 
capitalist). 
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The formations are dominated by a massive rural 
and urban petty-bourgeoisie, a greater or lesser part 
of which is partially proletarianised (as seasonal, 
casual and sub-contracted semi-independent wage la-
bour) . The categories intermediate between the working 
and capitalist class are large in relation to these 
(when compared with either classical or contemporary 
industrial capitalist societies). This is mostly due to 
the necessity of a large state sector - both to provide 
the essential public services and apparatus of coer-
cion, and to substitute for the 'missing' capitalists. 
In moving from class structure to class conscious-
ness we may first see how Meszaros (1971:109-110) sets 
out the general process of social reproduction under 
capitalism and the modes of consciousness this gives 
rise to. This he does not only for the working class 
but also for the subordinated categories that lie 
between the capitalist and the working class. These are 
of importance because of their intermediacy, because 
they are immediately above or around the working class 
and because - in a peripheral capitalist society - of 
their combined numerical weight relative to the working 
class. Generalising about these peripheral groups, 
Meszaros argues that whilst their peripheralisation 
allows them to develop a critical attitude toward 
capitalism, it also 
necessarily condemns them to an impotence 
graphically expressed in the self-fulfilling 
character of their ideologies (from some 
later representatives of the enlightenment to 
anarchism, and from the manifold varieties of 
'populism* to the countless forms of utopian-
ism) . 
They are incapable of formulating an autonomous class 
ideology. They are condemned to ideological support for 
the ruling class, to impotence, or to identification 
with the working class. 
With respect to the working class Meszaros first 
deals with the crucial distinction between contingent 
and necessary consciousness. Proletarian consciousness 
is 
the worker's consciousness of his social 
being as embedded in the necessary structural 
antagonism of capitalist society, in contrast 
to the contingency of group consciousness 
which perceives only a more or less limited 
part of the global confrontation (Meszaros 
1971:101) . 
'Proletarian consciousness', it is suggested, is not a 
spontaneous and immediate product of the proletarian 
situation. Whereas the individual self-interest of 
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members of the dominant class is directly related to 
its general interest, that of the subordinate groups is 
not so. To understand the gap that exists between 
contingent (empirically observable) and necessary 
(corresponding to structure and interest) consciousness 
amongst workers, we can consider the process indicated 
by Meszaros. 'Individual self-interest', 'status con-
sciousness' and 'class consciousness' can be considered 
either as aspects of worker consciousness at a parti-
cular point in time, or as 'breadths' of worker con-
sciousness over time. Amongst any group of workers at 
almost any place or time it is possible to identify 
individual interest, segment, stratum or fraction 
interest and class interest. If this is not recognised, 
it is easy to misunderstand worker attitudes or ideolo-
gies amongst a particular group, within a particular 
country, or at a particular period. 
Let us consider again the matter of breadths of 
consciousness amongst workers. Many observers have 
recognised the necessity of going further than Lenin in 
distinguishing between the 'trade union' and 
'socialist' levels of worker consciousness. Worker 
individualism is openly recognised by labour organ-
isers. It is understood by socialists less as a product 
of the competition of worker against worker than as a 
'petty-bourgeois' trait. This is because of the tra-
ditional marxist stress on the socialising and soli-
darity-creating effect of the wage-labour relationship. 
The capitalist division of labour can, however, stim-
ulate the creation of the partial group with its status 
consciousness. This may be consciousness of stratum 
interest (white-collar/blue-collar, skilled/semi-
skilled/unskilled) of segment interest (religious, 
ethnic, national, sexual) or of fraction interest 
(departmental, enterprise, ownership sector, industrial 
sector, etc.). Finally, there is class interest, which 
at its broadest implies: 
recognition of the objective socio-historical 
prevalence of the strategic world perspec-
tives of the working class in both its nega-
tive and positive aspects: i.e. both as a 
radical negation of the capitalist world 
system and as a positive organisational 
principle of production based on a structural 
emancipation of labour (Meszaros 1977:117). 
It is, indeed, on the occasions that national segments 
of this international class demonstrate their inter-
nationalism that one can best judge its potential for 
remaking a world divided into hostile nations and blocs 
by international capitalism. 
There are in the Meszaros presentation - or my 
gloss on it - two dangers. The first is of an economic 
determination of consciousness, of reducing ideology to 
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the classes created by capitalism. The second is of 
legislating for 'necessary working-class consciousness' 
from outside and above the working class - and before 
the event. Indeed, the two errors are linked and 
mutually-sustaining. For if the empirical worker is 
frequently or commonly dominated by individual or 
status consciousness, he is evidently going to need the 
(presumably non-petty-bourgeois) marxist intellectual 
or politician to tell him what his necessary con-
sciousness should be. The major anti-capitalist re-
volutions so far have seen the spreading of basic 
marxist precepts amongst labouring people, but the 
preservation of theory and ideology production in the 
hands of specialised marxist theorists and professional 
organisers. The movement from a narrower to a broader 
working-class consciousness, therefore, must be un-
derstood as having additional requirements. The first 
is the breaking down of the division of labour between 
theoreticians, activists and members within the labour 
movement. The second is that we recognise the intimate 
linkage between working-class consciousness and work-
ing-class capacity-to-control. Growing class conscious-
ness will then be indicated not by ideology-switching 
(e.g. from Catholicism to communism) but by increasing 
understanding and control of social processes (as 
demonstrated in 1980-81 by catholic Polish workers). 
Having made these qualifications and specifications 
concerning class consciousness, we may turn to the 
question of non-class structures and consciousness. 
Laclau (1977:Ch.4) and Laclau and Mouffe (1981) 
point out that since not all social contradictions can 
be reduced to the worker-capitalist one, there are 
other potentially revolutionary subjects than the 
worker. The contradictions between women, students, 
regional and racial minorities, on the one hand, and 
capital and state on the other, are not due to the 
wage-labour relationship but to the general social 
organisation of capitalist society - that it is sexist, 
racist, centralist, etc. The relationship between such 
identities and class ones is evidently vital in de-
veloping a working-class strategy with a general appeal 
to the exploited and oppressed. Of the non-class iden-
tities the one of most interest to us is the ethnic. 
In a useful discussion of writings on class and 
ethnicity, John Saul (1979) reminds us of the extent to 
which the relationship between industrialised capi-
talist core and periphery implies a heightened rele-
vance on non-class social structures and identities for 
and within the periphery. [3] The imposition of capi-
talist relations by conquest increases the importance 
of the nation state and of nationalism. In so far as 
the conquered societies were pre-capitalist, they were 
also ones in which the 'superstructures' of kinship, 
religion, etc, entered into the constitution of the 
mode of production to a greater degree than under 
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capitalism. Finally, the manner in which capitalism 
both undermines and preserves (for its own purposes) 
pre-capitalist modes serves 'to animate and politicise 
ethnicity' (Saul 1979:360). Saul draws on Laclau to 
make the point that the question is precisely how 
ethnic identity is articulated with (i.e. joined with) 
class identity, ethnic struggle with class struggle. 
The ethnic consciousness and struggles of labouring 
people can be articulated with the interests of the 
bourgeoisie. But 
there are 'bottom-up' as well as 'top-down' 
explanations for the peasantry and prole-
tariat/semi-proletariat constituting them-
selves as ethnic subjects. We should not be 
surprised at this. Nor should we assume that 
this is invariably at odds with the develop-
ment of class consciousness. (Saul 1979:365). 
Referring to the particular African experience of 
imperial rule and foreign capitalist exploitation, Saul 
even argues that the 'class consciousness of the pea-
sant and proletariat as it emerges will almost inevit-
ably' express itself in ethnic terms.[4] Saul recog-
nises the problems that such ethnic identification 
creates for revolutionary socialists, who are future-
oriented and universalistic. Even if ethnic politics 
does raise more general class or democratic issues, it 
does tend to lay major stress on the preservation of 
traditional behaviour patterns, language, religion, 
etc. And it does require that one belongs - usually by 
birth - to the group in question. The implications of 
this for the internal politics of the unions will be 
considered shortly. 
9.2. Union structure and function 
In considering union structure and function, we 
may turn again to Hyman (1975) . Hyman points out that 
every attempt by workers to institutionalise their 
power is met by capitalist and state efforts to use the 
very organisations and achievements against the work-
ers. Thus we get the widely recognised and much dis-
cussed cleavage between the union as an organisation 
and its members. Such a cleavage must be understood not 
as due to 'institutional needs' but to particular 
social structures and historical processes. Firstly, 
there is the matter of union base or constituency. The 
earliest unions were 'closed' ones, based on a pre-
existing craft or industrial community, created from 
below, and therefore willing and able to exercise 
'primitive democracy'. This meant decision by general 
meeting, minimal delegation, volunteer officers, 
regular rotation. Whilst the development of the later 
general unions 'open' to all skill levels and/or indus-
tries was a result of mass upsurge, the creation of 
organisations on such varied constituencies required 
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action from above by professional organisers. Govern-
ment of such unions is commonly by 'popular bossdom': 
the power of the key leaders within the 
formal machinery of union decision-making is 
firmly entrenched, and this dominance they 
seek to legitimise by cultivating the person-
al identification and loyalty of the members. 
..Mechanisms of upwards control are limited 
in significance. (Hyman 1975:72). 
Hyman also encourages scepticism toward the notion that 
the creation of industrial unions is necessarily a 
working-class victory. Whilst they have been fought for 
by socialists who saw this as a basis for working-class 
unity and workers' control of industry, they have also 
been favoured by the managerialy inclined. These see in 
industrial unionism an end to competitive militancy by 
unions and a possibility for increased union discipline 
over workers. 
A second source of cleavage is, of course, the 
professionalisation of union leadership as such: 
The trade unionist who becomes a full-time 
official enters a new world. His job revolves 
around an office and a briefcase: in most 
cases a total contrast with the old tools of 
his trade. His circle of social relations, 
both within work and outside, often alters 
radically; his style and standard of living 
tend to reflect what he has become - a man 
with a career. The attractions should not be 
exaggerated: the hours of work are often 
long, the pressures considerable, the pay 
(for junior officials at least) rarely much 
above the earnings of the higher-paid sec-
tions of the membership. What the job does 
bring, however, is a position of influence, a 
wide area of autonomy, a sense of meaning and 
importance, a status in the community, which 
few trade unionists can expect from their 
ordinary employment. (Hyman 1975: 78). 
Along with such incentives to retain office goes the 
ability to influence the electoral process within the 
unions: 
A necessary part of the leadership position 
centres around the development of political 
skills and experience: how to make speeches, 
handle meetings, cultivate contacts, perform 
favours which attract repayment...Hence the 
defeat of sitting officials is comparatively 
rare.(79). 
The stress on 'political' and its definition in terms 
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of 'handling' meetings, 'cultivating' contacts, perfor-
ming 'favours' suggests (although this is not necessar-
ily Hyman's intent) that politics is here being under-
stood as bourgeois politicking rather than a higher 
level of working-class consciousness and action. 
A third source of membership/leadership cleavage 
is the transformation of union function consequent upon 
their recognition and legalisation by capital and 
state. Amongst the early aims of the unions have been: 
the reconstruction of the social order; the 
abolition of the dominating role of profit; 
the establishment of workers' control of 
industry; the reorganisation of the economy 
to serve directly the needs of the producers 
and the general members of the society; the 
humanisation of work; the elimination of 
gross inequalities in standards of living and 
conditions of life; the transformation of 
cultural richness from the privilege of a 
minority to the property of all. (Hyman 
1975:87) . 
But concession, recognition, legalisation, and the in-
corporation of union leaders into the institutions of 
management and government mutes the radicalism provoked 
by their former illegal or unrecognised status. The re-
duction of unions to a role functional to the ends of 
exploiting and oppressing minorities, we might add, 
does not only occur under liberalising capitalist 
regimes, but also under communist ones. And the brief 
experience of unionism in Poland reminds us that the 
reduction of unions to the role of representation/ 
discipline within an accepted social and political 
structure is not a one-way evolutionary trend. If, 
within Poland, we could briefly see unions moving away 
from their 'productionist' role, there is within 
liberal capitalist societies no clear or general trend 
away from their 'consumptionist' one. Given the exis-
tence of liberal legislation, the union official 
experiences a natural commitment to the 
existing bargaining arrangements and the 
terms of existing collective agreements. This 
commitment, moreover, is attributable less to 
any personal characteristics of the official 
than to his function...Yet if the union 
official sees orderly industrial relations as 
essential for stable bargaining relationships 
with employers and ultimately for union 
security, his viewpoint in many respects 
parallels that of management. (Hyman 1975:91. 
Stress in original). 
And if the union's function is understood as negoti-
ating and administering wages and conditions with 
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employers, then there is no need for membership parti-
cipation and activity: 
The reasonable member, in turn, will view his 
union as no more than a fairly narrow service 
agency; so long as it delivers the goods he 
has no cause to worry about its internal 
government. It would be as pointless to tell 
his full-time official how he should go about 
his job as it would be to tell his greengro-
cer. (85) 
Given these three mutually-reinforcing forces for 
the conversion of union organisations into mediators 
between capital/state and the working class, what are 
the countervailing tendencies? For Hyman, drawing on 
the experience of industrialised liberal-democratic 
societies, the total incorporation of unions is incon-
ceivable. Under corporatist or communist societies it 
is, of course, both conceivable and historically demon-
strable for long periods of time. The only significant 
limitation on this process - in all three socio-poli-
tical situations - is the activity of the members 
themselves. Although Hyraan stresses this direct expres-
sion of worker interests (a matter to which we will 
return in more detail in Part IV) , he also allows for 
the manner in which this can express itself through 
lower-level elected or paid officers, and through union 
factionalism (80-81). 
Although racial, religious and linguistic faction-
alism is far from unknown in the labour movements of 
industrialised capitalist countries (consider, respec-
tively, the US, Northern Ireland, Belgium), it is clear 
from what has been said earlier about ethnic segmen-
tation within the working class that it will be more 
marked at the capitalist periphery. There is a clear 
relationship between ethnicity, clientage politics and 
union factionalism. But before we examine this rela-
tionship, we must briefly consider the issue of patron-
client relations in popular movements. 
First, a definition: 
Patronage...is a structural principle which 
underlies asymmetric personal transactions 
involving protection and loyalty between two 
persons...In the transactions between a 
patron and client, the former can be clearly 
distinguished from the latter: it is the 
patron who determines when and who defines 
what is going to be exchanged. In a word, the 
transaction is initiated and 'directed' by 
the patron...The same actor may perform both 
roles, each in a different context, vis-a-vis 
different or the same people. (Blok 1969: 
365-6). 
185 
Although Blok suggests that the concept of patronage is 
merely an analytical construct (which can be applied 
also to the father-son, saint-devotee, landlord-tenant, 
politician-voter relations), he himself identifies the 
historical roots and changing historical forms of 
patronage. He offers an evolutionary schema, with types 
of patronage (vassalage, brokerage, friendship, dis-
guised patronage) distinguished according to successive 
state types. There is a danger of such a construct 
being overgeneralised (so as to illegitimse other 
inequality or leadership theories) or of the evolu-
tionary schema becoming a philosophy of history (sug-
gesting universality and inevitability). This is 
revealed in Galjart's (1964,1969) writings on social 
movements in Latin America. Galjart (1965) offers 
'following' as both a necessary and a sufficient con-
cept for the analysis of the dramatic peasant movements 
in Brazil in the 1950s and early 1960s. He also pre-
sents leader-member relations amongst urban workers in 
this manner (1969:405-9). Huizer (1965) criticises some 
of Galjart's evidence and interpretations, and also 
shows how the body of his material can be interpreted 
in classical marxist terms. This is not, in turn, to 
deny the value of patronage analysis but to limit and 
specify its use: 
Both approaches, the one Galjart criticised 
and the one he used, are attractive because 
of their simplicity, but their value for 
future planning and experimenting is limited. 
Galjart stressed too much the static aspects 
of Brazilian rural life, while those he tried 
to combat possibly overstressed the dynamic, 
the 'historical-dialectical' aspects, without 
taking into account enough the particular 
situation in each different region. (Huizer 
1965:141) . 
Huizer and Wertheim (1969) would not, therefore, deny 
the existence of patronage relations within liberal-
democratic societies, nor within revolutionary move-
ments, but rather stress the increasingly represen-
tative and rational character of new mass organisa-
tions, even where they retain clientage elements. It 
would seem to me, however, that the existence or re-
appearance of patronage relations within liberal-
democratic polities, within revolutionary social move-
ments and in post-capitalist societies requires further 
consideration. We cannot assume that there is an evolu-
tionary process occurring in which patronage relations 
are being driven out by increased democracy and ration-
ality - only that there are new contradictions between 
the old norms and institutions and the new ones. Inso-
far as we can identify patronage relations within the 
new polity, movement or society, we have reason to 
question their democratic, revolutionary or socialist 
claims. Since the market and liberal democracy are 
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universalistic only in the claim (in practice reproduc-
ing economic inequality and power differentiation), 
they cannot but reproduce patronage relations - if on 
the greater scale of competing parliamentary parties. 
But the persistence or reappearance of patronage rela-
tions cannot be explained by patronage analysis. Nor 
can patronage analysis by itself assist in the sur-
passing of patronage relations. It is in this sense 
that it is not only static but conservative. One thus 
needs a theory that can explain the historical and 
social origins of 'asymmetric personal transactions 
involving protection and loyalty*, as well as the 
moments in which these are challenged and the condi-
tions for their surpassing. This, of course, would be 
the claim of marxism. But, then, this would be a marx-
ism that did not so much deny the value of patronage 
analysis as situate it in relation to class analysis. 
Recognition of the re-appearance of patronage relations 
in - for example - post-revolutionary Russia, would 
then require analysis of the nature of the revolu-
tionary classes, movements and leaderships. As the work 
of the historian Marc Ferro (1980) suggests, the repro-
duction of patronage (and other capitalist and pre-
capitalist) relations was due to the underdevelopment 
of a homogenous social force with universalistic (i.e. 
socialist) desires and capacities. 
The working class is claimed by marxiste to be 
such a force - which may be why Hobsbawm (1974) objects 
to having its organisations analysed in terms of 
patron-client relations. Yet it is precisely in such 
terms that Richard Sandbrook (1975) has analysed Kenyan 
unions.[5] And he presents a convincing argument on 
the relationship between clientage politics, ethnicity 
and union factionalism. He shows that whilst ethnic 
identity amongst workers is not inevitably an obstacle 
to class consciousness, it evidently provides a basis 
for creating vertical loyalties of workers or union 
members with rich and powerful ethnic brothers. Patron-
client relations in Kenya are shown as extending from 
the 'big man' at the centre down to the peasant at the 
periphery, cutting across geographical, organisational 
and occupational boundaries. Although permitting some 
benefits to trickle down, 
Clientelism, emphasising vertical, personal 
linkages, impedes the development of con-
sciousness of common interests on the part of 
the underlying strata...To the extent that 
clientelism...promotes intra-class rather 
than inter-class conflict, it is a support of 
the inegalitarian status quo. (Sandbrook 
1975:21). 
Although clientelism clearly has rural roots, Sandbrook 
makes clear how this was practised by the colonial 
authorities (who, one might add, also stimulated -
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where they did not create - tribalism) , and how it 
serves the post-colonial order. 
Factions are defined as structurally identical 
groupings, and Sandbrook shows that when the political 
process is pervaded with clientage relations, the main 
form of conflict is factionalism. Since such factions 
are basically concerned with power, they rarely have a 
distinct political or ideological orientation. The 
patron reinforces stability by appeals to friendship, 
kinship or ethnicity. What are the implications of this 
general political pattern for trade unionism? Union 
leadership offers material benefits, prestige, the 
possibility of promotion within industry, a stepping 
stone to political office. Particularly where the 
check-off (employer deduction of union fees from 
wages) exists will leaders have the opportunity to 
create patronage networks, offering union positions, 
scholarships and other benefits in exchange for person-
al loyalty. Whilst competition between structurally 
identical patron-client factions would seem to vitiate 
membership control of unions, Sandbrook argues other-
wise. He suggests that leaderships are caught in a 
series of contradictions between capital and state on 
the one hand and the working class on the other. These 
tensions fuel intra-union conflicts. These conflicts 
are expressed in faction fighting, and the consequent 
rise and fall of factions provides an obstacle to the 
existence of self-continuing, conservative and authori-
tarian leaders. Here we must qualify by recognising 
that whilst factionalism may be a threat to a parti-
cular leader, it is no threat to opportunist, career-
ist, elitist and manipulative leadership. Clientage 
relations and factional politics would seem to be pre-
cisely the means of articulating the ethnic identity of 
workers with the social interests of those exploiting 
and oppressing them. 
9.3. Types of labour leadership 
Lastly, we have to deal with types of labour leader. Vie 
have already dealt with leadership ideology or stra-
tegy. What we are here concerned with is the social 
position, style and persona of leaders. Evidently the 
two are related, but the present focus can tell us more 
about the nature of leadership and leader-member rela-
tions than the adopted (or borrowed, adapted, aban-
doned) ideologies.[6] 
An attempt at a typology of popular leadership in 
a PCS has been made by Post (1978:182-6) in his study 
of a labour rebellion in Jamaica in the 1930s. He 
identifies 1) the exemplary leader who demonstrates 
personally to followers an alternative way of life, 2) 
the charismatic leader, claiming to possess or be an 
expression öï supernatural powers, 3) the trickster, 
claiming or demonstrating the capacity to deceive the 
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rich and powerful, 4) the status leader, a person 
demonstrating the technical skills and capacities 
necessary to bargain with capital and state, and 5) the 
reformist or revolutionary educator (Post actually 
refers here to the position of intellectual, rather 
than the appeal) . Although not necessarily set out as 
such, this is implicitly an evolutionary typology 
insofar as the first types appeared earlier and were 
rooted in the rural or urban petty-commodity culture, 
the later ones in a more urban and wage-earning one. It 
is also a normative typology insofar as Post sees the 
revolutionary intellectual as the bearer of socialism. 
We should further note that (with the adjustment I have 
made above) this is a typology of style or appeal 
rather than one of social position. And, finally, we 
must recognise that it is a typology of popular rather 
than worker leadership, from the beginning of unionism 
in Jamaica. 
Having set out some of the concepts necessary for 
the analysis of relations within unions, let us turn 
again to the case study. 
NOTES 
1. Customarily one would here be dealing with the 
traditional problem of union democracy. I did not 
have the time or the opportunity to observe more 
than one or two union meetings, and one can get 
little or no idea from documents of how the unions 
are governed. For the best Nigerian study of this 
problem, consult Smock (1969). For a marxist 
approach to the problem, see Hyman (1975:Ch.3). 
2. Wright's analysis is concerned with modes of 
production rather than social formations. He is 
therefore not required to 'place' state personnel 
in his diagram, although he does make references 
to them in his text. Moreover, he places between 
capitalists and workers only those with interme-
diate places in the authority structure, not those 
with the specialised technical/scientific func-
tions required by capitalist industrialisation. He 
therefore places professionals, teachers, tech-
nicians (overwhelmingly sellers of labour power 
historically) with skilled artisans (historically 
sellers of commodities) between the working class 
and the petty bourgeoisie. It would seem to me 
more appropriate (even on his own criteria) to 
place the state personnel, technical and scien-
tific experts between capitalist class and prole-
tariat, and add to the skilled artisan such sig-
nificant intermediate groups as seasonal, casual 
and outworkers. There is a further problem with 
Wright's terminology, that he himself recognises. 
It is somewhat confusing to talk about categories 
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in 'contradictory locations' between classes that 
are themselves in contradiction. However, I consi-
der it preferable to employ his terminology rather 
than propose an alternative. 
Since Saul's article is largely a survey of a 
range of literature, one should not assume that my 
references to it here are necessarily his views of 
the matter. For a critical discussion of Saul's 
paper see LARU Studies (1980) . 
Not only at the periphery, and not only in ethnic 
terms. John Leggett's classic study of Detroit 
shows the extent to which class and ethnic con-
sciousness are inter-related at the very centre of 
world capitalist industry (Leggett 1968). And much 
of Paul Lübeck's work on Kano has been concerned 
with the articulation there of class and islamic 
consciousness and organisation amongst workers 
(Lübeck 1973, 1975a, 1975b, 1979, 1981). 
What follows is in large part drawn from a review 
of Sandbrook's book (Waterman 1977). 
See the fascinating account of the leadership of 
the Light and Power Workers Union in Cordoba, 
Argentina, by Marta Roldan (1978). This shows how 
a formerly Peronist (radical-democratic) leader-
ship was gradually shifted in a socialist-revo-
lutionary direction by its experience of increased 
repression and exploitation in the 1960s. The 
ideological radicalisation of the leadership, 
however, took place without an accompanying démo-
cratisation of its traditional personalist leader-
ship style. With the return of a Peronist regime 
in 1973, the leaders found themselves increasingly 
isolated from their followers, to the point at 
which the members took no action when their lea-
dership was repressed. 
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Chapter 10 
PORTWORKER UNIONISTS: INVISIBLE ENEMIES 
AND ABSENT FRIENDS 
In this chapter we will be dealing with the internal 
relations of trade unions in a long- and well-estab-
lished industry. We will deal in turn with the formal 
qualities of the organisations, with the factionalism 
that plagued them, and with their relations to the 
national and international trade union movement. Fol-
lowing this we will examine more closely the nature of 
union leadership and compare the attitudes of leaders 
and followers. We will become aware of the problems of 
unions that reduce themselves to representative/bar-
gaining bodies, thus demobilising their members. It 
will be suggested that ethnic factionalism was the last 
weapon left to ineffective leaderships as their type of 
unionism failed to meet their followers' needs. 
10.1. Union structure 
As long ago as 1963, 8,000 of NPA's national junior 
staff force of 9,875 were said to have signed check-off 
forms for one union or another (NPA Report 1963:71) . 
This suggests a unionisation rate of over 80 percent. 
Ten years later. Table 6.1 shows there to have been a 
total junior staff union membership (i.e. excluding the 
NPAOA) of 10,923, at a time when total junior staff in 
NPA was 14,211 (NPA Report 1973:84). This suggests a 
unionisation rate of some 76 percent. Given the quality 
of NPA statistics, we cannot assume a fall in union-
isation between the two periods. But even the lower 
rate suggests a solidly-unionised industry. Table 6.1 
also shows the distribution between unions in NPA 
nationally in 1973. This shows the R&PT&CSU of Adebola 
to have controlled over 40 percent of the unionised 
workers, the NPAWU of Nwankwonta some 35 percent, the 
NMWU of Zudonu some 16 percent, with the other unions 
or associations having each two percent or less. 
Although we do not have unionisation rates for Lagos, 
we do have membership distribution figures for Lagos 
Port Complex and Headquarters. The data are presented 
in Table 10.1. these show the R&PTCSU to have been in a 
dominating position, with two-thirds of the total 
membership. The NPAWU and NMWU together, with almost 
equal numbers, did not make up the other third. The 
MESAN and FGT&GWU, again with almost equal figures, 
192 
Table 10.1. Union Strength at Lagos Port Complex 
August 1977 
Namp 
NPAWU 
R&PTuCSU 
NMWU 
MESAN 
FGT&GWÜ 
'lOTAL 
Strength 
919 
3,959 
968 
82 
85 
6,013 
% 
(15.2) 
(65.8) 
(16.0) 
( 1.3) 
( 1.4) 
(99.7) 
Income 
(in Ν) 
575 
3,898 
1,024 
92 
41 
5,630 
& 
(10.2) 
(69.2) 
(18.1) 
( 1.6) 
( 0.7) 
(99.8) 
Income per 
member (in Ν) 
0.6 
0.9 
1.0 
1.1 
0.4 
0.9 
Source; NPA union Strength 1977. 
Notes; These organisations were the registered junior 
staff unions with check-off facilities in mid-1977. 
193 
accounted for less than three percent between them. 
Bearing in mind that total junior staff in Lagos Port 
Complex and Headquarters at that time would have been 
well over 10,000, it would appear, however, that the 
rate of unionisation would have been between 50 and 60 
percent. This comparatively low rate conflicts not only 
with the earlier given rates, but also with the much 
higher ones suggested by the Port and Dock Worker 
Survey cited below. What the two tables do tend uni-
formly or cumulatively to confirm are the relative lack 
in change of position by the NMWU, MESAN and the FGT-
&GWU compared with the 1960s, the decline of the NPAWU 
and the rise of the R&PT&CSU. 
Table 10.1 also gives us some information about 
union finance. Although the average union dues appear 
to be almost N1 per member per month, one notices that 
both the NPAWU and FGT&GWU have considerably lower dues 
than unions equal in comparative strength. In terms of 
financial strength, the R&PT&CSU is followed by the 
NMWU, NPAWU, MESAN and FGT&GWU, in that order. What did 
the unions do with the considerable amounts of money 
that some of them were getting regularly and automati-
cally through check-off? Evidence is provided from the 
financial returns that unions have long been obliged to 
make to the Registrar of Trade Unions. [1] We may con-
sider expenditure under the following heads: admini-
stration (office and staff); organisation (conferences, 
publications, education, tours, meetings); benefits; 
industrial action; external relations (affiliations, 
solidarity). 
The major head was undoubtedly administration. In 
1974 the R&PT&CSU spent some 60 percent of income on 
this. So did the much smaller NMWU. Staff salaries 
accounted for the largest part of this. In 1971, 1973 
and 1974 the NPAWU spent respectively 37 percent, 60 
percent and 52 percent of its total income on this 
item. In 1974 the R&PT&CSU spent around 30 percent on 
staff salaries and the NMWU around 34 percent. 
In 1975 the MESAN (which had no fulltime officers) 
spent some 22 percent on staff salaries. If the NPAWU 
is any guide, then secretarial salaries alone accounted 
for a considerable proportion of total expenditure. In 
1974 it spent on the salaries of its General Secretary, 
Deputy General Secretary and Delta District Secretary 
N3803, some 40 percent of its total income of N9409. 
Spending on organisation seems to have varied 
considerably from one union to another, although being 
a rather small proportion of income. Thus in 1974 the 
NPAWU spent around seven percent and in 1975 the MESAN 
11 percent on this item. The fact that in 1974 the NMWU 
spent as much as 26 percent is accounted for by 'reor-
ganisation expenses', and 'seminar and course'. It is 
noticable that in general the unions spent little on 
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either education or publicity, even if one includes 
scholarships under the first item and all printing 
costs under the second. Thus, the 'seminar and course' 
mentioned accounted for only some three percent of 
total NMWU income in 1974, and printing less than half 
that. In fact, in the three other detailed accounts we 
have, education only comes up once, when the NPAWU 
spent N45.81 on scholarships in 1974. 
Membership benefits appear to have been low or 
non-existent. On the four detailed accounts such items 
are specified but once, when the MESAN allowed N40 for 
'death benefits'. When Akinwamide was sacked from NPA 
in 1976, the R&PT&CSU supported him on full salary 
while it fought for his reinstatement. Unions often 
paid legal fees for members charged with criminal 
offences. Perhaps one should consider the considerable 
customary sums for 'entertainment' as a membership 
benefit, even though this perk was usually limited to 
officers and activists. The only other item that could 
be found under the head of benefits was a small pur-
chase of shares in CFAO, one of the major foreign-owned 
trading companies, by the R&PT&CSU. 
Industrial action was mentioned but once, by the 
R&PT&CSU in 1974, and here it was unfortunately grouped 
with other organisational and administrative expenses. 
It is noticeable, however, that the same organisation 
was the only one to identify legal and Industrial 
Arbitration Tribunal expenses, both presumably related 
to industrial action. 
One external relations item that came up for most 
of the unions was that of affiliation. This, however, 
usually accounted for only one or two percent of in-
come. As for solidarity payments of any kind, the only 
one to be found was a contribution of N20 made by the 
NMWU to the Drought Relief Fund in 1974. 
If expenditure is any guide to the nature of 
unions, what are we to make of the above pattern? It 
would appear that the trade unions were basically 
administrative and representative offices. Given the 
minimal amounts spent on education, consultation and 
agitation, it would be difficult to consider them as 
organisers of the workers. Given the virtual non-
existence of benefits it would be difficult to consider 
them as welfare bodies. Given the minimal expenditure 
on industrial action it would be hard to consider them 
as a movement. And the low proportion devoted to any 
kind of external relations suggests that the work and 
interests of the trade unions were basically confined 
to the NPA itself. Finally, even the efforts to improve 
the formal functioning of the unions were insignifi-
cant. We have already mentioned in Chapter 6 the ambi-
tious projects of the R&PT&CSU enunciated at its 1973 
conference. But in 1976 the union was still housed in 
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the two or three rooms behind the ULC headquarters at 
97 Herbert Macaulay Street. Its office equipment and 
staffing appeared no more adequate than those of 
smaller NPA unions. A few shares had been taken out in 
a commercial company but there was no sign of any 
cooperative, insurance or welfare activity. To all 
intents and purposes, the union's administration 
appeared concentrated in the hands of its General 
Secretary. The only sign of some kind of administrative 
development was the existence of a 'Research and Infor-
mation Bureau'. But this was not so much what it might 
seem to be (although it did issue leaflets) as a group 
of organisers. It had apparently been created by the 
union's National Working Committee precisely to spread 
a load of work that was evidently beyond the capacities 
of one man. Finally, the 1976 conference decided to 
create two fulltime Assistant General Secretaryships. 
Of all the proposals, it seems that these were the only 
ones to be put into practice. 
10.2. Factionalism 
Whereas the radical-moderate split of the 1950s-60s in 
the NPA was fought out in political/ideological terms 
(see Chapter 6, Introduction) , that of the 1970s was 
expressed largely in those of ethnicity. It is true 
that one does find the moderates accusing the militants 
of using 'unscientific' industrial relations methods, 
of being 'political' (appealing to forces outside 
NPA?), of 'violence' or 'anarchism'. But the main accu-
sation was of tribalism. 
If we look at all the available evidence on this 
matter (Waterman 1979h:Ch.4), what accusations does one 
find? Within the NPAWU; in 1975 Beyioku warned the 
leadership against tribalism, and Alade accused it of 
appealing to Yoruba sentiment to oust a branch leader-
ship it alleged to be Ibo-Efik dominated. By the R&PT-
&CSU: in 1976 Adebola accused three top Ibo managers of 
conspiring with Ibo members within the union to put 
down Adebola's recruiting successes solely to tribal 
propaganda and intimidation; in late 1976 three leaf-
lets by NMTÜF supporters accused Adebola of appealing 
to Yorubas by stressing the non-Yoruba predominance in 
NPA management. Additionally, in the heated atmosphere 
of late-1976, three or four union leaders were making 
accusations against the R&PT&CSU. It was said that 
Adebola was an 'arch-tribalist', that his union leader-
ship was 'dominated by Yorubas', and that a 1971 split 
in the NMTUF was 'tribally motivated'. In addition to 
such references to ethnicity, we can find the R&PT&CSU 
being referred to disparagingly as the 'Arab Onion', 
which was presumably an attempt to label it as musi im 
before a largely christian workforce. R&PT&CSU leaders 
were more concerned to deny such charges and accuse 
their attackers of bad faith than to counter-charge 
them with tribalism. Thus, even one who said that the 
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other union leaderships 'were all non-Yoruba and have 
mostly Ibo officers' added that the NPA unions were 
'not tribalistic in nature' (Interview Notes, December 
1976) . 
It is difficult to obtain evidence for or against 
many such accusations. What we can do is to see to what 
extent the composition of union leaderships might 
provide grounds for them. We can only do this in a 
rather arbitrary and rule of thumb manner,[2] but this 
should prove sufficient for the present purpose. Thus, 
we could talk of 'predominance' if one ethnic group had 
more than half of the leadership positions in a union, 
or of 'balance' if no single group had this. We could 
then analyse the ethnic composition of union leader-
ships, taking for each of the main organisations a list 
of activists, a list of national officers and a list of 
the Lagos area leadership.[3] On this basis it would be 
possible to speak of Yoruba 'predominance' in the 
R&PT&CSU and a 1971 NMTUF caretaker committee it spon-
sored, of eastern minority group (or these plus Ibo) 
'predominance' in the NMWU, of Ibo predominance in an 
NMTUF sponsored inquiry into the NPA Accounts Depart-
ment (NMTUF Memo June (?) 1976). 
It was probably the Yoruba predominance in the 
R&PT&CSU leadership that facilitated accusations 
against it. This does not, however, prove that they are 
true. Questions remain about how this 'Yoruba-domin-
ated' organisation managed to hold its non-Yoruba 
branches in other ports and to win over non-Yoruba 
members - and leaders - of other unions despite this 
image. Finally, one is required to consider why the 
R&PT&CSU did not make similar public attacks on what it 
could easily have called Ibo, or 'Ibo and Calabar', or 
'Eastern', domination of the NMWU. The answer to all 
these questions is probably provided by an NPA IR 
officer: 
When Adebola made gains in the Engineering 
Department, it was on the basis of winning an 
up-grading. It was not an ethnic appeal: most 
of the ones he won over were Ibo...The other 
unions have more motive to attack Adebola for 
tribalism than he has to attack them, because 
he can say they are ineffective. (Interview 
Notes, December 1976). 
A question remains over why the R&PT&CSU and NMWU 
permitted themselves a certain ethnic predominance 
amongst their leaders in a very ethnically-conscious 
workforce. In the case of the NMWU there was little 
choice. 'Floating staff' should preferably be able to 
float, and it appears that the NPA recruited them 
traditionally from amongst ethnic groups living on the 
creeks in southern and eastern Nigeria. It appears that 
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Zudonu's constituency was possibly one of ethnic as 
well as of occupational category. But in so far as the 
R&PT&CSU was appealing to the Traffic and Engineering 
Departments, or to both manual and clerical workers 
within these, it would have been faced by an ethni-
cally-mixed constituency. According to the Port and 
Dock Worker Survey, there was a Yoruba majority in none 
of these categories, in some cases there were more Ibo 
than Yoruba, and there was always 20 to 30 percent of 
other groups. Perhaps the Yoruba predominance in the 
R&PT&CSU leadership was a leftover from a previous 
period in which that union (like the NMWU) found its 
security in an ethnic identification. But this is 
speculation. What can be concluded with more certainty 
is that ethnic 'balance' was no guarantee of a leader-
ship's success (NPAWU) and ethnic 'predominance' no 
barrier to it (R&PT&CSU). A sucessful appeal to NPA 
workers in general required avoidance of an ethnic 
appeal (R&PT&CSU); a last-ditch defensive effort seems 
to have required an appeal not only to this but also to 
religious identifications (NMTUF majority). 
10.3. National and international affiliation 
Whilst national and international affiliation were 
matters of great import to portworker unions in the 
1950s and 1960s (see Chapter 6, Introduction), they 
seem to have been of peripheral significance in the 
1970s. This does not mean that they were of no interest 
to portworker union leaders, as we will see in the 
cases of the NMWU and the R&PT&CSU. These affiliations, 
however, seem to have been of interest rather for the 
personal opportunities they offered than for any common 
orientation they implied, or any means they might have 
seemed to have provided for for overcoming conflicts at 
industry level. 
O. Zudono was evidently a convinced 'internation-
alist', keeping up the ties with the ITF and the US 
that we will see Adebola to have either broken or lost 
interest in. During an interview in August 1975 he 
declared his hopes of attending a Moral Rearmament[4] 
meeting in Brazil later that year. Amongst his members 
he was known as 'International Zu'. The relationship of 
the NMWU with the ITF seems to have been of positive 
value to the union. It organised a joint seminar with 
the ITF in Port Harcourt in 1972, and Zudonu addressed 
two others organised by ITF for its Nigerian or West 
African affiliates in 1974 and 1975. It also received 
from the ITF a duplicating machine as a contribution to 
its post-Civil War programme (NMWU) Conference Docu-
ments 1973) . Whilst its relationship with the US 
unions was equally warm, it led the union into con-
flicts with the ULC. In 1972, Zudonu attended a Seminar 
on labour journalism organised by the American Feder-
ation of Labour-Congress of Industrial Organisations 
(AFL-CIO) and the US Agency for International Develop-
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ment in the USA. This enabled him to meet Gleason, 
President of the International Longshoreman's Associ-
ation, and to obtain from him the offer of a car for 
the NMWU. Zudonu had only to obtain the approval of 
Irving Brown, 'Director of the AALC [African-American 
Labour Centre PW] in New York who is also my personal 
friend and a true friend of our Union'. [5] This was 
obtained and the arrangements went forward. But, at 
this point, the ULC objected that the bilateral agree-
ment violated an accord between itself and the AALC 
that all aid be channeled through the ULC. Zudonu was 
then involved in a dispute with the ULC that led him to 
ask whether the NMWU should not 
re-examine our relationship with the ULC with 
a view to improving it now or it will surely 
deteriorate to a level where great damage may 
be done to it. (NMWU Conference Documents 
1973) . 
Although Zudonu made it clear that there was no inten-
tion to disaffiliate from the ULC, NMWU protests were 
apparently sufficient to get the ULC to withdraw its 
objections. The car eventually arrived in 1974, was 
first registered in the name of Zudonu personally and 
then became the property of the union. As far as the 
NMWU was concerned, the energy spent in obtaining the 
vehicle, and the conflicts surrounding it, must have 
been easily compensated for by the material advantages 
it offered and the prestige of having a large Peugeot 
stationwagon with the union's name emblazoned thereon. 
Although Zudonu, in complaining of ULC behaviour 
in the car case, had protested the union's loyalty, the 
NMWU appears to have been generally dissatisfied with 
the ULC. Reporting on the 1971 ULC Congress, Zudonu 
stated that it 
brought into [the] open yet [again] the in-
ordinate ambition for leadership conflict and 
intrigue that have been the main cause of 
division in the Trade Union movement in this 
country. There is more than enough for any 
Trade Unionist to do in this country but 
greed, selfishness and vain pride will not 
allow people to cooperate with one another 
for the interest of the workers we profess to 
lead. (NMWU Conference Documents 1973). 
The situation within the ULC seems to have reflected a 
certain stagnation, lack of direction and demorali-
sation amongst all the portworker unions except the 
RbPT&CSU. When the NLC was created at the end of 197 5 
this was welcomed by Zudonu, who himself became one of 
its Vice-Presidents. Although he again expressed the 
hope that this would bring about the industrial union 
which he had long dreamed of, this was not - yet - to 
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be so. The 'industrial union' eventually created was 
brought into existence at the instance of the Nigerian 
state, not that of the industrial, national or inter-
national trade union movement. 
Although, like the other portworker unions, the 
R&PT&CSU was traditionally affiliated with the OLC, its 
relationships with the national (and international) 
trade union bodies have had special characteristics. 
Both Adebola and Adegbesan were prominent within the 
ULC. Adebola was its Présidait until he was deposed and 
given the formal function of Life Patron in 1969. 
Adegbesan had been elected Deputy President of the ULC 
in 1971 and held this post until it was dissolved. 
Adebola and Adegbesan were both active within the ICFTU 
and its African Regional Organisation (AFRO). From 1960 
to 1964, Adebola had been Chairman of AFRO, and from 
1962 to 1969 a Vice President of the ICFTU. Adegbesan 
became Vice-President of AFRO and a member of the 
governing body of the ICFTU. He made numerous trips 
abroad in the 1960s and 1970s, to the USA, West Ger-
many, Mexico and Libya. He followed courses at the 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Germany and Harvard Uni-
versity, USA. Possibly he was an acceptable substitute 
for H.P.Adebola in such international bodies, since 
Adebola had begun to distance himself from them in the 
late 1960s. In 1969, becoming aware of the CIA invol-
vement in the international activities of the US unions 
(which were now the main financial prop of his own 
ULC) , he became as bitterly opposed to them as he had 
once been to the communists: 
I formed the impression that some of the 
officials of the foreign trade unions in 
Nigeria had something to do with the CIA of 
America... [S]ince the advent of the Afri-
can-American Labour Centre in Nigeria... 
treachery and betrayal has found a comfort-
able asylum in the Nigerian trade union 
movement. (Adebola Memorandum, March 22, 
1976) . 
The clash with the Americans seems to have meant that 
Adebola lost his leadership of the ULC to American-
backed unionists. Adebola and Adegbesan were apparently 
amongst that faction of the ULC that favoured the 
creation of the NLC. They claim to have successfully 
got a unanimous vote for this at the Kano Conference of 
the ULC in 1975 despite the efforts of an unnamed 
'imported guest' who tried to obstruct it (R&PT&CSU 
Conference Documents, 1976). Support for the NLC paid 
off in the election of Adegbesan as leader of the 
Steering Committee in 1975. His name then became known 
amongst the newspaper-reading public as the leader (if 
briefly) of the first unified central body of Nigerian 
trade unions for many years. In 1976 Adebola's name was 
also much in the press when he appeared before the 
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Adebiyi Tribunal, speaking as a ruthless critic of 
foreign influence on Nigerian unions, of the trade 
union centres themselves and particularly of the ULC 
(Adebola Memorandum, March 22, 1976; Adebiyi Proceed-
ings 1976: 25-7) . He thus appeared as the representa-
tive of an independent nationalist unionism, free of 
the mud which clung to most of the older generation of 
national trade union leaders in Nigeria. In later 
denouncing to the government a US trade union repre-
sentative, he declared himself to be acting as a 
'loyal', 'reasonable' and 'patriotic' Nigerian. He had 
apparently turned back not only to his own union base 
but also to his original identification with the 
Nigerian state. It is probably as a reasonable, loyal 
and patriotic Nigerian that he would like himself to be 
considered by others. His followers could by now have 
well dubbed him 'National Adebola'. 
10.4 Onion leaders 
In dealing with the unions in Chapter 6 we have in 
large part in fact been dealing with union leaderships 
or even a dominating individual officer (usually a 
longstanding general secretary). Survey evidence from 
1975 and 1976, as well as earlier interviews and addi-
tional statements enable us to isolate them from their 
organisations and obtain an impression of the charac-
teristics and opinions of union officers as a group.[6] 
10.4.1 Characteristics 
The backgrounds of union officers do not differ signi-
ficantly from those of NPA manual workers. By ethnic 
origin they are mixed. They are rather older than the 
average NPA worker, with most of them being over 40. A 
'young man' amongst the union officers is in his thir-
ties rather than his twenties. Lengths and types of 
education are mixed, with a few having school certi-
ficate or equivalent, and several having trade training 
within NPA. Most have been working in NPA for well over 
10 years, many for over 20. Amongst the fulltime offi-
cials there are ex-manual workers as well as an ex-
senior staff man (from outside NPA). And amongst the 
unpaid officers one finds men from the occupations 
found amongst the members - a fireman-greaser, an able 
seaman, a fitter, an assistant supervisor, a marine 
engineering assistant, a clerical supervisor, etc. 
Apart from one unpaid officer who receives an honor-
arium of N15 a month as general secretary of his small 
union, the others receive nothing above their pay. Of 
the fulltime officers interviewed, one was receiving 
N159 and another N268 per month. Whilst the first sum 
is not much different from the average manual wage 
found in our survey of NPA, the second is 1.8 times 
above it. Another fulltimer, however, was earning N330 
per month in 1973 - some 3.6 times the maximum of a 
skilled tradesman in that year (Interview Notes, August 
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1973) . However, even this considerable differential 
would have put him somewhere near the bottom of the 
senior staff scale in that year. Whilst some fulltime 
secretaries may enjoy the living standards of the 
intermediate salaried strata in Nigeria, and, whilst 
the unpaid officers might enjoy freedom from their 
official NPA occupations, it would be difficult to 
argue that they are a race apart from the workers they 
organise. 
As one might expect, the officers have many years 
of union membership and activity behind them. Whilst 
some had first become officers just two to five years 
earlier, several had done so as long as 15, 20, or 30 
or more years back. And behind even the shortest period 
of office holding there appears to lie 10 to 20 or more 
years of membership. It thus seems that union leader-
ship is not quickly won in the NPA. When questioned on 
their knowledge of their own unions, some interesting 
replies were given. Thus, only one gave an accurate 
idea of his union's membership in Lagos Port. The 
others either did not know or gave wildly exaggerated 
figures. Behind this lies, no doubt, not only confusion 
about the meaning of the word 'member', but also the 
absence of reliable figures for 'financial' members, 
and the current conflicts over representativity. Whilst 
most knew of their organisation's present or past 
affiliation nationally, far less knew of the inter-
national affiliations. Knowledge about international 
affiliation seemed to be correlated with participation 
in trade union courses - these being often organised by 
the internationals. The great majority of the officers 
had taken part in such courses, at the ULC-AALC Trade 
Union Institute in Lagos, at Ibadan University, or 
abroad under the auspices of the ICFTU, the AFL-CIO, 
the German or Swiss trade unions. 
It is possible to find amongst the NPA union 
leaders almost the entire range of types I have earlier 
identified within Nigeria. These can be named as the 
worker, the entrepreneur, the professional and the 
senior staff leader. 
The first is represented by the former able-seaman 
who became General Secretary of the NMTUF, J.E. Bone 
Okoro. Born in 1933, he had a christian education, 
became a schoolteacher, but abandoned this for better-
paid work within the old Marine Department in 1954. 
Although he would at first have been a manual labourer, 
there is little doubt that his background must have 
helped him when 'in 1960 he decided to make a career' 
of trade unionism (NMTUF 1975). He was at first a 
branch representative of his union, the NMWU, later 
becoming its Assistant General Secretary. He has atten-
ded three or four residential courses, at Ibadan Uni-
versity, or at the Trade Union Institute of the AALC 
and the ULC. Okoro remained an employee of the NPA, 
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even when released for work within the unions. He is a 
modest and simple person who 'loves reading, politics 
and societies. He is married and has a number of chil-
dren' (NMTUF 1975). [7] 
The second type is represented by a man I inter-
viewed in 1973, before I had made contact with the NPA 
unions. He claimed to have been approached by an NPA 
union, the secretary of which had fled to the east 
during the Civil War. He said that it paid him £N 90 
per month but that he left this to become the secretary 
of an association of NPA technical officers at £N200 
per month. This organisation had an income of over 
£N1,000 per month from check-off, provided him with an 
officer, secretary, typist, messenger and a Peugeot 
car. Careful readers (not to speak of NPA unionists) 
may be as puzzled as I initially was about the wealthy 
union of which this man claimed to have been secretary 
in 1971. I found that he had held the two positions 
claimed, but that the rest of the claim was fantasy. 
His earlier and later career is better attested for. 
Born in 1934 and secondary-educated, he became a labo-
ratory technician and then a union activist. In 1958 he 
became fulltime secretary of the union at his former 
workplace, came under the influence of communism and 
was a founder of the first NTUC in the early 1960s. In 
the 1960s he was picked up by the International Feder-
ation of Christian Trade Unions (IFCTO) and appointed 
its West African representative. In 1966 he was asso-
ciated with its Nigerian affiliate, the Nigerian Wor-
kers Council (NWC), into which the IFCTU was putting 
large amounts of money. Although the NWC split on 
ethnic grounds, amongst accusations of misuse of funds, 
the IFCTU kept its confidence in this man, and recom-
mended him for industrial relations training in Europe. 
On his return to Nigeria he became a personnel officer, 
although not in the NPA.[8] 
The professional leader - one for whom it is a 
lifetime commitment rather than a stage in career -is 
well represented by H.P.Adebola. Much has already been 
said about his attitudes. Here we will fill in on his 
personal characteristics. Interviewed in 1973, Adebola 
claimed to have been a professional trade unionist for 
13 years, to earn around N2,000 as a union secretary, 
and another N1,300 as a member of two government 
boards. He was married, had six children, and owned his 
own five-bedroomed house in a middle-class area of 
Lagos. In his own home town in Western Nigeria he owned 
a piece of laand. Adebola is a one-time station officer 
within the NRC. He was, during the 'political days', 
active in one of the elite parties and had represented 
it within the House of Chiefs. He claims to have had 
legal training within the Inns of Court whilst in 
London, as well as from Lagos University. Although 
always careful to listen to the unpaid union officers 
who officially employ him, Adebola has always been the 
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dominating person in his union - an organisation appa-
rently run as a 'popular bossdom'. His office was 
always run as a one-man outfit, the workers within it 
always deferring to him and refusing to say a word to 
anyone in his absence. Never a great public orator or 
crowd leader, like Imoudu, Adebola comes into his own 
in bargaining or courtroom sessions. Here his abrasive 
tongue and domineering presence are employed to maximum 
advantage. Considering unionism a 'noble profession', 
'like a religion', he proudly declares his personal 
holdings, that he has never received money from any 
body other than his union, never used a union scholar-
ship for his children, and been cleared by two tri-
bunals in the late 1960s (Adebola Memorandum, March 22, 
1976). He made this statement at the Adebiyi Tribunal, 
which exposed and punished practically every other 
major national union figure in Nigeria apart from him. 
Having thrown all his considerable energies into union 
work at industrial level, Adebola was held in awe by 
his followers and in considerable fear by his oppo-
nents. [9] 
The senior staff leader is represented by the 
president of Adebola's union, J.O.Adegbesan. He has a 
very similar background to Adebola, except that he 
remained in the NRC when Adebola abandoned it for full-
time unionism. Born in 1929, he became a senior sta-
tion-master in 1977. Apart from his industrial, 
national and international union posts, he was ap-
pointed a member of the National Library Board by the 
Federal Military Government in 1976. When the Nigerian 
unions created the first NLC in 1975, it was under his 
chairmanship. Okeke Ugwuanyi, one of his admirers, 
writes of him that 
Mr. Adegbesan is a complete gentleman, sim-
ple, unassuming and approachable. His style 
of leadership is worth emulating by all those 
who believe in trade unionism without bitter-
ness. (Ugwuanyi, October 24, 1977). 
ugwuanyi was the leader of the Mechanical Workshops 
workers who moved en masse out of the NPAWU and into 
the R&PT&CSU at a particular point of time in the 
mid-1970s. It was he who revealed the status appeal of 
this type of leader to at least some NPA workers: 
The leadership of the R&PT&CSU is composed of 
men and women whose educational background or 
outlook and skills compare favourably with 
those on the management side. (R&PT&CSU 
Memorandum, August 17, 1976). 
We must not forget that the victory of the radical 
R&PT&CSU within the NPA in the 1970s was also a victory 
of professional and senior staff leaders over worker 
and entrepreneurial ones. 
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10.4.2. Opinions 
Whether or not ΝΡΆ union leaders were a race apart from 
the men they led, they did have capacities and a role 
that separated them off from the ordinary workers, 
which brought them into a relationship with management, 
provided them with a quite distinct ideological train­
ing, and made personal social mobility a practical 
possibility. To what extent, if any, did this lead to a 
particular set of attitudes that might differentiate 
them from the workers they led? The Open-Ended Inter­
view Schedule (Appendix 2) was used in a dozen inter­
views. What did these tell us, firstly, of their as­
pirations and expectations? Half of the interviewees 
wanted, and expected, to stay or advance in a trade 
union career, one having earlier rejected the possi­
bility of a senior staff or industrial relations ap­
pointment. Several of them aspired to fulltime trade 
unionism or some professional career - usually as an 
industrial-relations officer or consultant. A couple of 
others, both less educated than their fellows, favoured 
private trade or commerce. 
Asked about the government ownership and control 
of NPA, none of them could imagine any other pattern, 
most of them feeling that NPA problems were either due 
to lack of NPA autonomy, or to internal management (or 
management-union) conflicts and shortcomings. Only one 
raised the necessity for union representation on the 
NPA Board. 
Whilst attitudes towards the junior supervisors 
were mixed, some stressing their good and some their 
bad qualities (arrogance, lack of qualification), 
majority attitudes towards officers tended to be criti­
cal or hostile. 
Answers to the above question often flowed into 
those on work motivation and how to improve it. Replies 
concentrated on NPA shortcomings, particularly ethnic 
favouritism, bad conditions and the stress on paper 
qualifications. A few stressed the consequent demora­
lisation of the workers. Positive solutions were com­
monly seen in terms of better promotion possibilities, 
regrading, training, a high basic wage, etc. 
If not all the unionists would consider NPA man­
agement as partners, it was impossible to find more 
than a couple who considered them (or anyone else in 
Nigeria) as enemies of the workers. Most recognised 
there was a worker-management or worker-government 
conflict, but did not consider either management or 
government as an enemy of the workers. The range of 
attitudes amongst them may be reflected in the change 
of mood found within this declaration: 
Nobody actually is an enemy to us. We are all 
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fellow Nigerians. In one family you get some 
people at the top and some who are suffering. 
This [present system? PW] is the system the 
nationalists fought for. But those who got in 
regarded themselves as a privileged class. 
Some jump from the commoners to the elite 
group. Even if they are from the same womb, 
they have made it. They are the enemies, they 
are! they arel They make it possible for 
honest government intentions to be frustra-
ted. 
Two leaders of the unions that had been losing members 
to the RbPT&CSU sought the workers' enemies closer to 
home: 
No. There are no such people in NPA. But this 
clamour for trade union leadership! Udoji put 
skilled tradesmen on 05, then Alhaji [Ade-
bola] told government that in all other 
corporations the skilled tra'desmen were in 
04. So then Williams and Williams put then 
onto 04. The unions are the enemies of them-
selves! 
If there were no real enemies, were there some 
brothers in arms of the NPA workers? The majority men-
tioned a specific corporation, or corporation employees 
in general, one of them stressing the similarity of 
situation and union structure, another mentioning the 
liaison committee that had functioned during the Udoji 
dispute. Only one mentioned dockworkers specifically or 
private-sector workers generally. No other possible 
allies were identified. 
Whilst there was evidently little or no feeling of 
identification with dockworkers or the dockworker 
unions, this does not mean that the NPA union leaders 
were unaware of their existence or their situation. 
Whilst none of them could imagine a fundamental change 
in the ownership and control of NPA itself, they were 
unanimous on the necessity for a government or NPA 
takeover from the private contractors. Two of them 
recollected past union action (R&PWUN or NPAWU) on 
behalf of the dockworkers. Most of the others spoke of 
the sufferings of dockworkers. But it was evident that 
many of them were as concerned with the inefficiency of 
contractor ownership as with this factor. And one even 
claimed that some problems of the dockworkers were not 
so bad as those of NPA workers. 
Given their feeling that NPA workers were suffer-
ing, but suffering on their own and even divided 
amongst themselves, what did they think about possi-
bilities for the labouring poor in general to achieve 
its desires? They felt universally that this could only 
У* 
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be done through the unions and through the strengthen­
ing and amalgamation of the unions. In many cases, 
however, amalgamation was seen as dependent upon gov­
ernment action and there were further expressions of 
dependency on others. At the other extreme was a man 
who favoured a 'sort of' Labour Government and another 
who qualified dependence on government unification of 
the unions as follows: 
There is no central labour organisation now. 
Government is doing everything itself. If we 
get one of our own choice, it will carry the 
peasants along and organise them. The we will 
be in a better position. 
Given the ladt of identification with other wor­
kers or unions in Nigeria it is not, perhaps, surpri­
sing that almost half the unionists had no idea about 
any possible brothers in arms elsewhere in the world. 
The majority that did know referred to courses and 
equipment offered by the ICFTU, the ITF or the AFL-CIO. 
One talked of educational assistance from the East as 
well as the West. Not one made a specific reference to 
African workers or unions. Indeed, only one mentioned 
workers at all. It would appear as if working-class 
internationalism is in the NPA case more a relationship 
between moderate Western trade union organisations and 
top NPA union leaders than anything of a broader 
nature. 
10.5. Union followers 
We will now deal with the organisational character­
istics and the attitudes of the NPA workers - those to 
whom the union leaders universally refer as 'members', 
whether they actually pay a contribution or not. Evi­
dence on organisational characteristics is from the 
Port and Dock Worker Survey (Appendix 1), the nature of 
which has been reported in Chapter 3. 
10.5.1. Characteristics 
Union membership was claimed by nearly Θ0 percent of 
the portworker sample, and 90 percent of these claimed 
to be paying dues. Bearing in mind the general rate of 
unionisation in the NPA, these are very high rates. But 
even if the respondents were not actually members (or 
not actually financial members), the response indicates 
a favourable attitude towards union membership. Whilst 
only five percent of those interviewed could not name 
their union, nearly one-quarter were unable to name any 
union officers. Furthermore, over one half did not know 
the ULC affiliation of their union. Just over one-third 
had attended no union meeting in 1975 despite the fact 
that this was the year of the Udoji Award and disputes. 
A favourable attitude towards unions was evidently not 
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matched by information on them or participation in 
them. Furthermore, less than half the respondents 
claimed strike experience in what are two fairly 
strike-prone departments of the Port (Traffic and 
Engineering). However, nearly two-thirds of them had 
taken part in other forms of protest - mostly a 'work-
to-rule'. Given that this term had in part come to 
replace 'strike' following the legal restrictions on 
the latter, perhaps this answer gives a better idea of 
industrial protest activity than the former one. 
The 80 percent union support and over 60 percent 
protest experience suggests a quite well-unionised and 
active workforce, even if some of the other answers 
suggest lower levels of knowledge and activity. To what 
extent do these features find expression in worker 
attitudes? And to what extent do these attitudes match 
or diverge from those of their leaders? The same open-
ended interviews used for the leaders (Appendix 2) were 
used for their followers. Those interviewed were 12 
workers, amongst whom five were clerical and seven 
manual. Amongst the clerks there was one supervisor, 
the rest being Quay Staff II. All were from the Traffic 
Department. Amongst the manual workers were an un-
skilled porter and blacksmith, a couple of semi-skilled 
equipment operators, a skilled carpenter and an assis-
tant supervisor. Most of them were from the Engineering 
Department. 
10.5.2. Opinions 
What, firstly, were the aspirations and expectations of 
these men? One or two aspired only to promotion or 
better conditions within NPA, but most hoped to make a 
career either within a profession or in a petty com-
merce. Except for the one who hoped to become a general 
manager ('with God's will1), the others were more 
realistic. The would-be professionals were following 
courses and/or had been union activists. Those aspiring 
to petty commerce or crafts based their expectations on 
their own skills, backed up by the generous retirement 
benefits recently announced: 
I am not only a blacksmith but a locksmith 
too. But it is not recognised here. When re-
tired, if I get blacksmith work in my own 
town, or locksmith. Or I can make petty-petty 
trading or something to help my family. I 
expect to stay here until I retire, only four 
years more... They will pay me my money and 
then I can plan. You can't say what you will 
have, although. It is not like Europe. 
The question of government ownership and control of NPA 
was usually interpreted in terms of extended minister-
ial control, something that most were opposed to. 
Others took it to mean the present managerial set-up, 
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of which the manual workers in Engineering were bitter­
ly critical. One of the second group proposed a private 
enterprise solution to corruption and inefficiency 
within his department. Whilst attitudes towards the 
junior supervisors tended to be sympathetic, even where 
critical, those toward senior staff tended to be much 
harsher, particularly amongst the manual workers: 
There is open disagreement between officers. 
They openly accuse each other of inefficiency 
or weaknesses. There is a lack of discipline, 
therefore it is hard to apply discipline... 
Another thought the problem was the failure to promote 
by seniority from the ranks: 
Ά person who spent 30 years [as an NPA wor­
ker] should be senior staff... 
On motivation, workers spoke of pay and conditions. The 
supplies of fixed-price essential goods being distri­
buted to state-sector workers were appreciated, but it 
was said that they were always out of stock, or that 
officers were supplied four to five times as much as 
the men. The question of such differential treatment 
was raised repeatedly: 
We need beter rate - belly full - then you 
work hard all day. But if one gets £N200 and 
one gets five shillings, then he won't want 
to work because we too cheated... Nothing 
worry us than money... 
And the issue of promotion: 
Someone who has been in the service for 20 
years without promotion is a disillusioned 
worker. Even though he is hard working he 
will be disheartened and reluctant to obey 
the supervisor because already his spirit has 
been wounded. 
Although one worker was able to identify a particular 
head of department and 'one type of General Manager' as 
enemies, most of them could not identify any such. This 
incapacity to identify enemies was in some cases liter­
ally so: 
I cannot say we have enemies. There is in­
ability of management to reason along with 
modern demands. But we do not have visible 
enemies as such. 
Or, 'I can't say about outside NPA. I am not a union­
ist'. Or, again, 'There should be but I don't know the 
people'. The following view was probably more represen­
tative: 
209 
No, I cannot tell [if we have enemies] . When 
we say we are suffering and that government 
does not care for us, we are just talking in 
general, because we all make up Nigeria. 
As for brothers in arms, most mentioned corporation 
workers and declared their ignorance of others. As one 
put it, 
So many people are suffering the same thing. 
But I can only speak of my department since I 
have little chance of going out. 
Two or three mentioned the dockworkers, one to say they 
were 'enjoying' more than NPA workers. Another said, 
Dock labour is fighting for similar. They are 
most hit...[Also] other shipping company wor-
kers. All in the port industry have similar 
problems. 
As for how they felt the poor in Nigeria could achieve 
their desires, there was a range of answers, from one 
who thought this could only be achieved through hard 
work to one who declared 
The only power we have is demonstration, 
work-to-rule and strikes. By trade unionism. 
That is the only weapon after so many nego-
tiations have failed. Strong and united 
labour front, because we are more than the 
big men [the rich and the powerful. PW]. 
Most, however, felt that worker organisation needed 
government assistance: 
Before workers can do anything they need cen-
tral organisation. But this requires govern-
ment action. Only military government can do 
this. 
Or - presenting military government in a less-positive 
light: 
We have union representatives to put our de-
mands... In the colonial days and political 
days we could take industrial action and 
government would give or not give...But with 
military government we have so many restric-
tions. 
As for foreign friends of the Nigerian workers, the 
only one who could think of any was a former union 
leader who mentioned the ICFTU and the ILO. 
10.5.3. Discussion 
What does this interview data suggest? Despite the fact 
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that most NPA workers are likely to spend their wage-
earning life within its junior staff, there are still 
high aspirations to professional or petty-entrepreneu-
rial occupations. Wage labour within the NPA appears to 
be considered more as a - possibly long - period in the 
worker's life than as characterising his social status. 
The retirement benefits are rather an encouragement to 
aspire to petty-entrepreneurship than to a time of 
rest. Both family demands and the insecurity of such 
benefits in a time of high inflation in any case re-
quire a continuation of economic activity. As for the 
aspiration to professional employment, this is fired 
both by past example within NPA, and by the possibi-
lities (hypothetical or not) apparently offered by the 
commercial boom. 
The alternative to bureaucratic state and manager-
ial control of NPA was seen either in terms of correc-
tive action from above (a government-worker alliance 
against management?) or in those of private enterprise. 
Generalised grievances, pointed criticism and marked 
hostility toward authoritarian and arbitrary management 
was not taken to require independent worker or union 
intervention. 
There was generalised hostility to the senior 
staff, to the differentials they enjoy, and to the bar-
riers that exist between the junior and senior. From 
pre-colonial tradition and/or late-colonial practice 
there seems to be some expectation that each should in 
his own lifetime progress from being a 'junior' to 
being a 'senior'. Such an expectation of eventual 
promotion to a position of influence and respect is, 
thus, not simply due to 'traditional' age-grading. It 
is also due to the British civil service practice of 
annual increments, and to the experience of rapid 
promotion of many junior staff to officer (and even top 
management) status during the period of rapid 
Nigerianisation associated with de-colonisation. It is 
striking to observe that the NPA workers literally 
cannot identify any enemies to themselves. They do not 
think of any social category in Nigeria in such terms. 
Given their resentments, the extent to which they 
accept a view of society as existing of one community 
is remarkable. Once again, experience of the relatively 
classless rural community may have been reinforced by 
the colonial experience, which created an image of a 
universe divided along racial lines. Again, the belief 
in classlessness would have been reinforced by the past 
promotions of fellow workers (often without academic 
qualifications). 
Equally striking is NPA worker inability to iden-
tify those in a common position to themselves. In part 
we can take the inability to identify friends as a 
complement to the inability to identify enemies. Given, 
however, common NPA worker residence alongside other 
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wage-earners, petty entrepreneurs and the unemployed, 
and given that significant wage rises usually occur as 
a result of common national action along with other 
wage earners, one would have expected them to see some 
brothers in arms beyond other corporation workers. The 
inability to do so may be explained in terms of the 
nature of NPA as an enterprise and as an employer. As 
a state corporation it does not operate on narrow 
profit-and-loss calculations, this distinguishing it 
sharply from the multinational companies that have 
dozens of branches in the Apapa area alone. And, 
although its conditions may not be better than those of 
the local TNCs, the near-100 percent security NPA 
offers seems to turn it into a universe which not only 
surrounds the worker in the present but also (despite 
his aspirations) for the future. Be this as it may, 
the NPA workers clearly see themselves as isolated from 
others and evidently have no conception of a working 
class. 
In their attitudes toward collective action one 
does find the positive evaluation of trade unionism and 
worker protest that one would expect from their union 
membership and participation in industrial action. Yet 
this is clearly qualified by feelings either of power-
lessness in the face of military rule, or of dependency 
on government to strengthen union organisation for the 
workers. The ambiguity here is crucial since it bears 
on the willingness to take action either against the 
state or within the trade unions. We will see that in 
practice worker action is aimed rather at NPA manage-
ment than at the state. 
From these replies it would seem that the workers 
do not differ significantly in their views from their 
leaders. The only significant differences would seem 
to be leadership criticism of unions and workers, and 
the greater confidence of union leaders in union 
action. As far as the relationship with leadership 
attitudes is concerned, the problem may be not so much 
a gap, as the very closeness. Despite its wider ex-
perience, the leadership - largely trained in Western 
liberalism and social democracy - has no alternative 
ideology to that of the workers themselves. 
10.6. Summary 
We have been discussing the findings as we went 
along, but it might nonetheless be worthwhile repeating 
these findings and trying to find some connection 
between them. 
In discussing the organising and financing of the 
unions, it was suggested that these revealed them to be 
primarily representative organs, largely confined to 
the NPA, and only peripherally engaged in education, 
welfare, mobilisation or even recruitment. Even as 
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representative and administrative agencies they were 
neither well-structured nor developing. What we seem 
to have here, in fact, is an extreme form of trade 
union atrophy, related to their reduction to collective 
bargaining bodies. Even the R&PT&CSU shows here little 
evidence of the activism that was attracting new mem-
bers to it in the 1970s. 
The close similarity between the attitudes of 
leaders and followers that we have just noted is pro-
bably related to the type of trade unionism being 
practised. Given that the leaders were not actually 
leading their followers, they did not need to be any 
more advanced in attitudes than the rank and file 
workers. All they needed were certain administrative 
and diplomatic qualities. This explains the absence in 
the 1970s of such a charismatic worker leader as M.A.O. 
Imoudu had been in the 1950s and early-1960s. It also 
explains why a professional and senior staff type of 
leadership was able to triumph over a worker or entre-
preneurial one. 
The major difference between leaders and followers 
was reduced to the simple hierarchical one. But, as 
professional or part-time union officers, the leaders 
not only enjoyed such minor privileges as their con-
tacts with management might have brought them. They 
also had access to the national and international trade 
union movements. This access was of no interest to 
their followers, who had been ideologically demobi-
lised, and who could expect no collective or personal 
benefits from such affiliation. And, indeed, the 
national and international movements could offer little 
to the leaders apart from courses, trips abroad and 
other such perks. They could only offer the tradi-
tional platitudes of reformist unionism - policies 
decreasingly relevant to Nigerian unionists. They were 
policies, also, with too little ideological or moral 
content to help the NPA unionists overcome their petty 
personal rivalries. 
It has been earlier suggested that there might 
have been a popular ethnic basis to the ethnic domina-
tion of certain NPA unions. There was certainly such 
past popular support for fraction- or stratum-based 
unions. But the basis for the latter was evidently 
eroding in the 1970s, because little or no appeal was 
made to it by union leaderships. In the absence of 
powerful departmental or stratum sentiment, and in the 
absence of any meaningful ideological appeals, leaders 
seeking to preserve their personal positions of power 
could only play the ethnic card. In this they failed. 
The R&PT&CSU leaders won by striking the same radical 
note that one can find amongst their portworker union 
followers: one of common resentment against the privi-
leges and incompetence of at least their immediate 
oppressors. Combining a virulent attack on NPA manage-
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ment with an explicit or implicit call to action by all 
NPA workers, the R&PT&CSU helped them to identify at 
least some enemies and friends. 
NOTES 
1. Although unions are legally obliged to make such 
returns by a fixed date in Nigeria, many did not 
do so in the the past, and were not punished for 
their failure. Moreover, only the main heads of 
expenditure are required, permitting unions to set 
out expenses in their own individual manner and 
according to their own desires. Searches were 
made of the Registrar's files in two succeeding 
years (1975, 1976), obtaining returns as follows: 
NPAWU 1971, 1973, 1974 (detailed); R&PTbCSU 1971, 
1974 (detailed); FGT&GWÜ 1971. Although not 
permitting comparison across NPA and for a single 
year, the data does provide an important source of 
information on union expenditure. 
2. Por a more systematic approach to such an analy-
sis, permitting rather more definite conclusions, 
see Sandbrook 1975 (Appendix 3) . 
3. I was able to find such lists for various years in 
the 1970s for all these levels in the three major 
unions, with but one exception. I could find no 
conference list (for the 'activists') for the 
RbPT&CSU. It seems probable that such a con-
ference list would contradict the implications of 
the other lists for the ethnic structure of the 
R&PT&CSU leadership. In the case of the R&PT&CSU, 
therefore, 'predominance' can only be taken as 
applying to the national officers and the Lagos 
leadership. Here, however, it is undeniable. 
Ethnicity was established by identification of 
names that clearly belonged to certain groups. 
This is a rule of thumb method that would not be 
approved by an ethnologist, but it is one used by 
Nigerians themselves. The 'groups' that could be 
identified during analysis were Hausa-Fulani, Edo, 
Yoruba, Ibo, a 'group of groups' that I have 
called 'eastern minority', and 'others'. Whilst 
the first four are commonly accepted as ethnic 
identities by Nigerians, 'eastern minority' is 
again my own term for a diverse collection of 
groups that have in common that they were minori-
ties in the formerly Ibo-dominated Eastern Region 
of Nigeria and neighbouring areas. They include 
Efik, Ijaw, Isoko, Bonny, Okrika, Ikwere and 
Calabar. In this case both ethnologists and those 
identified might disapprove. I can only say that 
it is what appears to characterise those who led 
the NMWU. 
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The MRA (founded 1938) is a crusading christian 
organisation, preaching brotherly love between 
races and classes - as earlier between coloniser 
and colonised. It is fiercely anti-communist and 
has always directed its energies toward influen-
tial individuals in the business, political and 
union worlds. It was both a product of and con-
tributor to the Cold War. 
Irving Brown has frequently been named as the key 
CIA linkman within the international trade union 
movement. Philip Agee (1975: 693) describes him 
during an earlier period as 'representative of the 
American Federation of Labour and principal CIA 
agent for control of the ICFTU'. Although this 
specific accusation might not have been general 
knowledge amongst Nigerian trade unionists, 
general information of AALC-CIA links was evident-
ly available. It is not without significance that 
whilst Adebola publicly broke with the Americans 
on this issue, Zudonu was still prepared to boast 
of and use his personal friendship with the AALC 
chief. 
The 1975-6 interviews were carried out with a 
dozen or so union officers, using the Port and 
Dock Worker Interview Schedule (Appendix 1) , the 
Open-Ended Interview Schedule (Appendix 2) and a 
Trade Union Officer Interview Schedule (Appendix 
3) largely designed to elicit factual information 
on the unions concerned. As with other survey 
material used in this study, we can claim that it 
is suggestive even if we cannot claim that it is 
fully representative. We were, for example, unable 
to obtain interviews with the top officers of the 
R&PT&CSU. Fortunately we have additional materi-
als to compensate for this particular imbalance. 
The account below draws from the three schedules 
except where otherwise indicated. 
In 1982, Okoro was an NPA labour relations officer 
at Apapa. Proletarian background is evidently no 
guarantee of loyalty to workers or unions. 
For a more general account of this type of union 
leadership during the period when it was at its 
peak in Nigeria, see Cohen (1974:119-26). 
Adebola died in 1982. Despite his middle-stratum 
background and his favourable attitude toward free 
enterprise he remained within the unions until his 
death, and was universally honoured by the trade 
union movement at his funeral. 
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Chapter 11 
DOCKWORKER UNIONISM: THOSE WHO WERE BEING PAID 
COULD NOT FACE THE WORKERS 
Here we will be looking at the internal relations of 
unions in a recently and peripherally unionised indus-
try. We will deal again with the nature of the organi-
sations, with factionalism, and with the national and 
international organisations that stimulated this. And 
we will again deal with the nature of the union leader-
ships and compare their attitudes with those of their 
followers. Here we will become aware of the problems 
of even a radical leadership in combining mobilisation 
with organisation, and in preventing a divergence of 
interest between even worker leaders and ordinary 
labourers. 
11.1. Union structure 
Unionisation within this sector is a matter that can be 
dealt with quite briefly due to the fact that there 
existed in fact no cardholding membership within any 
dockworker union, and that no union leadership was able 
to produce such a thing as a membership list. Even 
where check-off existed, as with the BSA, the union 
could provide no membership list, probably depending on 
Biney's records for this. Even the veteran Okon did 
not have card-holding membership amongst the regularly-
employed dockers at Akere's. The most one can speak of 
is a 'followership', this being demonstrated by the 
size of public meetings and the success of strike 
calls. Within Biney's we know that declared membership 
rose from 713 in 1968 to 1,495 in 1969 and 'up to 
2,000' by 1976. This steady increase was no doubt due 
to the granting of check-off facilities in 1970. Yet, 
even though the raising of union membership was only a 
matter of getting a usually illiterate docker to put 
his thumbprint on another form before obtaining work, 
the BSA seemed to have been unable to do this with more 
than 40 percent. Thus it was at one conference ob-
served that there were people 'who should be members of 
the union but who had not taken up membership' and 
others who were members but who 'had not been paying to 
the union' (BSA Conference Documents 1973). 
The lack of any cardholding, and the lack of 
check-off outside Biney's, meant that dockworker unions 
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had to rely on dues collection, levies (from indivi-
duals or branches), and the dash which workers seem to 
have always been willing to give on receipt of lump-sum 
back-pay won by union-led strike action. In the ab-
sence of sufficient income from workers, the unions had 
to turn to outside patrons. 
In the case of the BSA we can see the advantage of 
winning the check-off. The documents show that the 
196 8 union events were largely financed out of the 
pockets of its founders, including its consultant and 
Chief Biney himself. Total receipts since the begin-
ning of 1968 had been just over £N200, and total expen-
diture just over £N190. Given that the BSA still owed 
£N5 0 to various officers, and given the need to 'raise 
the general funds of the union', it was first agreed 
that all company staff and headmen should be levied a 
flat sum of £N2, and all labourers 10 shillings (BSA 
Conference Documents 1968) . At this time a levy of 
even a flat 10 shillings would have provided it with 
over £N350. And its monthly dues of two shillings 
would have provided it with £N8-900 per annum. Despite 
the check-off it was not to reach this annual income 
until 1972. Thus in 1969 its income was only £N500 -
an average of six or seven shillings per year for 
members who were supposed to be paying a minimum of 
24s. We will see later that there was 'membership' 
resistance to paying union dues within the company. 
The Treasurer's Report to the 1969 conference, reveals 
that there had also been headman resistance to paying 
the levy voted unanimously at the previous conference. 
Following check-off, however, income rose to £N900 in 
1972. And in 1976 I was informed that the BSA was 
collecting some N400 monthly. 
Before the union obtained the check-off facility 
it was having difficulty even with its payments to its 
consultant. Chief Beyioku. In 1968 it had committed 
itself to a payment of £N420 per annum of him. In 196 9 
it had had to cut this to £N240 due to its lack of 
income, this cut apparently being accepted by Beyioku 
without protest. What is curious is that whilst by 
1976 its income had risen by a factor of more than 10, 
and whilst money wages had risen by a factor of 2.5, 
its fee to Beyioku had risen by a factor of less than 
0.3. Evidently Beyioku's fee from Biney must have been 
sufficient to compensate him for the little he was 
receiving from the BSA. However, the higher income 
level of 1976 was enabling the BSA to pay its Secre-
tary, Assistant Secretary and Clerk monthly allowances 
of N30, N10 and N8 respectively, with transport and 
meeting allowances of N10 each. The very considerable 
difference between a total monthly income of N400 and a 
current monthly expenditure of N148 was reflected in a 
very respectable balance, amounting for the period 
January-October 1976 to N1129 (Interview Notes, Novem-
ber 1976) . The check-off facility was thus financing a 
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leadership which did not represent the general labour, 
and freeing them even from the previous effort they had 
had to make to collect dues monthly from the 'members'. 
We know that the moderate ADWT&GWU(U) had had very 
limited success in collecting dues or affiliation fees 
in the 1960s. Its major source of income just after 
its foundation had therefore been money from the AALC, 
variously estimated at £N6,050 to £N10,500. The AALC 
itself claimed to have contributed to the union a total 
of £N8,828 and to have believed even after the 1968 
debacle that the money had been used 'constructively'. 
Whether used constructively or not, it was certainly 
all used up during the six month period following 
January 1967 (Urhobo Report 1971:49, 55). It looks as 
if the 'reconstitution' of the ADWT&GWU(U) was also 
largely dependent on US finance. In 1973 alone, the 
AALC made four separate payments to the moderates, 
amounting to a total of N1,227 (Adebiyi Report 1977: 
20-21) . The AALC was not the only source of external 
income. Roxy Udogwu, West African representative of 
the ITF, told me in 1975 that his organisation had paid 
the costs of the 1973 conference. 
In addition to these foreign trade union patrons, 
the moderates also had at least one local one. Abam 
admitted that the union president, G.A. Brown, was a 
contractor (although apparently not a dock labour one), 
and that 
we are using his house in Lagos as our head-
quarters, that he is always able to lend us 
money, and that without him we would never 
have held together. (Interview Notes, May 
1977). 
Since the ADWT&GWU(U) made no financial returns to 
the Registrar, and (at least according to its Internal 
Auditor) tried to falsify its accounts, we do not know 
whether it actually managed to collect any money from 
workers at all, nor what it was doing with such income 
as it did receive. It may well have been that the 
union was operating at a fairly modest level in the 
mid-1970s. Of four top officers interviewed in 1976, 
only two declared themselves to be paid fulltime offi-
cers, one earning N150 and the other N100 per month. 
The two others declared that they were dependent on 
their income as tally clerks. A fifth officer was 
earning N120, but this was coming from his own union, 
not the moderate leadership. 
What of the radicals? One can assume that the 
NTÜC may have subsidised the radical leadership after 
the 1968 strike although there is no evidence of this. 
It may have later provided the radicals with free 
office space at the NTUC school, the Patrice Lumumba 
Labour Academy, in Yaba. unfortunately, the radical 
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leadership was unable in 1975-7 to produce for me any 
accounts at all. All they could say was that their 
total income came from the dockworkers themselves. It 
was admitted that they had received an enormous bonanza 
following the Udoji strikes, but no actual sum was 
mentioned. It was said that money was being collected 
regularly from the various units within Lagos, but 
again no details were given. The only actual figures 
mentioned were of N30 received from a leader of the ADO 
in 1975 and of N40-50 monthly from Balogun of the BSA 
in 1976. A top radical leader described the collection 
procedure at Ramallam's as follows: 
Some people will say they are Ramal lam union 
and will bring you some money - N60. Other 
times they are not bringing good money but we 
can't prosecute them, (Interview Notes, 
December 1976). 
From interviews we do know a little about the pay of 
the fulltime officers. Of eight interviewed, four were 
fulltimers, claiming to receive N70-100 per month. 
Others received hororaria, sitting fees or minor ex-
penses. 
It appears that the financial affairs of the union 
were in the same sort of disarray as with the previous 
dockwide unions. Evidence for this is provided by two 
documents. The first is a leadership attempt to 
collect funds by writing to a certain employee of 
Mainland (presumably its contact man there) complaining 
that no dues had been paid for four or five months and 
requesting that they be so. To add weight to the 
demand the letter was copied to the Director of Main-
land and to the Apapa Quays police (ADWT&GWU(N) to 
Aweda, February 17, 1976). The second document is a 
handwritten minute of an EC meeting of the union in 
1976. This indicated considerable dissatisfaction by 
EC members themselves with the handling of union 
finance. Thus, the Patron (Olagboshe) stated that once 
the union had become financially strong (presumably 
following Udoji), people who had newly joined the union 
'started their crooks business over finance'. There 
were complaints about the Treasurer alone taking deci-
sions on financial questions. There seemed to be no 
bank account. And even EC members did not seem to be 
fully informed about union finances.[1] Thus, even the 
most militant and financially autonomous of the dock-
worker unions had not by the mid-1970s managed to 
establish the minimal order and democratic control over 
its funds that would seem to be necessary for effective 
continuous organisation and defence of the dockworkers. 
11.2. Factionalism 
Although public or printed accusations of triba-
lism are rarely to be found during this period, they 
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were made privately and they did play a role in ten-
sions between or within unions. The original Amalgama-
tion, founded in 1967 was troubled with ethnic con-
flict, and the Urhobo Report (1971) considered a reason 
for its collapse the fact that 'tribal sentiments were 
freely exploited' within it. More recently, one can 
find a prominent radical (himself an Ibo) saying of the 
moderate leadership 'They are mostly eastern and they 
organise on a tribal basis' (Interview Notes, December 
1976) . And one international union official not only 
accused Odulana of being a Yoruba tribalist, but ex-
plained the lack of success of the moderates in Lagos 
as partly due to 'the ethnic question, that the leader-
ship is mostly non-Yoruba' (Interview Notes, July 
1975). 
Using the same methods and terms as with the 
portworker unions we may now consider the question of 
ethnicity. We should recall what we know of Lagos dock 
labour: that pool labour was overwhelmingly Yoruba, 
quay labour predominantly so, and jetty labour predomi-
nantly northern Nigerian or non-Nigerian in composi-
tion. 
The BSA turns out on analysis to have been over-
whelmingly Yoruba in its leadership composition, both 
as regards its Executive and as regards those attending 
its 1968 conference. The national leadership of the 
moderates appears to have been ethnically balanced, 
both in 1966 and 1973, whilst its Lagos leadership was 
predominantly Yoruba. The leadership of the radical 
ADWT&GWU(N) was overwhelmingly Yoruba, whether one 
considers its national or Lagos leadership. What are we 
to make of this? It may be best to take each case in 
turn. 
We know that the old BWU was a predominantly 
Yoruba organisation, even incorporating certain Yoruba 
cultural elements. And we know that the radical oppo-
sition to it in the 1960s was predominantly non-Yoruba. 
Analysis of the BSA leadership in the 1970s shows that 
it was significantly more Yoruba in composition than 
the Biney labour force in general. It was also more 
Yoruba than any of the sections or departments of the 
labour force that it might more realistically have 
claimed to represent. Thus if we take the 200 or so 
quay headmen, the Biney operations and quay staff, or 
the total Biney permanent staff, all appear to have 
been around 60-65 percent Yoruba, whilst the BSA lead-
ership was more like 80-90 percent so. In this case, 
ethnic particularism would seem consistent with the 
other particular interests served by the BSA, as well 
as with Chief Biney's special set of devices for the 
control of his management and his general labour. 
The ethnic' composition of the national moderate 
leadership appeared representative of Nigeria as a 
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whole, and that of its Lagos leadership was more or 
less representative of pool and quay labour. The 
radical accusation that it was in some way 'eastern' is 
unfounded. The non-Yoruba element in its leadership 
was traditional. The four manor dockworker leaders in 
the 1950s and early-1960s (Okon, Abam, Khayam, and 
Eluma) were all non-Yoruba, It may have been their 
'stranger' status that made them both desire and be 
suitable for leadership roles in the 1960s. Ethnic 
outsiders have provided leadership to the young working 
class also in Zaria, Kano and Port Harcourt. [2] But 
these were not simply ethnic outsiders, they were also 
largely professional trade unionists or clerks. Of the 
four leaders mentioned from the 1960s, only Eluma seems 
to have been recently employed in the industry. Okon 
had not worked in it for years, and neither Khayam nor 
Abam had ever worked in it. Furthermore, these men had 
been (or become) and remained moderate reformists in 
ideology and strategy. If it is agreed that being an 
ethnic outsider can be seen as a virtue in a trade 
union officer, then it seems likely that their rejec-
tion by the dockworkers was more for one of the latter 
reasons than because of their ethnic origins. 
The ethnic composition of the radical leadership 
was weighted toward Yorubas, although not to the ex-
treme degree of the BSA. It had a few non-Yorubas, 
amongst its top leaders both at national and at Lagos 
level. Yet, again, we will see that it was not only 
predominantly Yoruba in composition, it was also more 
plebian, represented a new generation of leadership, 
and was more radical. Even if we assume, however, that 
dockers followed it for these latter reasons rather 
than for ethnic ones, a question still remains about 
why the radical union was predominantly Yoruba in 
leadership. Because of the parallel with the NPA case, 
it seems better to postpone this issue until we can 
consider both portworker and dockworker unions to-
gether. In the meantime, we should not forget the 
differences from the NPA case. In the docks, the more 
experienced and more regularly employed labour was 
predominantly Yoruba, almost half of quay labour was 
uneducated, and over half spoke Yoruba as first lan-
guage at work. Unlike the NPA case, the fact that the 
radical union leadership consisted largely of native 
Yoruba speakers provided it with a direct practical 
advantage in access to the dockers. We can cede this 
point without accepting any unwritten corollary that a 
predominantly Yoruba leadership could have sold moder-
ate reformist strategies to the Lagos dockworkers. 
Although there would seem to have been sufficient 
combustible ethnic material in the docks, the fact is 
that differences between the three main types of union 
in the industry - the enterprise-based, the moderates 
and the radicals - were understood and expressed by 
both leaders and dockers in terms of base, structure 
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and strategy. Accusations were to the effect that a 
union was a company union, or dominated by headmen, or 
that it followed a strategy not in the interests of the 
dockers. Interpretations in these terms were far more 
common and significant than those in ethnic terms. 
Thus, the moderates, and their national and inter-
national patrons, accused the radicals of being 'sub-
versives' or communists. Said the ULC following the 
1968 strike: 
The docks are vulnerable to subversive acti-
vities for various reasons. The Congress 
role has been 'to build and develop a strong, 
democratic and responsible union in the 
docks...because of the strategic position 
which the docks occupy in the economic life 
of the nation. The present impasse is the 
handwork of a handful of disgruntled elements 
aided and abetted by an ambitious clique 
outside the docks (Urhobo Report 1971:25). 
Said ITF West African Representative, Roxy Udogwu, 
several years later: 
The attempt to reconstitute the ADWT&GWU in 
April 1973 was broken up by the Communists... 
Maybe they are not real Communists, but they 
make trouble. (Interview Notes). 
Meanwhile, the radicals confirmed the communist tag by 
addressing each other and their followers as 'com-
rades'. Their accusations against their moderate 
opponents were of dependence on the contractors or the 
Ministry of Labour or foreign finance, of weakness, 
corruption and inefficiency. And they accused the BSA 
of being run for the personal financial benefit of the 
headmen, supervisors and foremen. It should be noted 
that a low level of ethnic interpretation seems to be 
paired with a high level of political interpretation in 
terms of strategy or ideology. It should be further 
noted that whilst the moderates made use of general 
ideological accusations, the radicals seemed to confine 
themselves to those having to do with strategy narrow-
ly. Since both the moderate accusations quoted have 
been from national or international supporters of the 
ADWT&GWU(U) rather than the union itself, the question 
must arise of whether such terminology was not stimu-
lated by or addressed to such quarters rather than the 
dockers themselves. 
11.3. National and international affiliation[31 
As far as the radicals are concerned, national and 
international affiliation were evidently of peripheral 
- and possibly decreasing - importance. The NTUC was 
evidently important at the time of the 1968 strike, 
providing a source of both technical expertise and of a 
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radical ideology to legitimise the militancy of the 
Olagboshe group. As the 1970s progressed, the NTUC 
suffered from internal conflicts and its previous 
'class' analysis of Nigerian society was replaced by an 
increasing identification with the various governments' 
developmental ist domestic and pan-African foreign 
policies (Waterman 1973: 298-9). What was left was a 
central national leadership with a certain tradition, a 
certain terminology, and links with the international 
communist movement. Through these foreign contacts, 
the ADWT{«GWU(N) was able to send some activists to 
courses in Eastern Europe. Such courses were of a 
general ideological nature, having little to do with 
the practical realities of trade union struggle in a 
country such as Nigeria, even less to do with dock-
workers as such. Few of the radical leaders seem to 
have attended such courses. Their benefit seems to 
have been the provision or confirmation of the general 
communist worldview of those who did attend. For the 
rest, the radical leadership devised its strategy, 
tactics and organisational principles and practices 
from its experience within the dock labour industry 
itself. 
The situation with respect to the moderates was 
evidently very different. Okon's contacts with moder-
ate-reformist European trade unions ran back to the 
early-1950s. Abam's contacts with the AALC began in 
the late-1960s. Furthermore, both the ITF and the AALC 
had had representatives sitting in Lagos or Accra (ITF) 
or permanently in Lagos (AALC) , in each case paying 
special attention to dockworkers. National affiliation 
was of much greater importance to the moderates than it 
was to the radicals. Whilst in the mid-1970s the 
influence of the ULC dropped off for reasons analogous 
to those given for the NTUC, the ULC had been a deter-
mining influence before 1968, and in the reconstitution 
in the 1970s. The ADWT&GWU(U) was largely made what it 
was by these three organisations. 
We may limit our consideration of the ULC to its 
role with respect to the original Amalgamation. Evi-
dence to Urhobo revealed that the role of this organi-
sation had been far greater than that of the NTUC. 
Although it was stated at the time of the Report to 
have had only one dock affiliate, the UTC, it claimed 
to have had six of the eight dock unions as members in 
1964. It admitted that it considered foreign financial 
aid necessary, declared that it had sought this from 
American sources, and claimed that 'such aid has never 
been put into any use inimical to the interests of the 
Congress or the Nation'. Despite these patriotic 
claims, the ULC came in for severe criticism from the 
Inquiry. Not only was there specific criticism of the 
role played by Acting General Secretary, 0deyemi,[4] in 
attempting to settle the rift within the Amalgamation, 
but the ULC in general was considered to have played a 
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major disruptive and divisory role. It had negotiated 
the loan with AALC, originally estimating for £N2,090, 
with only the General Secretary and Executive Secretary 
to be paid. The sum had then been drastically in-
creased upwards, with a large list of officials. 
Secondly, it had supplied the defective constitution. 
Thirdly, it had interfered unconstitutionally in the 
running of the Amalgamation, appointing a caretaker 
committee, issuing notices for the annual conferences, 
and instructing the AALC to cease paying salaries after 
September 1968. 
The crucial and continuing role of the AALC in 
subsidising the moderate dockworker union leadership 
has probably been adequately suggested. In his state-
ments to the Urhobo Tribunal (Urhobo Report 1971) the 
AALC Nigerian representative, George McCray, also made 
quite clear that the motive of his organisation was to 
encourage US private investment and build up Nigerian 
commerce and industry by the creation of developmen-
tal ist trade unions. 
Despite the evident failure of the AALC's first 
efforts, of criticism by Adebola in 1969, of the Urhobo 
Report in 1971, and the total disappearance of the 
moderate leadership, the Americans did not give up. 
They now switched from 'direct assistance to unions* to 
a 'welfare project', evidently meant to make a direct 
appeal to the dockers themselves. This was the toilet 
facility mentioned in Chapter 7. Evidently, this 
project was not negotiated with the non-existent 
unions. It was agreed upon between the Military Port 
Commandant and Teddy Gleason, a Vice-President of the 
AFL-CIO. Nor could the facilities be handed over to 
the non-existent union. They were, instead, handed 
over by Irving Brown, Executive Director of the AALC, 
to the Port Manager, in the presence of portworker 
unionist, Zudonu, representing the ULC. The six build-
ings, costing US$55,000, then 'disappeared' from sight 
so effectively that no one I questioned in 1975-6 knew 
anything about them. It was only after some two months 
in the port that I discovered them. They were func-
tioning, but locked, presumably so as to prevent their 
misuse by anybody but the higher-level NPA key holders. 
Their main function seems to have been the glorifica-
tion of the ULC and the self-glorification of the AALC. 
The AALC Reporter had announced in September 1970 that 
'AFL-CIO AND AALC AID LAGOS DOCKWORKERS'. A plaque on 
the toilet I discovered announed they had been in-
stalled 'in cooperation with the ULC'. In practice it 
seems as if the dockworkers had been used to help the 
AALC and the ULC. 
Perhaps it was recognition of the failure of this 
project that caused the AALC to switch back again to 
'direct assistance'. We know, in any case, that it did 
feel it worthwhile investing over N1,000 in the recon-
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stitution of a leadership which had demonstrated its 
incapacity but five years earlier. Whilst the activity 
of the AALC can be explained by its links with the US 
State Department and the US multinationals, what are we 
to make of that of the International Transportworkers 
Federation - old, venerable, and strongly supported by 
the European social-democratic unions? 
The International Transportworkers Federation 
seems to have been the most constant friend of the 
moderate dockworker leadership in Nigeria. It had had 
connections with the dockworkers since the 1950s, and 
A.E. Okon was a member of its Executive Board from 1962 
to 1968. It had a representative in Nigeria during the 
1960s. And, since 1970, its Accra-based African repre-
sentative had been Roxy Udogwu, a Nigerian who made 
frequent visits to Lagos. For the nature, motives and 
activities of the ITF we can turn to his evidence to 
the Adebiyi Tribunal (ITF 1976) . The ITF presented 
itself as an international organisation for all trans-
port workers, set up for cooperation, exchange of 
information and 'the practice of authentic working 
class solidarity'. It aimed to embrace all transport 
unions regardless of colour, nationality, race or 
creed. It was 
for the defence of democracy and freedom and 
is opposed to colonialism, totalitarianism, 
aggression and discrimination in all their 
forms. 
Membership was open to all transport unions, 'provided 
that such unions subscribe to democratic principles and 
are independent of any outside control'. Within 
Nigeria it claimed 17 affiliates, including the ADWT& 
GWU(U). According to Udogwu, ITF activities in Nigeria 
have been strictly restricted to practical 
trade unionism.. .The ITF is not a political 
organisation and has never indulged in any 
political activities in Nigeria...At no time 
did the ITF offer any aid...with strings or 
on political or ideological considerations... 
Udogwu admitted to past financial contributions to 
Nigerian unions, but declared that 
Once it became certain that these aids had 
been well utilised by the recipients to 
achieve self-reliance, they were quickly 
discontinued. 
What it had rather been involved in was practical 
advice and assistance, particularly in the area of 
education. The ITF had in the past few years conducted 
15 seminars in Nigeria, always in cooperation with, and 
with the participation of, the government, particularly 
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the Ministry of Labour. Referring to the matter of 
trade union division Udogwu claimed that the ITF had 
been helping to 'unite the mushroom unions on indus-
trial lines as a prelude to unity on the Central Labour 
level'. So much for the claims of the ITF. What of 
its achievements? 
In the docks of Lagos the ITF had been for a 
quarter of a century supporting leaders who were inca-
pable of obtaining a popular following. Not once but 
twice it put its efforts into the creation of an amal-
gamation and it continually poured in moral support, 
education and advice, which its supporters were unable 
to use to the benefit of the dockers. Throughout the 
years, the base of the moderates had been not so much 
the dockers themselves as the Ministry, the ÜLC, at 
least one friendly contractor and - of course - the 
AALC and the ITF itself. When the moderates finally 
gained control of the single legal national dock-
workers' union in 1978, this was due to an act of the 
state, and was followed by widespread unrest amongst 
the Lagos dockers. 
It is evident that the ITF was propagating in West 
Africa the brand of trade unionism and pattern of 
labour relations believed in or practised by the 
moderate-reformist trade unions that dominate it. 
Hostile to the notion of class struggle, and possessed 
of paternalist attitudes towards the young transport 
workers' unions in Africa, it was always prepared to 
convince post-colonial governments of its 'a-politi-
cism', whilst in practice actively identifying with and 
reinforcing the development policies of corrupt and 
reactionary colonial or military regimes. The ITF 
problem is that it has contradictory aims. In Udogwu's 
statement to Adebiyi we find both a declaration of 
liberal-democratic and developmental ist faith, and a 
programme of practical and non-partisan organisational 
assistance. The two are contradictory in word and 
practice. There is a contradiction in word between the 
denial of 'ideological considerations' for assistance, 
and the use of such terms as 'free', 'democratic' and 
'totalitarian' (which belong to the traditional termi-
nology of liberal ideologists) . There is a contradic-
tion in practice because the ideological conditions 
were used to support one faction against the other, 
thus creating the major obstacle to the uniting of 
unions on industrial lines in the docks. The rejection 
of the effective, popularly-supported, autonomous 
leadership in the docks meant the denial to it of 
practical training and advice that it needed. The 
long-standing opposition to the radicals was evidently 
due to a traditional hostility to communism that appa-
rently continued in Africa at a time when the ITF has 
been willing to improve its relations with communist 
unions in both Eastern and Western Europe. Although 
the ITF would no doubt like to differentiate itself 
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from the AFL-CIO, its impact on the Lagos dockworkers 
was little different. One does not have to assume that 
the ITF was a tool of the CIA in Nigeria. [5] But one 
is obliged to recognise that ITF principles and prac-
tices within the Nigerian dockworker unions were more 
in the interests of national and international capital 
and of the Nigerian state than in those of the dock-
workers . 
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that 
whatever the benefits of national and international 
relations in terms of the provision of moral, finan-
cial, technical and educational support, such contacts 
gave personal or strategy differences an organisational 
form and an ideological justification. It appears that 
the less the contact with such external bodies the more 
a dockwide union was able to respond to dockworker 
needs. The same lesson seems to have been eventually 
drawn by H.P. Adebola. Although he had once been 
deeply involved with the ICFTU and the AALC, and had 
himself approved the financial assistance to the dock-
workers in 1966-8, he eventually came to the following 
conclusion: 
I am sorry I have to say it, we have to be 
truthful here. When the Dockers were getting 
money from George McRay, every month they 
will get money, you don't find them on the 
quays. That was why Endeley Olagboshe was 
able to drive all of them away. Because when 
he was holding meeting at the Dock, the 
people who were being paid by George McRay 
were sitting on big tables in the offices... 
Those who were being paid could not face the 
workers, and Olagboshe who was not being paid 
was addressing the workers at Apapa (Adebiyi 
Proceedings 1976:27:21). 
11.4. Union leaders 
Given that dockworker unions were little more than 
their leaderships, the distinction between dockworker 
union leaders and dockworker unions is evidently even 
less real than in the case of the portworker organisa-
tions. Interviewing them in a standardised manner 
nonetheless enables us to make comparisons between 
leaders of different organisations, leaders of one 
organisation, between the leader and the official 
position of the organisation, and between leaders and 
those they claim to be leading. Interviews were car-
ried out with 18 paid or volunteer officers of the BSA, 
the moderates and the radicals, using the three sche-
dules employed with the portworker leaders. Compari-
sons will be made with the information on the dock-
workers in Chapter 3. 
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11.4.1. Characteristics 
As might be expected, the backgrounds of the union 
leaders varied from those of the dockworkers both in 
being more urban and in their ethnic composition (to be 
dealt with just below) . The youngest of the leaders 
was 30, and most of them were aged between 30 and 40. 
This might make them older than much of jetty labour, 
but not strikingly different from either quay or pool 
labour. With an average of eight years' schooling, the 
leaders were a little better educated than any group of 
dockers. With an average of 19 years since they 
entered the industry, the leaders placed themselves 
amongst the most experienced dockers. When we consider 
current or previous employment within the industry, we 
begin to see a difference between leaders of the BSA, 
the moderates and the radicals. Those of the BSA were 
all in supervisory grades, the moderates were either 
long-time professionals or tally clerks, and the radi-
cals were the only ones to have manual or ex-manual 
workers amongst them - these being either winchmen or 
securitymen. If we accept as true the statements of 
the fulltimers amongst the leaders that they were 
earning N70-150 a month, this would put them well above 
the pool labour, even if we assume that such a man got 
a full month's pay of N65. However, it would not put 
them above the level of the manual workers in the NPA, 
whom we found to be averaging just under N150 per 
month. Except for those veteran professional union 
leaders who had income from other unions, or from 
patrons, one cannot say that dockworker leaders lived 
above a Nigerian working-class living standard. This 
assessment is confirmed by the appearance of the two or 
three homes of such leaders that I visited. In terms 
of union experience and training we again find three 
patterns. The difference was not so much in terms of 
membership experience (which usually went back 10 or 20 
years), as in leadership experience and training. 
Thus, the BSA leaders had less than 10 years' leader-
ship experience and no trade union training (apart from 
the NPA Industrial Relations course in December 1976) . 
The moderates mostly had over 15 years' experience and 
almost all of them had had trade union training - some 
of them several courses. The radical leaders had both 
less experience and less training. Interestingly 
enough, many of this last group mentioned that they had 
begun their trade union experience in 'Okon's union' or 
'Abam's union'. 
The non-institutionalised nature of labour rela-
tions in the contract labour sector gave rise to a 
wider variety of leader types than in the NPA. The 
direction of change is also less certain, given that it 
is difficult to assess the significance of certain 
leaders. If, however, we ignore the 'leaders' of the 
Biney 'union' (a joint creation of Biney himself and 
his junior supervisory staff) we can identify a certain 
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pattern and a certain process. 
We may begin with the socialist intellectual 
leaders, even if they made their last appearance during 
the 1968 dock strike. These were Eskor Toyo, Dr. 
Mayime Kolagbodi and Baba Omojola (or Oluwide), inde-
pendent socialists who had taken an interest in dock-
worker organisation since the early 1960s (Waterman 
1982:Ch.3.). We will see in Chapter 15 that - whatever 
their hopes or intentions - their role was that of 
reformist middle-class sympathisers and advisors rather 
than anything more substantial or revolutionary. 
Given the inability of socialist intellectuals to 
provide the kind of leadership the dockworkers needed 
at this point of time, they were outpaced by the 
charismatic worker leader, Endeley Olagboshe. This man 
had been active in a union of Khayam and Abam in the 
early 196 0s, was a signator of the agreement that ended 
the 1964 dock strike, and in 1968 led the gang of angry 
dockers or union activists which raided the offices of 
the old ADWT&GWU, grabbed its documents and eventually 
affiliated it with the NTUC.[6] An interview in 1975 
provides us with more information. Olagboshe was a 
Yoruba from Ondo, born in 1937. His father was a 
farmer and hunter, his eldest brother a product trader. 
He claimed five or six years education but his standard 
of literacy was evidently not adequate to obtain him 
clerical work. He began to work in the docks in the 
early 1950s, becoming a rigger and winchman. He joined 
the Nigerian Stevedores and Dockworkers Union (NS&DWU) 
in 1961 when it was the militant opposition organisa-
tion. He claimed to have become its President. He 
said of Abam that he was 'not effective* and that 'our 
people let us down in the 1963 dock strike'. Nonethe-
less, he appears to have stayed with the organisation 
until 1968, and then to have been one of the organisers 
who lost their paid positions in the Amalgamation. 
Olagboshe was a striking figure who customarily ap-
peared in public clad in rubber boots and bearing an 
umbrella. He had been in jail on more than one occa-
sion, and not only for offences connected with union 
activities. One arrest for protest action was during a 
strike that took place in 1972. Olagboshe claimed to 
have been held in a maximum security prison for 12 
months. He further stated that he 
wrote a petition to Gowon. I was taken to 
see him. He say I contravene the no-strikes 
decree. I say it was not me that went on 
strike - the workers. I could not refuse 
them. I say one man can never go on strike. 
He warn me to go back and use my office to 
cooperate with government. 
Although military heads of state in Nigeria have been 
known to have had confidential interviews with leading 
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unionists, Olagboshe's colleagues discount his story as 
a product of a too-fertile imagination. It may have 
been his wild appearance and behaviour that later 
caused them to follow a practice used with both Imoudu 
and Adebola by 'promoting' him from President to 
National Patron. 
Having effectively booted Olagboshe upstairs, the 
ADWT&GWU(N) came under the leadership of the profes­
sional outside General Secretary, Bernard Odulana, and 
of such worker leaders as Reuben Lazarus, its Presi­
dent. Whilst a fulltime union organiser for many 
years, Odulana cannot simply be characterised as a 
professional leader. And whilst a worker leader for 
many years, Lazarus cannot be simply so characterised. 
Odulana, who was to lead the radical faction for 
at least a decade, was a secondary-educated Yoruba, a 
one-time clerk, who in the 1960s was trained as one of 
its 'revolutionary cadres' by the NTUC. In an attempt 
to overcome the trade union entrepreneurship which had 
long bedevilled the trade union movement, these acti­
vists were to have 'dual responsibility', to be 'em­
ployed in the services of individual trade unions while 
at the same time remaining loyal to the Congress' 
(Waterman 1973) . Odulana had in 196Θ been at the 
NTÜC-WFTÜ one-month school at the NTUC's Patrice Lumum-
ba Labour Academy. Later he was to attend courses run 
by the Czech and East German trade unions. Bearded and 
bespectacled, he conformed to the popular Nigerian 
image of the professional communist trade union organi-
ser. Although his loyalty to the NTUC was not ques-
tioned, the other NTUC activists tended to look at 
Odulana askance, considering him less serious and 
reliable than they themselves. What was noticeable was 
Odulana's evident preference for the wilder fringes of 
the trade union movement. Thus, in addition to the 
dockworkers, he had also been secretary to the Idi-Oro, 
Mushin and District, Ikeja and District Minibus Drivers 
Union. Such unions consist of both drivers and owner-
drivers. Odulana admitted that they were not indus-
trial unions and that even though the drivers made wage 
demands on owners, their aims and ambitions were capi-
talist (Interview Notes, August 1975). Odulana's 
personal style and preferences apparently suited him to 
leadership of the dockworkers. The fact that he man-
aged to retain the confidence of the radical dock-
workers leaders for ten years suggests that his quali-
ties suited them also. It was only following the 
success of the moderates in leading the December 1976 
strike (Chapter 15) that the worker leaders began to 
complain to me about the irresponsibility and unrelia-
bility of Odulana. At that point of time, the differ-
ence between an entrepreneurial and professional type 
of leadership seemed to be becoming apparent to them, 
even if they would not have used these words. 
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Lazarus was an Ibo, in his 40s, raised in Lagos, 
and having some secondary education. He had been 27 
years in the docks as a winchman, joined Okon's union 
in 1949 and was sent by it to Holland for technical 
training in the mid-1960s. Lazarus was the President 
of the ADWT&GWU(N) at the time I interviewed him and 
was being paid by it as a fulltimer. Whilst previously 
the only options open to him might have been that of 
worker or fulltime union leader, the creation of the 
NCHC offered him a new opportunity. Given his training 
and his evident leadership qualities, he felt in Decem-
ber 1976 that he had a good opportunity of obtaining a 
supervisory position within the new company. He de-
clared that there was no danger of being won over to 
its management, 'since we and they have different 
ideologies'. He considered it important that union 
officers should be engaged in dock work and experienced 
in its techniques. He declared further that even as a 
supervisor he could and would continue to 'work in the 
interests of the union'. Lazarus was not the only 
worker leader of the radicals to have such opportuni-
ties before him. In early 1977, the union had actually 
offered its aid to the Task Force appointed by the 
Federal Military Government to clear the port conges-
tion. The Task Force took on four such men whom it 
considered experienced, intelligent and with leadership 
qualities. These men were regularly employed at around 
N160 per month, at a time when fulltime officials of 
the union might have been earning around N100 and pool 
dockworkers N65 - both irregularly. The Task Force 
warned these men against exploiting their positions to 
engage in union activities and promised that if they 
worked well they would be recommended for supervisory 
positions up to Grade Level 12 (currently paying around 
N600 per month). They were, however, warned that they 
would have to choose between union activity and these 
posts, since the two were not consistent with each 
other. The Task Force was satisfied with the experi-
ment and recommended a number of the officers to the 
NCHC. The union itself felt that its influence and 
prestige were enhanced by its association with the Task 
Force. The four union officers could be seen riding 
the port area daily in Land Rovers, equipped with 
walkie-talkies, giving orders to contractor and 
clearing-agency staff. Even if the hope of Lazarus and 
his friends was in vain, its existence must be consi-
dered as a probable explanation for the increasing 
moderation of the traditional radicals. 
Chapter 7 has already provided sufficient informa-
tion on the background and activities of Okon and Abam 
to establish these as at least would-be professionals 
- if in an industry that could provide no base for 
them. By the mid-1970s both this and other leadership 
types had been largely replaced by worker leaders. 
Ironically, the transformation of the structure of the 
dock labour industry was providing conditions that were 
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favourable to leadership of either a senior service or 
a professional type. 
11.4.2. Opinions 
The considerable differences between the three 
main dockworker union leaderships existing in the 
late-1970s make it impossible to consider them as a 
single category in analysing their aspirations and 
opinions. Instead, we will use the material in the 
Open-Ended Interview Schedule (Appendix 2) to examine 
in turn the attitudes of two BSA, two moderate and two 
radical union leaders. 
Firstly, the two BSA leaders. Both of these were 
labour supervisors, having worked their way up from the 
ranks of the dockworkers. Thomas Olushipo, was a 
primary-educated Yoruba, aged 46, and a veteran Biney 
trade union officer. Samuel Umeghai, also primary-edu-
cated, was a 38-year-old Ibo from Bendel State, and one 
of the rare non-Yoruba officers on the BSA leadership. 
What were their aspirations and expectations? Both 
expected to remain as supervisors with Biney, although 
one saw petty-trading as a possible alternative. Both 
expressed pride in their achievements and skills. 
Asked about ownership and control of dock labour opera-
tions, both wanted private ownership to continue with a 
reduced number of contractors - one of them, of course, 
being Biney. Both were critical about the operations 
of the NPA. They had a complex view of the junior 
supervisors (such as themselves) and management in the 
industry. Olushipo felt that the former were compe-
tent, but that some managements were not so because 
they practised short-ganging (i.e. operating with less 
men than officially required). On motivating the 
workers, both mentioned the necessity of industrial 
reorganisation either through the Integrated Cargo 
Handling Scheme or a reduction in the number of con-
tractors, but Umeghai added the necessity for a daily 
rate of N4 for the dockers. Both believed that there 
were others who shared the sufferings of the dockers, 
one mentioning 'anyone on the quays' and including NPA 
workers, the other mentioning Apapa factory workers. 
As for enemies, Olushipo mentioned government and NPA, 
blaming them for bad conditions and pay, Umeghai bad 
top managements and nobody else. Both of them con-
sidered collective action necessary if the poor were to 
achieve their desires in Nigeria. Umeghai stressed the 
necessity for trade unionism, 'because there is nobody 
who can fight for the workers except the union', and 
Olushipo even mentioned the necessity for strike ac-
tion 1 
One need not take this as a mere form of words or 
as deliberate hypocrisy. During the stormy 1970s they 
would certainly have witnessed the efficacy of organi-
sation and action amongst dockworkers outside the 
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company. And we will see in Chapter 15 that in 1975 
the BSA was itself involved in the first ever 'offi-
cial' strike action within Biney's. Most of what the 
pair said, however, was consistent with their position 
as self-made men, proud of their skills and achieve-
ments, aware of their lack of prospects outside the 
industry, grateful to and dependent on their employer. 
One does nonetheless note a continued identification 
with the labourers from whom they had risen and the 
poor amongst whom they lived. Whilst supervisors, they 
were still wage dependent, with conditions and pros-
pects closely related to those of other wage earners in 
Nigeria. 
Now for the two moderate leaders. We will see 
that whilst Okon's views were consistent with those of 
his organisation, those of Abam were somewhat contra-
dictory. This will become apparent as soon as we ex-
amine their aspirations and expectations. Okon re-
ferred to a 1973 cargo operations and labour relations 
course in the United States, to which he had been sent 
by the Nigerian government. He felt that this quali-
fied him for an industrial relations job, but in such a 
place as the NCHC rather than in private industry, 
since the latter 'usually muzzle good ideas'. However, 
Okon said that he was also prepared to be a labour 
attaché if government appointed these. And if either 
of these failed, he would like to go into politics. 
Abam expressed the hope of either going into printing 
(for which he was trained) or politics. If the latter, 
it 
should be a straight marxist party without 
mincing any word. In Russia...it is bureau-
cratically led. I have been out of contact 
for a long time with the trotskyists who much 
attracted me with the concept of permanent 
revolution. 
Abam said he would definitely go into politics if the 
opportunity arose but admitted that 'in Nigeria we are 
cowards and if military does not hand over it will be 
difficult to change things ourselves'. Both the moder-
ate leaders were in favour of government supervision 
over dock labour operations, but without direct owner-
ship and control. We have already cited Abam briefly 
on nationalisation. It is now worthwhile quoting him 
more fully. He said 
This really should be done. This was one of 
our demands in the early 1960s. We had to 
drop it because the dockers did not under-
stand it and the whole weight of the contrac-
tors and shipping companies was against us. 
The actual job is not done by them. It is 
done by the dockworkers themselves...So why 
not government direct? In 196 8 we wrote a 
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memo on this...Now I will not say this openly 
because of the lack of understanding amongst 
dockworkers and also because of the govern-
ment we have and a lot of interests involved. 
Whilst Okon had no criticism of the NPA, Abam accused 
it of inefficiency and corruption. Both the moderates 
were critical of the capacities and attitudes of junior 
supervisors and management within the industry. Okon 
felt, however, that four of the companies were quite 
competent: the trouble with the Nigerian private sector 
was not that it failed to employ competent people but 
that it failed to listen to them. As for Abam, he felt 
that with the introduction of the ICHS the companies 
would improve, since they now all felt the necessity to 
employ expatriates and experienced supervisors. Both 
of them felt that better work by the dockers required 
better organisation and conditions within the industry. 
Both felt that the dockers had some brothers, Abam 
mentioning shipping and clearing, factory, commercial 
and other non-governmental exployees. Of enemies to 
the dockers Okon mentioned only the contractors. Abam 
went much further, criticising also the shipping com-
panies, the NPA and the government. On the possibili-
ties of workers achieving their desires, Okon referred 
to trade union unity, and Abam again went further: 
If power rests with capitalists they will 
always use it to overcome the trade unions. 
The workers must be educated to understand 
that you need to have political power for a 
permanent solution. 
Whereas the two BSA officers had admitted total ignor-
ance of any foreign friends to the Nigerian workers, 
both Okon and Abam were, of course, well aware of this, 
Okon mentioning a whole series of ITSs in addition to 
the ICFTU and AALC. 
In introducing the views of this pair it was said 
that those of Okon were consistent with those of his 
organisation, whilst those of Abam were not. The 
inconsistency seems to have lain not so much between 
the two leaders as within Abam himself. In his practi-
cal positions, Abam seemed as moderate as Okon. It was 
his revolutionary analysis and aspirations that were 
out of character. In practice it appeared that it was 
the existence of a military regime that prevented him 
from being an active socialist, and the hostility of 
contractors, shipping interest and government that 
prevented him from advocating nationalisation. If we 
discount the significance of Abam's socialism, then we 
are left with two men aspiring to careers outside trade 
unionism, but currently accepting the Nigerian social, 
political and economic structures as a given framework 
within which they were working for incremental change. 
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The last two leaders are the radicals Bernard 
Odulana and Reuben Lazarus. How did their views con-
trast with those of the moderates? To begin with, both 
wanted to remain in trade unionism, expressing them-
selves in very similar ways. On industrial organisa-
tion, both wanted total nationalisation of dockwork, 
although both were critical of the NPA. Thus, Odulana 
said of NPA that it 
should be autonomous and profit oriented. 
With a bias for profit there will be effec-
tive supervision. 
His scepticism of NPA capacities led him to desire a 
separate and independent state corporation for dock 
operations. Both condemned contractor management and 
criticised the headmen and junior supervisors, although 
Odulana excused the corruption of the latter as due to 
bad pay. On the encouragement of better work, Odulana 
made the customary suggestions on conditions, but 
Lazarus (who was currently hoping to obtain a supervi-
sory position within the NCHC) said, 
Government guidelines must be applied first. 
Then we will kick out anyone who doesn't 
work. If [workers] say it's 'government 
job', we will send them home for one or two 
weeks. Once government does what is right, 
you should obey. 
Both the radicals had a problematic view of those who 
were in the same position as the dockers. According to 
Odulana, 
All portworkers should be called dockworkers 
...But NPA workers are under a different 
employer. They have a sense of security. 
They express solidarity but they don't take 
it. 
Lazarus had a greater feeling of the isolation of 
dockers: 
The dockworker is suffering the most...Nobody 
is fighting for their cry. Dockworkers fight 
for themselves. It is very common in our 
country and everyone fight for themselves... 
On the dockworkers' enemies, their views agreed with 
those of Abam. So did they seem to on achieving the 
needs of the poor in Nigeria, Odulana stating that this 
would be 
by organising into formidable trade unions. 
Principally, if the country goes socialist. 
under the present system, by organisation. 
Then by participation in a political movement 
whose aim is to achieve socialism. 
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In answer to another question, however, Lazarus had 
stressed the value of strike action: 'Immediately we go 
on strike, everyone has sympathy with us'. Dealing 
with friends abroad, Odulana mentioned the Transport 
Trade Union International (TUI) of the WFTU. Lazarus 
seemed to be unaware of this, although he considered 
the unions in East and West to be supporters of 
Nigerian workers in some manner. Perhaps for this 
reason he would have liked to see the union affiliated 
to both the East and West. 
One does notice certain differences between the 
pair. These possibly reflect the differences between 
the professional NTUC cadre, Odulana, and the working 
unionist that Lazarus, had for so long been. For the 
rest, their views appear to be consistent with the 
somewhat ambiguous radicalism of their organisation. 
Thus Lazarus was able to adopt a managerial view on 
industrial discipline, Odulana a technocratic one on 
the solution to the ills of public enterprise. And 
whilst their common favouring of nationalisation could 
be explained in terms of personal self-interest, the 
fact is that it would have guaranteed the dockers what 
they most wanted too. 
11.5. Union followers 
11.5.1. Characteristics 
In dealing with the organisational characteristics 
and the attitudes of dockworkers, it is necessary to 
recall that we are covering only the more-experienced 
workers who do know something about the unions or union 
leaders. Evidence on the organisational characteris-
tics of these more-experienced workers is from the Port 
and Dock Worker Survey (Appendix 1) . Union membership 
was claimed by just over 60 percent of those sampled, 
with 90 percent of these 'members' claiming to pay 
dues. Earlier evidence on union finance suggests that 
we cannot take these claims to mean more than irregular 
donations. The real nature of union attachment is 
indicated by the inability of one-quarter of the 'mem-
bers' to name their union. Similarly, 30 percent of 
those claiming membership could not name a union offi-
cer. And over half did not know whether or not their 
secretary was paid. The general image of the ignorant 
or disinterested docker is complicated when we consider 
activity. Over one-half of the dockers had attended a 
meeting in 1975, one-quarter having attended more than 
10 meetings. Moreover, 80 percent of the dockers 
questioned had had strike experience, one-quarter 
claiming to have struck five or more times. The doc-
kers surveyed come over as being experienced and active 
in protest action, but as having a low level of parti-
cipation in, or commitment to, 'their' unions. 
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11.5.2. Opinions 
Using the Open-Ended Interview Schedule employed 
with the leaders (Appendix 2), interviews were carried 
out with 11 labourers working for one of three major 
contractors. These men were earning N2.62-2.80 per day 
and working 15-20 days a month. A number were illiter-
ate, the others having a few years of primary educa-
tion. Most of them, including those who said they were 
not union members, had taken part in the Udoji strike a 
few months previously. 
What, firstly, were their aspirations? The dock-
workers aspired mostly to self-employment as petty-
traders, drivers or contractors. A few aspired to 
advancement within the industry - and two to medicine 
or journalisml Those aspiring to self-employment were 
largely confident about achieving their aim within five 
years, though some put their faith in God's will. Even 
an aspirant tally clerk was pessimistic: 
I have the experience to be a marker and 
tally clerk but no one introduces me to 
anyone who matters...I have no hope because I 
have no godfather [patron. PW]. 
The dockers thought overwhelmingly that the industry 
should be taken over, either by NPA, or government, or 
government and unions. Said one: 
All I want is government to take it over -
hand it over to the unions. Because they are 
fighting for us mekunu [common people. PW] . 
All of us know about the job but contractors 
do not allow us to use our brains. They 
don't handle trucks, only us labourers. It 
would be good with government. Government 
and unions should work together. 
A few, however, thought contractors should remain in 
control: 
I like them to continue controlling...This is 
because they employ me too and by their help 
I can have the money for my future business 
of the coming five years...the more contracts 
government give to contractors the more 
contractors give me job and I will be rich. 
What did they think of the present nature of the NPA? 
Was this considered satisfactory? The answer was 
overwhelmingly favourable. Attitudes toward both 
junior supervisors and senior management were over-
whelmingly positive. Was it thought possible to get 
workers to work better in the industry? They were 
divided. The majority, however, stressed the need for 
improved pay, conditions and work organisation. Said 
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one: 
They should provide us with amenities. If we 
work, we sweat. If we see water to drink and 
bath we will be happy. If we are working 
every day we will be happier. We should [be 
paid] when they book us whether rain or no 
rain. 
Did they feel they had any brothers in arms? The 
dockers were overwhelming negative. Said one: 
At present there is no much brothers in arm 
because most of them do not care for others. 
A few referred to the union and to government, but the 
latter was mentioned in terms of hope rather than 
actuality. 
If the workers did not feel that they had friends, 
did they feel that they had enemies? They divided into 
two equal groups, one of which could identify no col-
lective enemy (although personal ones were mentioned) 
and the other of which mentioned contractors. The most 
explicit statement here was as follows: 
The contractors. NPA is helping them. They 
connive. Government is in collaboration with 
contractors. They dupe us together. 
On the question of the poor achieving their desires, 
half put their trust jointly in government and union/ 
worker protest: 
There is no way we can come out to get power 
except government come to help. We have no 
power over government but government has 
power over us. We can protest against the 
contractors. When we protest, when we 
strike, we are only inviting government [to 
act] . 
Among the other half there were those who simply did 
not know and others who either believed in hard work or 
in the impossibility of the poor achieving their 
desires: 
...we cannot get what we want at every 
minute. This is because we have no power and 
will not have. 
The final question was on foreign friends. Most of 
them knew of none. One or two mentioned individual 
countries - Russia, Britain, the USA. Others identi-
fied foreign businessmen. 
Europeans and Indians like those who esta-
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blished textile industry at...Oyigbo. They 
always want to keep peace with them without 
trouble. 
11.5.3. Discussion 
Let us try to summarise the material on leaders 
and followers. It appears as if dockworkers aspired to 
petty-capitalist self-employment, a status for which 
they had high expectations. They condemned the exist-
ing private ownership of the industry and wished to see 
it taken over by the state or the state and unions. 
They saw the structure of NPA as satisfactory, probably 
as desirable. Whilst possibly critical of supervisors 
and managers, they did not see themselves opposed to 
them. They saw improved work performance as requiring 
improved pay and conditions and the re-organisation of 
work. If not fatalistic or individualistic in their 
views on achieving the desires of the labouring poor, 
they believed in a combination of collective action and 
government assistance. This struggle was quite likely 
to be seen as taking place against a specific common 
enemy - the contractors - but it was not seen as a 
struggle in which the docker had outside support. If 
they thought of foreign supporters at all, it was in 
terms of foreign governments, investors or traders. 
We have to recognise both the extent of this 
worker consciousness and the limitations on it. Posi-
tive consciousness of their situation as wage earners 
was expressed in their opposition to their immediate 
exploiters, in their demand for nationalisation, and in 
a certain recognition of the necessity for collective 
action if they were to achieve their demands. Limits 
to such a consciousness are revealed in their petty-
capitalist aspirations, feelings of isolation, belief 
in individual self-help, dependence on the rich and 
powerful (nationally and internationally). 
The question now is of how the values of the three 
leaderships related to this contradictory set of worker 
values. Evidently, each of the three shared certain 
values or aspirations with the workers. Evidently they 
also had some which differed. Given that the leaders 
were in a position to influence the workers, it may be 
most important to consider where their ideas differed, 
where they were 'leading' the workers to. First, the 
BSA leaders. Let us consider their ideas on worker 
organisation and action as sincere. Let us also accept 
that they wished to see the workers enjoying better 
conditions. Yet we note that both in their personal 
aspirations and in their faith in Biney ownership, they 
were leading the workers to identify with a particular 
capitalist, and emphasising individual mobility within 
his company. Secondly, the moderates. Discounting 
Abam's socialism (which had not been publicly pro-
pounded for more than 10 years) , we find the signifi-
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cant differences with the dockworkers to lie in their 
personal apsirations to political, managerial or diplo-
matic employ, in their faith in private ownership, and 
in their belief in the existence of both local and 
foreign friends or supporters of the dockworkers. This 
is evidently a broader view of society than that of the 
BSA leaders. But we must note that it was also more 
conservative than the dockworker view in arguing 
against nationalisation. Moreover, their 'interna-
tionalism' was based on the value to themselves of a 
relationship with one part of the international trade 
union movement. Where they would seem to have been 
leading the workers is toward a 'modernised' industry 
and labour relations compatible with the development of 
private capital nationally and internationally. Third-
ly, the radicals. They would seem to have been moving 
the workers away from their feelings of dependency on 
the rich and powerful. In their personal identifica-
tion with trade unionism, in their practical recogni-
tion that progress of the dockworkers depended on 
dockworker action alone, in their nationalisation 
demand, in the aspiration of Lazarus for full inter-
national working-class solidarity, and in their common 
recognition of the necessity for a socialist political 
movement, they would seem to have been leading the 
dockers toward greater self-consciousness and self-
confidence. Yet we must not forget the limitations on 
this radicalism, nor the questions we raised earlier 
about the problems of their organisation. 
Having now examined the attitudes of the radical 
leaders and their followers more closely, it may be 
possible to suggest answers to some crucial questions. 
Were these leaders not, in some ways, also too close in 
their attitudes to the dockers? They did seem to share 
the faith of their followers in the goodwill of govern-
ment and in state action as a solution to dockworker 
problems. Was their communist ideology of any practi-
cal value? All they were doing in practice was to 
press energetically for the traditional reformist 
solutions to dockworker problems. Their longterm 
socialist aspiration was not translated into effective 
organisational and consciousness-raising work amongst 
their followers. This answers the last question also. 
It is evident both from the low commitment to and 
participation in the unions that the dockworkers were 
not conscious of the need for organisation in addition 
to action. This is confirmed by the failure of the 
dockers to make any mention of the necessity for strong 
and powerful trade unions. It was this failure of the 
radicals that prevented them (as we will see in Chapter 
15) from responding to the dockworker sentiment in 
favour of a strike in late 1976 or, alternatively, of 
preventing the moderates from leading such a strike. 
11.6. Summary 
As in the summary to the last chapter, we may now 
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tie in the conclusions above with the problem of fac-
tionalism. It is evident that we are dealing here with 
a situation in which workers are acutely aware of their 
immediate oppressors and in which the form of collec-
tive organisation necessary to deal with these is 
barely existent and hardly recognised. The volatility 
of the dockworkers, and their difficulties in self-
organisation, made them a continuing object of interest 
to the Nigerian and international labour movements - as 
well as to certain reform-minded contractors and to the 
Nigerian state. In general, these movements were so 
dependent (at least ideologically) on national and 
international capitalism as to be incapable of coming 
to terms with the attitdes and capacities of the wor-
kers themselves. They accepted explanations of organi-
sational weakness and division in terms of ethnicity or 
ideology. They thus stimulated and subsidised such 
divisions. But, given the crudity of dockworker exploi-
tation, the obviousness of their organisational needs, 
and the self-evident nature of their immediate demands, 
such efforts booked little success. 
The NTUC cadre, Odulana, evidently established 
another sort of relationship by collaborating with, 
and possibly helping to build, a worker leadership with 
the necessary structural basis, minimal reform pro-
gramme, personal courage (or bravado) and strategy. If 
one had been looking at it in 1973-4 one could have 
easily assumed that there was developing a plebian 
worker leadership, with its roots amongst the dockers, 
and which had both surpassed ethnic factionalism and 
turned away from the dubious attractions of ideological 
factionalism dangled by national and international 
patrons. But, when one takes into account the ex-
perience of 1975-6, one realises that this kind of 
identification with the dockworkers was not enough. 
The success of the ADWT&GWU(N) and the promises atten-
dent on this success (the ICHS and the NCHC) opened up 
new perspectives for trade unionism as an organisa-
tional form and for trade union leaders as a distinct 
social category. Whilst still largely sharing the 
attitudes and aspirations of at least the more regu-
larly-employed dockworkers, the radical leaders were 
now faced with very different personal possibilities. 
Those with a possibility of being paid were also having 
problems in facing the workers. 
NOTES 
1. The handwritten minute is reproduced in full here 
not only because of the insight it gives into the 
administration of the union, but because it is the 
only EC minute available. Moreover, it draws 
attention to the existence of an 'adviser1 or 
'advisers' (of whom, unfortunately, we know no-
thing more) . The existence of such a person (or 
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persons) suggests that the union had not escaped 
from the dependence on outside expertise that we 
find with the BSA and with moderate-reformist 
unions in the cargo-handling industry. The note 
reads as follows: 
Advisers like know, how much we have in 
the account now? The Committee must 
continue their jobs over the [illegible] 
on the account. The Patron spoke over 
the past events, and after the union 
became financially strong and people who 
newly joint the unions started their 
crooks business over the finance. Both 
pay officials and collectors to go 
together and collect money together. By 
adviser. Come back in two weeks time... 
a treasurer alone is not capable of 
taking self decisions of his own on many 
issues of Finance. Joint current 
account. And great shame to you union. 
(1) To know how much the treasurer has 
hand. Who soever that is possession of 
our union money, we like to know. Joint 
account to be opened between the 2nd and 
the 5th July 1976. B. Odulana said that 
he used the treasurer to give an ac-
count. G. Sect, still pressed much to 
know about the account on the finance. 
Advisers advises that nobody should keep 
money in hand of the treasurer should 
not more than impress account. We need 
to open account for account sake. 
Hausa union officers in Zaria, Northern Nigeria, 
told me in 1970 of their regret that their 'most 
effective leader', an Ibo, had fled during the 
1966 pogroms. Paul Lübeck was during the same 
period told that the only trade union organiser 
trusted by Kano factory workers was an Ibo (Lübeck 
1975b:144). Wolpe deals with an analogous pheno-
menon in Port Harcourt at the time of the 1964 
General Strike. In a predominantly Ibo city, 
dominated by Ibo politicians, the Strike Manage-
ment Committee contained six non-Ibo to four Ibo. 
He argues: 
For non-Ibos...trade unionism had become 
an organisational vehicle to protest 
their exclusion from the political 
establishment... 
Further: 
Non-Ibos were in a far better position 
than their Ibo trade union brethren to 
lead a public protest against a politi-
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cal establishment that was, after all, 
largely Ibo in composition. Not cons-
trained by ties of blood and community, 
or by considerations of vested interest, 
non-Ibos were freer to lead and to speak 
out on matters of common concern to both 
Ibo and non-Ibo workers. (Wolpe 1975: 
182, 1986). 
For a fuller treatment of the foreign influence on 
Lagos dockworker unionism from the 1950s to the 
1970s, see Waterman (1980c). 
Chief E.A.O. Odeyemi was later to be even more 
severely criticised by a tribunal. In addition to 
his ULC post, he was General Secretary of the 
Nigerian Motor Drivers and Allied Transport Wor-
kers Union. With the aid of the ITF this had in 
1962 set up a Motor Drivers Training School. From 
1965, both finance and technical expertise for the 
school were provided by the AALC. In 1974 the 
Training School was still receiving aid of 
US$6,000 from the AALC and an additional N15,000 
from the Nigerian Industrial Training Fund. By 
this time the operation was formally in the hands 
of the Motor Union, but in practice in those of 
Odeyemi. In 1974 the school and the land it stood 
on were transferred to Chief Odeyemi and his 
heirs. The Adebiyi Tribunal declared that such 
dealings 'raise grave doubts about the integrity 
of Chief Odeyemi', and recommended he be banned 
from further union office (Adebiyi Report 1977: 
24-5). 
The ITF has been named as an instrument of the CIA 
in Latin America. Former CIA agent Philip Agee 
declares that the various International Trade 
Secretariats (ITSs) are often more effective and 
appropriate for CIA influence than the ICFTU 
structure in Latin America. He declares that Jack 
Otero, a US transport union leader and ITF repre-
sentative in Latin America, was a CIA 'contract 
labour agent' there at one time. He gives exam-
ples of efforts made to control Latin American 
transport unions in the interests of the US state 
(Agee 1975:76,306,358,384). In 1978 Otero was a 
Vice-President of the ITF. In respect to the 
Nigerian dock unions, also, the US trade unions 
can operate either directly, through the AALC, or 
indirectly, through the ITF. In fact, the same 
individual has played a leading role in both 
bodies. Teddy Gleason, who in 1970 made the 
toilet deal with the Nigerian government on behalf 
fo the AALC, was in 1974 elected a Vice-President 
of the ITF. One should beware of conspiracy 
theories: neither the CIA nor the US trade unions 
control the ITF. But the ITF is open to such 
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influences because it shares the belief that 
workers in the third world * face similar problems 
today to those which confronted workers half a 
century ago in the more industrialised nations1, 
and that the appropriate model is that of 'coun-
tries where there is a long-established tradition 
of democratic trade unionism and industrial rela-
tions' (ITF 1975:4). The problem is that as a 
result of policies emanating from the dominant 
states and multinationals, there are less and less 
liberal regimes in the third world. The ITF may 
help trade union struggle against racist or fas-
cist regimes in Portugal, Chile or South Africa. 
But liberal regimes remain in existence only as 
long as the trade unions are 'reasonable'. If the 
working class and other parts of the poor become 
•dangerous' then we get coups or states of emer-
gency, as in Tunisia, Chile, or Thailand. The ITF 
favours the 'reasonable' unions, and - in Latin 
America, for example - opposes movements with 
revolutionary 'ideologies which do not answer the 
continent's needs' (ITF Activities Report 1977: 
65) . So does the CIA. If the ITF was to effec-
tively separate itself from such influences, it 
would have to be open to those trade unions that 
are taking appropriate and effective action 
against capitalist exploitation and state repres-
sion, whether their ideologies and methods were 
revolutionary or not. 
6. The stormy nature of dockworker unionism and the 
key role played by Olagboshe in the events of 
1968-9 come out clearly in the Urhobo Report 
(1971) . This is how Fakoya, one of the moderates, 
reported the attack on the offices of the amalga-
mation: 
Suddenly Endeley Olagboshe and a group 
of men about 50 strong whom we know in 
the docks as smugglers stormed into the 
Secretariat and seized all the keys... 
They ordered the officers present to 
assemble in the conference room under 
physical violence...One of their lea-
ders, late Fatai Ayinde, read out a 
resolution purported to have been passed 
by the dockers in Lagos with so many 
charges against the National Officers... 
They did not allow the officers to 
speak...They seized the nominal roll, 
the union's certificate, and started to 
ransack the office. 
Whilst Fakoya described the attackers as smugglers 
others preferred to term them 'canoe boys' or 
'toughs'. F. Balogun, President of the ADWT&GWU, 
claimed that he had seen £N40 change hands and 
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that each of the attackers had received £N5. 
Meanwhile, the critics of Khayam were claiming (in 
the words of A.E. Okon) that 'The thugs Sidi 
Khayam used to harass others turned against him'. 
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Chapter 12 
ANALYSIS: CAPITAL AND STATE ARE ALSO WITHIN THE UNIONS 
Let us first of all recall what has been established in 
the analysis of Parts I and II. In Part I it was 
argued that there was in neither of our two sectors an 
unambiguous proletarian-capitalist opposition. It was 
further asserted that each of the two labour forces was 
itself significantly divided by fraction, segment and 
stratum. Given the relatively close relationship, 
finally, between the two labourer types, the question 
was raised of whether the division between them was 
really the most significant amongst the Lagos port 
workers. Part II furthered this line of argument. 
Having recognised the nature of the division between 
the two types of labour force, it considered the impli-
cations of such a division for the more- and less-
proletarianised workers respectively. The two final 
paragraphs of Chapter 8 again reveal the common prob-
lems for both worker types. The first conclusion was 
that there is no 'real' working class in Nigeria from 
which either the more- or less-proletarianised workers 
are to be differentiated; there was no proletarian 
vanguard (no economically-determined or 'natural' 
vanguard) that other workers had to follow. One could 
not, in other words, assume on the basis of extent-of-
proletarianisation or extent-of-deprivation a certain 
level of class consciousness. In so far, indeed, as it 
was possible to identify the relationship between group 
experience and radicalism, it was also possible to 
identify the limitations to such radicalism in the 
group experience. The second conclusion had to do with 
the relationship between group particularism and union 
organisation and action. Whilst it was argued that in 
the Lagos Port at this particular period the unions had 
been overcoming divisions amongst workers, it was also 
recognised that the union form permitted their continu-
ation. The more general question of the relationship 
between the union form and worker division was left 
open. 
Part III provides material for the consideration 
of this problem. In the theoretical introduction, 
Chapter 9, we have spoken about relations running 
across, up and down the unions. In this analysis it 
would seem to make sense to deal in turn with relations 
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between workers and leaders, with structure and fac-
tionalism, and finally with external affiliation. This 
is to change the order of presentation in Chapter 10 
and 11, and also the 'direction' of the relations to be 
analysed. We will, therefore, be looking in turn at 
relations running down from, across, and up from, the 
Lagos Port union leaderships. The weight of the analy-
sis, moreover, will now shift from differences between 
the two sectors to differences within both. It is 
necessary to make clear that the problems of the work-
ers would not be solved simply by the establishment of 
a united port and dockworker organisation with a common 
radical strategy toward an enemy seen solely as outside 
and above the trade union movements. 
Analysis will draw primarily from Chapter 9, 
supplemented where necessary by material from earlier 
chapters. 
12.1. The worker-leader relationship 
Before dealing with the relationship between 
leaders and workers we have to deal with each separ-
ately. We will start with the workers. Here it is 
possible to identify attitudes specific to each cate-
gory and those common to both. What we are here dis-
tinguishing is between two narrow (portworker, dock-
worker) and one broader (cargo-handling worker) cons-
ciousnesses. Let us first consider the attitudes 
specific to the two categories. These can be best set 
out as follows: 
Attitude Portworker Dockworker 
Aspired status Salaried Petty-ownership 
Fatalism Low High 
Militancy Low High 
Union consciousness High Low 
Hostility toward Supervisor Owner 
What might seem to be not only conflicting but inter-
nally inconsistent sets of attitudes become at least 
comprehensible when we consider the respective back-
grounds, social networks, and precise class relations 
within which they are placed. We know from Chapter 3 
already of the different backgrounds and networks of 
port and dockworkers, with the first being largely 
incorporated into an urban, wage-earning (and white-
collar) milieu, the latter into a rural and petty-
entrepreneurial one. We also know of the significant 
differences between the state and capitalist sectors. 
If we recall Figure 9.1 we can see this expressed in 
terms of the relations of each worker type to a very 
specific and quite distinct intermediate category. 
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The portworker, it should be recalled, is employed 
with lifetime security in a non-capitalist enterprise 
which he has little or no desire to abandon. His 
personal advancement would be into the intermediate 
salaried strata - either within or outside NPA. There 
is no capitalist exploiter, so he feels his sufferings 
in terms of the hierarchy at the bottom of which he 
finds himself. The combination of low fatalism, low 
militancy and high union consciousness (all relative to 
the dockworker) suggests a 'middle-class oriented' wage 
earner, taking purposeful group action to further his 
wage and job interest without endangering either. If it 
was not for the attitudes we will later see to be 
shared with the dockworker, he would seem to be an 
almost ideal wage-earner - from a capitalist or statist 
point of view. 
As for the dockworker, he is casually employed in 
a capitalist enterprise offering low wages and no 
security. He exists between, or circulates between, 
wage work and self-employment, the latter offering at 
least autonomy and the possibility of wealth. He is in 
a small-capitalist enterprise, one run by a crudely-
exploitative boss, whose presence - and conspicuous 
wealth - identify him as the exploiter. The first-line 
supervisors are people like himself, to some extent 
chosen - or accepted - by the worker, and who also play 
a group-coordinator role. The combination of fatalism 
and militancy is far from contradictory, being part of 
a well-known syndrome amongst those in urban or rural 
self-employment. Meszaros (Chapter 9 above) links 
petty-bourgeois impotence and anarchism - the latter 
being often itself linked with insurrection. And, as 
with all those in the petty-commodity sector, it is 
difficult (though not impossible) for these workers to 
translate rebelliousness into organisational terms. 
Such attitudes may provide for the necessary fervour in 
a revolutionary situation but be the despair of organi-
sers before one has arisen or after it has subsided. 
However, these are only the points at which dockworker 
attitudes differ from portworker ones. We now have to 
see where they coincided. 
The points at which there is such a coincidence 
seem to be the following: 1) a combination of hostility 
to the immediate exploiter/oppressor with dependency on 
the state; 2) a general non-consciousness of belonging 
to a national - far less an international - working 
class; 3) a combination of egalitarianism, individu-
alism and deference. The third element is already 
familiar from the findings of earlier research on 
Nigerian workers reported in Chapter 1. This parti-
cular complex can be understood in terms of the rural 
background of most Lagos Port workers. Here we have a 
relatively classless rural community, yet one in which 
competition and commercialism exist, and in which 
deference is paid to the 'big men'. This is not to say 
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that it is solely a rural hangover. We have seen that 
the pattern of class formation in Nigeria has not yet 
crystalised, that there is still much social mobility, 
and that many of the 'big men' in business and bureau-
cracy have humble origins. The particular process of 
peripheral capitalist industrialisation in West Africa 
also helps us understand the first point. The workers 
experience exploitation and oppression in the work-
place, but do not necessarily see these as local ex-
pressions of a total social order. Because, at the 
national level, the dominating social force is not a 
landed aristocracy or industrial bourgeoisie, but the 
state. And the state not only provides much - secure 
- employment but appears as a source of communal wel-
fare. Point 2, the non-consciousness of class belong-
ing, is the other side of this coin. Actually the 
situation is even worse, since the port and dockworkers 
showed little awareness of commonality with each other. 
If we consider the complex of common attitudes in 
terms of levels of worker consciousness, then we are 
here looking at what Meszaros would call a partial 
group with a status consciousness. We are obviously 
light-years away from 'recognition of the objective 
socio-historical prevalence of the strategic world 
perspectives of the working class' (Chapter 9 above). 
However, this status consciousness _is a worker cons-
ciousness, and permits the linkage of port with dock-
worker interests, as well as the linkage of these with 
other Nigerian workers. It is also something more than 
only a worker consciousness, since most of the atti-
tudes are, as we have seen, shared with the urban and 
rural poor more generally. The constraint on this set 
of attitudes for sustained common action would seem to 
be that it i¿ simply a set of attitudes, lacking syste-
matic articulation in the form of an ideology. The 
development or spreading of such ideologies is a poss-
ible function of labour leadership, and it is to such 
leadership that we will now turn. 
In terms of attitudes it has been said of both 
port and dockworker leaders that they stood too close 
to their members. This might seem a curious comment or 
criticism. Particularly when the introduction to Part 
III has stressed the necessity for ending the division 
between thinkers and doers within the labour movement. 
We do certainly see the disappearance of both social-
democratic and marxist ideologists amongst the leaders. 
But the abandonment of irrelevant ideologies seems to 
have implied the abandonment of any attempt by the 
leaders to present their followers with some more-
sophisticated and integrated (radical-democratic?) 
worldview than that of the workers themselves. Only 
the radical dockworker leaders seemed to have been 
offering some kind of intellectual leadership. But we 
have seen the qualifications placed on their radicalism 
by their position as mediators between the workers and 
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management or state. The aspirations of most of the 
leaders seem explicable in terms of this intermediate 
economic, status or power position. Indeed, it would 
seem we could explain their aspirations and ideas in 
terms of Figure 9.1, with leaders as intermediate 
categories between working class and management, or 
working class and petty-bourgeoisie. Only in their 
positive identification with the trade unions and 
stress on the necessity of political power for labour 
can we see the union leaders giving coherence and 
direction to the disparate dissatisfactions, aspira-
tions and desires of the workers. But then we have to 
take into account the divergences between the different 
leaderships, a matter to which we must now turn. 
In an initial distinction between leader types 
within Lagos Port (Chapters 10 and 11) I identified and 
named six, according to criteria of social position and 
motivation or aspiration. The six types have mostly 
been previously identified in work on Nigeria. They 
are, again, 1) the worker leader (Peace 1979:116-34; 
Smock 1969:139-46), volunteer or paid, but not yet 
professionalised; 2) the entrepreneur (Cohen 1974:119-
26) , with his portfolio of secretaryships, secondary-
educated or an ex-clerk, selling his expertise and 
treating organising as a business operation; 3) the 
intellectual (Waterman 1982: Section 3.1.7), usually an 
academic, the bearer of information, ideas and analyti-
cal capacities; 4) the cadre (Waterman 1973), trained 
and possibly paid by the communist NTUC, to which 
primary loyalty was owed, and supposed to both organise 
and educate the workers; 5) the professional, of any 
background, considering unionism as a career, and 
demonstrating primarily administrative, bargaining and 
legal capacities; 6) the senior staff leader, with a 
similar status, capacities and skills to those of 
management or the ministerial or legal officials with 
whom he deals. Dockworker unionism showed not only a 
different mix of types from portworker unionism, but 
also a broader range. And more hybrids. In both 
cases, however, we note a movement in the direction of 
the professional and/or senior staff type leader. 
If we are concerned with the leader/follower 
relationship, then we need to consider both the differ-
ence in pattern and the common direction of change. 
For both we need to refer back to concepts in Chapter 
5. It appears that a situation in which a simple 
control strategy is being exercised by management over 
barely proletarianised workers does not only give rise 
to frequent strikes but also provides an opening or 
attraction for a broad range of would-be leaders, 
including socialist intellectuals and communist cadres. 
What of the portworker leaders? In Chapter 8 it was 
suggested that the NPA seemed to combine bureaucratic 
control with a traditional proletariat. We therefore 
find unions accepted by management, and engaged in 
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wage, security and pensions negotiations (although the 
behaviour suggested by Edwards for the 'middle layer' 
worker is not totally absent). In the NPA situation, 
socialist intellectuals and communist cadres had never 
made a showing, the charismatic worker leader (Michael 
Imoudu in the 1950s-60s) had booked little success, and 
the entrepreneurs (amonst whom Fagbenro Beyioku could 
be counted) had decreasing impact. At the national 
level, Nigeria was in an uncertain phase between a 
liberal and a corporativist labour control strategy. 
This meant that unionisation was officially permitted 
and encouraged whilst not being emptied of meaning for 
the workers. The tendency toward leadership profes-
sionalisation was a result. 
How does this pattern and process relate to the 
typology of style or appeal set out in Chapter 9? 
There, adapting Post's typology, we identified the 
exemplary, charismatic, trickster, status and educator 
types. There is some coincidence between the two 
typologies, insofar as we can see (or have shown) a 
relationship between the charismatic and the worker 
leader, the educator and the socialist intellectual, 
the trickster and the entrepreneur, the status and the 
professional/senior staff type. However, we have in 
the port no exemplary leader, nor do we find any evo-
lutionary trend toward the socialist educator or intel-
lectual . Rather do we see the disappearance or mar-
ginal isation of these (as well as of charismatic and 
trickster types) with time. This is not to suggest 
some iron law of bureaucratisation. But there is 
clearly a relationship between leadership types and 
particular phases of industrialisation, labour control 
strategy and working-class self-identification. The 
time for exemplary, charismatic and socialist intellec-
tual leadership in Nigeria may come again. 
We should not assume that the process of profes-
sionalisation necessarily implies an increasing dis-
tance of leaders from workers. Nor a simple switch of 
patrons by the workers. The evolution which did occur, 
indeed, seems to have been accompanied by a mobilisa-
tion of the workers and by the creation of a broad base 
of volunteer worker leaders. However, we cannot con-
versely assume that even such a mobilisation and broad-
ening implied a signficant démocratisation, a matter we 
must consider again below. Of the six types I identi-
fy, five are possessors of special skills or qualities 
which place them in a position of superiority to the 
worker, thus providing the structural basis for patron-
client relation». Only the worker leader does not, but 
he is at this phase in the development of Nigerian 
capitalism being excluded from top leadership or con-
verted into something else. If this is the situation, 
should not the future problem be seen as that of 
spreading the necessary skills or qualities amongst the 
workers, of ending the specialised function of leader-
ship over and above them? 
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12.2. Structure and factionalism 
In the NPA unions we have members, accounts and 
conferences. In the dockworker unions we have follow-
ers, collections and meetings. This, in a nutshell is 
the difference in the organisational structure of the 
two types. The dockworker union exception - the BSA 
with its forced check-off and industrial relations 
consultant - only proves the general rule. The differ-
ence is clearly between recognised unions oriented 
towards collective bargaining and unrecognised unions 
mobilising for recognition. The common process was the 
clear movement toward a single, united and dynamic 
union in each sector. Whilst this again suggests a 
coming together of leaders and followers, we must 
recall 1) that the state was also in favour of indus-
trial (or, in this case, half-industrial) unions, and 
2) that big industrial unions are not necessarily more 
democratic than small non-industrial ones. 
In the initial theoretical discussion of trade 
union structure a process was suggested of increasing 
bureaucratisation as unions gain in size and recogni-
tion. There is a movement from primitive democracy to 
popular bossdom, from the parttime to the fulltime 
leader, from the socially-transformatory to the collec-
tive-bargaining union. Worker victories are turned 
into capitalist instruments, unions are bureaucratised, 
professionalised, 'politicalised' and incorporated. 
The only countervailing force is the self-activity of 
the rank-and-file. This would seem to be a sufficient 
framework for understanding our case. However, it is 
necessary to recall that Nigeria never had the exten-
sive artisan stratum which provided the base of power-
ful craft unions and also of early anti-capitalist 
protest. In place of volunteer artisan leaders, 
Nigeria - and the port - had semi-professional or 
middle-stratum leaders. And in place of anti-capi-
talist it had anti-imperialist unionism. It is there-
fore difficult to consider the transition to the pre-
sent pattern as a fall from grace. We have now, how-
ever, to take into account not so much divisions bet-
ween workers and leaders on the vertical axis as bet-
ween groups of both workers and leaders on the horizon-
tal one. 
The main form of factionalism amongst the unions 
in Lagos Port was the ethnic one. And the major in-
stance was almost identical in both halves of the 
industry. This is quite remarkable given the pre-
viously noted differences between labour force, control 
strategy and union structure. The case in mind is that 
of the two radical unions, the R&PTbCSU and the ADWT& 
GWU(N). In each case the rising radical leadership was 
predominantly Yoruba, the declining moderates predo-
minantly non-Yoruba, and the ethnic card was being 
played by the multi-ethnic moderates. Possible explan-
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ations have already been suggested for a given ethnic 
predominance in union leadership: it could have re-
flected a certain ethnic balance in membership, or the 
early role of ethnic stranger leaders. The rise of 
Yoruba leaderships could also have been due to the 
departure of Ibo workers and leaders during the Civil 
War. But what of the common radicalism of two pre-
dominantly Yoruba leaderships of such different ideolo-
gical and political backgrounds as those of Adebola and 
Odulana? We have, again, already suggested that the 
Yoruba leaderships may have been less incorporated into 
a western, christian and liberal culture and therefore 
more capable of a populist response to the rising 
dissatisfaction of the workers. We have seen that it 
would have been impossible for Adebola to have had a 
wide appeal to the NPA workers if he had played the 
ethnic card. And whilst it might have been possible 
for Odulana, there is no convincing evidence that he 
did. Given the multi-ethnic nature of each workforce, 
indeed, any ethnic appeal could in this situation only 
have been an obstacle to class consciousness and unity. 
Consequently, it was the conservative forces within the 
unions that made most use of it. But - because they 
were liberals and because they were multi-ethnic in 
composition - they could hardly make a tribalist ap-
peal. Instead, they tried to prevent the radicals from 
having a universal appeal by labelling them as tribal-
ist. 
It is notable that these more conservative leaders 
grasped at ethnicity as the previously predominant form 
of factionalism - grades and trades - declined in 
appeal. Conversely, where the conservative Yoruba-
dominated leadership of the BSA still controlled its 
membership as a company-based faction, it had no need 
to make ethnic appeals or accusations. As for Okon, he 
used ethnic accusation to defend his company-based 
faction from the radical ADWT&GWU(N). And he used a 
group-self-interest appeal to defend it from his fellow 
moderates in the ADWT&GWU(U). 
Interesting is the different extent of ethnic 
appeal and explanation in each of our two wage-labour 
sectors. The 'advanced' NPA unions showed in this 
period much more evidence of ethnic factionalism than 
the 'backward* or 'undeveloped* dockworker unions. We 
have seen that amongst dockworker unions differences 
were more commonly expressed in terms of organisational 
structure and union strategy than in those of ethni-
city. Yet, at earlier periods, the reverse seems to 
have been true. In the 1950s and 1960s, portworker 
unionists were more concerned with strategical and 
ideological issues, and - at least in the mid-1960s -
the dockworker unionists were pre-occupied with ethnic 
argument. There would thus seem to be no direct and 
positive co-relation between the type of sector or type 
of worker and the appeal to ethnicity. But there 
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would again seem to be one - a negative one - between a 
class appeal (whether of a socialist or a populist 
type) and an ethnic one. In each case the suppression 
or disappearance of class appeal or class strategies 
saw a rise in ethnic factionalism. And in both cases 
- at both periods - ethnic factionalism seems to have 
been more marked in the moderate than the radical 
unions. 
Let us sum up the argument so far. Firstly, it is 
evident that there was abundant material for faction-
alism in the port, whether based on fractioning within 
wage-labour or segmentation within the social formation 
more generally. Secondly, there is no necessary corre-
lation between ethnic predominance in a leadership and 
ethnic appeal (although such leadership has evident 
dangers in this respect). Thirdly, an ethnic appeal 
can be made in a 'liberal anti-tribalist' form. 
Fourthly, conservative leaderships must obstruct hori-
zontal identification amongst the masses and therefore 
tend to factionalism, particularly when on the defen-
sive. Finally (and conversely) a radicalisation of the 
masses implies opposition to factionalism. There seems 
no reason to assume that liberals or moderate refor-
mists are more tribalist than populists or radical 
reformists. But liberals and moderate reformists deny 
themselves the weapon of class ideology and mobilisa-
tion in struggling against factionalism, whether eth-
nic, political/ideological or personal. 
How does this all tie up with our earlier theore-
tical discussion? There was stressed 1) the basis in 
popular experience for ethnic self-identification 
amongst the masses, 2) the virtual inevitability of 
class consciousness in the third world taking ethnic 
form, 3) the failure of liberal-democratic society, 
revolutionary movements and post-capitalist societies 
to overcome such particularism, 4) the mutually-suppor-
ting relationship of ethnicity, factionalism and clien-
tage, and 5) the obstacle that factionalism forms for 
the surpassing of the hierarchical relationship between 
leader and follower. On the basis of our evidence and 
argument I would only want to point out the following. 
Firstly, that we do not here have evidence to trace out 
the connection to clientage, although we will below. 
We can, nonetheless, see how factionalism was used in 
certain cases to preserve a certain leadership consti-
tuency. Secondly, and more importantly, I would want 
to question or qualify Point 2 above. It is true that 
John Saul, in making this statement, recognised the 
problem that such a virtual inevitability created for 
revolutionary socialists. But our case does not 
suggest any such inevitability and - insofar as it 
reveals the existence of ethnic identification -
suggests that it created a problem for any radicali-
sation. Perhaps Saul was thinking of situations of 
race-class identity, where either the exploiting-ruling 
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minority or the exploited-oppressed majority has a 
distinct ethnic character. But our situation (which is 
surely more common) is one in which the working class 
is ethnically mixed, even if it contains distinct 
ethnic strata and fractions. In such a situation, 
appeal to an ethnic identity even by an underprivileged 
minority would (inevitably?) reinforce vertical link-
ages to ethnic leaders and ethnic exploiters/oppres-
sors. Insofar as we recognise the truth of the follow-
ing arguments (Points 3,4 and 5), we will in any case 
see how factionalism reinforces clientalism. It seems 
that any cessation of mobilisation and consciousness 
raising will tend to convert unions from working-class 
organs into capitalistic and statist ones. Within the 
latter, the norms of competition and hierarchy are at 
home, and these cannot of themselves obstruct the 
reproduction of factionalism and clientalism, or other 
particularistic appeals. It is therefore instructive 
to witness in Lagos Port a moment at which movement 
within the unions was, if briefly, in the working-class 
direction. 
12.3. External affiliation 
Here we are back to the question of patron-client 
relations - if not ethnic ones. 
The striking similarity between the two sectors 
here is the continuing importance of national and 
international affiliation for the moderates at a time 
when they were of decreasing importance to the radi-
cals. The unimportance for the radicals in both sec-
tors was due to their turning toward the workers -
workers whom we have seen to have had little or no 
interest in a national or international working-class 
movement. Worker radicalisation is commonly accom-
panied by greater consciousness and contacts with 
national and international movements. But, in this 
case, the national movement had been demobilised by 
intimidation from the military regimes and by its own 
ideological disorientation in the face of these. The 
national union centres functioned most effectively as 
consultative or negotiating bodies during national 
commissions on wages. As for the international organi-
sations, these were too incorporated into the ruling 
ideologies of West and East, too much a part of Cold 
War diplomacy, to be able to offer relevant ideas and 
effective assistance to the Nigerian workers. The 
disorientation and demobilisation of the national and 
international movements meant that - again - their 
relationship towards unions in the cargo-handling 
industry was primarily defined by their positions in a 
power and wealth hierarchy. Here we had a patronage 
network running from the 'big men' at the centre, down 
to the minor union officers at the periphery. The 
international organisations offered an attractive 
alternative source of support to that of the workers. 
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And since their primary demand was loyalty, they encou-
raged not only dependency but also factionalism as 
different individuals and groups fought for the limited 
rewards offered. As an alternative base for trade 
union leaders, the international organisations thus 
also encouraged the cleavage between leaders and mem-
bers. Is this why the Western unions active in Nigeria 
were incapable of supporting in the cargo-handling 
industry those unions that were as loudly nationalistic 
and as effectively 'economistic' as they themselves at 
home? 
The major difference regarding at least inter-
national trade union contacts was their continuing 
importance for the moderate dockworker unionists at a 
time when this was declining for the moderate portwor-
ker ones. This requires little explanation. The 
relatively unorganised dockworkers provided an attrac-
tion for external patrons - and not only international 
trade union ones. At the same time, we have seen that 
the moderate dockworker organisation was heavily depen-
dent upon such external patrons, without whom it is 
unlikely to have reappeared in the docks. 
In the theoretical introduction it was suggested 
that patronage analysis was insufficient for the under-
standing and surpassing of patronage relations. All we 
have so far done in this section is to reveal the 
existence of these at the level of the international 
trade union movement. This is certainly necessary in 
order to demystify the nature of international trade 
union relations, to penetrate beyond the projected 
self-image, and to show how such organisations can 
themselves stimulate the very factionalism and tri-
balism they condemn. It is also necessary in order to 
understand how the isolation of the two radical leader-
ships in the port could be a positive act, an act of 
liberation from such patronage. But it is evident that 
we need other concepts in order to specify both the 
relation and role of the international organisations to 
working-class struggle internationally, and their 
transformation over time. Here we can make use of 
Section 2 and Footnote 2 to Chapter 5, which attempt to 
present a marxist approach to international union 
history and function. This material suggests that the 
present form of trade union internationalism - at least 
as it affected Nigerian port unionism in the 1970s - is 
an increasingly archaic one. It is a result of a parti-
cular compromise struck in the late 19th century bet-
ween the labour movement on the one hand and capital 
and state on the other. This same material suggests a 
range of possible roles or functions of the interna-
tional labour movement at the present time (interna-
tional relations, international union relations, inter-
national working-class solidarity). And it suggests 
the pressures being raised since the mid-60s for a 
transformation of international trade union relations. 
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The action of radical trade union leaders in Lagos Port 
was, thus, not only a reaffirmation of ties with the 
workers, it was also an implicit practical critique of 
a model and period of international trade union rela-
tions which had little left to offer except patronage. 
Did it not thus make its own modest contribution to the 
more self-conscious efforts of radical worker leaders 
in other peripheral capitalist countries? The fact, 
however, that it was in this case a barely conscious 
act, and that the radical leaders did not link a strug-
gle against their client status with their at-least 
potential patron status meant that the danger of a 
further reproduction of patron-client relations in new 
ideological or political clothes could not be ruled 
out. 
12.4. Conclusion 
The initial question raised in this chapter was of 
the extent to which the union form itself reinforces 
divisions amongst workers. Let us summarise the argu-
ment before returning to this issue. 
In discussing worker-leader relations we first 
tried to specify worker consciousness. We found 
amongst the workers separate orientations toward the 
middle salaried and petty-bourgeois strata respective-
ly, but also a common consciousness of status. This 
common consciousness did not include a national and 
international working class, nor the other labouring 
people of Nigeria, but it paralleled those of these 
others and therefore could now be seen to have allowed 
for common action with them. Amongst the leaders we 
identified a common process of professionalisation, but 
without any definite process of either bureaucratisa-
tion or démocratisation. It was suggested that insofar 
as the leaders were failing to raise the consciousness 
and activity of the members they could themselves be 
considered as occupying intermediate and mediating 
positions between the workers on the one hand and 
capital and state on the other. 
In considering union structure and factionalism we 
identified a common process toward a collective-bar-
gaining unionism, but again without any definite con-
clusion concerning bureaucratisation. However, it was 
then suggested that there was a definite relationship 
between factionalism, clientalism and conservative 
leadership. It could now be suggested that insofar as 
collective bargaining status is achieved and accepted 
as both means and end of union activity, unions become 
conservative and factionalism and clientalism will be 
stimulated. 
The last section continued this line of argument 
in considering union relations 'upwards' in terms of 
clientage. Here a relationship was suggested between 
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factionalism, clientage and a national and interna-
tional trade union movement marked by an increasingly 
archaic compromise arrangement with capital and state. 
Factionalism and clientage are here seen as both stimu-
lating and being stimulated by the reproduction of 
capitalism and statism on a world scale, with the world 
trade union movement as its channel. 
Where does this lead us to with respect to our 
fundamental question? Our case suggests that capital 
and state (competition and hierarchy) operate inside as 
well as outside or above the trade union movement. In 
so far as union leaders do not recognise this and take 
action against it, obstacles to what has been called 
the expansion and consolidation of a working class 
would seem likely to remain. There is no evidence that 
such action was taken nor that recognition of this 
problem existed amongst either of the two radical 
leaderships. They had, therefore, taken only a limited 
step away from the mediating role that capitalism seeks 
to foist on worker leaders. Perceived as specialised 
structures with an allotted role in an existing social 
formation, unions seem likely to reproduce old divi-
sions or create new ones amongst workers. Perceived as 
a movement against capitalism and statism outside, 
competition and hierarchy inside, unions can contribute 
to overcoming divisions amongst workers. Given the 
failure of both radical leaderships to recognise the 
necessity of this within their respective sectors, it 
is hardly surprising that little if any effort was made 
at overcoming the division between them. 
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PART IV 
COLLECTIVE WORKER PROTEST ACTION 
Chapter 13: Theoretical introduction: strike action 
and worker organisation 
Chapter 14: Portworker protest: going the whole hog? 
Chapter 15: Dockworker protest: sit-ins, go-homes, and 
the howling mob 
Chapter 16: Analysis: the slow and awkward self-defin-
ition of a working class 
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Chapter 13 
THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION: 
STRIKE ACTION AND WORKER ORGANISATION 
Part IV is concerned with collective worker protest 
action. There are other forms of protest (absenteeism, 
indiscipline, etc.)[l] which are certainly more wide-
spread and common, but which do not require the public 
collective refutation of capital and state that the 
strike does. On the other hand, there are other forms 
of collective worker action (creation of cooperatives, 
participation in unions, voting behaviour) which may-
give us more information about working-class capacity 
to control its own environment. These, however, do not 
usually demand the mass involvement of strikes. Nor do 
they have the same dramatic - the literally theatrical 
- effect in defining 'us' and 'them'. If revolutions, 
finally, are 'festivals of the oppressed', strikes must 
be considered at least family celebrations in which 
workers assert - however briefly - their rejection of 
wage-slavery. We will see however that strikes are not 
homogeneous in character, and that the extent and 
nature of such protest against the wage labour rela-
tionship takes different forms in the two sectors of 
the cargo-handling industry. 
In order to situate this material and to handle it 
theoretically we will in this chapter consider in turn 
1) strikes as a general form of working-class protest, 
2) the specificity of strikes at the capitalist peri-
phery, and - briefly - 3) the historical setting of 
strike movements in Nigeria. For both the first and 
second we will be drawing on the work of Richard Hyman, 
who has written widely on strikes in the British con-
text (1972, 1975), the industrialised capitalist coun-
tries more generally (1979a), at the periphery (1979b), 
and who has also synthesised recent marxist writings on 
the topic (1980). 
13.1. Strikes in general 
Firstly, then, strikes as a general social pheno-
menon. [2] We may begin with two initial assertions. 
The first is that strike action occurs within a setting 
of antagonistic relations of production and are an 
expression of protest against the exploitation and 
oppression that these imply. This is simply to re-
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assert a general view of the workers' position spelled 
out in earlier chapters. The second is that strikes 
represent creative, positive and purposive action by 
workers to establish collective social control over 
forces which capital and state cannot themselves effec-
tively master. 
This does not mean that strikes are all of one 
piece. The general social position and the general 
needs of workers mean that the potential for strike 
action is always present. But workers may take part in 
any particular strike for a variety of individual or 
group motives, such motives may conflict, the expressed 
motive or overt cause of the action may conceal under-
lying or more general ones, and the very purpose of the 
strike may only become explicit during the event. 
When considering how worker discontents are trans-
formed into protest action, one much surpass explana-
tions in terms of simple 'spontaneity' from below or 
'organisation' from above in favour of a recognition of 
the complex interplay between workers and leaders. All 
collective protest is organised and structured, with 
leaders playing a crucial role in both the initiation 
of action and in shaping {out of the variety of worker 
discontents) both the meaning and purpose of the 
strike. Such 'selective articulation' of protest may, 
of course, be not only by formally recognised union or 
worker leaders, but by opinion leaders amongst the 
workers, or by influential individuals or organisations 
outside the unions - or the working class itself. 
If we recognise that organisation is necessary for 
struggle, then we must also recognise that organisation 
restrains struggle. This is a matter well-recognised 
for the 'collective bargaining* union that attempts to 
formulate demands in negotiable forms and terms (quan-
titative or incremental ones being the most appro-
priate) , and to reduce protest action to conventional 
or even ritualised forms under leadership control. 
However, such restraint on worker assertion is the 
effect of the 'consolidation of hierarchical repre-
sentational structures' in general - of any separation 
of the activation and representation of interests. 
In recognising the capacity of worker organisa-
tions to both express and repress worker discontents, 
we must not fail to distinguish them from other in-
terest organisations within capitalist societies, of 
which analogous statements could be made. What is 
distinctive of worker organisations is that they are 
constituted through struggle. Workers are not only 
subordinated to capital, they are atomised by market 
competition, and each possesses separate needs, aspir-
ations and interests for which (unlike the profit 
motive and cash calculus for capitalists) there is no 
'natural' common denominator. Given the relative 
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powerlessness and division of workers, their organi-
sational strength can derive only from the 'mobilisa-
tion of collectivity' itself. The willingness to take 
action is both a cause and an outcome of a collective 
self-definition of interests. This implies a struggle 
to overcome both the assigned role of the worker under 
capital and the ideological forms by which this is 
disguised. The creation of a working-class identity 
and the meeting of working-class needs is something 
which requires a redefinition of the identity and needs 
of working-class individuals and groups. Strikes need 
to be understood as contributing to this process. 
If we understand the process of working-class 
self-identification in terms of a re-definition through 
struggle of identity and needs, then we can better 
understand the process by which major working-class 
struggles to overcome a certain institutionalisation or 
codification of forms of organisation and protest lead 
to a re-institutional isation: 
Re-institutionalisation of militancy is 
facilitated where its initial impetus in-
volves the more aggressive pursuit of exist-
ing collective bargaining objectives, rather 
than radically new strategies and definitions 
of collective interest. (Hyman 1980:23-4). 
The phrase 'collective bargaining' could be here re-
moved to provide us with a general recognition of the 
limits on collective protest activity. Evidently, the 
militancy or extremity of strikes is in itself no 
indicator of the capacity to extend control over 
society, or even the workers' own organisations. 
13.2. Strikes at the capitalist periphery 
Hyman's generalisations are, in fact, based on 
consideration of the strike phenomenon in industri-
alised capitalist societies. Let us now consider the 
phenomenon at the capitalist periphery by first sur-
veying some evidence. In an earlier overview of some 
20 papers on third world strikes[3] (Waterman 1979c), 
the following points were made about the nature of 
strike action. Firstly, that even barely-proletarian-
ised workers, isolated from the world labour movement, 
and in a very hostile environment, are capable of bold, 
imaginative and effective strike action. In a study of 
the Nambibian strike of 1971-2, Richard Moorsom (1979) 
showed how migrant workers, living under a tightly-
policed, colonial, racist regime, and without trade 
unions, were nonetheless capable of organising sus-
tained industrial action. What might before this 
action have been considered evidence of 'weakness' or 
'subordination', now appeared as the bedrock on which 
aggressive action was based. The workers were able to 
exploit their semi-peasant status, their isolation in 
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well-policed compounds, the defensive ethic of brother-
hood, to attack first individual companies and then the 
regime itself. 
This brings us to a second point, the manner in 
which strike actions spread and escalate. It is not-
able that all the major strike movements surveyed began 
with 'narrow', 'economistic', 'sectional' demands. It 
was during campaigns on these immediate issues that the 
strikes began to escalate to a higher and more directly 
political level. The escalation from one level to 
another was frequently accompanied by a process of 
widening, as movements spread from one factory to 
another, from factories into the streets and popular 
residential areas and even into the countryside. Thus 
strike movements allow for the overcoming of two cru-
cial cleavages produced by capitalist economic develop-
ment or state ideology and action: that between differ-
ent sectors of the labouring poor and that between the 
industrial and political levels. 
This, in turn, brings us to a third point. Even 
if action within the industry and residential area can 
be organised by the workers themselves, action in the 
'political' arena (i.e. struggle with or against the 
state) inevitably means action in collaboration with or 
mediated by intermediate strata. Moorsom pointed out 
the leading role played by students in planning and in 
mobilising workers for an attack on the contract labour 
system as a means of strengthening the national liber-
ation movement. Although he asserted that the actual 
movement rested 'entirely with the organisers and 
workers themselves' (1970:221) and that it was not 
subordinated to wider considerations of nationalist 
strategy, he also showed that when they returned to 
their place of origin in Ovamboland, the leaders came 
into collaboration with 'an already militant white-
collar opposition' there. Similarly, Shaheed writing 
on the Karachi strike wave of 1969-72, stated that 
the movement against Ayub Khan was a nation-
wide effort, and involved strata of society 
in addition to the working class - notably 
professionals such as lawyers, teachers, 
doctors...(Shaheed 1979:191). 
The problem here is that in escalating from the indus-
trial to the political level, the strike movement is 
likely to change from a working-class one into some-
thing else. If the 1971-2 Namibia strike had been 
successful, its likely result would have indeed been 
the introduction of a 'free labour market' (Moorsom), a 
state staffed by ex-students and white-collar workers, 
and a trade union movement created by the new national 
state and probably staffed by the same people. 
Where, in peripheral formations, strike movements 
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- or generations of working-class struggle - have won 
the right to organise there is no guarantee that the 
union leadership will in all (or even in any) case 
favour strike action. My survey suggested that union 
leaders - communists and social democratic, from the 
periphery or the core capitalist formations - had 
considerable reservations about strikes in the third 
world. George Fernandes, social-democratic leader of 
the railwaymen during the historic Indian railway 
strike of 1974, revealed (Fernandes 1980) that his 
efforts were directed to preventing the strike before 
it occured and to calling it off once it took place. 
Agustín Muñoz, of the pro-Allende Chilean trade union 
centre, failed in a historical survey to mention worker 
strikes that pushed Chile to the left despite the 
compromising of Allende with the right (Munoz 1979) . 
Gilbert Julis (1979), of the French Communist-led 
Confederation Generale du Travail, distinguished bet-
ween under-developed countries of a more-progressive 
and of a bourgeois type, and gave examples of strikes 
from the latter but not from the former. The extreme 
point was reached by Solomon (1979) of the Brussels-
based International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, 
who declared that 
the right to strike is not an absolute and 
unqualified right. It is subject to restric-
tions in the interest of public good. Wor-
kers are members of society and must respect 
the interests of society... 
and concluded that 
contrary to popular belief, strong, democra-
tic, free trade unions are organisations 
which help to prevent strikes and are not 
their cause... 
In fact, the only trade unionists surveyed who seemed 
to have an unambiguously positive attitude toward 
strikes were two temporarily-exiled Peruvian miners' 
leaders, coming from a country in which a military 
regime with radical pretensions was provoking mass 
working-class resistance whilst being unable or un-
willing to channel it off or crush it. 
The overview did not, however, suggest that unions 
could be dismissed as agents of the state and bour-
geoisie. It recognised rather, the manner in which 
even conservative leaderships responded to forceful 
worker protest action. Shaheed showed that in the 
strike situation certain leaders simply ignored the 
pressures from below, whilst others in fact adjusted to 
them. For Shaheed, it was not simply a case of the 
'radical' workers opposing the 'compromising' bureau-
crats. It was more a matter of the impact of working-
class action on working-class organisation. What he 
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showed was such an organisation being brought under 
closer control by the workers, either over the decade 
he was dealing with or during the strike movement he 
was concentrating on. Even after this assertion by the 
workers, ambiguity remained within the leadership: 
leaders who were formally associated with the 
old form of organisation and mode of opera-
tions,. .change their mode of operations and 
in turn work in cooperation with new forms of 
organisation... (Shaheed 1979:201) 
Yet, progress in working-class organisation had been 
made. The lesson was drawn from Argentinian experience 
by Elizabeth Jelin, and it is certainly of more than 
Argentinian relevance: 
In the Argentine case it is difficult to deny 
the fact that 'bureaucratic' leaders were 
representative. Indeed, important sectors of 
the working class were identified with their 
leadership and with the struggle they were 
waging. The 'bureaucratic' union bargaining 
organisation did not result from the will of 
certain labour leaders and/or from certain 
state officials, but was for a long time 
anchored in and responded to the needs and 
orientations of the Peronist mass of workers. 
Nonetheless, the processes of political and 
economic change which have taken place in 
Argentina in recent years generated new 
sectors of workers and new needs. For these, 
the union structure proved to be inadequate. 
Their field of struggle centred directly 
around the workplace and their forms of 
action were direct, with high rank-and-file 
participation and less delegation to union 
organisations. (Jelin 1979:251). 
It is evident from this rapid and limited overview 
that where working-class protest action actually makes 
working-class history is within and around itself. It 
is, therefore, back to working-class organisation and 
consciousness that we have to look if we want to esti-
mate the success of working-class action. This applies 
not only to cases in which mass working-class protest 
activity has brought about political revolutions, but 
even to cases in which strikes appear to have failed. 
The point was made by Shaheed: 
For the workers of Karachi, the feeling of 
power and of control over their own lives -
however contingent and temporary this may 
have been - at moments of strike action 
constitutes the success of those strikes, and 
this feeling may constitute the ultimate 
long-term success of such action. Just as 
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grievances accumulate in the collective 
consciousness of the working class, these 
experiences of relative autonomy and control 
over their own lives remain and accumulate in 
their collective consciousness and help to 
form the goal for future action. 
Generalising on strikes at the periphery on the 
basis of the same set of studies, Hyman declares that. 
Commonly they are a form of pressure or 
protest directed against the government 
rather than individual private employers; 
accordingly, they are likely to possess an 
overt political dimension. An important 
feature of their development may be the 
demand that what are supposedly organisations 
representing workers' interests perform this 
role adequately in practice; or else the 
struggle for acceptance of new representative 
institutions. Strikes which are an explicit 
challenge to established authority are com-
monly intimately linked with other forms of 
popular protest; thus upsurges of strike 
action normally occur in periods of more 
general social and political turmoil (Hyman 
1979b:323). 
On the basis of my own overview above, I would add and 
stress the inevitable ambiguity of the 'overt political 
dimension' insofar as reference here is to the politics 
of state rather that of the workplace, the place of 
residence, and the workers' own organisations. 
Hyman, however, goes further, suggesting that 
generalisation about 'third world strikes' is likely to 
be both too broad and too narrow. It is too broad 
because the category 'third world' 
includes feudal backwaters and societies with 
a confident and cosmopolitan national bour-
geoisie; military regimes, one-party states 
and (in diminishing numbers) liberal parlia-
mentary systems; economies with a substantial 
'modern' sector and a well-established urban 
proletariat, and those still overwhelmingly 
rural and agrarian; victims of unqualified 
economic imperialism and possessors of a 
significant degree of economic autarchy; 
state-managed economies and those in which 
private capital exerts a key role; societies 
in which the working class subscribes to an 
ideology of national unity and those where 
there is an extensive consciousness of a 
distinctive identity and divergent interests; 
countries where representative working-class 
organisations can exist openly, and those 
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where mobilisation must occur clandestinely. 
(Hyman 1979b:323). 
The isolation of 'third world strikes' is narrowing, 
Hyman suggests, because of the evident parallels bet-
ween strikes at the periphery and those in either core 
capitalist or post-capitalist formations.[4] This is a 
point worth stressing. It is evident that 'incorpora-
tion' is not a monopoly of core capitalist formations 
- nor is it restricted to liberal-democratic polities. 
Conversely, Hyman's above-cited generalisation about 
strikes at the periphery could be applied almost word 
for word to capitalism's other periphery - the post-
capitalist formations![5] 
13.3. Strike movements in Nigeria 
We may conclude this discussion of strikes with a 
note on strikes in Nigeria. Part of the national 
background is provided in chapters 14 and 15 them-
selves. What is, perhaps, the most important factor to 
recall here is the relationship of major industrial 
strikes or strike movements to national political ones. 
Thus, the strikes in 1946 and the following years 
inevitably took on a nationalist political colouring 
and were quite deliberately exploited for their nation-
alist potential by the petty-bourgeois and inter-
mediate-strata politicians who led the nationalist 
movement. This is quite clear from the manner in which 
the nationalist politicians who had supported the 1945 
strike began to distance themselves from the unions as 
soon as the de-colonisation process began (Cohen 1974: 
164) . It is even more clear from the Enugu affair of 
1949. Striking coalminers had been fired on by police, 
resulting in 25 dead and 51 wounded. An 'inter-party, 
inter-ethnic, inter-class' National Emergency Committee 
was set up (Cohen 1974:74). This lasted less than one 
year. The major result of the nationalist uproar was a 
British decision to allow Nigerianisation of certain 
government posts. And the event itself soon ceased to 
be even commemorated. The political success that 
crowned this period - national independence - was not 
to be repeated. 
Already in 1963 worker disappointment with Inde-
pendence began to be expressed in strike action. In 
1964 there took place a major General Strike which -
although concerned primarily with wages - was taken as 
expressing popular discontent with an inegalitarian and 
corrupt social order (Cohen 1974:164-68). The attempts 
of socialist parties and radical union centres to 
convert this discontent into a directly political 
attack on the regime failed. During the (admittedly 
disturbed) general elections following the General 
Strike, neither the communist Socialist Workers and 
Farmers Party nor the independent-socialist Nigerian 
Labour Party managed to make any showing. The workers 
269 
remained firmly attached to the old nationalist or new 
regionalist parties (Melson 1970). And the civilian 
regime was eventually overthrown by a military coup. 
The two strike waves of 1970-71 (Adebo) and 1975 
(Udoji) remained unarticulated politically either by 
working-class or non-working-class forces (Adeogun 
1979; Peace 1979:Ch.6; Lübeck 1979). The first of 
these waves was also the first which was essentially 
factory-based and demonstrated the coming-of-age of the 
industrial working class in Nigeria. The second was 
supported by most middle-stratum wage-earners in 
Nigeria and expressed general social discontent with 
the military regime of General Gowon. But the fall of 
Gowon was again engineered by a military coup, not a 
working-class or popular movement. 
Between such major movements it has been possible 
to witness a less dramatic pattern in which discontent 
led to wage commissions, commissions recommended in-
creases to public sector workers, and other sectors 
then struck to get the increases applied to themselves 
also. But, whilst expressing and feeding wage-earner 
consciousness, such strikes have remained confined to 
the industrial level. 
Against this national background, let us consider 
the evidence we have of collective industrial protest 
action in the Lagos cargo-handling industry. 
NOTES 
1. A point developed by Robin Cohen (1980). Cohen is 
concerned to surpass the terms in which African 
working-class protest and consciousness was con-
sidered by radical scholars in the 1970s - terms 
in which this present work has been largely con-
ceived. There has, he says, 'been too much reli-
ance on data relating to strikes, unionisation and 
overt political militance, and for the most part a 
failure to discover and evaluate the silent, 
unorganised, covert responses of African workers* 
(Cohen 1980:8). He feels it necessary to specify 
the precise implications of the capitalist labour 
process and then, on this basis, to identify the 
variety of labour responses. Imposition of the 
wage-labour relationship has implied 1) enforced 
proletarianisation, 2) managerial control, 3) 
psychological adjustment, 4) differential reward, 
5) political control. He identifies 15 types of 
worker response, of which only five or so - inclu-
ding economic and political strikes - have been 
customarily considered by radical scholars. The 
other 10 are desertion, community withdrawal or 
revolt, target working, task/efficiency/time bar-
gaining, sabotage, creation of a work (worker? PW) 
2 70 
culture, accidents and sickness, drug use, belief 
in other-wordly solutions, and theft. Cohen 
believes that attention to these multiple forms of 
covert protest will enable us to overcome the 
'formula dichotomies' (economic/political, re-
formist/revolutionary, etc.) that have marred or 
limited studies of overt protest. Moreover, 
recognition of the 'variety of responses and 
tenacity of purpose shown by African workers in 
their attempt to resist the capitalist labour 
process' will reveal the so far limited 'capacity 
of African trade unions and revolutionary parties 
to channel such dissent for progressive or revo-
lutionary ends' (22). It is not possible here to 
do justice to Cohen's original conceptualisation 
and argument. One can only welcome the broader 
and deeper research agenda for the 1980s that it 
implies. But I do feel it necessary to make a few 
points that relate to my work: 1) The error of 
'formula dichotomies' must be combatted at the 
level of theory, otherwise it may be simply repro-
duced within the new extended area of study 
(overt/covert? extant-and-readily-observed/latent-
and-subterannean?); 2) the unions/parties have 
channeled (and converted) discontent into forms 
(and demands) that suit unions/parties - 'econo-
mic' bargaining with employers and 'political' 
bargaining with or over the state; 3) the politi-
cal import of the new focus is that it is on areas 
over which workers do or could exercise direct 
control unmediated by unions/parties - and that it 
allows us to measure increasing worker conscious-
ness in terms of 'capacity to control' rather than 
adoption of ideologies; 4) studies of forms of 
overt protest such as strikes also need to be 
carried out from the perspective suggested in 
Point 3 - something I hope to do within the rest 
of Part IV. 
What follows is a restructured and selective 
synthesis of the final parts of Hyman (1980). It 
should be noted that Hyman is himself drawing here 
in part on Offe and Wiesenthal (1980). 
This was written in response to a 1977 seminar on 
'Third World Strikes' held at the Institute of 
Social Studies in The Hague in 1977. 
Hyman attempts to surpass a 'three worlds' typo-
logy of strikes by offering - tentatively and with 
qualifications - a matrix of 'schematic contexts 
of strike activity' (1979b:327). This has 'em-
ployer-state perceptions of labour action' along 
one axis, and 'goals of labour action' along the 
other. Employer/state attitudes are either 'inte-
grative/corporativist', 'troublesome but legiti-
mate', or 'disruptive/illegitimate'. Labour goals 
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are either 'moderate-reformist', 'radical compro-
mising', or 'radical uncompromising'. Whilst I 
find Hyman's ambition admirable, I also find his 
categories formalistic and empty of historical-
social content. The typology is therefore open to 
the critique offered in Chapter 5, Footnote 7. 
His qualifications to the scheme, moreover, would 
seem so extensive as to both seriously undermine 
it and suggest the difficulty of constructing a 
more adequate one: 
The schema ignores internal differen-
tiations within both labour and capital. 
On the side of labour, vertical divi-
sions (between industries, occupations, 
races, sexes) and horizontal (between 
central leadership, local activists and 
the more passive membership) are often 
highly significant. On the other side, 
divergent interests between fractions of 
capital, contrast between 'progressive' 
and 'conservative' employers, and ten-
sions both within the state and in its 
relationship to capital, can all exert a 
profound influence. Moreover, variations 
between regions, industries of tribal 
groups may case doubts on the validity 
of any single national stereotype 
(334). 
I would like to hope that my own typoplgies in 
Chapter 5 might provide at least a base for a more 
adequate schema. 
This is something that has been recognised by both 
a socialist Brazilian strike leader and a fascist 
South African politician. Both were responding to 
the Polish workers' movement of 1981-2. The 
Brazilian was the first national working-class 
leader to not only identify with the Polish move-
ment but to recognise the parallels with his own 
(Da Silva ('Lula') 1980). The South African 
politician did not identify with the Polish move-
ment, but was reported in the Dutch press as 
saying 'we have a Polish situation on our hands 
here' - meaning, presumably, that neither re-
pression nor concession was capable of checking 
the strike movement. 
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Chapter 14 
PORTWORKER PROTEST: GOING THE WHOLE HOG? 
A careful combing of available government, NPA and 
trade union documents, and a reading of the press since 
1970, does not reveal more than 12 industrial disputes 
in the period 1968-77. Indeed, concerning the first 
two of these (see Table 14.1) there remains doubt over 
whether action went beyond the declaration of a dis-
pute. Several of the other actions are of such a 
limited nature that it has been felt necessary to 
extend the account one year beyond the following one on 
the dockworkers. There is also a problem of paucity of 
material on those actions for which we do have more 
than a cryptic reference. Nonetheless, the record is 
rich enough to give some impression of the nature of 
protest action within the NPA at this time. It is also 
sufficient to demonstrate the differences between the 
unions. Strike action within the NPA in the 1970s has 
evidently been in large part a discontinuous campaign 
led by the R&PT&CSU. Not only was it responsible for 
eight of the 12 strikes, but its successful action 
inspired two of the others. And one of these two was 
led by NPAWU dissidents who later joined the R&PT&CSU 
precisely because of its greater militancy. 
14.1. The Civil War backlog dispute 
The disputes which broke out in 1971 appear to 
have been over a series of grades and trades issues on 
which the R&PT&CSU felt the NPA was dragging its heels. 
As eventually listed (Labour Review, 3rd Quarter, 1971) 
there were 13 items, including the appointment of an 
acting timekeeper, promotions, conversion of daily-paid 
to permanent staff, upgrading of securitymen, positions 
of secretary-typists, etc. The issue was presented by 
the union as follows: 
During the last Civil War we exercised 
patience and restraint and refrained from 
engaging in any industrial action because we 
believe that industrial upheaval during the 
period of the national emergency is not 
conducive to concentrated efforts for the 
crushing of rebellion... We adopted reason-
able and constitutional methods. Vie went to 
Table 14.1. Chart of reported portworker strikes in Lagos, 1968-77 
Dates 
196Θ-9 
1970 
19.3.71 
1-5.7.71 
10-11.8.72 
Numbers/ 
Site 
1,200 
10,000 
(inc. NRC) 
Leadership 
NMTUF 
NMTUF 
R4PT&CSU 
RÄPT&CSU 
R&PT&CSU 
Issues 
Outstanding promotions. 
Appointments of outsiders 
Military Port 
Commandant's decision to 
deprive workers of 
benefits from compulsory 
overtime 
Failure to implement agree-
ments reached in June 1970 
13, including appointment 
of timekeeper, promotions, 
acting allowances, housing, 
conversion of daily-paid 
to permanent staff, etc. 
Non-implementation of IAT 
award of one-eighth in-
crease to RSPT&CSU members 
in Traffic Department 
Comments 
Promotions later released. 
No further details 
available 
Successful 
Negotiations open on 
day of strike but 
without settlement 
Issue sent to 
conciliator. Unsettled 
items go to IAT. 
Labour Ministry 
orders payment before 
September 3p. 
Sources 
NMTUF Conference 
documents 1973 
NMTUF Conference 
Documents 1973 
See text 
See text 
See text 
3-4.10.72 
1.11.72 
30.6-1.7.73 
2-4.10.74 
6-10.3.75 
April 1976 
1.11.77 
(S day) 
1,000 
Eng.Dept. 
5,000 
nationally 
300 
Headquar-
ters & Port 
Managers 
office 
NPAWU 
N m O F 
RSPT&CSU 
R&PT&CSU 
R&PT&CSU 
R&PT&CSU 
R&PT&CSU 
Extension to Engineering 
Department of one-eighth 
award 
Extension of one-eighth 
award to all workers. 
One-eighth award, its 
extension to uncovered 
categories; release of 
promotions,etc. 
Conditions of service; 
filling of secretarial 
vacancies 
Delay in payment of 
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negotiations, we went to conciliations and we 
went to arbitrations... Despite... our con-
stitutional approaches we have been given 
great disappointments... (Daily Times, June 
9, 1971) . 
The disappointment, according to the same statement, 
was the failure of NPA to meet it for nine months after 
the declaration of a trade dispute in June 1970, and 
its failure to implement an agreement signed in that 
month. After the union appealed to the Transport 
Ministry in February 1971, the Ministry instructed the 
NPA to negotiate. According to Adebola (R&PT&CSU Con-
ference Documents 1973:32), 'Inspite of this letter the 
Management of the Authority still refused to meet us'. 
The union then called a one-day industrial action, on 
March 3, 1971, following which, 'this same Management 
wrote that they wanted to meet us on the very day'. 
Despite the negotiations, no further progress was 
made. In May 1971, management claimed that settlement 
had been held up by the Statutory Corporations Service 
Commission (SCSC) which had not acknowledged an NPA 
letter for six months. In its Daily Times statement, 
the union pointed out that the SCSC was just along the 
road from the NPA, and suggested that that body had in 
any case no powers over many of this issues raised. 
The union then gave the NPA (and the NRC with which it 
was also in dispute) until the end of the month to 
settle with it, 'failing which we shall take any action 
we deem fit'. The Transport Ministry again instructed 
the NPA to settle the issues, and the NPA declared that 
it would not permit the situation to deteriorate until 
a strike occurred (Daily Times, June 11, 1971). Evi-
dently it was unsuccessful. On July 1 there began a 
'work-to-rule' action which lasted at least three days 
(five according to the Daily Times, July 8, 1971), and 
which involved 1,200 RbPT&CSU members (Labour Review, 
3rd Quarter, 1971). It was called off after a tripar-
tite meeting, the official apprehension of a dispute 
and its reference to a Ministry conciliator. Although 
the strike was called off, Adebola continued to mobi-
lise his members, holding a mass meeting at NPA Head-
quarters, and seeking permission for 'a peaceful demon-
stration... in support of their fight for improved 
working conditions' (Daily Times, July 16, 1971). With 
the help of the conciliator, the union managed to 
achieve a number of its demands, the unsettled issues 
being sent to the IAT (R&PT&CSU Conference Report, 
1973:40). 
14.2. The one-eighth dispute 
This was a long-drawn-out dispute, primarily 
between the RbPT&CSU and the NPA, although the other 
unions were drawn in following the success of the first 
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one. It began as a claim for parity in hours between 
quay staff (clerical staff in the massive Traffic 
Department) who were working a 44-hour week along with 
the manual workers, and other clerical staff who were 
on a 39-hour week. At some point during the negoti-
ation or arbitration of this issue, Adebola seems to 
have seen the possibility of broadening the affected 
categories to include other Traffic Department staff, 
and NPA management seems to have failed to note this 
danger. [2] Be this as it may, the fact is that when 
the IAT made a favourable award on this in 197 2, it 
read as follows: 
There shall be no award in respect of the 
claim of 39-hour week but in compensation 
therefore the Tribunal awards an allowance of 
one-eighth of the salary to staff of the 
Traffic Department of the Authority who work 
a 44-hour week. (FRN Official Gazette, 
August 27, 1972). 
The wording now certainly suggested that it applied to 
all Traffic Department staff and not just quay staff. 
It may have been either due to this, or to the general 
lethargy of the Labour Ministry in confirming awards at 
this time, that a delay occurred. And it may have been 
either the potential in the wording or the growing 
frustration of the union that caused it to call what 
was called a 'no pay no work' action on August 10-11, 
1972. This affected 10,000 workers in the NPA and NRC 
(with which the union was also in dispute) , and was 
said to have cost £N 50,000 before it was called off. 
This did not, however, occur before Adebola had had a 
six-hour session with Anthony Enahoro, the Commissioner 
for Labour. And when it was called off this was, in 
Adebola's works, 'as a mark of respect to General Gowon 
who had shown interest in the matter* (Daily Times, 
August 12, 1972). Enahoro promised to confirm the IAT 
awards, and it was announced that payment would be made 
in September. 
Immediately after the award was gazetted, however, 
there came an NPA declaration that: 
The award covers only staff represented by 
the R&PTSU before the amalgamation of that 
union with NPACWU. In other words it is 
exclusive to quay staff, shunters, diesel 
engine drivers, porters and other staff of 
the Traffic Department. (NPA Statement, 
August 31, 1972) . 
This represented an unwilling concession by management 
to the unfortunate wording of the IAT award, at the 
same time as an attempt to ensure that other NPA wor-
kers would not get the mistaken idea that they could 
get it applied to themselves. That it was an unwilling 
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concession is suggested by Adebola's complaint on 
October 12 to the Labour Ministry that 
the management of the NPA has started to work 
against the Conciliation Agreements and... 
has even stated that it will not implement 
[them] (R&PT&CSU Conference Documents 1973). 
That management was mistaken in its somewhat naive 
belief that it could confine to members of one union in 
one department a one-eighth increase in pay (plus the 
customary arrears and other associated rate changes) 
was also rapidly demonstrated. 
Immediately after the NPA announcement, the 
General Secretary of the NPAWU reminded management that 
my members in the Engineering, Stores and 
Harbours Departments throughout the Ports 
work the same 4 4-hour week and night duties; 
as that is the case my union demands that its 
members already mentioned above should be 
covered and enjoy the award since they all 
work under the same management. (NPAWD to 
NPA, August 31, 1972). 
The other NPA unions, through the NMTUF, then issued a 
demand for an extension of the award to all NPA workers 
on a 44-hour week. When management refused on the 
grounds that it could not vary a government award, the 
NMTUF produced an ultimatum. This threatened that it 
would 'ask its members to revert to 39-hour week in 
conformity with present salary scale' if the concession 
were not made by October 31, 1972 (NMTUF to Labour 
Ministry, October 2, 1972). 
Such a limited threat was clearly insufficient for 
the workers in the Engineering Department who were 
numbers of the NPAWU. There are conflicting accounts 
of what happened there. The NPAWU claims that it 
'ordered the Lagos Branch to an industrial action', it 
adds that 
During the action, 11 of our members were 
involved on the charges of tampering with the 
NPA properties. Some were suspended from 
duty, others' appointments were terminated. 
With our united, relentless efforts and 
cooperation of the management, the whole 
affected men even with the Hire and Fire ones 
amongst them were returned back to their 
respective jobs. (NPAWU Executive Council 
Documents, 1973). 
Ugwuanyi denies this account on some points and com-
plements it on others. He states that he, along with 
other branch leaders, consulted with their followers in 
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the Mechanical Workshops and Civil Engineering and 
decided to go on strike on their own: 'realising the 
usual attitude of the NPAWU national officers towards 
positive action they were kept off the show' (Ugwuanyi 
1978:3). He further declares that the union leadership 
disowned responsibility for the strike when called to 
account for it by the NPA. The strike took place on 
October 3-4, affecting some 1,000 workers. The reason 
for the disciplining of the 11 was, according to 
Ugwuanyi that they cut off the electricity supply on 
Apapa Quay: 
This was done on their own initiative by a 
group of our members. They tampered with the 
generating plant...We did not order them to 
do it. But we also did not order them to 
reconnect it. (Interview Notes, April 1978). 
Ugwuanyi further states that when the NPAWU leadership 
made an agreement with the NPA that brought the strike 
to an end, it also agreed that the tamperers could be 
disciplined. He argues that it was only because of the 
strong protest of his branch (which supported the men 
by taking collections within the departments affected) 
that the leadership took action to defend them. 
The strike was called off on the promise of the 
NPA that it would consider extension of the award. 
There having been no settlement by the end of the 
month, the NMTUF began its threatened action on Novem-
ber 1: 
the Federation reverted all the workers to 
39-hour week... The Management noticed the 
action from morning when those to resume duty 
as early as from 5 a.m. according to schedule 
were all resumed at 7 a.m....A hurried meet-
ing of the Federation and the Management was 
arranged (NPAWU Executive Council Documents 
1973) . 
Despite the comparatively mild form of protest, manage-
ment now apparently felt that it would have to make a 
concession to the labour force as a whole. In order to 
reduce its cost, the NPA proposed that from November 1 
all workers would be on a 39-hour week, with extra 
hours being paid at overtime rates. The issue of 
arrears (which the unions wanted backdated to the point 
at which the Traffic Department workers had got theirs) 
was to go to arbitration. As for the workers who had 
got the one-eighth, they were to remain - somewhat 
oddly - on their 44-hour week. Delighted though the 
workers must have been with this easy victory, it left 
the NPA to foot an enormous bill, and to deal with a 
workforce officially working different hours and being 
paid different rates. In a later appeal against the 
original IAT interpretation, the NPA stated that the 
280 
one-eighth award was costing it N900,000 per annum 
within the Traffic Department and would cost it 
N2,864,000 if it was extended to NPA as a whole. It 
further complained that the general introduction of a 
39-hour week (as a cheaper alternative) was not being 
accepted by the Traffic Department staff as 'nullifying 
the Arbitration Award made to them even if its justi-
fication no longer exists' (NPA Statement, April 10, 
1973) . What management was apparently trying to do was 
to get the IAT to order a 39-hour week in place of the 
one-eighth award. 
In early 1973 one union was calling 1972 'a most 
revolutionary year', whilst mentioning aspects of the 
one-eighth issue still to be settled (NMWU Conference 
1973) . As for the NMTUF, although it was for most of 
the 1970s in bitter conflict with the R&PT&CSU, and 
although it apparently felt the Engineering Department 
strike 'was not justified', it still felt it necessary 
to: 
congratulate...the R&PT&CSU for this singular 
achievement which formed the basis for the 
agreement reached. (NMTUF Conference Docu-
ments 1972). 
The R&PT&CSU still seemed unsatisfied, complaining 
forcefully and at length about the failure of NPA to 
implement the decision of the IAT, as well as of delays 
in the processing of matters referred to the IAT 
(R&PT&CSU Conference Documents 1973) . Meanwhile, the 
NPA distinguished its 'most soothing relationship' with 
the NMTUF in general with the lack of restraint and 
responsibility of a union clearly identifiable as the 
R&PT&CSU (NMTUF Conference Documents 1972). 
By April 1973 the R&PT&CSU was again in dispute 
with the NPA, with the Labour Ministry appointing a 
conciliator and warning the union against taking strike 
action (Daily Times, April 9, 1973). Whilst management 
was appealing to the IAT against paying the one-eighth 
to the Traffic Department staff, it also seems to have 
stopped payment of this to the workers. This led 
Adebola to place an advertisement in the press in which 
he warned NPA against anticipating any result from the 
IAT (Daily Times, April 19, 1973). His warning appar-
ently being ineffective, the union held a meeting to 
discuss the matter with its activists, and followed 
this up with an action on June 30 and July 1, 1973. 
This was carried out once again within both NPA and 
NRC. Within the NPA it involved over 3,000 workers 
directly and another 1,000 indirectly. The main issue 
was again the one-eighth award, as well as its exten-
sion to other Traffic Department categories, and the 
release of agreed promotions. With the help of a Minis-
try officer, management settled the issue by promising 
to implement within 30 days an agreement on the matter 
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signed the previous year (NPA IR Report 1974). Al-
though this seems to have been the end of the major 
dispute, the one-eighth issue was still having reper-
cussions as late as 1977. 
14.3. The Udoji award dispute 
Apart from a minor three-day action affecting 300 
R&PT&CSU members in 1974 (see Table 14.1), the next 
strike at NPA was over the Udoji award in 1975. The 
Udoji award made massive increases to public sector 
workers without requiring industrial action from them. 
The award, however, was full of anomalies. This meant 
delays in payment at a time of high expectations and 
high anxiety amongst workers (who knew that market 
prices were increasing daily as a result of the award). 
In the case of the NPA, it was found that assistant 
supervisors had been put on grade level 05. As a 
result of representations by the NPAWU, management 
placed the supervisors on 06 as an interim measure, 
meanwhile informing the Public Services Review Panel 
(appointed to deal with such anomalies) of the action 
it had taken. On March 3 the R&PT&CSU wrote a letter 
protesting about such a change being made without the 
approval of the Review Panel and demanding that certain 
union members who had previously been on the same grade 
as the assistant supervisors should now be raised to 
06. The letter was distributed as a leaflet throughout 
the port (NPAWU to R&PT&CSU, March 20, 1975). Appar-
ently as a result of such anomalies (or protests about 
them) , the NPA had only paid out eight percent of the 
Udoji award by February 15. The R&PT&CSU now called 
out its members on a five-day action for the balance of 
the award. The action began on March 6. On March 8 
the Port Manager was reporting 
that traffic operations remain partially 
paralysed as members of the R&PT&CSU continue 
their industrial action...Members of the NMWU 
also have continued to protest...Some traffic 
staff obstructed officers who tried to render 
skeleton services and also drove out of the 
quays privately-owned forklift drivers...! 
had been reliably informed this morning that 
they had planned to block all accesses to and 
major roads within the quays. I have taken 
necessary precautions to ensure that their 
plans do not materialise. (Port Manager to 
General Manager, March 8, 1975). 
Meetings with the participation of Ministry officials 
failed to solve the issue until March 10. On that day, 
Brigadier Adefope, the Commissioner of Labour, inter-
vened and seems to have managed to bring the action to 
an end (Daily Times, March 10, 1975). One of the 
things that the NPA had been trying to do was to again 
stop the payment of the one-eighth. At the March 10 
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meeting it promised to drop this issue, and also pro-
vided assurances about payment of the balance of the 
Udoji award (NPA to R&PT&CSU, March 11, 1975). 
The strike certainly demonstrated to NPA the 
continuing militancy of the R&PT&CSU, and probably 
convinced NPA workers that this was the most dynamic 
union in the corporation. Riding high on the crest of 
publicity and success, Adebola now declared a six-month 
industrial truce as his union's contribution to the 
decongestion exercise (Daily Times, April 11, 1975). 
Although this act of magnanimity is not out of charac-
ter with Adebola's Civil War truce and his undoubted 
nationalism, it is significant that Bernard Odulana, 
the leader of the militant dockworker union, was to 
himself declare a similar truce one month later. 
Whether there was some direct pressure from the Gowon 
regime (now in its last crisis-ridden months) on the 
two militants we cannot know. What we do know is that 
in neither case did the concession lead to any signifi-
cant change in the attitude of government or employers 
towards the workers or unions concerned. 
14.4. The five-day week dispute 
On April 1, 1976, the government introduced a 
five-day 4 0-hour week for the civil service and the 
public sector. On March 18, the NPA had apparently met 
with the R&PT&CSU and agreed that before any circular 
on new working hours was issued there would be further 
consultations with the union, when management decided 
without further consultation that the new hours would 
be 8.00-16.00, the union directed affected members to 
work 07.30-15.30 instead. It claimed that these were 
the hours worked by many government offices and cor-
porations, and that they were more convenient for 
access to public transport. The action affected those 
union members working at Headquarters and in the Port 
Manager's department. On April 3, management sacked 
six R&PT&CSU activists. It claimed that 
the roles played by the staff concerned 
differed considerably from any normal trade 
union activities. What had happened...was 
that a few staff who also were officials of 
the union, rather over-zealously, took upon 
themselves to undermine Management's official 
instruction by issuing their own instruction 
to the staff were noticed to have ejected 
other staff from their offices as well as 
inciting them against their officers (NPA-R 
&PT&CSU Minutes, April 15, 1976). 
Not only did it sack a number of officers, it also had 
one of them arrested and locked up by the police. 
Protest against this then spread to Apapa Quays where 
union members stopped work until the man was released. 
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The main issue now became that of the dismissals, with 
management eventually agreeing to reinstate the men 
without loss of benefits (NPA to R&PT&CSU, April 15, 
1976) . 
The five-day issue went to arbitration, where it 
was settled in favour of the management. It must, 
however, be understood less for the issue itself than 
as part of the general campaign of Adebola. Management 
had not only had a union leader arrested, it had also 
tried to restrict the holding of union meetings, was 
using the police to spy on them, and even had armed 
police present whilst they were being held (NPA Acting 
Security Chief to Port Manager, April 14; R&PT&CSU 
Statement, April 23; NPA-R&PT&CSÜ Minutes, May 4, 
1976) . The strike must also be seen within the 
national context. The union had struck despite the 
reaffirmation of the strike ban by Decree No. 7 in 
February. And Adebola followed this strike not by a 
further truce offer but by defending his strike record 
and denouncing strike bans before the Adebiyi Tribunal. 
14.5. The non-implementation dispute 
Evidently, the R&PT&CSU was reaping benefits from 
its aggressive activity. In June 1977 it organised a 
five-day action in Port Harcourt, an action which 
involved the national leadership and which once again 
brought it into conflict with the other NPA unions 
(Ugwuanyi 1978:12-13; NPAWU to Labour Ministry, June 7, 
1977). Meanwhile it was awaiting the outcome of the 
previous dispute, which was being processed through the 
IAP. On June 16, 1977, the Ministry informed the union 
of the panel's favourable decision on four of the seven 
issues it had raised. The union had obtained favour-
able judgements both on the reinstatement of the sacked 
officer and on arrears still owing from the one-eighth 
dispute, as well as on certain procedural questions. 
On July 21 the union wrote to the General Manager 
threatening a withdrawal of labour if the four awards 
were not implemented within 30 days. 
The R&PT&CSU might seem here to have been merely 
continuing a by-now traditional strategy. However, we 
must bear in mind that Decree 23 of 1976 had extended 
strike restrictions even further within such essential 
services as the ports. The decree had been followed up 
by direct government intervention in a teachers' 
strike, the banning of a bankworkers' union and the 
proscription from union activities of its militant 
leader. Just six days after the R&PT&CSU issued its 
strike threat, the press announced even tougher anti-
strike legislation. Strikes which came outside the 
strict limitations of the 1976 laws would now amount to 
breach of contract, prejudicing all workers' rights 
dependent on unbroken employment. Furthermore, workers 
could no longer be paid for the period on strike - a 
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traditional clause in the settlement of strikes in 
Nigeria. Finally, the power of employers to cede wage 
increases was restricted, and increased fines and terms 
of imprisonment were threatened for breaches of trades 
disputes legislation (New Nigerian, July 27, 1977). 
In its letter of July 21, the union appeared to be 
taking some account of the anti-strike atmosphere in 
the country by declaring that: 
Our action is not and cannot be interpreted 
to mean a disruption of the national economy 
but it is an attempt to expose the wrong 
gradings in the NPA which some of your offi-
cers are determined to maintain for reasons 
that are quite obvious. (R&PT&CSU to NPA, 
July 21, 1977). 
Yet, even after publication of Degree 54 on July 27, 
the union was still threatening to withdraw labour, now 
giving a deadline of August 31 (NPA-RitPT&CSU Minutes, 
August 5, 1977). The threat was repeated at a meeting 
on August 17. Apparently management was attempting to 
delay the awards by appealing to the Industrial Court 
(which had not yet come into existence) and by inform-
ing the government that the union's real reason for 
striking was its compaign against the Controller of 
Personnel (Ugwuanyi 1978). The union was invited to a 
meeting with the Ministry of Transport on August 22, 
and on August 25 there took place one between the 
Ministry and both parties to the dispute. This led to 
a common declaration, expressing the confidence of NPA 
and the R&PT&CSU in each other, and announcing the 
union's agreement to withdraw its planned action 
(Transport Ministry Statement, August 25, 1977). 
Despite this promise, and despite the draconic anti-
strike legislation, thousands of the union's members 
went on strike once again on November 1. Amongst other 
issues being raised was - once again - the one-eighth 
award. The action was brought to an end by the inter-
vention of the Ministry of Transport (The Punch, Novem-
ber 4, 1977). 
14.6. Worker activity during strikes 
The meagre information we have on worker activity 
during strikes within the NPA is not only due to 
limited sources. It is evident from what the militant 
rank-and-file leader Ugwuanyi himself writes and says 
that strikes are seen more as an instrument in the 
bargaining process than as a form of self-activity of 
the workers. Ugwuanyi's written account deals at far 
greater length with the negotiations that proceed and 
follow strikes than with strike action itself, and its 
diplomatic handling of the tampering issue suggests 
that this was not considered a fully legitimate form of 
activity. Yet, the President of the R&PTbCSU declares 
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that whilst 'we do not use our power to hold this 
country to ransom...we go to the whole hog in indus-
trial relations matters' (Interview Notes, December 12, 
1976). And Ugwuanyi (1978:5) declares that the role of 
the union during the one-eighth dispute 
appeared to be that of supporting and encou-
raging the most militant action on the part 
of the workers. The union built support by 
championing the workers' action against 
exploitation of the NPA management. It 
offered itself as the vehicle of workers' 
self-initiative. 
What does 'going the whole hog' mean within the NPA? 
What is the extent of worker militancy and self-
initiative? ugwuanyi admits (Interview Notes, April 
1978) that whatever the actions are called, what they 
usually involve is workers coming to the place of work 
but remaining inactive. They spend their time reading 
the papers or chatting. It is rare for them to leave 
their workplace. He only once recalls drivers having 
blocked access ways. He only remembers one cross-
departmental solidarity action. He recalls threats 
against 'whitelegs'. But he does not recall violence 
being used during strike actions either by the authori-
ties against the workers, or by strikers against the 
authorities. Yet, the fact that the branch leaders 
approved the cutting off of electricity on one occa-
sion, and that the workers supported those punished and 
demanded their reinstatement, suggests that workers are 
prepared to go beyond a merely ritual and routine 
protest activity. This is confirmed by the one other 
case for which we have evidence. This was a strike at 
NPA headquarters which Adebola offered to the Adebiyi 
Tribunal as an example of the necessity and value of 
strike action. The nature of Adebola's account is so 
telling that it must be presented verbatim before we 
conclude this section. Adebola first explained that 
they had informed the police of the failure of NPA 
management to react to a ministerial order of action. 
He was asked what he then did (Adebiyi Proceedings 
1976:26:40-41): 
Adebola: Well, we decided right from the Chairman 
of the Authority to the least officer 
that they should not go into the build-
ing, they should not park their cars 
inside and we locked the doors. 
Chairman: Where was this? 
Adebola: NPA Headquarters My Lord. When it was 
half past nine, then we asked some of 
our members to bring them into the space 
where they normally park their cars. 
Chairman: All the officers? 
Adebola: All the officers, including the General 
Manager. 
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Chairman; They carried them or they asked them to 
march? 
Adebola: If they asked them to come and they 
refuse they know that they are in trou-
ble. They were there. When we were 
addressing them, then one of them 
- Estate Manager, Mr. Akindahunsi - said 
'look Alhaji, you know we too belong to 
a sister union like you.[3] It was not 
our fault, why do you put us in the sun 
like this?' We had sympathy with him, 
then we said there are the things, go 
and see that the management meet. In 
fairness to the police on that day, 
maybe as a result of our letter, because 
we copied Lagos State Commissioner of 
Police, the Inspector General and every-
body, the police did not answer them. I 
think that was the first time the police 
would be on the side of the workers. 
Chairman; That was a derelection of duty by 
police. 
Adebola; They could not have come sir, because 
they knew... 
Chairman; Because you have locked gates. I have 
never heard a story like this. 
Adebola; We did it sir... 
NOTES 
Parts of this section have appeared in Waterman 
(1979d and 1980a). I am much indebted to Okeke 
Ugwuanyi for both his written (1978) and verbal 
accounts of part of the period covered. However, 
he additionally provided me with valuable docu-
mentation and with useful criticism of earlier 
versions. 
Adebola later claimed that he had never made the 
claim solely on behalf of the quay staff, and NPA 
management seems to have been unable to prove that 
he did. In its eventual appeal to the IAT against 
the way it had worded its judgement, the NPA was 
obliged to depend on the argument of its own 
failure to argue against the application of such 
an award to categories other than quay staff (NPA 
Statement, April 19, 1973). It seems possible 
that we have here another example of the superior-
ity of Adebola's legal skills over those of NPA 
management. 
3. Akindahunsi was in 1973 President of the NPA 
Officers Association (see Table 6.1). 
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Chapter 15 
DOCKWORKER PROTEST: SIT-INS, GO-HOMES 
AND THE HOWLING MOB[l] 
In this chapter we will examine a series of strikes or 
movements distinguished by their place of occurence or 
type of leadership. These are the unofficial dockwide 
strike of 1968, the series of radical-led strikes in 
the 1970s, the moderate-led dockwide strike of December 
1976, and the unofficial strikes at Biney's in 1969 and 
1975. These are by no means the only strikes that 
occurred at this time, but they are those for which a 
certain body of information is available. Many minor 
dock strikes, and even some major ones, are recorded by 
no more than a two-inch story in the press. Many others 
must have gone completely unrecorded. Table 15.1 
summarises the data from all available sources. 
15.1. The unofficial dockwide strike of August 1968 
The economic background to this strike was the 
increasing pressure on Lagos Port caused by the Civil 
War. Dock employers had had to introduce a 12-hour day 
of continuous work following the ban on night lighting 
by the government. There had been a union demand for 
two separate six-hour shifts, each to be paid as for 
eight hours. The Port Labour Officer had negotiated 
such an agreement, whilst insisting that meals and 
rest-times still be allowed for without disturbing 
continuous work, and that workers be discouraged from 
working two consecutive shifts (Labour Review, 3rd 
Quarter 1967) . On June 1 there came into effect the 
Trade Dispute (Emergency Provisions) Decree. Decree 21 
of 1968 severely conditioned the right to strike, but 
apparently had no effect on the dockworkers. The 
strike lasted three days and affected 7,000 workers. 
The official explanation given later for the stoppage 
was that it was a protest against the reintroduction of 
8-hour shifts, with the Ministry of Labour eventually 
getting workers back by forcing restoration of the 
6-hour shifts 'pending further negotiation on the 
8-hour system' (NECA Report 1968: Appendix C) . The 
account given by the Orhobo Report (1971: 60-67)[2] is 
more detailed. The reversion to 8-hour shifts was 
desired by contractors because they were losing two 
hours of labour under the 6-hour system. The NPA was 
also interested in this and had been discussing 
Table 15.1. Chart of reported docker strikes in Lagos, 1968-76 
"ates 
19-21.8.68 
2&12.1.69 
3.3.69 
18-21.7.69 
11.12.69 
(2 hours) 
6-7.7.70 
8.2.71 
15-17.2.71 
Numbers/ 
Site 
7,000 
General 
1-200 
W.H.Biney 
300 
A.Assaf 
6,000 
General 
63 
A.Assaf 
50 
S.B. Bakare 
10,000 
General 
10,000 
General 
Leadership 
Informal oppo-
sition to Amal-
gamation 
Informal oppo-
sition to BSA 
Unreported. 
Probably Radi-
cals 
Radicals 
Radicals 
Issues 
Arbitrary worsening of pay/ 
hours 
Delay in payment December 
wages,- dismissal of leaders 
Refund of compulsory 
savings; obligation of 
maintenance men to work 
8 houra 
Publication report Urhobo 
Tribunal; decasualisation,-
pay, benefits, accident 
compensation 
Removal of headman and re-
placement by one of 
workers' choice 
Payment of agreed Gowon 
Bonus; increase in over-
time rates 
Adebo interim award and 
arrears; general griev-
ances 
Withdrawal of Gowon Bonus 
Comments 
Successful. Also leads to 
replacement of moderate 
leadership by radical one 
Successful on both issues 
Called off for negotiations 
Called off on beginning of 
negotiations. NECA reports 
15,200 involved for total 
period of 15 hours 
Ended on explanation by 
management 
Called off on employer 
promise to consider demand 
Successful on wage issue 
Outcome uncertain 
Sources 
See text 
See text 
NECA Report 1969 
Labour Review, 
3rd Quarter 1969; 
NECA Report 1969 
NECA Report 1970 
NECA Report 1970 
See text 
See text 
29.12.71 
17-18.5.72 
12-14.8.72 
20-23.5.74 
Sept.1974 
(4 days) 
8-10.1.75 
12.2.75 
14.7.75 
1.9.75 
14-16.12.76 
General 
9,500 
General 
458 
Scanshlp 
6,000 
General 
General 
S.B.Biney 
185 
H. Stephens 
1,000 
Nasara Co. 
General 
Radicals 
Radicals 
Radicals 
Radicals 
Radicals 
BSA 
encouraged 
Radicals 
Moderates 
Adebo final award; non-
recogmtion of union; Re­
moval of PLO 
Decasualisation; conditions 
Management refusal to per­
mit union adviser to negoti­
ate 
Decasualisation; recognition; 
50% wage increase 
Udo]i award 
Prompt payment of Udoji to 
labour; extension of in­
creases to staff 
Reinstatement of sacked 
workers; better conditions 
Failure to pay full Udo]i 
award 
Payment of agreed 5-day-
week award before Xmas 
Successful on wage issue 
Clashes with police and 
nrm-.t of lpiid<»rs ouf-ome 
not known 
Strike probably by dock 
labour on Scanshlp ship 
Clashes with police; strike 
gains certain de facto re­
cognition for Radicals 
Gains award and arrears; 
Radicals rewarded finan­
cially by dockers and gain 
further de facto recogni­
tion 
Successful on both counts 
Strike probably by dock 
labour on a Henry Stephens 
company ship 
Successful 
See text 
See text 
•Ξ^Λ Report 1972 
See text 
See text 
See text 
See text 
19.7.75 
See text 
See text 
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reversion with the employers on May 25. When the 
night-lighting ban was eased by Government in August, 
NPA decided to return to the 8-hour shift. Despite 
earlier agreement that reversion should take place 
'when the Government so directs', the PLO was only 
informed officially of the change by NPA one day before 
the strike, but 
the most pathetic part...was that nobody 
thought it was an important enough event to 
inform the dockworkers either publicly or 
through their leaders (...) There is no 
doubt, therefore, that the mishandling of the 
notice to revert to the former system was the 
last straw that broke the dockworkers' back 
and they resisted by going on strike. (64-5) 
The last straws also included the failure to operate 
effectively the long-awaited labour relations and dock 
labour machinery, and the general breakdown of the 
Amalgamation, which had finally led to the raid on its 
offices by Endeley Olagboshe on August 9. 
The leaders of the ADWT&GWO were down on the quays 
on the 19th and knew that the strike was brewing. M.I. 
Eluma (1969) reports that he went there with Abam on 
that day 'on the usual visit to educate the workers 
about the dock labour scheme'. Their response to 
dockworker agitation over the change in hours was to 
complain unsuccessfully to the PLO, and then retire to 
the union office to carry out the negotiation procedure 
he had advised. Knowing about the anti-strike decree, 
they decided to call an emergency meeting advising 
patience till the union had met with the employers. It 
was not until he read the papers on the following day 
that Eluma knew that the strike had started! 
The strike broke out on the afternoon of August 
19. A.R.D. Oriola, a leader of the Amalgamation, 
described how it reached Customs Quay. 
after the commencement of work on the day of 
the strike some gang-men who had come from 
the Apapa Quays to work on a ship shouted 
noisy exhortation to the Akere Section of 
dockworkers to join the strike which had been 
started at the Apapa Quays for more pay, 
expulsion of contractors from the docks and 
removal of the union leaders. The interven-
tion of Nigerian Ports Authority officials in 
the commotion was ineffective and the police 
stepped in to clear the wharf. (46) . 
A somewhat different account of the strike was given by 
Nkamare, the representative of the labour contractors. 
He claimed that 
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The particular strike was a very unusual 
kind. Because instead of workers refusing to 
work a few thugs beat workers from their 
places of work hurling bottles at them. When 
workers still resisted, police and other 
security-men advised that it was in their 
interest to stop work. (29). 
Disu Sumonu, a former organiser of the Amalgamation, 
and later a member of the Committee of Ten, stated 
that 
The strike was on before he knew about it. 
He was reporting for the afternoon duty shift 
and discovered that the strike was on and he 
was forced to keep out. On the following day 
[August 20] when he came down from the bus he 
met one Ayo Ige and Willie [3] and others. 
Together they chartered a bus for £1.13s. to 
go to the ULC office to report the strike. 
(54). 
This account was confirmed by the ULC, which declared 
that its efforts to arrange a negotiated settlement 
failed because of the influence of the socialist in-
tellectuals, Toyo and Kolagbodi. [4] The ULC declared 
further that 
When all efforts to get the men back to work 
failed, and the influence behind the strike 
became clearer. Congress then made a press 
statement dissociating itself from the action 
of the dockworkers. (25). 
The meaning of this statement was clarified by Toyo. 
He said that whilst meeting with the dockworkers (on 
the 20th?), 
they heard on the radio that Alhaji Adebola 
had called off the strike. That made the 
workers laugh. The next morning, however, 
the strike was called off. (53). 
Amongst the 'efforts to get the men back to work' were 
those undertaken at Oriola's section, Customs Quay: 
On the second day of the strike, the people 
from Apapa came to the wharf to prevent 
people from working although the union lea-
ders told the workers to refrain from joining 
the strike because it had been caused by some 
irresponsible canoeboys. (47). 
Whether these people were Abam, Khayam and Eluma we do 
not know. What we do know from Eluma's account is that 
because of the 'unconstitutional action of the strike 
which I timed [sic] illegal', the three of them went 
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down to Apapa to see what was happening. A friendly 
docker warned them that there was a trheat to kidnap 
them if they attempted to enter the wharf or call off 
the strike. The warning was too late: 
there was a waiting bus van for the kidnap-
ping near the bus stop. Mr. Abeke held me 
and my suitcase bag was carried away, [and I 
was] pushed into a pit where I sustained 
injuries on my foot, and brother Khayam, Abam 
and myself were being dragged to the waiting 
van. It was at the stage an army corporal 
rescued us instead, in the army landrover to 
Apapa police station where we lodged our 
complaints. As the landrover was moving the 
group led by Mr. Webber Abeke, were shouting 
this slogan. Army take them kill them, for 
they are Agents to contractors, NPA and 
Government, they want 8 hours back. 
The reference to Abeke gives us the only name of some-
one evidently involved in the organisation of the 
strike. Abeke, however, was not identified with the 
Joint Committee of Toyo and Kolagbodi, but rather with 
the Committee of Ten that was appealing to the ULC. So 
what role was the Joint Committee playing in the 
strike? 
On August 16 the two socialist intellectuals were 
seen in the docks, giving rise to charges by Khayam, 
the ULC and others that they had instigated the strike, 
supported it with £N560, encouraged the kidnapping of 
the union leaders, etc. T.A. Ayorinde said that he had 
heard Toyo say that if the leaders of the Amalgamation 
came down to Customs Quay they should be beaten up. 
Toyo himself admitted to having been in the docks on 
the 16th, but claimed that his role was solely that of 
advisor to the Joint Committee and his presence on that 
day had had nothing to do with the strike. As for his 
role during the strike itself, Toyo denied that he had 
done more than to help resolve it: 
One evening in August [20th?], Bajare[5] who 
was an active member of the Joint Committee 
came to him at his residence at City Way and 
informed him that there was a strike at the 
docks...He helped the workers to resolve the 
strike and to go back to work when the em-
ployers agreed to continue with the emergency 
six hours shifts. The workers were reluctant 
to go back to work as they wanted to use the 
opportunity to resolve the disagreement with 
the Contract Labour System. He advised them 
to call off the strike since it was a mili-
tary regime and they had no organisation 
strong enough to fight their course [sic]. 
(53). 
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It may be that Toyo was dissimulating through fear of 
being held responsible for the strike, yet his account 
is consistent with the role of a sympathetic but power­
less external advisor.[6] 
According to Oriola, news of the end of the strike 
was brought by 'some of the troublemakers who claimed 
that their demands had been met by the government. (47) 
Again, no names are given, although it may be that the 
settlement was negotiated by those who were now calling 
themselves the 'Accredited Representatives' or 'Commit­
tee of Ten', since the Labour Ministry was dealing with 
them later. In the absence of further information one 
can only assume that the strike was provoked and led by 
an informal grouping that was variously or serially 
seeking aid and advice from the socialist intellectuals 
or the moderate-reformist trade union centre. 
The incoherence of the worker militants, the 
failure of the socialist intellectuals to lead them, 
and of the ULC to control them, meant that neither of 
the two committees crystalised into an alternative 
leadership after the strike. The vacuum was filled by 
Endeley Olagboshe and his group, who found their exter­
nal support in the communist NTUC. 
15.2. The radical-led strike movement, 1971-5 
From 1969 till 1973 there was no moderate organi­
sation in the docks, and from 1973 to 1975 the moder­
ates were avoiding strike action and condemning it. 
Although there were a number of strikes before 1971 
(see Table 15.1), and although it may be assumed that 
the bigger ones took place under the leadership of the 
ADWT&GWU (Ν) , the first one we know to have been so led 
is the Ade bo strike of February 1971. At the end of 
1970, tension was rising in Nigeria over the expected 
report of the Wages and Salaries Review Commission 
appointed by government in July. The Adebo Commission 
was forced by the central trade union organisations 
(temporarily united in the United Committee of Central 
Labour Organisations) to issue an Interim Report on 
December 4 (Adebo 1970) . This led to a 'Cost of Living 
Allowance' backdated for the previous nine months. 
Trouble was caused by the fact that the Commissioner 
for Labour, Anthony Enahoro, had stated that only such 
private sector firms as had paid no increases since 
1964 were expected to pay the full COLA. This caused 
an uncoordinated but nationwide wave of strikes in the 
private sector in January and February 1971.[7] This 
seems to have had its effect in the docks. 
On February 8 there was a 'sit-down action' by 
10,000 dockers against non-payment of the Adebo award 
and for redress of accumulated grievances. They also 
demanded overtime arrears, night overtime, a one-hour 
paid break and release of four men held for incitement 
294 
(Daily Times, February 10). The report of this strike 
indicated that the Secretary of the ADWT&GWU(N) was now 
Bernard Odulana. On February 15-17, 1971, there 
occured a major three-day stoppage, involving 10,000 
workers. According to the NECA Report (1971: Appendix 
C) , causes were the withdrawal by the Ports Manager of 
an incentive award and 'Restoration of a 6-hour shift 
as against the 8-hour shift introduced by the Military 
Ports Commandant'. What the workers were probably 
protesting against was the imposition of six hours pay 
for a six-hour shift. Probably Government felt that 
the Adebo award should not come in addition to those 
benefits that the workers had earlier gained. However, 
it was the attempt to impose the six-hours pay that had 
been responsible for the 1968 strike. Whether the 
workers were again successful on this issue is not 
clear, but the two-shilling 'Gowon incentive award' was 
still being maintained at the end of the year (NPA 
Minutes, December 19, 1971). 
When, later in 1971, the final Adebo Report and 
government white paper on it appeared, the dockers were 
to receive only a 9-10d increase. The union protested 
bitterly against this and 'rejected outright this final 
award' (ADWT&GWU(N) Statement, October 27, 1971). On 
December 29, it organised what appears to have been a 
ore-day stoppage. This was less a demand for a higher 
rate of pay than a protest against the non-payment of 
the new rates and the customary arrears. Other issues 
raised during the dispute were the non-recognition of 
the union, removal of the Port Labour Officer, working 
conditions, etc. (Nigerian Observer, January 3, 1972). 
On the day of the strike the NPA called a meeting with 
contractors, directing that agreements with workers 
over payment of the award be deposited with NPA, and 
that the new rates, with - if possible - the arrears, 
be paid within two days (NPA Minutes, December 29, 
1971) . The NPA then held a three-hour meeting with the 
radical leaders at which the following decisions were 
announced: the new rates would be paid before December 
31, with any arrears remaining to be paid before 
January 6; there would be no victimisation of strikers; 
the demand for removal of the PLO would be forwarded; 
NPA would take up the issue of recognition of the 
ADWT&GWU(N) with the authorities. Whilst an NPA 
spokesman deplored the strike and described it as an 
'attempt to subvert the country's economy', a union 
leader said that it was 'motivated by the lukewarm 
attitude of the authority to the workers' problems. 
(Nigerian Observer, January 3, 1972). The union 
appears to have abandoned its 'outright' rejection' of 
the small final award and to have struck over a more 
immediate grievance with a more easily obtainable 
outcome. The year end is the time at which dockers feel 
most hardly pressed for ready cash for Muslim or Chris-
tian festivities, and the uncertainty over, or delay 
in, paying the award (for which responsibility lay as 
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much in the hands of the NPA as in those of the con-
tractors) was a ready provocation to action. As for 
the general and longterm complaints, the union was 
appeased with promises which meant, in effect, nothing. 
The issue of non-recognition was to remain a major 
stimulus to strike action by the radical leaders in the 
years to come. 
Apart from a two-day strike in May 1972, there 
appears to have been no major stoppage in that year or 
the following one. The May 1972 stoppage was about the 
introduction of the integrated labour scheme, and on 
lavatories and drinking taps at the quays (Labour 
Ministry Disputes Register). During this strike, union 
President Endeley Olagboshe was arrested at gun point 
by military police. He later claimed to have been held 
in a maximum security prison for 12 months (Interview 
Notes, August 1975). Clashes with the police were to 
remain a feature of dockworker strikes for some time. 
As for any positive outcome of the strike we have no 
information. 
In early 1974 the ADWT&GWU (N) was demanding that 
government negotiate with it on the proposed dock 
labour scheme and stating that the 'dockers would not 
accept responsibilities for any industrial situation 
created by the refusal' (Nigerian Tribune, February 27, 
1974) . It further demanded an interim wage award of 50 
percent. We saw in Chapter 4 that the union was mobili-
sing the dockers by issuing leaflets and calling mass 
meetings on the quays, and that fighting broke out with 
leaders of the moderates at this time. On May 9 Odu-
lana issued a seven-day strike warning. On May 15 he 
and three of his officers were invited to the Ministry 
of Labour and treated to a dressing down. The Minis-
try's statement contained the following significant 
elements: 1) there was a wage freeze on; 2) there was 
no evidence of an attempt by the union at collective 
bargaining with the employers on the issues raised; 3) 
that, given the existence of three registered unions in 
the docks, the declaration of a dispute by such an 
unregistered group was not provided for; 4) that 
strikes were illegal. He appealed to the union leaders 
to await government action on integration and wages. 
In response, 
Mr. Bernard Odulana promised to convey the 
advice of the Assistant Director of Labour to 
the dock workers and to ensure that they 
pursue their claims in accordance with the 
provisions of the law and without resort to 
the threatened industrial action'. (Labour 
Ministry Statement, May 15, 1974). 
In fact, Odulana seems to have done nothing of the 
kind. On May 20 there began a strike which three days 
later involved 6,000 workers. The event became vio-
lent: 
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a meeting of the representatives of the 
workers with the ports manager...reached a 
deadlock as 25 demonstrating dockworkers were 
arrested...By afternoon, armed policemen 
stood at alert at strategic positions in the 
wharf as a skeleton staff toiled away at the 
day's work. A dock superintendent...denied 
an allegation by some of the strikers that 
they had been teargassed by the police. A 
man who could not give satisfactory answer to 
his mission in the wharf when challenged by 
the police was immediately whisked away to 
the police station. (Daily Times, May 23, 
1974) . 
Negotiations with NPA took place on May 23, at 
which it became evident that the major issue was that 
of non-recognition of the union. Port Manager Tukur 
promised to take up the issue, to ensure wage payment 
for the days on strike, and to attempt to get the 
arrested dockers released (NPA Statement, May 23, 
1974). Following the strike the Ministry signed a 
joint communique with the Amalgamation, and in mid-June 
the union was referring to this in calling urgently for 
a tripartite meeting in the docks. In July there were 
negotiations between Odulana and the Port Labour Offi-
cer. (Daily Times, July 26, 1974). Thus, despite the 
direct flouting of the law of the land and the instruc-
tions of the Ministry, the strike seems to have forced 
the latter to come to terms with the radicals. Yet, 
despite the de facto recognition, the union was unable 
to get formal recognition from the government, or from 
the dock labour contractors. On the other hand, the 
radicals had probably increased their influence and 
prestige amongst the dockworkers, since they had man-
aged to strike not only despite government but also 
despite the indirect opposition of the moderates, and 
the direct strike-breaking threat of the BSA (Daily 
Times, May 20 and New Nigerian, June 1, 1974). There 
was yet another four-day dock strike at the beginning 
of September (Daily Express, September 6, 1974). And 
at the end of the month, Odulana was again giving a 
seven-day ultimatum to the contractors (Sunday Times, 
September 22, Daily Times, September 30, 1974). In 
this case the threatened action seems not to have taken 
place. 
The reason for all this activity was the expecta-
tions raised by the Udoji Commission that was to report 
in 1974. Although this was not strictly a wage commis-
sion, it was known that Udoji would recommend public 
sector wage increases, and the dockworkers probably 
felt it necessary to stake their claim before the 
report appeared. In December there finally appeared 
the report of the Udoji Commission and the government 
white paper on it (Udoji Report 1974; FRN Views 1974). 
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The latter established a new official minimum wage for 
public sector workers, this amounting to a doubling 
from N1 to N2 per day. On January 1, 1975, Bernard 
Odulana of the ADWT&GWU(N) addressed his customary 
utlimatum to the Ministry. This tried to play its 
customary buckpassing role. We know (Chapter 7, Sec­
tion 2) that on January 3 Abam's union was inviting the 
Biney and Bakare unions to meet with it at Chief 
Beyioku's office and in the meantime advising against 
strike action. Meanwhile the radicals were continuing 
with their preparations. Following another 24 hours of 
grace on January 7, the dockers struck work on January 
8 for some three days. On this occasion there was no 
violence since the union adopted the tactic of sending 
all but a few pickets home. The strike was effective. 
On January 10 the Port Manager wrote to the union that 
' in accordance with the tradition of the Port in mat­
ters of Government Salaries and Wages Awards', he could 
assure it that the award and arrears would be paid 
partly at the end of January and the rest by February 
15 (NPA to ADWT&GWU (Ν) , January 10, 1975). On the 
eleventh, eight of the dock employers signed a con­
firming agreement in the presence of the PLO, ensuring 
also that there would be no victimisation and that 
dockworkers would be paid for the strike days (ADWT-
S.GWU (N) -Dock Employers Agreement, January 11, 1975). 
All that the moderates could do was to complain that 
Odulana had 'played on the sentiment' of the workers 
and 'misdirected' them to a 'premature industrial 
action'. With N100-200 back-pay in their pockets, the 
dockers generously rewarded the leaders they considered 
responsible for their gains. Both the NPA and the 
contractors signed further agreements with the union, 
and in the following months it appeared as if informal 
bilateral bargaining between the union and individual 
contractors was finally becoming established. The 
success and recognition evidently went to the heads of 
the radicals and in May they signed the declaration of 
identification with national goals and support for 
industrial peace quoted in Chapter 7, Section 3. The 
peace declaration should not be understood too liter­
ally, for in September the radicals supported a strike 
by 1,000 dockers working for Nasara (Nigerian Observer, 
September 2, 1975) . But in the following year it was 
doing more to prevent strikes than to stimulate them. 
15.3. The moderate-led strike of December 1976 
Whilst the radicals had become more moderate as a 
result of their 1975 success, the moderates had become 
more and more frustrated at the refusal of government, 
contractors and the NPA to take them seriously. Des­
pite their evident inexperience with the organisation 
of strikes, their long opposition to them and their 
lack of a close relationship with the dockers, they had 
in January 1976 made their first - unsuccessful -
attempt to organise one. That one had been foiled by 
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the combined efforts of the radicals, the NPA and the 
police. Whilst we see both moderates and radicals 
apparently involved in similar and simultaneous negoti-
ations with the authorities in 1976, the negotiations 
had different implications for both parties. For the 
radicals their first experience of taking an issue 
through the machinery to the IAP must have been giving 
them a sense both of official recognition and of res-
ponsibility. For the moderates it was a customary 
procedure, any positive results of which were likely to 
rebound to the credit of their adversaries. At stake 
was the extension to dockers of the five-day week 
introduced for public-sector workers on April 1, 1976. 
The anxiety of the moderates to call a strike over this 
issue is indicated in Chapter 7, Section 2. The suc-
cess of the attempt I was able to witness for my-
self. [8] 
The pretext for the strike was the forthcoming 
Integrated Cargo-Handling Scheme (ICHS), under which 
most existing contractors would disappear. A.E. Okon 
stated before the strike that if the scheme was brought 
in before the contractors had paid the nine months 
arrears, the workers would never see the money. It 
must have been either this reasonable proposition or 
the customary worker anxiety to get extra cash to cover 
the December festivities that made workers ready to 
strike. At twelve o'clock on December 14 a number of 
men ran along the quayside calling on the workers to 
strike. A few stones were thrown at NPA shed staff and 
at contractor offices, in the latter case breaking 
windows. One or two cars were damaged. A couple of 
tough-looking labourers stood between the sheds with 
broken wooden staves in their hands, threatening any 
NPA worker whose head appeared out of a shed door. At 
12.30 the NPA sheds were locked 'as a precaution 
against looting'. From the main gates people came 
running with handkerchiefs to their faces, shouting 
that teargas shells had been fired. By 1.00 the quay-
side was deserted. The whole dock labour force had 
gone home. 
At an Apapa restaurant a half dozen moderate 
leaders were later to be seen discussing the strike 
together. One described the preparations: 
It was decided at a mass meeting on Saturday. 
300 met from the different areas of contract. 
They were addressed by Okon and Abam. 
Another described the morning's events: 
I was there at 6.00. Odulana's outfit was 
there...Endeley was beaten up. He was forced 
out to the roundabout. Jaja was chased away. 
They arrested Tunde. Some people were 
arrested for puncturing tyres or being armed 
with sticks. 
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An argument broke out over whether the union had called 
the strike or not. One man said, 'We didn't call them 
out, they went out. We only organise them'. Evidently 
he was anxious about the leaders being held responsible 
for an illegal action. Another was quite happy to 
admit responsibility: 
It is a dispute with the contractors. We 
call workers out because contractors promise 
to pay today. It is the first time we have 
call a successful general dock strike at 
Apapa1 
Another argument took place over the production of a 
statement. There was uncertainty about what should go 
in it, where a typewriter could be found to type it, 
whether an agency should be paid to type it out. The 
group was elated, confused and anxious simultaneously. 
As two leaders began to speak to each other in their 
own tongue, another insisted angrily that they 'talk 
the common language' (English or Pidgin). 
On the following day, December 15, the manager of 
a major contracting company was in a state of despera-
tion. He had received the new rates at only 4.00 the 
previous day. It would take him three weeks to work 
them out and to pay.the arrears. The NPA, he said, had 
messed up the whole business. In the first place it 
had no right to make an agreement with the unions 
before the shipping companies had also agreed to pay 
the extra rates (a by-now traditional NPA practice). In 
the second place the NPA had agreed to a one-fifth 
increase but only paid contractors one-sixth. As for 
the strike: 
The workers went mad, smashing windows and 
cars, and beating people. The workers are a 
howling mob. They've got a low boiling 
point. They are organised by militants - the 
semi-educated tally clerks. The trouble is 
that the tally clerks are protected by the 
Pool. They are responsible to nobody and you 
can't discipline them. Imaginel The Pool 
should be bust up. 
Thomas Olushipo, General Secretary of the BSA, was 
down on the quay on the 15th. He seemed to be taking 
his distance from the events: 
They just call a strike. They smash windows 
in our offices. We can't do anything about 
it. We will just wait and see. 
Apparently he felt he had no control or influence over 
the Biney labour, which had totally disappeared from 
the quay along with the others. Jetty labourers em-
ployed by Biney's at a site one or two miles from the 
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regular quays declared that someone from the Biney 
union had told them to go on strike and threatened them 
with violence if they did not do so. It seems possible 
that such an action might have been taken unofficially 
by a BSA leader, since they would also benefit from the 
increase demanded. 
On the morning of the same day a leader of the 
radicals gave his account of the events leading up to 
the strike and the strike itself.[9] Two or three days 
previously a Principal Labour Officer from the Ministry 
had been sent to them to find out who was behind the 
rumoured strike. The radicals had informed both him 
and the officer in charge of the police in the port 
that they had nothing to do with it and were opposed to 
it. Following the outbreak of the strike the day 
before, the NPA had called in both Odulana and Abam. 
Abam had denied calling the strike and claimed not to 
know who had done so. Odulana had told Abam that there 
was a security report out against him because security-
men (i.e. plainclothes police) had been at his meeting 
a few days previously. Odulana had also accused Abam 
of organising the strike and condemned him for having 
done so. My informant revealed a certain annoyance 
with Odulana and with the disorganisation of the radi-
cal leadership in general: 
You see, Bernard is never there when you need 
himl We decided to produce a leaflet about 
the agreement with NPA about five days ago, 
and also to call a meeting of dockers. But 
we couldn't produce the leaflet because of 
the problem of no letter-heading paper due to 
the absence of the Treasurer who has it. 
He said there was to be a meeting that day to approve 
the wording of a leaflet, which would then be typed and 
duplicated on unheaded paper if necessary. He con-
demned Abam for the way the strike had been called and 
the tactics used: 
We don't hide it when we go on strike. We 
always state it. We give ultimatum, as in 
the law...You must have material and moral 
support for a strike. Not just the tally 
clerks who are behind this one. The tally 
clerks don't support morally and financially. 
They are unstable. They go from one leader 
to another. The dockworkers are more sta-
ble...We don't attack people when we go on 
strike like they did. We don't resort in 
violence. We don't destroy. We organise and 
educate them so there is no violence. You 
know they had to force out Biney workers? 
Down at the port gates at 1.00 there were few 
workers to be seen. A couple of scrawled signs were 
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leaning against the fence of the Port Labour Office: 
'DOCKERS WERE NOT SLAVES', 'NO DOCKERS, NO NPA', and 
even one in French. Supporters of the radical leader-
ship were there in force. They pushed and chased off a 
man they accused of attempting to spy on their conver-
sations. At 3.00 two radicals were handing out a 
leaflet signed by Odulana. This declared: 
Our attention had been drawn to misguided 
industrial action which was caused by a group 
of confusionists in Lagos Docks...[S]urpris-
ing we witnessed rioting/assault which re-
sulted to stoppage of work at Apapa Quays. 
Our investigation revealed that a group of 
confusionists had gone round spreading false 
rumour that the new wages would be paid on 
December 14 contrary to our agreement. In 
view of the above we call on the Federal 
Military Government to institute a High 
Powered Inquiry into this action with a view 
of bringing to book those that were respon-
sible for the strike. (ADWT&GWU(N) State-
ment, December 15, 1976). 
A group of dockers approached the leafletters: 
What is this paper?...It is from Odulana...He 
is a confusionist...We want our money...They 
promised to pay... 
The group then began pushing and punching the two 
radicals who (since the balance of forces at the gate 
had changed) finally retreated to where NPA securitymen 
were on duty. 
At 3.30, one of the radical leaders began dis-
cussing the strike with a man introduced as being 'from 
Lion Building' (i.e. a plainclothes policeman). They 
talked about the police searching for Abam and his 
group, about Odulana having been called in, but con-
vincing them that he had no responsibility for the 
strike. After a few minutes of such conversation, the 
radical leader climbed onto the policeman's motorbike 
and rode off with him. 
At 6.00 the same evening the dispute was settled 
by the promise of the contractors to pay the arrears on 
the 20th. Somehow the news was passed to the dock-
workers, since at 6.00 the following morning (December 
16) they were back at work. Tally clerks at the Port 
Labour Office knew that the strike had been organised 
by Abam. Other workers were not so sure. The con-
sensus at Biney's quayside offices was that it had been 
organised by Abam. At those of Aronjim the majority 
thought it had been led by Odulana. At the Port Labour 
Office, one solitary radical turned up. The tally 
clerks began to shout at him: 
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Imagine a trade union leader who is against 
workers getting more money! Shame on you I 
You should gol Aren't you ashamed? 
The radical showed every sign of acute discomfort, 
turning his back on his tormentors and hiding himself 
in his newspaper. The Daily Times of December 16 and 
17 reported the beginning and end of what it termed a 
• work-to-rule', announcing the new rate for dockers to 
have been raised from N2.42 to N2.91, with the arrears 
to be paid out on December 21. According to Jonas 
Abam, the arrears amounted in some cases to N250 (In-
terview Notes, April 1977). 
Whilst the moderates were cock-a-hoop, the radi-
cals were deeply humiliated. Said one of them a couple 
of days later, 
All the dockworkers want is money. They are 
not matured. We were afraid of Anima-
shaun.[10] The others [Abam's group. PW] 
deceived the workers. We could have coun-
tered them as before, in January. 
In fact, it appears as if the radicals did use the same 
tactics as on that occasion. According to Abam, 
One of our guys was dragged out of his house, 
beaten up and had his clothes ripped by 
Odulana's boys, who then took him to a police 
station where he was held without anyone 
knowing this for three days. (Interview 
Notes, April 1977). 
Furthermore, several of his supporters had been charged 
with incitement, although the charges were later 
dropped. 
It is difficult to assess the impact of this event 
since it was rapidly followed by the reorganisation of 
the industry under thr ICHS. This meant not only the 
disappearance of most of the contractors, but their 
replacement by the NCHC. On the same occasion on which 
he made the above statement, Abam claimed that the 
'dash' following the strike success had come to his 
union, and that it had thus had wide recognition 
amongst the dockers. At the time that he was saying 
this, he was walking with me along the waterfront for 
half an hour and over a distance of several hundred 
yards. During this time, he was greeted by only three 
people. Evidently, such success as his organisation had 
won three months earlier had not turned him into a 
popular hero amongst the dockers. 
One or two immediate comments are needed on state-
ments made by the competing leaderships. The extent of 
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the change of roles is evident, with the moderates 
grasping at a pretext (December 14 being, as they knew, 
the date for rate announcement, not payout), agitating 
the dockers, using violence (or recruiting others to do 
so) , and the radicals denouncing violence, condemning 
'confusionists', cooperating with the police, appealing 
to government to punish the strike leaders, fearing to 
take strike action, and denouncing the instability of 
the tally clerks or the immaturity of the labourers. 
At the same time, we must recognise the secretive and 
cautious way in which the moderates went about their 
action. The 'mass meeting' which is said to have 
called for it, was in fact only attended by 15-20 
men,[11] there was no public strike call or mobilisa-
tion of the dockers and the moderates were in two minds 
over whether to deny responsibility for the strike or 
claim the credit for iti These features are in clear 
contrast with what we know of the radicals' tactics. 
15.4. Two unofficial strikes at Biney's, 1969 and 1975 
The first of these events[12] links up with the 
dockwide strike of 1968 not only in point of time but 
also in that its apparent leader, Paul Edah, had been a 
member of the Committee of Ten. The background to the 
event is provided, again, by the needs of workers for 
extra cash with which to celebrate the Christian and 
Muslim festivals. Apparently the BSA had agreed with 
management that three weeks wages would be paid on 
December 20th, with the balance at the end of January. 
Evidently it had forgotten that the labourers would be 
unable to wait that long after having spent all their 
money celebrating. On December 30 the BSA leaders 
requested that the last week's money be paid earlier. 
They were told to return for an answer on January 3. 
But on January 2 a group of workers came to the main 
offices of the company 'in a very riotous manner' to 
demand earlier payment. When the strike leaders were 
questioned, more details came out. Biney had at this 
time announced an end to wage advances. Moreover, some 
other contractors had already paid out their workers. 
And, 'The truth was that the men were already out of 
pocket and were suffering for money'. About 100 men 
had gone to the Burma Road offices. Only four were 
admitted, the door being locked behind them. Whilst 
the four inside were negotiating, those outside were 
trying to force the door. When management promised to 
pay up, the strike leaders 
went out downstairs and delivered the promise 
to the men, but it was at the request of the 
majority who said they would neither trust us 
nor the management with verbal but [only 
with] written [guarantees] , before we had to 
come up to you again and demanded written 
undertaking. 
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The management felt obliged to sign its promise, and 
the group thereupon dispersed, returning to the wharf 
to boast that it had been able to achieve what the BSA 
had not. Management then decided to pay before the 
agreed date so as to 'strengthen and safeguard' the 
dignity of the BSA. At the same time, it decided to 
sack the four spokesmen plus two others. Chief Biney 
explained how the names got on to the list: 
He said that he was told that 01 abode Ottun, 
Raufu Aremu, James Ojime and Okanlawon Alabi 
led 'on-board* workers to Burma Road offices 
and behaved in a riotous manner. He then 
decided that the leaders should be disci-
plined, and remembering past activities of 
people like Paul Edah and Alfred Duru, he 
concluded that although these men did not 
show up at Burma Road, they couldn't be 
unconnected with the incident. This is how 
your names got into the termination list... 
When the six found out they had been sacked, they 
reported back to their followers. Said one of them, 
Our members viewed it on Saturday that if it 
is not victimisation why was it that only the 
six of us out of all those who visited Burma 
Road should be terminated. If the termination 
is because of our role played on January 2, 
1969 then, they too would not work, they all 
should be terminated and, the on-board men 
then refused to work. 
The leaders then went and reported the affair to the 
police station and, whilst there, heard that the police 
had already been informed of the second strike by 
Biney's Personnel Officer. A few minutes later 
we saw 12 policemen who arrested some of us. 
There was confusion. Mr Savage [a Biney 
manager. PW] was begging us to return to work 
but we said we cannot while some of us are 
being taken away by the police. Mr Savage 
then spoke to the policemen and secured the 
release of us. 
Biney then realised that the strike leaders had popular 
support and decided to suspend the dismissals 'for the 
time being'. Anxious to restore the damaged image of 
the BSA, he then proposed that it should play a role of 
'go-between' and get the strike leaders to both apolo-
gise and promise to behave themselves in the future. 
Whilst the BSA leaders condemned the labourers who 
struck as 'ignorants', and promised to educate them 
better, it also begged management to give the union 
'maximum cooperation' by granting some of its previous 
demands. Biney then directed on the spot that all 
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tally clerks should get 'five shillings increment if 
they have not actually committed any offence'. 
Further sessions of the inquiry were used to 
enable the strike leaders to air their criticism of the 
BSA, to raise general complaints about conditions and 
to apologise for their behaviour. Edah tendered apo-
logy for the actions and begged management to pardon 
his supporters. This was apparently considered in-
sufficient. He was asked to put his apology into writ-
ing and immediately agreed to do so. Despite this act 
of abject contrition (essential if the men were to 
avoid being sacked and blacklisted) the strikes were 
quite successful: the first had achieved its immediate 
purpose and the second one had protected the strike 
leaders. One or two of the leaders were later absorbed 
into Biney staff and/or the BSA (e.g. Alabi) and others 
were probably eased out quietly later. Whatever the 
outcome, it seems to have marked a certain milestone in 
the history of the company. Biney had said that it had 
never happened in the history of the company 'that 
demands by its workers were met under duress'. Al-
though he might have taken measures to ensure that this 
would not happen again, it is evident that it was 
precisely under duress that Biney had been obliged to 
concede worker demands. 
We know that both before and after this event the 
BSA condemned strike action. Yet during the Udoji 
campaign in early 1975 it came very close to organising 
a strike amongst Biney labourers and staff. Whilst the 
moderates were playing their traditional role, the BSA 
was apparently changing its own one. It first asked 
management for assurance that it intended to pay Udoji 
rates to all labour and demanded that the arrears be 
paid on January 17, as with government employees (BSA 
to General Manager, January 2, 1975). Although the new 
rates had been announced on January 23, the Biney 
workers had evidently not been paid out by the end of 
that month. Moreover, the new rates applied to dock 
labour, not to contractor staff. Whilst the labourers 
might have been content to wait for their promised 
increases, Biney staff (amongst whom were those junior 
supervisors who dominate the BSA) could not. On 
February 1, there was a meeting of the 'entire members 
of the Union' (probably meaning the EC) and the 'entire 
workers of the company'. This demanded a 100 percent 
increase in staff salaries, with the backpay to be 
handed over on February 12. The new rates and backpay 
for the labourers were to be paid on February 14. It 
warned management to 'avert any further crisis and 
industrial disputes' and threatened that 'there is no 
going back from these demands' (BSA to Biney, February 
4, 1975). In the absence of action by management, it 
appears that both workers and staff went on strike on 
February 12.[13] Union President Katsina claimed that 
he had no advance knowledge of the strike and had 
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called a meeting to explain to the workers that the BSA 
was to meet management that afternoon. The workers, he 
claimed, were unsatisfied with the assurance and insis-
ted on following the leaders to the meeting at Burma 
Road, 
and after the meeting which lasted four hours 
some of the strikers disagreed with the 
orders of the Union leaders and refused to 
leave Burma Road premises. It is likely that 
these are the people who threatened the 
General Manager in the absence of the Union 
leaders. 
The threat seems to have been effective, the GM being 
forced to give a written undertaking that payment would 
be made on February 21. Biney was furious. A meeting 
was called to discuss the event and to negotiate the 
still remaining issue of staff pay. Here, 
The Managing Director expressed displeasure 
for this incident because over the 60 years 
of the Company's existence its staff had 
never engaged in strike action over anything 
whatsoever... 
He demanded an explanation for the action. Whilst 
Katsina paid his respects to the management and apolo-
gised profusely for the strike (which he, also, des-
cribed as the first in the history of the company) he 
did not condemn it. Since we know that there had been 
other strikes in the company, it appears that what 
Biney was furious about was the involvement of company 
staff and the BSA. Even if the latter had not 
organised the strike, it had been agitating the labour 
force and making threats. It seems likely that it was 
not as sorry about its occurrence as it made out. 
Having expressed the ritual apologies, the BSA got down 
to what it was really interested in, the issue of staff 
pay. In reply to its 100 percent demand, Biney offered 
30. Before the meeting was over, the BSA had grate-
fully accepted 40. The main effect on the BSA may have 
been to give its leaders a greater sense of the value 
of trade union organisation and action than previously. 
But, if so, this was only on behalf of supervisory 
staff not of the labourers it had stimulated to action. 
15.5. Worker activity during strikes 
Evidently, dockworker strikes are more dramatic 
and violent than those within NPA. Does the volatility 
of the workforce, however, suggest a higher level of 
mass activity? The best evidence we have of mass 
activity comes from the 1969 Biney strike, where num-
bers of workers took effective action not only for 
improvements in conditions but also to defend their 
informal leaders. The portwide strike in 1968 seems to 
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have also represented a largely spontaneous action, 
initiated or stimulated - but hardly led - by one or 
more of the informal groups opposed to the Amalgama-
tion. Beyond the cessation of work and some violence 
to property or persons, mass activity seems to have 
been strictly limited. The 'go home' strategy of the 
1970s seems only to have formalised the mass inactiv-
ity. Thus, the greater drama of dockworker strikes 
compared with those of the portworkers seems to have 
resided rather in their generality and their occasional 
violence than in any high level of mass activity during 
the actions. Moreover, one must recognise the severe 
limitations on such spontaneous activity as there was. 
In the absence of effective and recognised leadership, 
the portwide dock strike of 1968 reaped strictly 
limited benefits. It took several years before the 
Nigerian state felt obliged to take permanent account 
of worker protest. Similarly, the Biney strike of 1969 
reaped only shortterm benefits. Permanent and effec-
tive defence of dockworker interests within the company 
would have required an organisation. In the absence of 
such an organisation such action as they took in 1975 
was available as a resource to be exploited for the 
benefit of the junior supervisory staff who controlled 
the BSA. 
NOTES 
1. Parts of this chapter have appeared in slightly 
different form in Waterman 1976 and 1979a. 
2. Except where otherwise indicated the account of 
this strike comes from this source. References 
are therefore given by page number alone. 
3. Samuel Ayo Ige and Willie Aghoruntse were also 
members of the Committee of Ten that crystalised 
during the strike. The efforts these three made 
to end it together with the ULC suggest that the 
Committee of Ten was not the organiser or leader 
of the strike - a matter to be discussed later. 
4. These had been active in the docks in the period 
1963-6, of course, but by 1967 the effort to 
create an independent socialist party (NLP) and 
trade union centre (LUF) had run out of momentum. 
Their contact with dockworker activists at this 
time may well have been the last that they had 
with any workers before the NLP faded out of 
existence. 
5. 'Bajare' is evidently E. Bajere, Chairman of the 
short-lived 'Dockworkers Apapa Branch' of an 
equally short-lived R&PT&DWUN in 1964. He seems 
to have retained his political relationship with 
the two socialist intellectuals till 1968, at 
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which date it was being said that he was employed 
by Kolagbodi's fishery cooperative. 
The Urboho tribunal did not consider the evidence 
sufficient to prove that Toyo and Kolagbodi had 
been responsible for the strike, and seemed more 
sympathetic to the notion that they had only given 
£N10 to help to call it off. The final judgement 
of the tribunal on the pair throws light on the 
conventional Nigerian view of the relationship 
between worker struggle and socialist theory: 
The... g roup is an anomal ly in the docks 
...It was quite clear...that Mr Toyo and 
Dr Kolagbodi were interested in unity 
among the dockworkers not merely to 
improve their bargaining strength and 
their conditions of service but because 
they hoped that the workers so organised 
would be instrumental in bringing about 
a Socialist Government in Nigeria which 
they were interested in promoting. 
(Urhobo Report 1971:69). 
For a general account of the Adebo affair, see 
Cohen 1974:233-7. For a case study of its effects 
in the Lagos industrial estate of Ikeja, see Peace 
(1974, 1975, 1979). For Kano, see Lübeck (1975a, 
b). 
I had been talking at length with Abam and Odulana 
just before the event and - like everyone else in 
the industry - had discounted Abam's intention and 
capacity to call a strike. I was, however, on the 
Apapa Quays when the strike broke out. Further-
more, the moderates were using as their headquar-
ters a restaurant at which I ate (and which was 
run by an ex-trade unionist ethnically related to 
one of the moderate leaders). I spent much of the 
next couple of days down at the quays, where I was 
able to speak to the radical activists, as well as 
to supporters of Abam. I also spoke frequently, 
and at length, to a manager of one of the contrac-
ting companies. 
He took me away from the Port Labour Office at the 
port gates and along a disused railwayline to an 
empty bar. Here he felt he could talk to me 
without being observed or overheard. 
A reference to action taken against the union and 
the person of Alhaji Babs Animashaun. As leader 
of the nationally unaffiliated National Union of 
Bank Employees, Animashaun had followed a policy 
of militant industrial action, much in the spirit 
of Odulana - or Adebola. It was because of his 
militancy that the Banking Act was amended so as 
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to make a ban on trade unionism possible within 
the banking sector. And it was his union that was 
the first to be banned, and he himself who was the 
first to be proscribed when members of it contra-
vened the new Essential Services Legislation in 
1976. 
I am assuming that this is the same 'mass meeting' 
that Abam had told me he had to address at midday 
on Saturday, December 5 and the actual attendance 
at which I was able to observe for myself. 
The source for this account is the minutes of the 
inquiry that Biney organised into the events 
(Biney Minutes, January 13, 15-17, 1969). All 
quotations are from this source. 
The account is dependent on the report of the 
negotiation meeting that followed the strike 
(Biney-BSA Minutes, February 18, 1975). 
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Chapter 16 
ANALYSIS: THE SLOW AND AWKWARD SELF-DEFINITION 
OF A WORKING CLASS 
If the central issue of Part II has been identified as 
one of strategy, and of Part III as of cleavage, then 
that of Part IV must be one of relative militancy 
within our two sectors. In order to consider this 
issue, we will deal first with what the strike pattern 
tells us about worker consciousness and capacity, and 
secondly with what it reveals about strike leadership 
and strategy. We will then turn to the question of 
militancy more directly. For the first two aspects we 
may draw on earlier theorising. For the last we will 
draw more directly on Chapter 13. 
16.1, Strikes, consciousness and capacity 
With regard to the NPA strikes we must remember 
two major features of the period we are dealing with. 
The first is that - possibly as a result of the 1964 
experience - the state was making major concessions to 
public sector workers and involving them in a complex 
apparatus of formal industrial relations. Neither the 
Adebo, Udoji or 5-day-week awards required previous 
industrial action by public sector workers, nor did 
they require the kind of follow-up action that was 
demanded in the private sector. The second feature is 
the failure of the industrial relations machinery at 
both NPA and national level to deliver the promised 
goods, and the decreasingly favourable nature of that 
machinery as time passed. That this was understood is 
suggested by action taken against their own moderate 
leadership by the Engineering Department workers in 
1972, and by the growing attraction that the more 
militant R&PT&CSU evidently exercised for these and for 
others. Evidently, this union was responding to a 
feeling that existed amongst the workers themselves. 
The action taken by the workers was little enough (when 
compared with that of the dockworkers below) . Table 
14.1 does not reveal the whole story, since it does not 
indicate clearly how many workers struck in Lagos on 
each occasion. What we do know is that there were a 
number of very short actions, that there was not one 
NPA-wide strike called (that of NMTUF in 1972 did not 
directly involve R&PT&CSÜ members who had already won 
their action), and that several actions of the R&PT&CSO 
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did not even involve all its members in Lagos. We also 
know that worker activity during such actions was 
usually at a low level, requiring nothing more than a 
reduction to zero of the customary pace of work within 
the corporation. Before we over-estimate the signifi-
cance of this low level of involvement and commitment, 
we should note two factors. The first is that in most 
cases such limited action was sufficient for its pur-
pose - the application of agreed concessions or the 
re-activation of stalled negotiations. The second is 
the preparedness of workers (both clerical and manual), 
and at least one union, to take the kind of extreme 
measures noted above. Finally, it must be remembered 
that in taking strike action the workers were well 
aware that they were flouting the law of the land. 
What of the dockworker strikes? That strikes here 
were a simple and direct expression of dockworker 
dissatisfaction is, perhaps, suggested by the number 
that took place at the end or beginning of each year. 
A number of the strikes took place explicitly over the 
need to meet expenses for the festivities. Any possi-
bility of an increase, any delay in a promised one, any 
doubt about the time or amount of payments due at this 
time, was liable to provoke dockworkers to direct 
action. That the strikes were a tool of the dockwor-
kers is further suggested by two other features. One 
is that moderate (ADWT&GWU(U)) or clientalist (BSA) 
unions were eventually involved with strikes despite 
their declared and demonstrated hostility to them. The 
other is that strikes were more than once used as a 
weapon against such corrupt or ineffective leaderships. 
The extent to which the strike was in this period the 
customary weapon of the Lagos dockworkers is indicated 
not so much by the frequency of strikes (we can only 
compare incomplete data after 1968 with even more 
incomplete data before it), as by the fact that there 
were 10 general strikes within the nine years shown in 
Table 15.1. At the same time we must recognise that 
these strikes demanded neither high commitment nor much 
sacrifice from the dockers. Three or four days were 
the maximum for strikes. Dockers were customarily 
compensated for days lost and protected from victimi-
sation following such actions. The danger of imprison-
ment or police violence was faced only by a tiny minor-
ity of activists. Moreover, the demands were usually 
modest, as were the successes. Where there were more 
wide-ranging demands (recognition, decasualisation) 
these were usually abandoned in practice. The intro-
duction of the 'go home' strike reduced any mass acti-
vity even further. 
What does this tell us about the consciousness and 
capacity of the workers in the two sectors? Evidently 
their actions were largely independent of each other. 
Even when they participated in national actions during 
this period, this was in a serial form not a combined 
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one. Thus, their actions might have paralleled or even 
coincided temporally with those of workers outside the 
particular sector, or even outside the industry, but 
they were confined to the workplace and required no 
combination for success. The significant difference 
between portworker and dockworker action would seem to 
have been the generality of the dockworker one. Thus, 
even if the portworkers were gradually breaking down 
previous fraction, segment or stratum divisions, they 
did not during this period reach the kind of combina-
tion that was almost natural to dockworkers. That 
dockwide strikes were natural to dockworkers, however, 
is not to suggest a more advanced consciousness or 
capacity. Determinants of dockworker action included 
the divided nature of industrial ownership, the un-
differentiated nature of dock labour, the lack of a 
liberal-paternalist labour control strategy, and the 
underdevelopment of dockworker organisation. The four 
were of course, inter-related and mutually-determining. 
The very success of dockwide strikes was leading to 
recognition of the radical union, the application of 
liberal-paternalist norms, the reform of the ownership 
pattern - and discouragement to dockwide strikes! In 
this sense the discovery (or rediscovery) of more-
general strike action by the portworkers suggests a 
higher level of consciousness than the dockworkers. Or 
a more significant rupture with official values and the 
Nigerian state. Despite their relatively advantageous 
material position, despite non-capitalist employment, 
despite sophisticated labour-control strategy, and 
despite organisational division, the workers were 
prepared to take action. Deeply incorporated into wage 
labour, well-aware of national labour-control strategy, 
these workers were not only prepared to stop work but 
also to tamper with equipment or to condone such tam-
pering. 
16.2. Strike leadership and strategy 
Now for the issue of strike leadership and tac-
tics. Within the NPA we are reduced to talking about 
the leadership provided by the R&PT&CSU. On the one 
occasion that the NMTUF felt obliged to take action, 
this was of a very brief and very mild nature, and its 
success was dependent on the more militant previous 
actions of others. With regard to the R&PT&CSU we must 
consider to what extent its leadership had its own 
motives for strike action separate (or separable) from 
those of the workers. One notices that most of the 
issues the union raised during this period were grades 
and trades ones, that they were frequently of great 
complexity, and that they often turned on fine legal or 
debating points. All these features are ones that 
reduce the level of worker activity or narrow it down 
to particular affected categories. The complexity of 
the issues requires that they be left in the hands of 
leaders with particular skills, and that they be solved 
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in negotiation. That the one-eighth issue became 
generalisable to the mass of NPA workers was not due to 
the original nature of the demand, nor was it put 
forward on behalf of NPA workers as a whole. Further-
more, strikes were used as an instrument of struggle 
against other unions, and not always in a manner that 
would increase worker unity. The Udoji strike seems to 
have been at least in part motivated by a desire to do 
down a union that had done nothing more than correct an 
anomaly affecting some of its members. Finally, there 
can be little doubt that Adebola's militancy in the 
1970s was in large part motivated by his bitter con-
flict with certain NPA managers. In so far as all this 
is true, it makes the strikes appear as an instrument 
in the hands of leaders who could turn them off (as 
they did for half a year or so) or on, at their own 
will and for their own purposes. 
The R&PT&CSU leadership was as prone to use other 
means of struggle which did not imply mass action at 
all. Thus, it had through the 1970s continually made 
use of secret letters and files to which it had been 
able to get access. Such documents were used in press 
releases, and in appeals to various state bodies for 
action against the NPA managers. These exposures were 
also extremely effective, finally resulting in the 
retirement at government order of a considerable number 
of top managers, as well as an officier of the NPA 
Board. The tactic was, no doubt, applauded by workers, 
seeing their erstwhile lords and masters tumbled by the 
audacious Adebola. Yet, the tactic was not one that 
required any collective worker action. The workers 
- with the exception of the one or two who might have 
been involved in obtaining or copying the confidential 
documents - were just an admiring audience. Further-
more, the tactic was just a tactic: exposure or threat 
of exposure was used against a particular manager, or 
management as a whole, to obtain some possibly unre-
lated concession by the union. Thus, when the R&PT&CSU 
obtained incontrovertible evidence that a particular 
manager was running a private transportation company 
from his NPA quarters, the evidence was handed to the 
press. But, at a certain point, the campaign was 
simply abandoned. 
The opportunity for the union to make a point 
about the nature of management as such was not taken 
because the union still believed there could be a good 
management. We do not know whether it was this sort of 
behaviour to which the moderate critics of the R&PT&CSU 
were referring when they called it 'political', but it 
was - perhaps - a style of operation more appropriate 
to the Nigerian parties of the past than to that col-
lective worker self-activity necessary if unions were 
to be able to deal with the more-experienced and 
tougher management and state that could be expected in 
the future in Nigeria. 
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All this should not, however, lead us to lose 
sight of the fact that the R&PT&CSU recognised the 
desire of workers for militant action, and that the 
workers approved of its general strategy and responded 
enthusiastically to it. 
When considering strike leadership and tactics 
amongst the dockworkers we are able to compare that at 
company level with that at dockwide level. The ambig-
uity of the BSA's role during the 1975 Biney strike 
nicely reflects not only its position as an organisa-
tion of supervisory staff but also its continuing 
dependency on Chief Biney. Evidently, such an organi-
sation had little potential as a strike leadership. 
The history of the moderates with respect to strikes 
suggests little more than this. The semi-conspira-
torial manner in which they went about organising the 
1976 strike suggests little talent for mass leadership. 
The success of the event, however, shows that dock-
worker strikes could be used for leadership purposes 
quite distinct from those of workers - a fact of 
general relevance. The informal committees that organ-
ised the 1968 general strike and the 1969 Biney strikes 
were evidently adequate to the immediate task, but 
inadequate for that of continuous struggle. Continuous 
struggle still seems to have required external support 
in the form of expertise, advice, finance or organisa-
tion. The socialist intellectuals failed to provide 
this in 1968, just as they have failed to provide it 
for the trade union movement more generally since that 
date. The mantle of strike leadership thus fell for 
most of this period on the shoulders of the radicals. 
These had access to the expertise, advice, etc., 
through their link with the radical NTUC. It was 
probably this access that enabled the radicals to 
preserve a united leadership and to act as a permanent 
strike leadership during these years. Yet this was not 
sufficient to transform them from a permanent action 
committee (one step ahead of the informal committees) 
into an organisation. It was only through organising 
strikes that they were linked to the workers. When 
they abandoned this activity, they lost control of 
them. Their abandonment of the strike was motivated by 
the interests of the leaders. Or, to put it another 
way, they were abandoning it for reasons that were 
obscure to the workers. 
One notes a number of special features of dock-
worker strikes during this period. The first and most 
important is that the dockers became capable of organ-
ising successful general strikes without the support of 
the national trade union movement. It is true that 
most of the successful wage claims conformed to the 
traditional form of private-sector action, in following 
up national-level demands or government concessions. 
However, a series of defensive actions (against reduc-
tions) or demonstrative ones (for decasualisation, 
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recognition) were carried out independently and with a 
certain success. One notes, secondly, the continued 
occurrence of violence. This was of two kinds, one 
used against the contractors, NPA or police, the other 
against dockers, NPA workers or opposition leaders. The 
'thugs', 'smugglers' and 'canoeboys' of 1968 appeared 
to have still been there nine years later. Given the 
nature of the industry, it is difficult to say whether 
the men who played this role were ordinary dockers or 
toughs hired from the periphery of the industry. 
Notable in the 1976 strike was that the violence was 
apparently being directed indiscriminately against both 
of the above-mentioned categories. The fact that each 
side accused the other of using violent intimidation is 
an indicator that it was considered illegitimate. It 
may be significant that in 1975 the radicals took steps 
to avoid such violence during strikes, and claimed 
later to have decided to end the use of it against the 
moderate leaders. The third feature one notes is that 
the radicals had not liberated themselves from depen-
dency on the state. The organisation of strikes seems 
to have been for them more a means of gaining recogni-
tion than of raising worker consciousness and capacity. 
They were prepared not only to abandon strikes as part 
of an unwritten deal with the state, but to collaborate 
with the very state agency that was used to arrest and 
beat dockers during strikes - the police. 
What does this tell us about strike leadership 
within the industry? It suggests, first the necessity 
of continuing leadership, secondly that the existence 
of this implies the possible use of strikes in the 
interest of such leaderships. Although this might seem 
self-evident, it is often forgotten. Given the oppor-
tunity that permanent leadership provides either to 
raise the consciousness and capacity of workers or to 
channel their energy off for non-working-class pur-
poses, the crucial question is evidently what kind of 
leadership is being offered. The differences between 
the two major types of strike leadership being offered 
within the industry seem here less significant than 
their similarities. Or perhaps it is the analogous 
relationship with the workers that is notable. Both 
leaderships evidently responded to the implicit or 
explicit worker demand for action. Both effectively 
stimulated and organised it. Yet both were capable of 
turning the action off (or at least trying to do so) 
for reasons that were more theirs than those of their 
followers. For both leaderships the strike appeared to 
be in good part a weapon in a battle being fought by 
themselves in the negotiating chambers of capital and 
state. 
16.3. Strikes, division and unity 
Now for the issue of relative worker militancy in 
the two sectors and its implications for the unity/ 
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division issue more generally. 
In Chapter 13 it was made clear that worker mili-
tancy or extremity in strikes was insufficient to 
indicate the capacity to control either the workers' 
own organisations or the society as a whole. After 
what has been said concerning the relative militancy of 
port and dockworkers it should not be necessary to 
further labour this point here. Militancy is not 
enough. There must be an expansion in the interests 
served - and in the understanding of self-interest of 
those interests. In other words, there must be an 
expansion of action to include yet more fractions, 
segments and strata of the working class, and/or new 
and broader demands. In both our cases, the issues 
round which strikes took place were traditional ones, 
and the groups on whose behalf they were put forward 
were quite narrowly defined. The price of such limita-
tions became evident in the dockworker case and re-
mained as a likely outcome in the portworker one. 
At the same time, we do see that 'redefinition 
through struggle' spoken of in Chapter 13. The strikes 
were imposed on leaderships that had previously been 
moderate (Abebola) or positively opposed to striking 
(the BSA and the dockworker moderates). The disjunc-
ture, secondly, of these strikes from national union 
and political organisation, must not be seen as neces-
sarily limiting. It meant, in the first case, inde-
pendence from the articulating role of distant national 
- and even more distant international - union leaders 
over whom the workers had little practical control. It 
meant, in the second case, freedom from the state-
oriented politics of reformist or 'revolutionary' 
intellectuals, imposing on workers ideologies and 
programmes with little or no relationship to worker 
needs or capacities. The port and dockworkers seem to 
have been redefining themselves collectively in a 
tougher-minded (if narrow) fashion, in order to extend 
control over their immediate conditions of work. 
If we now compare these strikes with what we have 
observed of strikes at the capitalist periphery more 
generally, we do find distinct parallels with the 
conclusions of Jelin on Argentina and Shaheed on Paki-
stan - despite the very differences noted between 
peripheral formations by Hyman. There seems to be 
developing, in other words, a general tendency for 
worker protest action to free itself from statist 
politics, and from control by top national union lea-
ders. Where the Nigerian strikes differed (also beyond 
Lagos Port) was in their failure to escalate or broa-
den, as they did in the Argentinian, Pakistani and 
Namibian cases. We noted in Chapter 13 the possibility 
that strikes open for the overcoming of two crucial 
cleavages imposed by capital and state - that between 
the industrial and political levels of working-class 
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struggle, and that between different sectors of the 
labouring poor. Here we see the negative aspect of the 
tough but narrow vision and action of the workers in 
the cargo-handling industry. A failure to engage 
directly with the central organs of the state implies a 
failure to recognise the role of the state in repro-
ducing the industrial exploitation and oppression. A 
failure to raise worker demands of immediate interest 
to other labouring people (transport, housing, infla-
tion, police and military harassment, etc.) means a 
self-definition in status rather than class terms. By 
this I mean that these workers were defining themselves 
as 'wage-earners' in the capitalist sense, rather than 
as a 'working class' the interests of which inevitably 
surpass the bounds of the wage relationship. 
If, in their failure to escalate and spread, these 
strikes differed from the movements noted elsewhere in 
peripheral capitalist societies then this may be due 
not only to the specificity of Nigeria as a peripheral 
capitalist society but also to the inevitable focus of 
most strike studies on the most dramatic movements. In 
dealing with a period that was critical neither for 
Nigerian capital nor for the state, we may find more 
parallels with strikes in the core capitalist for-
mations than in the peripheral-capitalist ones. It is 
under such 'normal' conditions that collective-bargain-
ing unionism best develops, that the separation between 
worker activation and representation develops and that 
the already-mentioned problem of the re-institutional-
isation of conflict arises most clearly. The non-
revolutionary character of strikes in Lagos Port at 
this time might be a disappointment to marxist intel-
lectuals, socialist politicians and radical union 
leaders. No matter. These 'normal' strikes will be 
recognisable to workers in 'normal' capitalist coun-
tries. Perhaps such a recognition will break through 
the barriers of ignorance, race, nationality, affili-
ation and ideology that have so far prevented meaning-
ful contacts between Nigerian and other workers. 
16.4. Conclusion 
As for this case, we can conclude as follows. 
Whatever the motive and intentions of the leaders, and 
regardless of their incapacity to raise the conscious-
ness and action of their followers beyond the horizons 
of their own half industry, the strikes nonetheless 
played a crucial role in liberating the workers from 
the feelings of inferiority and subordination incul-
cated by the wage-labour relationship. They also 
provided a crucial reminder to state and capital that 
they were not simply a labour force to be summarily 
exploited and oppressed, and to their leaders that they 
were not simply followers to be led. They were wage 
labourers, in one Lagos industry, awkwardly, slowly, 
yet certainly, contributing through their self-deter-
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mined action to the creation of a Nigerian working 
class. And if this action was being carried out with-
out common consciousness, organisation and action, then 
we should remember this:[1] in historical reality 
members of the working class are always at different 
stages of becoming. In our case we have been concerned 
with two fractions, one more and one less incorporated 
into wage labour. If the first stood close to and were 
influenced by the intermediate salaried strata, so did 
the second to the petty-bourgeoisie. If the first have 
to struggle to distinguish themselves from such strata, 
so do the second from the petty-bourgeoisie and the 
peasantry. In the process of this struggle, the two 
will not only find each other but also provide a pole 
of attraction for other labouring people. But they 
will only provide such a pole if they simultaneously 
help the other labouring men - and women - to escape 
from functions, roles and self-definitions imposed on 
them by an anarchistic, degrading and increasingly 
violent and destructive capitalist world order. In 
reaching out to new frineds nationally and inter-
nationally, the workers of Lagos Port - and of Nigeria 
- will better identify and isolate the few enemies who 
personify exploitative capital and the oppressive 
state. 
NOTES 
1. I owe the following thought to a similar formula-
tion by Archie Mafeje (1977). 
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CONCLUSIÓN 
1. The end of a debate? 
This work began with the ambition of surpassing 
the labour aristocracy/semi-proletarianised peasants 
dichotomy. It ends with the hope that it might repre-
sent the end also of this particular debate, and that 
future studies of the working class and unions in 
Africa (and elsewhere) will be carried out without this 
particular crutch or aunt sally. The hope would be 
futile if it depended solely on my efforts, since there 
is no power in theory alone that can prevent socialist 
intellectuals - or socialist politicians and labour 
leaders for that matter - from retaining traditional 
formulas or modes of thought. These may, indeed, serve 
their particular purposes, long after the appearances 
that gave rise to them have disappeared. Hopes for a 
reconceptualisation of the problem must therefore 
rather depend on the changing nature of labour strug-
gles in Nigeria and Africa and elsewhere. These strug-
gles - themselves a response to the changing nature of 
capital accumulation and state formation - are refusing 
to be bound by strategies based on the traditional 
modes of thought. It is this process that has called 
for a more adequate conceptualisation and analysis. It 
has - as we will see - also raised new problems for 
analysis. The question then is one of whether the old 
problem has been adequately re-conceptualised, and 
whether the new ones are being looked at in a new way 
or simply by a shifting of the traditional modes of 
thought into the new area. It would be regretable if 
this occurred. Part of the purpose of this conclusion 
is both to identify the shift in terrain of debate 
concerning relations amongst different kinds of working 
people in Africa (and the capitalist periphery more 
generally). Another part is to suggest the relevance 
to analysis of this new area of the re-conceputalis-
ation developed with respect to the old one. The end 
of the old debate signals the beginning of a new one. 
The purpose and spirit of this Conclusion should 
be made clear. The body of the study has been carried 
out in positive terms, in the sense of explaining and 
using new concepts to analyse the old problem (although 
322 
occasional criticism of the old concepts and methods 
may have been made along the way) . The case study 
could, therefore, stand on its own, requiring here 
merely a summary and the indication of certain theore-
tical or political implications. If I have chosen to 
take issue with others in Section 5 below, it is for 
the purpose already indicated and in the spirit sugges-
ted by Arrighi and Saul in the Introduction: to contri-
bute to constructive debate amongst concerned radicals, 
to develop and demonstrate new concepts, and particu-
larly to address oneself to the problem of solidarity 
amongst labouring people differentially incorporated 
into the circuits of capital and the meshes of 
state.[1] 
Let us now recall what was said of the labour 
aristocracy thesis in the Introduction and follow this 
up by considering the alternative offered. The labour 
aristocracy thesis, it was argued, was empirically 
falsifiable: its economic, social and political asser-
tions were inadequate, or misleading, or simply wrong. 
The problem underlying this was one of misconceptuali-
sation: the concept and its binary opposite had ambi-
guous and shifting referents, they were internally 
contradictory, represented a logical rather than a 
sociological opposition, and were of no analytical 
value. The misconceptualisation suggested methodologi-
cal errors: 1) the freezing of the social process, 2) 
the presentation of the working class and proletariani-
sation in terms of binary opposition, 3) the presenta-
tion of consciousness in economie-determinist or class-
reductionist terms, 4) the failure to directly observe 
and analyse the behaviour being conceptualised. Such 
points were partially conceded by John Saul. It was 
argued, finally, that the thesis had political impli-
cations that were in contradiction with a socialist 
orientation: there was an elitist notion of leadership 
(salaried middle strata who were assumed to be more 
radical than the workers and better understand their 
interests) and a statist notion of transformation and 
socialism (which might have to be imposed by govern-
ments on the resistant labour aristocrats) . 
Connections were suggested between shortcomings in 
the African labour aristocracy thesis on the one hand, 
and marxist dependency theory, classical marxist labour 
aristocracy theory, and marxism more generally on the 
other hand. Despite such shortcomings, the labour 
aristocracy thesis was still considered worthy of 
examination. Firstly, because it was an attempt to 
come to terms with the fundamental problem of 'uneven 
proletarian consciousness and industrial sectionalism'. 
Secondly, because it addressud itself directly to the 
trade unions and the role within them of the differen-
tially proletarianised. Thirdly, because it raised 
questions concerning the role of the non-industrial 
workers who form the overwhelming majority of the 
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African working class. Finally, because criticism of 
the labour aristocracy thesis had tended to negate it 
rather than surpass it. 
In what follows, we will consider in turn the case 
itself, the re-conceptualisation, the underlying 
approach and its general implications, and the rela-
tionship between all this and some relevant recent 
literature on labour in Africa and more generally. 
2. A case reconsidered 
Part I shows how capital and state attempt to 
shape labour within Lagos Port. The first chapter 
considers the historical development and present struc-
ture of industry, labour relations and the working 
class in Nigeria generally. There are identified three 
periods of industrialisation, and four distinct wage-
labour sectors currently existing. The specific his-
tory and structure of wage labour is set out. We are 
considering workers in a country in which one in three 
works outside agriculture, in which the workers are 
outnumbered three to one by non-wage-earners in the 
cities, and where only one worker in three works for 
even small-scale capitalists. There are also identi-
fied two main periods in national industrial relations 
policy in Nigeria, that of a liberal paternalist model 
and of an increasing - if uncertain - corporatism. The 
development of the national trade union movement is 
shown to be in part determined by the requirements of 
such policies and in part by the development of the 
Nigerian working class. This class - divided by indus-
trial structure and region - is shown to be intimately 
related to the rural and urban petty-bourgeoisie, from 
which it springs and amongst which it lives. Despite 
the development of a specific working-class conscious-
ness and behaviour, and despite the capacity for effec-
tive local-level working-class protest, we see why it 
had been unable, till at least 1977, to create a class-
conscious and representative national leadership. The 
second chapter deals with the structure of the Lagos 
cargo-handling industry itself, particularly with the 
division into two major sectors, and the division 
within each of these. Here we see that workers are 
divided not only by ownership sectors, but also scale 
(one big NPA, many small contractors) , and within each 
sector by a multiplicity of factors intended to make 
them functional to the separate structures. It is also 
shown that the sectoral division is a historically-
determined and still changing one, with changes largely 
reflecting the interests of capital and state - or 
fractions of these. The third chapter is concerned 
with the social backgrounds, present networks and 
living conditions of the two central categories within 
each sector. It becomes evident that we are looking at 
two worlds of wage labour, with major differences in 
income and security, background and education, social 
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networks and life chances. Evidence of the portworker-
dockworker gap is found in abundance, yet we can also 
see gaps within each category, and considerable link-
ages between the way of life of manual portworkers and 
the experienced dockworkers. In the conclusion to this 
part (Chapter 4) , it is argued that whilst prole-
tarianisation brings about a certain homogeneity within 
the wage-labour force, it simultaneously brings about a 
repeated heterogenisation. The heterogeneity in the 
port implies a multiplicity of divisions between the 
workers being considered. The division between rich 
and poor workers is, thus, only one of the variety of 
divisions and separations that Nigerian capital and 
state implies for Nigerian labour. The division of the 
cargo-handling industry into two major ownership, 
scale, technology and labour-control sectors certainly 
exists. Yet there is in neither of them the classical 
division between factory proletarians and industrial 
capitalists. Moreover, each of the two labour forces 
is itself significantly divided by fraction, segment 
and stratum. Given, further, the close relationship 
between contract and permanent workers - close compared 
with the whole range of urban labourer types in peri-
pheral capitalist cities - the question of whether this 
particular division is the most significant one is by 
no means self-evident. 
Part II begins the study of unions as the common 
form of worker organisation in the port. It is con-
cerned primarily with the external relations of the 
unions - union strategy toward capital and state. 
Having already recognised the nature of the division 
between the two types of labour force, this part con-
cerns the implications of such a division for the more-
and less-proletarianised workers respectively. Within 
the NPA we see the variety of membership constituen-
cies, and unions largely focused on competitive grades 
and trades demands within the framework of collective 
bargaining institutions and ideology. Increasing fac-
tionalism is, however, seen not simply as expressing 
ever-narrower self-interest but also increasing dis-
satisfaction with the existing union strategy. This 
both permits and encourages the development of a more-
aggressive and more-encompassing union strategy, which 
provides a basis for re-unification amongst the wor-
kers. The limits of this change are shown in the fact 
that it is industrial relations institutions rather 
than industrial relations ideology that are questioned, 
the strategy rather than the demands that change. The 
variety of situations and levels within the contractor 
sector implies a greater variety of possible consti-
tuencies and strategies. Yet here, too, we see a 
definite movement in the direction of radicalism. Even 
the most employer-dependent of the unions shows its 
teeth. The moderate-reformist organisation is con-
tinually outflanked. But the militant unrecognised 
organisation is unable to provide organisational ex-
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pression to the radicalism it has itself awakened. 
However ambiguous, portworker radicalism is able to 
take some definite organisational form. Dockworker 
radicalism has difficulty in achieving this. Inter-
pretation of such findings can be found in Chapter 6. 
The two final paragraphs of that chapter contain the 
most important conclusions. One concerns the nature of 
the working class, the other the nature of trade 
unionism as a type of worker organisation. The first 
conclusion is that there is no 'real' working class in 
Nigeria from which either the more- or less-prole-
tarianised workers are deviating, no proletarian van-
guard (no economically-determined natural vanguard) 
that other workers can be expected to follow. One 
cannot assume, on the basis of extent-of-proletariani-
sation or extent-of-deprivation, a certain class con-
sciousness. Insofar, indeed, as a certain type of 
consciousness is premised on the particular group 
experience, the radicalism of that group is going to be 
limited by this particularity. The second conclusion 
follows from this one in asking whether the trade 
unions do not reinforce such worker particularism. 
Whilst it is argued that the unions had in the Lagos 
Port case been overcoming such divisions, it is recog-
nised that the union form of organisation does permit 
such particularism. The more general question is left 
open for later consideration. 
Part III provides material for further considera-
tion of this second issue. It is concerned with the 
internal relations of the trade union movement locally, 
nationally and internationally. It considers in turn 
the nature of union structures, leadership relations 
with the national and international movement, and 
leadership relations with the membership. The analysis 
(Chapter 12) summarises the findings on these, albeit 
in another order. First comes the worker-leader rela-
tionship. Here is pointed out not only the separate 
orientations (of the NPA workers toward the intermedi-
ate salaried strata, and of the dockworkers toward the 
petty-bourgeoisie) but also their common consciousness 
of wage-worker status. This shared consciousness does 
not include a national or international working class 
(nor each other) but it parallels that of other wor-
kers. It also parallels attitudes of other non-waged 
labouring people in Nigeria, and it can therefore be 
seen to allow for common action with them. Amongst the 
leaders we can identify a process of professionalisa-
tion and danger of bureaucratisation. It is also 
suggested that insofar as the leaders fail to raise the 
consciousness and activity of members they can them-
selves be considered as occupying intermediate posi-
tions in the class structure rather than leadership 
positions within the working class. With respect to 
union structure, there is identified a common process 
toward a collective-bargaining unionism, but without 
any necessary corollary concerning bureaucratisation. 
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It is, however, suggested that insofar as collective 
bargaining status is achieved and accepted as both 
means and ends of union activity, unions become con-
servative, and factionalism and clientalism will be 
stimulated. This line of argument is continued in 
considering relations between the Lagos Port unions and 
their national and international union contacts. It is 
the conservative nature of such higher organisations, 
based on old compromises with capital and state, that 
leads them to stimulate clientalism and factionalism 
within the unions at port level. The conclusion to this 
chapter turns again to the general question of the 
union form and worker division. It is argued that we 
must recognise that capital and state (competition and 
hierarchy) operate inside as well as outside or above 
the trade union movement. Insofar as union leaders do 
not recognise and take action against it, obstacles to 
the expansion and consolidation of a working class will 
remain. There is no evidence that even the two radical 
leaderships recognised this in word or action. Per-
ceived as specialised structures with an alloted role 
in an existing social formation, unions will reproduce 
old divisions or create new ones amongst workers. 
Perceived as a movement against capitalism and statism 
outside, competition and hierarchy inside, unions could 
possibly contribute to overcoming divisions amongst 
workers. 
But have the workers the capacity to thus impose 
themselves within their unions and then through their 
unions? Part IV is concerned with this issue. Since 
Chapters 14 and 15 do little more than present a 
chronological account of strike activity in each sec-
tor, we may move directly to Chapter 16. This deals in 
turn with worker consciousness and capacity, with 
strike leadership, and with the problem of worker 
unity. First, consciousness and capacity. Although 
the portworkers are overcoming their divisions during 
this period, and becoming more militant, their strikes 
are comparatively few in number, moderate and far from 
general. The greater generality, frequency and mili-
tancy of dockworker strikes, however, does not neces-
sarily evidence a more advanced worker consciousness 
and capacity. In both cases the strike form can be 
seen as a rational and effective response to the situ-
ation of the particular fraction. But whilst the 
dockworker protest is leading them into the status 
enjoyed by the portworkers, portworker protest is 
implicitly leading them beyond this. However, each 
fraction was customarily striking on its own, and 
common action during national actions did not usually 
mean joint action. Secondly, strike leadership. This 
comes in both cases to be in the hands of radical union 
leaderships. But it is clear in both cases that these 
leaderships have motives for striking that are separ-
ate - or separable - from those of their followers. The 
quite considerable differences between the two leader-
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ships seem here less significant than their similari­
ties. Both leaderships respond to worker demands for 
action, both stimulate and lead it, yet both are cap­
able of turning actions off for their own reasons. But 
this must not be taken to mean that the strikes are 
totally in the hands of the leaders. Thirdly, the 
question of worker unity. It is clear that we here see 
a growing militancy, but one expressed in terms of a 
fairly narrowly-defined self-interest. However, this 
need not be considered a simply negative phenomenon. 
The strikes do not in any way oppose our two major 
worker categories to each other. Nor do they conflict 
with the interests of other Nigerian workers. The port 
and dockworkers are redefining themselves, collectively 
but separately, in a narrower but tougher-minded 
manner. The problem that remains is one of expanding 
the self-definition and taking more effective action. 
Protest action must include more fractions, segments 
and strata of the working class, and involve new and 
broader demands. But even these 'normal' strikes, 
taking place under non-crisis conditions nonetheless 
demonstrate the capacity of the workers to impose 
themselves on capital and state and their own union 
leaderships. 
The case, in conclusion, does not appear to con­
firm the listed assumptions and assertions of the 
labour aristocracy theory. It reveals the very real 
differences and separation between our two worker types 
but no conflict between them. It reveals other differ­
ences and separations within each sector that would 
seem to be as significant in obstructing the develop­
ment of class consciousness as those between the 
'labour aristocrats' and the 'semi-proletarianised 
peasants'. It produces a detailed specification of the 
nature of each worker type where previously there had 
been only economie-determinist prediction. It suggests 
the capacity of workers to fight capitalists and 
bureaucrats. 
3. Д conceptualisation re-examined 
The problem for social analysis - at least for 
socialist analysts - is also one of overcoming concepts 
that reflect rather than penetrate, obscure rather than 
reveal, and that express the capitalist project rather 
than attempting to suggest a socialist one. To expand 
on the last point: the division of rich workers and 
poor workers, of the protected and unprotected, those 
in large-scale from those in small-scale industries 
- these represent a capitalist project; this project is 
reflected/expressed/obscured in labour aristocracy 
theory. And if an overcoming of such concepts is a 
problem for socialist analysts, it is also a problem 
for the labour movement on which such concepts do have 
some influence. What kind of conceptualisation has 
been offered as an alternative? 
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In Section 4 of the Introduction I said that I was 
going to draw largely from the writings of contemporary 
European and American marxists who had attempted to 
come to terms with divisions within classes, within the 
labour movement, and with the specificity of peripheral 
capitalist societies. I also said that I would be 
drawing my conceptualisation from differing marxist 
traditions. How did this work out in practice? 
We may first note what a quantity and variety of 
concepts and conceptualisations were called on to deal 
(briefly) with what capital and state do to labour and 
what workers - through organisation and struggle - try 
to do to capital and state. And this range of theory 
was felt necessary to deal almost solely with the union 
form of worker organisation and the strike form of 
worker protest action. 'Uneven proletarian conscious-
ness and industrial sectionalism' is thus shown to be a 
most complex matter, requiring a whole set of instru-
ments for its dissection, rather than a simple matter 
that can be handled with a single carving knife. 
In Part I the key pieces of conceptualisation had 
to do with labour-control strategy at national level, 
and its implications for division amongst workers (in 
terms of fraction, segment and stratum). In Part II we 
introduced concepts to deal with the historical devel-
opment of international unionism, with the socio-poli-
tical and economic contexts of union activity, with 
levels of worker protest, organisational types and 
leadership strategy. In Part III we considered class 
structure and consciousness, non-class structures and 
consciousness, union structure and function, intra-
union division, leadership style and position. In Part 
IV we took a more comparative approach, but nonetheless 
considered both how workers through strike action 
created new collective identities and how leaderships 
could mediate and politicise such strikes in their own 
interests. These pieces of theory were, as has been 
said, drawn from differing marxist (and, for that 
matter, non-marxist) traditions, and were occasionally 
presented in a qualified or problematic manner. Thus, 
a warning was given concerning the use of typologies 
(Footnote 7, Chapter 5) , which could be formalistic, 
obfuscating and conservative if they did not have an 
explicit norm, consistent underlying methodology and an 
emancipatory purpose. But even where such a typology 
was found useful, as with those referring to working-
class consciousness, or levels of protest, types of 
organisation and of leadership, warnings were given 
concerning the usually quite explicit norms. On re-
flection, it seems to me that the common element in 
such qualifying statements is that the conceptualisa-
tion was based on a partial or outdated reality, and 
was not allowing for new possibilities in contemporary 
mass struggles. 
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The variety of the conceptualisation is, however, 
not to be explained only by the subject matter itself, 
but also by the analytical strategy. We were, in a 
sense, looking at the same problem in four different 
ways. In Part I we were considering labour in Lagos 
Port 'from the capitalist point of view', meaning in 
terms of the continued reproduction of capitalist/sta­
tist power. In Part IV we were considering labour 
'from the working-class point of view', meaning in 
terms of worker struggle to resist exploitation and 
manipulation, to deepen and widen a collective self-
identity. In Parts II and III we were looking - res­
pectively - at the unions' relationship to capital and 
state, and to the working class. 
Thus it is, for example, that what is in Part I 
presented as labour control strategy comes back in Part 
II as the socio-political and socio-economic contexts 
of union activity. Or that intra-working-class divi­
sions are presented as an internal relationship in Part 
I (fraction, segment, stratum) and as an external 
relationship in Part III (in terms of a - historically 
developing - relationship with the intermediate social 
categories). Or that organisations and leaderships are 
presented twice, first in terms of their external 
relations to capital and state, then in terms of rela­
tions internal to the trade union movement. Or that 
what is represented in terms of scales and breadths of 
organisational action in Part II is dealt with in terms 
of working-class self-identification in Part IV. 
I hope that whilst the conceptualisation and 
analytical strategy might have added to the complexity 
it will not have led to confusion. The point was made 
in Section 1 of Chapter 9 that to look at the same 
subject matter in terms of its external and internal 
qualities was not contradictory but complementary. The 
same argument could be made for the overall analytical 
strategy - that it is necessary if one is to understand 
class and class struggle not as 'things' in a structure 
but as relations in a process. But here we are stray­
ing from conceptualisation to methodology. And, since 
I did explicitly criticise the methodology underlying 
the labour aristocracy thesis, I must now try to just 
as explicitly identify the methodological implications 
of my own exercise. 
4. Д movement in approach - and its implications 
Of the methodological errors earlier identified, 
the most important are, perhaps the imposition of 
binary dichotomies instead of a dialectical approach to 
the working class as both structure and process, the 
presentation of consciousness in economie-determinist 
or class-reductionist terms, and the failure to develop 
concepts on the basis of direct observation of worker 
behaviour. Some of this was recognised by critics of 
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the labour aristocracy thesis. And many of these 
critics demonstrated a healthy respect for sociological 
research, as well as for the concrete struggles of the 
workers and unions they were studying. But it seems to 
me that in the absence of an alternative methodology it 
is not possible to surpass the problematic and to 
reconceptualise it in a manner better serving the 
struggles of working people. This is difficult because 
the errors I have identified are - in crude or sophis-
ticated form - part of the marxist heritage. And this 
heritage is shared even by the non-marxist critics of 
labour aristocracy theory. It is also my personal 
heritage, and this work represents my own attempt to 
come to terms with it. Whilst my criticism will be 
aimed at a certain kind of marxism, and will attempt to 
suggest another kind, I hope that it has a broader 
relevance. This is because, as I have just pointed 
out, the errors are not simply marxist ones. Not only 
has much marxism been absorbed by mainstream western 
social science, but orthodox marxism has also absorbed 
many liberal assumptions. This has increasingly been 
pointed out with respect to marxist and liberal 
'developmentalism' in studies of third world labour 
(Gould 1979; Bennholdt-Thomsen 1980). And it has also 
been suggested with respect to what has been considered 
the most characteristic element of marxism, its concep-
tualisation of class: 
The categories of class analysis used by the 
sociology of the traditional working-class 
movement and by bourgeois sociology (petty-
bourgeoisie, middle class, lumpen- or sub-
proletariat, lumpen-bourgeoisie, etc.) are 
[to be used] only in their conventional 
historical usage. We consider the scientific 
value of these classifications - in present 
conditions and given the assumptions under-
lying them - to be doubtful to say the least 
...These contradictions of language are an 
expression of the contemporary crisis of the 
traditional Marxist conceptual apparatus. 
They underline the need for a creative and 
political re-evaluation of analytical cate-
gories, a 'rediscovery' of Marxism in the 
light of the contemporary class struggle. 
(Bologna 1979:67. Original stress). 
The key terms here are 'present conditions' and 'as-
sumptions underlying'. Let us, then, see how the 
working class and the socialist movement was seen, and 
how I said it should be studied, at the beginning of 
the work. Let us consider how these initial assump-
tions were qualified along the way. And let us see 
what conclusions can be drawn from this movement. 
Already in the Introduction (Section 4) I was 
qualifying an orthodox marxism that prioritises econo-
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mie production over social reproduction, exploitation 
over repression, struggle against capital over struggle 
against the state. I also reasserted the traditional 
assumption concerning the fundamentally revolutionary 
role of the working class, thus prioritising working-
class over other struggle. This assertion was then 
qualified to allow for the shortcomings of wages-and-
conditions struggle: there had to be socialists working 
amonst the generally non-socialist workers; an organ-
ised marxist political force was necessary to provide 
the necessary ideology; social protest movements 
(women, students, etc.) were necessary to undermine 
capitalist legitimacy amongst workers; an anti-capital-
ist reform strategy had to be developed; and the goal 
had to be understood as a worker se If-managed economy 
and polity. In addition to statements about the nature 
of capitalist exploitation and oppression, the nature 
of the working class, and the requirements for a 
socialist movement, I also took a position on how 
labour must be studied: in terms of totality, change, 
contradiction and practice. 
There are different strands in these initial 
positions, but they were sufficient to enable me to 
begin considering the extent to which the protest and 
organisation of Lagos workers was more than the expres-
sion of separate and opposed interests. In devising or 
finding finer instruments for particular pieces of 
analysis in the various theory chapters, however - or 
in the analyses themselves - I began to further separ-
ate some of these strands. Let me try to identify some 
of the elements I rejected and those which I - at least 
by suggestion - favoured. Economic determinism was 
challenged in two senses. In the first sense there was 
questioned the tendency to reduce capitalism to capital 
- the economy - seeing the state as secondary or deri-
vative. It was suggested instead that one had to see 
the problem as capital and state jointly (Chapter 4) . 
The second sense in which economic determinism was 
questioned was in relation to the class structure. 
Here my position was more ambiguous since I sometimes 
allowed for economic determination of class, as in 
Figure 9.1 and the related discussion. But whilst 
permitting such 'conventional historical usage', the 
work as a whole has been concerned to argue that if 
capital produces the proletariat, it is struggle 
against it - i.e. a political act - that produces the 
working class (Chapter 9). 
The criticism of proletarianism relates to this. 
By proletarianism I mean the chain of assumptions: 
capitalism = proletarianisation = working class = 
revolutionary subject. In the first place some doubt 
was placed on the proletarianisation assumption - at 
least for this case - by showing how little Nigerian 
capitalism had proletarianised labour, and how ambi-
guously our labourers were proletarianised. I also 
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argued that greater proletarianisation did not neces-
sarily imply higher class consciousness (Chapter 8). I 
further suggested that working-class self-creation was 
not simply a matter of consolidation amongst wage-
earners but expansion to the intermediate salaried and 
petty-entrepreneurial strata (Chapter 9) . Whilst this 
would extend the concept 'working class' beyond its 
orthodox limits, there is still a suggestion here that 
it is the proletarianisation of these strata that 
allows them to join the working class. I think I 
should have gone further to argue that the creation of 
a working class was a joint struggle of all labouring 
people, in struggle against commercialisation, bureau-
cratisation and oppression, as well as against prole-
tarianisation. As for the connection working class = 
revolutionary subject, the case did not allow for its 
consideration. At least not positively. But the 
negative implication of such an assumption is, of 
course, that non-revolutionary workers are not workers 
but labour aristocrats, semi-proletarianised peasants 
or lumpen proletarians. And the whole work was con-
cerned with surpassing such conceptual get-outs. More 
positively, it was also concerned to establish that 
non-insurrectionary worker struggles can also be anti-
capitalist. 
This leads us to the criticism of vanguardism, 
because the traditional instrument for converting the 
'economistic' working class into a 'revolutionary' one, 
has been the vanguard party of socialist revolutiona-
ries. It also leads to the criticism of intellectu-
alism - the notion that socialist intellectuals possess 
science, whilst the masses have only ideologies. The 
connection between these positions is that both repre-
sent short-cuts to social transformation that actually 
reproduce the contradictions it is necessary to over-
come. In the first case it is the elite/mass or lea-
ders/led contradiction, in the second the mental/manual 
one. Criticism of the vanguard party was made briefly 
in Chapter 5 (Footnote 6) , where post-revolutionary 
problems were traced back to the pre-revolutionary 
party. And in Chapter 12 it was pointed out that the 
ideologies of 'working-class parties' (reformist as 
well as marxist) had to be abandoned in favour of some 
kind of populism that better expressed working-class 
feelings and capacities. In Chapter 9 I warned against 
legislating for working-class consciousness from out-
side and above, and before the event. I also stressed 
that the advance of class consciousness required the 
breaking down of the mental/manual division, and the 
understanding of working-class consciousness in terms 
of capacity-to-control. 
Recognition of the centrality of everyday worker 
struggles and their increasing capacity to control 
provides a motivation for criticising a statist under-
standing of politics. In a number of places 'politics' 
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appeared within such distancing quotes. And in Chapter 
13 it was made clear that the movement of strikes from 
an industrial to a 'political' terrain could simul-
taneously imply their transformation from an instrument 
of the working class to that of other classes. the 
conceptual problem here is evidently the orthodox 
coupling of 'politics' with struggle for state power, 
and the presentation of this as representing the most 
advanced form of working-class struggle and conscious-
ness. In my conceptual schémas (particularly Chapter 
5) I attempted to qualify such an assumption by sugges-
ting 'social' struggle against capital and state as a 
more-advanced form. But this permitted the connection 
politics-state to remain, and could allow readers to 
consider 'industrial' struggle as non-political. Such 
was evidently not my intention. I hope this is clear 
from my handling of industrial-level struggles, as well 
as of struggle against competition and hierarchy within 
the unions. 
The 'de-politicising' of everyday worker struggles 
is due to an opposition of 'economics' and 'politics' 
that would seem better to reflect a capitalist project 
for the working class than a socialist one. underneath 
this opposition lies the practice of thinking in terms 
of binary opposites. We know of labour aristocracy/ 
semi-proletarianised peasantry. Others have appeared 
and been criticised, as with responsible autonomy/ 
direct control (Chapter 4), economic/political (Chapter 
5, Section 5 and Footnote 4) . I am not sure that the 
offering of a spectrum represents more than a sophis-
tication of such a practice. And the dangers of such 
typologies have already been mentioned. The customary 
orthodox marxist defence of such binary oppositions 
would be in terms of their 'dialectical inter-rela-
tion'. But an assertion of interpénétration, mutual 
determination or logical dependency seems to me also 
insufficient to offset the heuristic effect of pre-
senting the world - or labour movement options - in 
this fashion. The true antidote to dichotomic thinking 
is, of course, dialectical thinking. I argued in the 
Introduction for the necessity of presenting the world 
in terms of totality, change, contradiction and prac-
tice. And I can only hope that I have succeeded in 
presenting my subject matter in a relational manner. 
My analytical strategy, once again, was concerned with 
showing labour first in its existence for capital (Part 
I) and then in its existence for itself. Within the 
latter part of the work, I dealt with this aspect in 
two terms, those of union organisation (Parts II and 
III) and worker protest action (Part IV) . And union 
organisation was, of course, itself dealt with in terms 
of external and internal relations. 
Placed in the light of the above, we can see that 
labour aristocracy theory is not so much a distortion 
or vulgarisation of orthodox marxism as an expression 
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of it, or of a predominant tradition within it. And 
let us then remember that labour aristocracy theory -
such as it is - has authentically marxist roots in 
Marx, Engels and Lenin. Operating largely with the 
chain of assumptions listed earlier (proletarianisation 
= working class =» revolutionary subject) , and assuming 
that only insurrectionary struggle was really anti-
capitalist, they were obliged to grasp at conceptual 
straws to explain the non-insurrectionary behaviour of 
the later-19th century British or early-20th century 
European working classes. So, in questioning labour 
aristocracy theory in Africa I have found myself to be 
questioning orthodox marxist theory much more generally 
- something it was certainly not my intention to do in 
commencing this work. Other scholars have been engaged 
in this more arduous task and I hope that reference to 
them will show more clearly the implications of the 
movement I have been making on a more restricted ter-
rain. 
Let us first consider again classical labour 
aristocracy theory. Various criticisms were made of 
this in the Introduction to this study: that it, too, 
had multiple and shifting referents; that insofar as it 
referred to the most-privileged workers it was under-
mined by evidence of their radical and even revolu-
tionary behaviour; that it was a conceptual escape from 
a coming to terms with the nature of the working class. 
Whilst primarily concerned to criticise contemporary 
'misapplication of Lenin's theory' in the industrial-
ised capitalist world, John Evansohn (1977) actually 
reveals the shortcomings of Lenin's theory. Against 
the contemporary argument that the workers in the 
industrialised West are corrupted by the spoils of 
imperialism, he argues: 1) that the tendency of the 
rate of profit to fall drives capitalists to invest 
abroad; 2) that this holds back capital formation in 
the metropolis and increases the reserve army of labour 
there; 3) that, in effect, workers in peripheral coun-
tries are being thus hired to assist capitalist class 
struggle against workers in the metropolis; 4) that we 
can in the contemporary world see how such increased 
foreign investment and international competition leads 
to an intensification of exploitation at the core, and 
to increased resistance by the working class there. 
The privileged position of metropolitan workers is due 
not to 'imperialist spoils', says Evansohn, but to 
uneven capitalist development, to their higher produc-
tivity, to a system of prices determined by capitalism, 
not by the working class. Finally, the theory is a 
'false issue' (58), because the fundamental question is 
not the standard of living, consumption levels of wages 
but that 
The basic relations of capitalist production, 
the process of production itself, and the 
system of class relations continually produce 
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and reproduce the conflict between capital 
and labour, whether in terms of the price of 
labour power, the utilisation of labour power 
in the production process, the ends for which 
labour power is used, or the reproduction of 
labour power. (60). 
Here Evansohn lays stress on the development of capi-
talist industrialisation implying increasing appro-
priation from the worker, increasing domination of the 
worker by his product, increasing competition from man 
and machine, 'increasing alientation of workers from 
themselves, from their needs and protentialities, and 
from other workers' (59). 
But much of the latter part of the argument (and 
some of the earlier as well) is subversive of Lenin's 
own argument. For Evansohn reveals that the latter was 
1) merely conjunctural, explaining the material basis 
for the chauvinism and opportunism of certain strata or 
leaders in the face of World War I, and that it was 2) 
on the basis of such a merely conjunctural theory that 
Lenin justified a splitting of the international labour 
movement into the opportunist/chauvinist/philistine 
trend (representing the corrupted minority), and a 
revolutionary trend (representing the real masses). 
Furthermore, he explicitly questions Lenin's theory: 
for even 
if one could argue that in the short run the 
capitalist class was forced to distribute a 
portion of the 'spoils', the question be-
comes, what are the mechanisms of that dis-
tribution? To whom do they distribute it? A 
fraction of the working class? The whole 
class? Union officials? (55). 
He does not attempt to answer this question, preferring 
rather to stress Lenin on the long-run implications of 
the internationalisation of captial: that it would lead 
to worldwide capitalist competition, equalising condi-
tions of exploitation, eliminating the possibility of 
labour aristocracies in other countries, and implying 
the impossibility of any longterm opportunist domin-
ation of the working class anywhere in the world. It 
becomes apparent from this that Lenin's was a spoils 
theory, and that it was economie-determinist in the 
crudest sense (rich workers and or rich/corrupted union 
leaders equal opportunism; 'real masses' and revolu-
tionary leaders equal revolution). It has also been 
proven wrong. Because, if by 'opportunism' we under-
stand reformism, this has been the dominant ideologi-
cal/political trend in the organised labour movements 
of the core capitalist societies ever since Lenin. And 
also because, where the communists found their 'real 
masses' and brought about revolutions, the working-
class nature of these has been increasingly ques-
tioned...by the working class! 
336 
The problem underlying Lenin's economic-determin-
ism in this instance (in other instances Lenin re-
vealed, as we will see, another orientation) would seem 
to be the absence of a theoretical explanation for 
working-class behaviour in the period between an ini-
tial rebellion during early capitalist industrialisa-
tion and the predicted revolution against a developed 
industrial capitalism.[2] Andrew Friedman (1977) 
traces the problem back to Marx himself. He suggests 
that 'while class divisions are at the centre of Marx's 
analysis of the capitalist mode of production, class 
struggle is not* (5) . Friedman suggests that Marx 
recognised the manner in which workers resisted the 
imposition of proletarianisation and provided examples 
of them in Capital. But 
These examples have to be teased out of 
Capital. In general Marx described the 
development of capitalist productive activity 
in terms of successive stages of social 
relations developing out of the technical 
progress of the forces of production once the 
initial basic mode of production is esta-
blished. (48). 
Marx understood that worker resistance would eventually 
overthrow capitalism, but not the implications of 
worker struggle along the way. Says Friedman, 
Worker resistance must be seen as a force 
(thrown up by the basic mode of production) 
which affects capitalist development, rather 
than simply a force which may eventually 
result in the destruction of the capitalist 
mode of production. (49). 
What we can draw out of Friedman's treatment is, once 
again, the strong economie-determinist element to be 
found in the classical marxists, an element encouraging 
explanations of both working-class radicalism and of 
working-class conservatism in terms of what capitalism 
does to it (or fractions of it) . The alternative 
required would seem to be an approach that not only 
puts class struggle at the centre of the analysis, but 
which sees such struggle in much more complex ways than 
heretofore. Such an alternative orientation is also 
present within Marx when he says: 
Communism is for us not a state of affairs 
which is to be established, an ideal to which 
reality [will] have to adjust itself. We 
call communism the real movement which abol-
ishes the present state of things. (Arthur 
1970:56-7. Original stress). 
The relevance of such an orientation is revealed 
by Laclau and Mouffe (1981). Within Marx and marxism, 
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they say, one can find class struggle both as an effect 
of underlying forces and as the motor of history it-
self. The first position implies the primacy of the 
economic, the second that of the political. They then 
show how the first came to dominate the Second Inter-
national and how it continues to dominate marxism -
despite major challenges - even today. What are some 
of the elements of this doctrine? 1) that history has 
laws independent of human will; 2) that history 
develops by economic stages, to which politics must 
adapt; 3) that capitalisation and proletarianisation 
will come to replace all previously-existing classes 
and remove all previously-existing structures and 
contradictions; 4) that this whole process is under-
stood by marxist scientists, who bring it to the 
masses. I would characterise these positions as those 
of economic determinism, stageism, class reductionism 
and elitism. Laclau and Mouffe also reveal curious and 
complex corollaries of these positions: 
since the endogenous logic of the process of 
capital accumulation would lead to the prole-
tarianisation of the middle classes and the 
peasantry...there was no need to articulate 
the interests of these sectors to those of 
the workers...In this way, there emerged a 
characteristic dialectic between the isola-
tion of the working class and its centrality: 
by relying on itself and defending its own 
specific interests, it would end up by repre-
senting the whole of the exploited masses. 
(18). 
Thus the proletarianisation assumption and proletarian-
ism, whilst appearing to be particularly marxist and 
revolutionary, actually prevent proletarians from 
escaping from the isolation imposed on them by capital. 
Laclau and Mouffe identify within marxism a move-
ment against economism associated with the names of 
Lenin, Gramsci and Togliatti. Lenin saw the overthrow 
of capitalism as occuring not where the forces of 
production were most developed, but where the contra-
dictions were most acute. And such contradictions were 
not simply those of worker against capitalist but also 
of peasant against landlord, nation against empire and 
people against state and war. Revolution was, thus, an 
outcome of the articulation of different class strug-
gles, and of class struggles with popular struggles. 
Whilst Lenin moved toward asserting the primacy of the 
political, however, he also stressed a hiatus between 
the working class in-itself and for-itself. He there-
fore posited a vanguard party to 1) represent the 
objective interests of the class, and 2) articulate 
the pre-existing separate interests of working class 
and peasantry (or, rather, of the working class over 
the peasantry). The first element leads to the 
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'working-class party' (substituting itself for the 
empirically-existing working class) and to the danger 
of infinite substitutionism. The second element im-
plies the continued existence of economically-deter-
mined classes: the leading role of the working class 
over the peasantry is something guaranteed by capital-
ism rather than something to be demonstrated by politi-
cal activity: 
The consequences of these limitations...were 
to be far-reaching: they would install... a 
permanent dualism between the political logic 
of Leninism and the economistic logic of 
Kautskyism. The primacy of the political was 
to be reserved for critical conjunctures, 
whilst economism continued to dominate for 
periods of stability. (19). 
Gramsci draws out and makes explicit the potentiality 
present in Lenin, seeing leadership (hegemony) not as 
simply bringing together pre-existing classes and 
forces, but as political, moral and intellectual lea-
dership through which new common identities (political 
subjects) are to be created. The revolutionary subject 
is a force which articulates within itself working-
class demands and popular democratic ones which are not 
reducible to class demands. Gramsci also breaks with 
the notion of revolution as primarily seizure of state 
power: 
If the articulations of the social whole are 
political articulations, there is no level of 
society where power and forms of resistance 
are not exercised...The achievement of soci-
alism...does not arise from an absolute 
moment represented by a radical break consis-
ting of the seizure of power. It must in-
stead be the result of a series of partial 
ruptures through which the ensemble of rela-
tions of forces existing in society will be 
transformed...What [this] refers to is a 
novel conception of the radicalisation and 
politicisation of social struggles, one which 
enlarges the field of confrontation and 
struggle to the whole of civil society. 
(20). 
However, Gramsci and his followers have, according to 
Laclau and Mouffe, left us with two heritages of eco-
nomism: the necessarily hegemonic role of the working 
class, and of the working-class party as the articula-
tor of that hegemony. But 
if it is certain that the working class is a 
decisive force without which there can be no 
socialism...its vanguard role cannot be 
considered an ontological privilege, guaran-
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teed a priori by the economic structure...As 
far as the role of the party goes...There is 
no question here of claiming that the 'party' 
form has become obsolete and that 'political' 
struggle of the traditional kind has been 
superseded, but rather of accepting that 
these only compose one terrain of political 
struggle in the broader sense that we have 
now defined. (22). 
Laclau and Mouffe, concerned with Western Europe, list 
as new subjects, engaged in 'clearly anti-capitalist 
struggle', anti-nuclear and anti-state, women's 
national, racial and sexual rights movements. They 
point out for these, however, that 
Their enemy is defined not by its function of 
exploitation, but by wielding a certain 
power. And this power, too, does not derive 
from a place in the relations of production, 
but is the outcome of the form of social 
organisation characteristic of the present 
society. This society is indeed capitalist, 
but this is not its only characteristic; it 
is sexist and patriarchal as well, not to 
mention racist. (21). 
But whilst they stress the necessity for such movements 
to have an autonomous role within a socialist project, 
they by no means reduce the significance of worker or 
factory struggles. On the contrary, they insist pre-
cisely on their political character: 
It is ever more clear today that the develop-
ment of the productive forces in terms of 
capitalist rationality leads...to the des-
truction of natural resources and possibly 
even of civilisation itself. We must there-
fore topple the last bastion of economism and 
assert the primacy of politics within the 
economy itself. Far from forming a homogenous 
field ruled by the simple logic of profit 
maximisation, the economy is in actual fact a 
complex relation of forces between various 
social agents, and the productive forces are 
themselves subject to the rationality imposed 
on them by the ruling class. This means that 
the economy, like all other spheres of 
society, is the terrain of political strug-
gle. ..(22) . 
It should now be clear that 1) labour aristocracy 
theory is but a symptom of a long-established and 
severely-restricting set of assumptions, and 2) it 
must be traced back to these roots. The alternative? 
Summarily: social structure is determined by political 
struggle; classes are shaped and re-shaped through 
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struggle; worker struggles are political struggles; the 
enemy is capital and state (and patriarchy and racism); 
the end is not the grasping of state power and the 
nationalisation of the commanding heights of the eco-
nomy, but the overcoming of exploitation and domination 
throughout society; this project will only be realised 
by the articulation of the autonomous demands of dif-
ferent types of worker, of the working class and other 
'working classes', of class and popular demands. 
But, if I have now placed my work within a wider 
context of research and discourse, it still remains to 
relate it to the most recent literature on relations 
amongst labouring people in peripheral capitalist 
societies. 
5. A comparison made 
The purpose of the last section was to suggest how 
labour aristocracy theory was but a symptom of an 
approach that tended to reflect or express what capital 
and state was doing to labour, rather than penetrating 
the mirror and both revealing how labour was imposing 
itself against these and arming it better for self-
liberation. Here I am again concerned with the contri-
bution that recent literature on relations amongst 
labouring people at the capitalist periphery makes to 
their self-liberation. The items I have selected for 
consideration all have a direct relationship to labour 
in West Africa, even if the last of them represents a 
reflection on research in other parts of the capitalist 
periphery also. Collectively they reveal a shift in 
the focus of attention, a shift that suggests a welcome 
broadening from the terms of the labour aristocracy 
debate but also a certain danger of side-stepping 
crucial issues that that debate raised. In terms of 
approach, purpose and method they are varied. There 
are amonst them marxist, marxisant and a traditional 
orthodox sociological item. But I am here less con-
cerned with establishing a certain theoretical position 
than in identifying the political implications of the 
shift in focus that they commonly represent. 
The four works to which I wish to refer are those 
of Meillassoux and Bagayogo (1980), Sandbrook (1981), 
Peil (1981a) and Bromley and Gerry (1979).[3] The first 
is one of the few studies in French on the working 
class in Africa, and also one of the few drawing on the 
experience of Francophone West Africa. The second deals 
with Africa in general but draws quite heavily on 
studies of Viest Africa, and even refers specifically to 
workers in Lagos Port. The third is based on a survey 
of West African cities and suburbs, and it includes the 
Lagos district of Ajegunle in which Lagos port and dock 
workers live. The fourth is itself a collective and 
comparative work, dealing with casual labour in peri-
pheral capitalist cities, but one of the authors deals 
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with a West African city, and the introduction and 
conclusion to the work inevitably deal with the rela-
tionship between different types of labour. Let us 
consider them individually before discussing them 
collectively. 
The purpose of Meillassoux and Bagayogo (hence-
forth M&G) is, at least in part, to establish whether 
under present conditions 
The African proletariat...is capable of 
'transforming itself' and developing into a 
social class of workers entirely and organi-
cally tied to the development of capitalism. 
(5). [4] 
The 'present conditions' are characterised as the 
predominance of the national and international migra-
tion of peasants, dependent on their impoverished 
villages for security and reproduction, working in the 
cities or abroad for international capitalism: 
Divided between his own and his employing 
country, or between his village and the 
enterprise for which he works, the African 
proletarian sees this situation but imper-
fectly. This proletariat is African only 
geographically, by origin or nationality. 
Economically, it is always a 'foreign' prole-
tariat, in the sense of being employed and 
exploited, almost entirely, by European or 
American capitalism. Its economic belonging 
is distinct from its national and political 
one. Even if consisting of citizens of 
supposedly independent states, its employment 
and pay depend on the decisions of enter-
prises that are nearly all foreign or multi-
national. (6) . 
M&G state that whilst it is in the longterm and general 
interest of capitalism to bring about complete prole-
tarianisation, it is in its shortterm interest to have 
a good part of the labour costs borne by the non-capi-
talist sector in the villages. Within the cities one 
sees the development of a dual labour market: one is 
for relatively skilled and stabilised labour, which 
must therefore be provided with social security and pay 
sufficient for urbanisation; the other is for unskilled 
labour, which can be paid a below-subsistence wage and 
be either allowed or forced to return periodically to 
the village. But, to this double labour market there 
corresponds a triple division of the proletariat: 
the integrated workers who could be con-
sidered a labour aristocracy, capable of 
supporting themselves and their families on 
the basis of their wages and social security 
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benefits;...the migrant workers receiving 
lower wages because they periodically return 
to their rural homes;...finally the uprooted 
workers having no more contact with the land, 
having finally quit their villages, but 
nonetheless in the same wage category as the 
previous fraction, and thus incapable of 
obtaining the total means necessary to ensure 
their social and demographic reproduction. 
It is this last fraction, increasing in 
number and incapable of finding more than 
occasional and temporary work that...serves 
as the reserve army of capital. (25). 
M&G then investigate the extent to which the 
proletariat in Africa is 'integrated', drawing on 
evidence from Mali and Senegal. They consider as 
indicators of such integration the stability and con-
tinuity of employment, the nature of wage payment 
(piecework, daily, weekly, monthly), access to social 
security and capacity to organise. On this basis, and 
after examining the complex and differentiated labour 
and social security legislation inherited from the 
French, they determine that over 80 percent of Malian 
workers in the modern sector are not integrated, and 
that in Senegal an overwhelming and growing majority of 
such workers share this status. These findings, how-
ever, take no account of the second type of industrial 
enterprise in Africa, the tiny labour-intensive pro-
ductive or service workshop in the so-called informal 
sector. Taking the case of Lomé (Togo), they find that 
the 'modern' part of this sector (wood, metal, build-
ing, electrical and mechanical services) provides for 
20 percent of industrial wage employment and - if 
unpaid apprentices are included - 50 percent of indus-
trial employment in this city. The apprentices are 
drawn from outside the capitalist or modern sectors 
and - indeed - they are required to pay for their 
apprenticeships. But this type of modern informal 
enterprise is providing a service to the large-scale 
modern sector by 1) purchasing from them overpriced 
inputs and 2) providing them or their workers with 
cheap goods and services. They conclude: 
The subordination of the domestic economy to 
the 'informal' sector - this being itself 
directly dependent on big capital - refutes 
the theses on the non-proletarian nature of 
the non-waged urban and rural workers of 
Africa. This is a proletariat forced into or 
continually returned to the swamp of relative 
over-population. (47). 
Turning to the matter of organisation, M&G lay 
stress on the weakness of trade unions that must rest 
on the tiny industrial proletariat. Although unions 
based on the 'integrated fraction of the working class' 
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did exist in colonial times, and although unionised 
workers did show themselves capable of action at that 
time together with non-workers and leading to some 
successes, these unions were subjected after indepen-
dence to destruction or incorporation. Today, there-
fore, 
The major popular political protest actions 
come from the secondary- or university-edu-
cated, from students and teachers, without 
any real connection with the working class 
having truly succeeded. Thus the defence of 
the integrated fraction of the proletariat 
takes place within weak unions, whilst that 
of other proletarian fractions is expressed 
by no mass organisation at all. (51). 
The unions set up in the colonies by the Confederation 
Generale du Travail (the French Communist-controlled 
trade union centre) were on the European model, and 
failed to take into consideration the minority nature 
of the African proletariat: 
Failing to take on the organisation of the 
rural areas and to establish relations with 
the peasantry, the organic linkages between 
the domestic economy and the urban wage-force 
have remained strictly private. They have 
never been dealt with or taken into consider-
ation in the programme of demands of the 
workers' unions. (49). 
In a number of ways M&G seem to be offering us an 
up-dated, if more nuanced, version of the Arrighi and 
Saul thesis. This is not so much a matter of the use 
of the labour aristocracy category, since M&G confine 
this category to the integrated supervisors and techni-
cians, and they do not in any case make any further use 
of it. The similarities lie in 1) the underlying 
dependency model, with capitalism primarily presented 
in terms of external impingement and expropriation, 2) 
reliance on economic analysis and categories in deter-
mining the nature and role of the working class, 3) 
reduction of such economic relations largely to market 
and consumption relations. Thus, the process of class 
formation is presented largely in terms of commerciali-
sation and proletarianisation, i.e., what capital is 
doing to labour. Similar also to Arrighi and Saul is 
the establishment of worker consciousness and behaviour 
neither by research nor by consideration of the liter-
ature but by assertion. What M&G have added to the 
earlier thesis are 1) arguments concerning the des-
truction/preservation of non-capitalist forms in the 
interests of capitalism, 2) related arguments (and 
evidence, here) of the dual support provided by the 
'informal sector' to the capitalist one, and 3) a 
somewhat different and more complex model of the divi-
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sion of the proletariat. These new elements make the 
paper worthy of consideration, even if primarily in 
terms of hypotheses to be tested. What we are in fact 
presented with is an image of the simultaneous incor-
poration of petty-commodity production (both rural and 
urban) into a national and international capitalism, at 
the same time as the classical process of proletariani-
sation is being blocked. One does not have to accept 
the particular models offered (of enterprise scale, 
labour markets or proletarian status) in order to 
recognise the generality of the semi-proletarianisation 
they portray. But should we then be worrying ourselves 
about the incapacity of the proletariat to become a 
class 'entirely and organically tied to the development 
of capitalism'? For, where this process has largely 
taken place, in the industrialised capitalist coun-
tries, this has not (yet) implied capacity to destroy 
and surpass capitalist relations. Should we not rather 
be taking the structuring of the labour force in Africa 
as a datum and considering the capacities and poten-
tialities for anti-capitalist struggle in this situa-
tion? Unfortunately, M&G confine their consideration 
of labour struggle to unions and strikes, and then do 
not even take into consideration (or mention) the major 
post-independence strikes in ex-French Africa - Congo-
Brazaville 1963 and 1968, Senegal 1968, Madagascar 1972 
(for which see Sandbrook 1981). Once again, this 
should not be taken as disqualifying their conclusion 
on the restricted character of the traditional trade 
unions, or the implication that one needs to find forms 
of organisation that will link the different parts of 
the labour force. 
If M&B can be criticised for a failure to directly 
deal with the non-economic in analysing relations 
between labouring people in Africa, this can hardly be 
said of Richard Sandbrook. Sandbrook's purpose is to 
establish whether a 'social-democratic or revolutionary 
role' is likely to be played by the working class in 
the peculiar circumstances of contemporary tropical 
Africa (Sandbrook 1981:1). To do this he considers in 
turn the limits of proletarianisation, the labour 
aristocracy theory, populism amongst the workers, and 
the possibility of 'worker political consciousness'. 
This is an implicit comparison of the African working 
class with its European (or Russian) forebears. Sand-
brook first establishes the incomplete proletarianisa-
tion of even the stable wage-force. It remains tied to 
the village through retention of land rights, through 
remitances and on retirement. For him, the whole 
working class is a semi-proletariat. The worker has 
both 'traditional' ties and interests in the village, 
and urban ones respecting employment, wages and prices. 
Yet, the unions make 
no connections between sociopolitical grie-
vances and the workers' specific industrial 
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grievances and protests. Obviously, the 
political effect of such an orientation on 
the part of powerful sectors of the working 
class is to stabilise the development of 
peripheral capitalism. (4) . 
Sandbrook then considers whether such an orientation 
can be explained in terms of labour aristocracy theory. 
He questions the logic of the theory, questions its 
economic determinism, and makes an empirical critique 
which draws on both well-known and more recent evidence 
concerning income differentials, living standards, etc. 
This is followed with more empirical evidence concern-
ing common urban residence, common life styles and 
common aspirations with the rest of the urban poor, and 
the issue of mulitple job roles and job circulation 
amongst urban labourers. If, he concludes, 'economism 
is a common tendency among organised labour in Africa, 
the labour aristocracy thesis provides no general 
explanation for this' (13). In the section on populism 
he first argues that the lack of worker radicalism has 
been due to the absence of a 'vanguard group', and to 
the fact that in both the colonial and contemporary 
period unions (above the grass-roots level) have been 
essentially incorporated into the state. Nonetheless, 
says Sandbrook, 'In some parts of Africa, segments of 
workers have evolved at least a "populist", if non-
revolutionary, political consciousness that transcends 
economism' (15). Here he places populism above econom-
ism but below revolutionary consciousness. Yet he also 
argues that populism is not a specifically working-
class consciousness: it is rather the consciousness of 
the underprivileged as a whole, holding the elite 
responsible for its sufferings and investing all virtue 
in the common people. Whilst this provides a limited 
guide to effective political action, it has stimulated 
and found expression in major general strikes. In such 
strikes, which have occasionally brought governments 
down, there were expressed the demands not only of 
workers but of the urban masses more generally. This, 
says Sandbrook, indicates a capacity for rebellion but 
not for revolution. He therefore asks about the possi-
bility for development of a working-class political 
consciousness - the idea of an 'economically dominant 
class enemy' and the 'control or transformation of 
certain economic and political institutions through 
collective action' as bringing the necessary change. 
(23). He considers the existence of long-established 
communities of dockers, railway and mine workers as 
providing a firm base for populism, and the growth of 
factory employment as likely to extend this. But even 
with further proletarianisation we cannot assume the 
development of a common working-class consciousness: 
In any specific case study, one needs to 
explain why, if workers' experiences on the 
job are similar, they develop a differential 
consciousness. (23). 
346 
Sandbrook considers as general politicising or depoli-
ticising forces ethnicity, occupational community and 
education. A politicised ethnicity he finds compatible 
with a trade-union or populist consciousness, but not 
with a 'working-class political consciousness' (25) . 
Occupational community (e.g. of miners or railway wor-
kers) can reinforce a working-class identity, espe-
cially if it is ethnically homogeneous, and can spread 
working-class attitudes to non-workers living around 
them. Finally, the disappointed expectations of the 
educated workers can stimulate consciousness and pro-
vide a stratum that could provide leadership to the 
less-educated workers. In conclusion, says Sandbrook, 
Any study of the political potential of 
African workers should focus upon the links 
between these and elements of the petite 
bourgeoisie, subproletariat and peasantry. 
Under current conditions, any popular move-
ment limited to workers is unlikely to have 
much longterm political impact. (27-8). 
It is evident that Sandbrook is trying, at the 
continental (or half-continental) level, to come to 
terms with the consciousness and behaviour of empirical 
(as distinguished from theoretical) African workers and 
trade unions. He is rejecting labour aristocracy 
theory and attempting to find more adequate concepts to 
deal with a more complex reality. Indeed, in dealing 
with evidence of communal and rural ties, and in his 
conclusions, he goes further along a line I may have 
suggested but did not explore. His treatment of resi-
dential community, of ethnicity and education as forces 
influencing class consolidation and expansion (to use 
my own terminology) also encourages a more-sophisti-
cated and differentiated study of African workers. The 
major question is whether the conceptualisation is 
adequate to the analysis of this new data and the 
proposed new subject area. Sandbrook is one of the 
major critics of labour aristocracy theory, and one of 
the few who identifies its conceptual shortcomings, but 
he does not attempt to find its roots, and therefore 
does not find it necessary to develop an alternative 
conceptualisation. He accepts - though not uncriti-
cally - the standard Leninist formulae: the economic 
and the political (with or without quotes), truly 
working-class politics as either reformist or revolu-
tionary (and populism, therefore as non-working class). 
His major qualification is the conversion of the two 
dichotomies into a trichotomy or spectrum by the inser-
tion of populism between them. But, as already indi-
cated, populism is not simply above economism in the 
hierarchy of working-class consciousness, it is also to 
one side. It is a consciousness common to the labour-
ing poor, crude, limited, etc. It is linked by Sand-
brook with peripheral capitalism, early industrialisa-
tion and unsuccessful rebellion. Sandbrook here raises 
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a crucial issue for the understanding of working-class 
consciousness, and for the political relations between 
differentially-proletarianised workers. He reveals the 
problem of a worker consciousness that is simultaneous-
ly more advanced and less working class than 'econo-
mism'. The solution to this puzzle would seem to lie 
in a recognition of the necessity for worker demands to 
be articulated with those of other classes and non-
class social groups. This is, of course, the implica-
tion of the Laclau-Mouffe argument above (c.f. Laclau 
1977:143-99 and Afonso 1980). Given the increasing 
impotence of both social-democratic and revolutionary 
(communist?) strategies in Europe and elsewhere - an 
impotence increasingly admitted by those within both 
traditions - the question of whether the populism of 
the West African working class is less advanced than 
the other strategies/ideologies is open to question. 
If we are to be able to understand the political poten-
tial of the African working class it would seem to me, 
further, that we will have to devote as much attention 
to the internal relations of the labour movement, and 
to its history, as to the class itself. Sandbrook has 
done this elsewhere (Sandbrook 1975). But here national 
union centres appear rather as instruments of state, 
and as anti-working class, than as themselves a terrain 
of struggle between workers (or even the grassroots 
union organisations) and capital. And analysis slides 
from workers opposed to unions, to 'powerful sectors* 
of workers whose orientation is such as 'to stabilise 
the development of peripheral capitalism'. Finally, I 
wonder whether Sandbrook's implicit understanding of 
the 'political' in terms of control over the state does 
not prevent him from considering the extent to which 
grassroots political struggle by workers has obstructed 
the development of peripheral capitalism - to such a 
point that the state has been obliged to attempt to 
incorporate their organisations (for a rural parallel 
in West Africa, see Van Hear 1983) . These qualifica-
tions made, one cannot but endorse Sandbrook's conclu-
sion on the limitations of purely worker movements, and 
his insistence of the necessity to study relations 
between these and those of the rest of the urban and 
rural labouring people. 
The purpose of Margaret Peil is to demonstrate 
that the incorporation of workers into hometown-, 
kinship- and residence-based relations 
severely limits the development of an organ-
ised working class and even widespread com-
mitment to trade unionism on a continuing 
rather than a sporadic basis. (Peil 
1981:72). 
Basing herself primarily on social survey data, she 
considers in turn the relations of waged (and self-
employed) workers with their workmates, their kin and 
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other friends. After showing the variety of occupa-
tions and employment sectors in the eight towns under 
consideration, Peil declares that 'craft guilds are 
often more important than unions for skilled workers', 
that although unskilled dockworkers do strike, 'they 
have tended to seek individual rewards through theft or 
smuggling, rather than participating in group action' 
(77), that teachers have been the most militant govern-
ment workers in Nigeria, and that white-collar workers 
have often provided literate leaders for the unions. 
In considering union membership more directly, she 
declares that unions are 'of negligible importance to a 
large majority of urban residents' (79), that unions 
attract mainly the easily-organisable (miners, railway 
workers, teachers), that members get little for their 
dues and often 'do not see the union as the logical 
place for...defence' (81). Her survey suggests to her 
that unions are irrelevant even to the majority of 
potential members, since they were hardly mentioned 
when people were asked about membership of voluntary 
organisations in general or trade unions in particular. 
Furthermore, the presence of top-level administrators 
within workers' unions is considered likely to dis-
courage militancy. Overall, 
the data provide convincing evidence that 
unions as presently constituted do little to 
raise the class consciousness of the majority 
of workers. (84). 
In considering informal contacts amongst workers, she 
suggests that these are more important than union ones, 
but she also finds that these are most developed 
amongst professionals, least amongst those least urban-
ised, educated or skilled. Contacts with kin and 
homeplace are strong amongst workers, particularly for 
those with most to gain (entrepreneurs and older wor-
kers) . In all four industrial towns surveyed, she 
finds that 'primary associations' (ethnic, family, clan 
and hometown) have memberships much higher than in all 
kinds of occupational associations: 
Some members attend meetings of these soci-
eties once or twice a month, whereas once a 
year or only in emergencies is enough for 
attending trade union meetings. (89). 
Peil finds that most people spend considerably more 
time with co-tenants and neighbours than with work-
mates. Speaking of friends she finds that half have 
one or more workmate friend, commonly met at work, that 
such ties are more permanent than those with non-work-
mates, but that these friends may be chosen for other 
reasons (e.g. shared ethnicity). Furthermore, there 
are many cross-class friendships and 'work is less 
important than either home or urban experience' in the 
selection of friends' (95). Her conclusions are the 
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following: 1) 'Society probably has a much greater 
effect on the workplace than vice versa; 2) there thus 
appear to be severe limitations on the spread of class 
consciousness 'from large bureaucratically-oriented 
workplaces to the general population'; 3) the work-
mates who do become friends are often selected on 
'ascriptive grounds', 4) that 
If changes in social structure must await the 
development of mass movements arising from 
workplace relations, they will be very slow 
in coming. Increasing inflation and economic 
differentiation, blocked mobility and the 
level of responsiveness of national and local 
government to public demands, will probably 
affect the rate at which class consciousness 
develops in these societies to a greater 
extent than the influence of workers in 
industry or trade unionists. So far, these 
data seem to explain quite well the 'conser-
vatism'.. .and 'populism'...of West African 
workers. (100-101). 
Like Sandbrook, Peil is trying to shift the locus 
of studies of African workers from the workplace to the 
wider community, unlike him, she does not consider any 
reconceptualisation necessary, establishing her posi-
tion primarily on the basis of empirical data, this 
data being itself primarily survey data. She could, 
indeed, be understood as making an implicit criticism 
of the methodology employed by Sandbrook (or myself) 
when she declares of worker and union studies that 
an historical or statistical approach which 
concentrates exclusively on records or an 
informant approach which relies on union 
activists is likely to give a false impres-
sion. 
A problem that has dogged much of this 
research is that most of those engaged in it 
have had no systematic training in survey 
methods. While a few have tried small sur-
veys, they know little about the techniques 
of conducting or analysing them and instinc-
tively mistrust them. As a result, the 
marginals from less than 100 interviews, 
often with poorly framed questions, tell us 
little about how the majority of workers feel 
about trade unions. Surveys can tell only 
part of the story, but they would be an 
invaluable supplement to balance the data. 
(80). 
This is no doubt true, both in the negative criticism 
and in the positive recommendation. One cannot but 
endorse the necessity of following up studies based on 
other methods with rigorous social surveys of workers 
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as Peil here recommends and has elsewhere carried out 
(Peil 1972, 1981b). The addition of such methods to 
the armoury of radical research on African workers has 
certainly added to their impact (Sandbrook and Arn 
1972; Lübeck 1975b, 1979, 1981). Is the problem, 
however, simply one of expertise and rigour, or is it 
also one of the combination of survey with other evi-
dence, and the general theoretical approach and concep-
tual equipment of the researcher? Such matters have 
been vigorously debated by researchers on African 
workers in the 1970s (Jorgensen 197 8; Waterman 1978b; 
Konings 1978; Sandbrook and Arn 1978). Although Peil 
does not make her own theoretical approach explicit, it 
is evident that she is operating within an orthodox 
sociological paradigm. She employs such terms as 
'traditional norms', 'primary associations' and 'as-
criptive grounds', which imply a traditional/modern 
dichotomy, and contrasts 'industrialising societies' 
with industrialised western ones (characterised as 
'post-capitalist'1)(99). Her survey methodology is 
also within an orthodox sociological tradition, in 
permitting her to consider any identified social struc-
ture or factor as an 'independent variable' for the 
study of behaviour and consciousness. Yet there would 
seem to be serious problems about applying the concept 
'traditional' to West African villages deeply incor-
porated into the national and international capitalist 
economy in the ways that Meillasoux and Bagayogo have 
suggested, and subject to world market fluctuations, to 
state marketing boards, taxation, police and public 
schooling. Secondly, does one not need to present an 
argument for treating certain social structures as 
independent variables if one is not to give the im-
pression of a uni-directional and structural deter-
mination of the social process? It is evidently pos-
sible to argue that industrial and occupational struc-
tures are themselves shaped by class attitudes and 
struggles. Survey research carried out within the 
framework of such an explicit assumption will evidently 
produce results different to those based on another. 
What Peil's survey does to is to supply additional 
evidence of the incorporation of West African workers 
into kinship, residence, friendship and rural relations 
outside the workplace. This confirms the argument of 
Sandbrook and is of utmost importance. But neither her 
survey nor her use of other authors would seem to 
support the string of assertions about unions, or the 
relations of workers with unions, or the influence of 
unions on urban labour in general. Her argument is 
supportive of labour aristocracy theory insofar as it 
stresses the leadership dominance of white-collar over 
other workers, union membership of top administrators, 
the non-organisation of unskilled dockers, the irrele-
vance of unions for the raising of class consciousness. 
But the assertions she makes, or the image she creates, 
is in conflict with most of the research which has been 
carried out on West African workers recently. Even the 
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two works she cites on the conservatism and populism of 
these workers (Waterman 1976 and Sandbrook and Arn 
1977) were rather concerned to demonstrate the relative 
radicalism of organised workers than the opposite. 
This is not to detract from the relevance of her con-
clusion on the limits to consciousness-raising of 
unions 'as presently constituted* in West Africa. But 
it is to suggest that we need to combine direct obser-
vation of relations outside the workplace with those 
inside both the workplace and the unions. And it is to 
argue that it is necessary to carry out such studies on 
the basis of an explicit model and methodology. 
The work of Bromley and Gerry (1979) is a collec-
tive work on casual labour in third world cities to 
which they both make contributions and to which they 
add a joint introduction and conclusion.[5] Although 
the collection deals with labour rather than labourers, 
and although it concentrates on casual labour, it is 
obliged to consider in detail at least the economic 
relations between this massive category and that urban 
minority in regular wage-employment. And it does spell 
out certain political implications of such relations. 
I will present in turn their approach, their economic 
analysis, their political analysis, and the implica-
tions for action they draw from these. Bromley and 
Gerry are concerned to reject the traditional assump-
tions underlying reformist/idealist (i.e. current 
international agency) strategies for 'informal sector* 
development at the capitalist periphery, and concerned 
to replace the category 'informal sector' itself. Their 
alternative model has been briefly mentioned in Chapter 
4. They reject the dichotomic opposition of formal and 
informal sectors, proposing instead a continuum running 
from 'stable wage-work' to 'true seIf-employment' (5). 
We thus get a typology stretching from 1) true or 
indefinite-period wage work, through 2) short-term 
wage-work or casual labour, 3) disguised wage-work 
(e.g. outworkers, commission sellers) 4) dependent work 
(dependency for credit, rental of premises or equipment 
for supplies or sales), to 5) true self-employment. 
Such a typology of labour (which can be applied by 
analogy also to enterprises) permits, B&G argue, an 
examination of the relations between large and small 
enterprises, between enterprises and workers, between 
the state and the labour process more generally. Why 
the role of the state? Because of the significant role 
played by law in distinguishing between wage-work 
(category 1 and - to some extent - 2) and non-wage work 
(the other categories). It is, more specifically, 
legislation which marks category 1 off from the rest. 
The 'normal* wage contract provides for some or all of 
the following: 
minimum wages, regularised working hours, 
fixed overtime payments, 'minimum notice 
requirements' for both employer and employee, 
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paid holidays, sickness benefit, redundancy 
pay, life insurance, and even access to 
subsidised consumer purchasing, mortgage, and 
public housing arrangements. (8). 
Loss of work is normally (their emphasis) compensated 
for 
by various forms of social provision (sick-
ness benefit, various forms of insurance, 
redundancy pay, pensions, unemployment bene-
fits, etc.). (7). 
B&G's replacement of a dichotomic opposition by a 
spectrum of employment statuses is certainly more 
realistic. Their treatment of the role of law in the 
structuring of the total labour process is an important 
addition to what has been said both by Meillassoux and 
Bamayogo and by myself. What is still open to question 
is the manner in which both innovations are used to 
divide - in dichotomic opposition - 'stable wage-work' 
from all other types of labour. They do qualify the 
opposition by their use of the word 'normal' with 
respect to the security of the 'stable wage-workers', 
but they then use this implied status to contrast it 
with 'the remainder of the continuum' (5). I will 
return to this later. In terms of the economic rela-
tion within the cities, what comes over most strongly 
from Bromley and Gerry is the intimate inter-relation 
of large-scale foreign and local-capitalist production 
on the one hand, and even the smallest-scale artisan 
production on the other. In his own contribution, 
dealing with forward and backward linkages of petty-
production in Dakar, Gerry shows the extent to which 
even some 'traditional' crafts are dependent upon 
inputs (and imports) from large capitalist producers. 
In terms of the process occurring within the petty-
production sector, Gerry shows the increasing trend to 
proletarianisation: 
Such relations may lead to formerly 'indepen-
dent' petty producers losing all but nominal 
control of their production, themselves 
becoming little more than wage-workers, even 
though a pretence of autonomy is kept up on 
both sides...[T]his process may be partial, 
intermittent and, in the present context, 
sometimes appear to operate in reverse. In 
this latter case, the process of proletarian-
isation has not ceased, but has merely become 
more covert...Nevertheless, the fundamental 
mechanisms of exploitation (both through the 
labour process and the market) will be the 
same as in the factory...'. (246). 
Gerry adds the 'small but noticeable' trend in the 
direction of 'capialisation', but he stresses the 
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limits to such a development not merely in the numbers 
who can benefit from it but the distance they can 
travel. The transformation is to petty-capitalism, not 
to large-scale industrial production. Because of the 
concentration of the B&G collection on the economic 
relationship, it has little to say about the political 
one. The overall image projected is one of the indi-
vidualism, competitiveness and apathy of the petty-
producers (248) , and the conservatism and self-interest 
of the regularly employed. What political implications 
do they draw from their findings? Although distancing 
themselves somewhat from the term 'aristocracy of 
labour' they do in fact twice present organised wage 
workers as privileged, self-interested and opposed to 
the rest of the poor. Having, in their introduction, 
opposed 'stable wage-work' to other types they argue as 
follows: 
The tendency of government to respond to 
pressure from trade unions, associations of 
civil servants, the armed forces, the police, 
and other organised groups of workers with a 
degree of job security, and the pressures 
exercised upon governments by international 
organisations (and particularly the Inter-
national Labour Office), tends to lead to an 
increasing provision for regulated job secur-
ity. At times, provision may be extended to 
new groups of society, but the stronger 
tendency is for provision to remain concen-
trated upon a minority of workers, and to be 
improved for them, further differentiating 
this group from the casual workers. In many 
cases, industrial trade unions, the armed 
forces, and other organised groups who have 
attained a degree of job security, tend to 
behave as vested interest groups, concerned 
to preserve and improve their privileges, 
rather than to express solidarity with the 
large numbers of less privileged workers 
engaged in a variety of forms of casual 
employment. (9). 
And in their conclusion they talk of 
a select group of coopted workers who contri-
bute substantially...to the continued impo-
verishment of their less-favoured colleagues 
among the casual poor. (309). 
Sceptical of the political capacities of both the 
casual labourers and the regularly-employed, B&G initi-
ally appear just as sceptical of the progressive poten-
tial of state strategies. These are treated as suici-
dal by Gerry, who considers that if third world govern-
ments continue with present policies toward the labour-
ing poor 'their days will be numbered' (248) . The 
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overall pessimism with respect to positive state poli-
cies, and the threat of mounting mass discontent in 
Gerry's account, is not matched by any evidence that 
the labouring poor are capable of toppling the regimes, 
nor any advice to them on how they might be able to do 
so. It seems as if an orientation (either positive or 
negative) toward the state as the only possible politi-
cal power, leads the editors of this work to precisely 
that blatant idealism they hope to avoid: 
if we are to move from a world in which the 
manifest objectives have a strong chance of 
success...a revolution in policy making is 
essential...[which]...could prepare the 
ground for the attainment of authentically 
developmental objectives which would match 
the aspirations and potentialities of the 
mass of the population...(307) . 
It is most interesting to rediscover in Bromley 
and Gerry a similar set of features to those in Arrighi 
and Saul almost one decade earlier. [6] There is the 
critique of an earlier model as simplistic, there is 
the attempt to reconceptualise the problem in primarily 
economic terms, there is an asserted yet undemonstrated 
conflict between the regularly wage-employed and the 
rest of the poor, and one is left only with the state 
as a deus ex machina to solve the problem for the 
powerless or selfish labourers. Let us just reconsider 
the logic of the Bromley-Gerry argument. Firstly, 
whilst B&G recognise the problematic nature of the 
security and privileges of indefinite wage-work and the 
increasing instability of wage employment in the third 
world (15-19) , they nonetheless use this as the cri-
terion on which to base an opposition. Secondly, 
whilst they recognise the relationship between cate-
gories 1 and 2 (both wage-work, both recognised in 
law) , do they not fail to recognise a crucial further 
one, that both are engaged in cooperative labour within 
capitalist enterprises? Thirdly, in discussing the 
political mechanism by which relative security is 
achieved by certain sectors of the wage-labour force, 
BS.G group trade unions not only with civil service 
associations, but also with the army and the police -
two types of wage labourer whose function (and not only 
at the capitalist periphery) is partly to repress 
restive wage workers. 
It would seem that the replacement of a dichotomy 
by a spectrum is insufficient to overcome the short-
comings of labour aristocracy theory. What would seem 
to be needed is not - or not only - a finer or longer 
scale for the identification of differential wealth or 
security within a national or international capitalist 
system but 1) the identification of labouring people as 
the source of the power and wealth that is taken and 
used (differentially) to manipulate them, 2) a theory 
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of class relations within different modes/forms of 
production, and 3) a direct examination of the politi-
cal struggles of labourers within these forms, and of 
the relations of such struggles to each other. The 
combination of a model of relations between modes/forms 
(Gerry) and the other elements would enable one to 
analyse the significance of differential position 
within the wealth/security hierarchy. And it would 
also suggest both the possibility and the necessity for 
the combined protest of labouring people. The possi-
bility of such combination is demonstrated not only by 
such rare occurences as social revolutions, but also in 
the increasing numbers of urban uprisings and general 
strikes in the 1970s and 1980s brought on by the pro-
letarianisation process Gerry indicates, and in such 
modest complementary (if separate) worker protest 
actions as those shown in this study. 
At the beginning of this section I said I was 
primarily interested in the political implications of 
these recent studies. Here I would like to try to 
identify both positive and negative implications. I 
think that the most important contribution that they 
make is the identification of a new problem area. The 
shift of attention will contribute to the death of 
labour aristocracy theory, inasmuch as old theories die 
not merely by direct criticism but also by atrophy of 
interest. The new problem area is that of the rela-
tions of the better-paid and more-securely employed 
wage-earners with other labouring people either 1) as 
urban residents, or 2) in terms of relations on a 
waged-unwaged axis, either urban or rural, or 3) as 
all - but differentially - semi-proletarianised. With 
the explicit addition of relations between waged men 
and women (waged or not) , this suggests not only a 
broad terrain for research but a broad area for poli-
tical activity in creating an anti-capitalist movement. 
If full proletarianisation is blocked, in the manner 
that most of these writers suggest, this need not be 
seen only as a disqualification for effective anti-
capitalist struggle. As Gould (1979) has pointed out, 
whilst working-class struggle is 'the main locus of 
overt, organised anti-capitaist struggle' even at the 
periphery of capitalism, we can and need to 
seek out aspects of the 'non-capitalist' 
social structure which can play a positive 
role in deflecting the onslaught of capital. 
(30). 
The second important contribution of these writers lies 
in the critique of trade unions 'as presently consti-
tuted'. The implicit or explicit argument here is that 
union forms and strategies based on European models are 
irrelevant to the pattern of proletarianisation in 
contemporary Africa. This point is acceptable providing 
it is recognised that tradtional trade union forms are 
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also increasingly irrelevant to contemporary patterns 
of proletarianisation in Eastern and Western Europe. 
For Eastern Europe this has been vividly demonstrated 
by the rise of Solidarity in Poland, and the attempts 
to link urban and rural workers within its folds 
(Szlajfer 1981). In Western Europe it lies more in 
recognition of the immobility and impotence of the 
unions, and in suggestions of the necessity for a 
broader social role (Ross 1981) . This said, we are 
still left with the necessity to fashion alternative 
forms of organisation and action appropriate to the 
particular structure and capacities of African labour-
ers. This will require research, discussion and -
above all - experimentation by the movement itself. So 
much for the positive aspect of the new studies. 
What of the negative side? Firstly, a cautionary 
note: I am wondering whether the new focus on the 
waged-unwaged axis does not mean an abandonment of 
certain other terrains of research and struggle with 
which this work has been concerned. The first is that 
of workplace organisation and struggle itself. In the 
case of both independent and racist Africa, there can 
be no doubt that the workplace is 'the main locus', and 
if our authors in general question whether workplace 
struggle is really 'anti-capitalist', then I can only 
hope that either the body of this work or its con-
clusion suggest that it is. What we therefore need are 
more studies of both the institutionalised and overt 
forms of worker protest (such as this one has been) and 
of the informal and 'hidden forms' (see, again. Chapter 
13, Footnote 1) . Another terrain which will require 
continued attention is the axis running 'up' to the 
intermediate salaried strata. It is no use shifting 
the concept of labour aristocracy up here, or consi-
dering them in 'conventional historical' terms as 
simply middle class. Examination of this axis is 
necessary for several reasons. In the first place, it 
is amongst such strata that much of the power and 
knowledge denied those in routine clerical or manual 
labour is concentrated. In the second place, the 
contradictory status of these strata means that they 
can potentially be won by the labour movement. In the 
third place, as has been pointed out, paid union lea-
derships can and do stand in an analogous position to 
workers within the labour movement as do the middle 
strata within society more generally. Study of the 
manual/mental division, in other words, is necessary 
both for the extension of worker control over their own 
organisations and over the society as a whole. 
Another shortcoming of these studies is - I feel -
the lack of a comparative perspective. This is implied 
above where I refer to the international crisis of 
traditional union forms. All these writers tend to 
present the problem of relations between different 
kinds of worker or labouring people as a specifically 
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African (or 'third world') one. In so far as compari-
son is made it is with European models that are either 
implicit (real proletarianisation) or presented in an 
uncritical or idealised fashion (social-democracy and 
communism as really working class) . It may be for the 
same reason that struggles of not only the unions but 
of the workers themselves and of other popular forces 
are presented (excepting Sandbrook with respect to the 
workers) in a pessimistic light. Comparison is here 
either explicitly or implicitly being made with a model 
of reformist or revolutionary achievement elsewhere in 
the world. However, recent studies of - for example -
the West European and American working class and labour 
movements have themselves been increasingly recognising 
divisions either identical or analogous to those iden-
tified by our authors. There has also been increasing 
recognition of the limitations on post-revolutionary 
regimes in Europe, Asia and Africa itself. Much of the 
new theory used in this work has been developed on the 
basis of such recognitions. This does not mean that we 
should return to either proletarian or peasant or 
lumpenproletarian messianism. But that reference to 
international experience may enable us to avoid both a 
messianism that will lead to adventures and disappoint-
ments and a pessimism that inevitably cedes the power 
of social change to the rich and powerful. One final 
problem with these studies is connected with this last 
point. This is that (with, again, the partial excep-
tion of Sandbrook) even the socialist writers amongst 
this group do not see the problem of division primarily 
as a policy problem for the labour movement. unless 
one addresses oneself either explicitly or implicitly 
to the existing social movement, one is likely to be 
providing information or advice - explicitly or impli-
citly - to the rich and powerful. Addressing oneself 
to the existing movement is a problem fraught with 
traps and dangers. But it does require one to come to 
terms with the movement as it exists, with its capaci-
ties and shortcomings. And, in our case, this does 
mean recognising the trade unions as the only organi-
sational form that African workers have and the only 
permanent and effective organisation of labouring 
people in Africa. It is not without significance that 
the revival of mass movement in South Africa itself has 
taken primarily the trade union form (Saul and Gelb 
1981; Fine, de Clerq and Innes 1981). 
6. A politics implied 
As I said above, addressing oneself to the exis-
ting movement is a problem. I would not, for example, 
like to translate my general findings and judgements, 
as they have developed during this work, into a de-
tailed policy recommendation on 'how to overcome divi-
sions amongst Nigerian workers'. It is not simply a 
matter of the presumption of such advice from an out-
sider who will never have to practice what he is 
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preaching. It is also the suggestion such advice would 
carry that division is a problem (i.e. isolable and 
soluble within an otherwise unchanged environment or 
structure). In reality, division is the problem for 
the Nigerian and all other labour movements. Division, 
in other words, is one manner of expressing the sub-
ordination of labouring people to capital and state. 
One cannot solve this problem without solving the 
others. Or, again in other words, we can say that 
division will only be overcome in the process of the 
general struggle. I hope that I have in this work said 
enough about division amongst workers - and how to 
recognise, classify and analyse it. I hope I have 
either in the body of the work or here in the Conclu-
sion said enough about the necessity and the broader 
implications of another approach to division amongst 
workers. The rest should surely be left to Nigerian 
socialists and unionists. 
But to whom, exactly, is the problem being left? 
We have seen in the work the extent to which the prob-
lem of division is also the problem of labour leaders 
(Nigerian) and socialist theorists/strategies (inter-
national) . Yet it is evident that the very form of 
this study is one that makes it primarily accessible to 
academically-trained intellectuals, socialist or not. 
In the Introduction I mentioned that I had produced 
other items during the course of this project, products 
meant to be accessible to labour activists and even to 
ordinary workers. This one is inevitably addressed 
primarily to my colleagues and has been intended to win 
their respect (if not their agreement) by demonstrating 
certain professional skills and a certain originality. 
But it is also addressed to the new generation of 
intellectuals in Nigeria (and elsewhere in Africa and 
the third world) . And here it is a quite specific 
message. Because what is being offered is largely an 
approach to the analysis of African working-class 
struggles from a frankly European and American perspec-
tive. Yet it is offered without apology, because the 
theory has been based on the struggle of socialist 
intellectuals here to themselves come to terms with 
their own labour movements. It is a curious fact, as 
Friedland points out, that revolutionary theory has 
been not so much an export from the capitalist centre 
to the periphery, but from the periphery (Russia, 
China, Cuba, Vietnam) to the centre. In the latter, 
thus, 
the relevance of revolutionary experience and 
the analysis conducted by revolutionary 
theorists is not immediate and direct. 
Rather, the application of these ideas repre-
sents a challenge to evolving revolutionary 
theory. (Friedland et.al. 1982:xiii). 
Well, most of the theory used in this work has come out 
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of the attempt by Western socialists to meet the chal-
lenge Friedland mentions. And here it is, being 
offered back to socialist intellectuals (academically 
or self-educated) at the capitalist periphery, to see 
what value they can find in it. I await their response 
with curiousity. And hope. Because if they do find it 
helpful, it may suggest that it has been based not on 
the experience of a nation or a bloc of nations, but on 
the international experience of proletarianisation and 
working-class self-formation. And that the conditions 
for the development of a common theory and strategy for 
a genuinely international working-class movement are at 
last, gradually, coming into existence. 
NOTES 
1. A certain tradition and a number of forums for 
debate on labour in peripheral capitalist socie-
ties has built up over the last decade in a series 
of conferences and associated monographs, collec-
tions and journals. Conferences and seminars with 
overlapping participation have been held in 
Toronto (1973), The Hague (1975), Montreal (1980) 
and New Delhi (1981). These have found expres-
sion, respectively, in Sandbrook and Cohen (1975), 
Waterman (ed.) (1979), in the monographs and 
discussion papers of the Centre of Developing Area 
Studies, McGill University, Montreal, and in Human 
Futures (1981). The CDAS journal, previously 
Manpower and unemployment Research, now Labour, 
Capital and Society, has provided a permanent 
forum for debate (see, in particular, M&UR Vol. 
10, No.2, 1977 and Vol.11, No.l, 1978). Special 
characteristics of this tradition have been the 
policy-relevant orientation and the attempt to 
involve labour activists in the proceedings. Both 
features run the risk of adding partisan political 
polemic to the traditional academic one. But, 
overall, it has been possible for participants to 
engage in debate, respond positively to criticism, 
and to return for more. 
2. The point is made somewhat differently by Albert 
and Hahnel (1978) , who in the course of an ex-
tended critique of traditional marxism say that 
Another problem of the orthodox approach 
is its unnecessary extension of a justi-
fied critique of ahistoricism into a 
disdain for attempts to understand 
historical continuity. As much as one 
may be interested in revolution and 
concerned to promote historical 'leaps', 
it is a fact that long periods of rela-
tive quiescence and evolutionary contin-
uity are more common conditions...We 
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need a method which helps us understand 
tendencies toward reproduction as well 
as revolution. Why do ideas often 
persist long after they have been logi-
cally refuted, even long after they 
serve anyone's objective material in-
terests?. . .When reproductive tendencies 
clash with revolutionary forces which 
will 'win'? (55. Original stress). 
Further: 
Offering no insights into why people 
don't rebel, the theory is of little 
help to activists attempting to help 
people overcome these barriers. How 
should activists talk, what issues 
should be raised, how should old views 
be uprooted and new ones expressed, what 
tactics best mobilise different groups 
of people? None of these questions is 
addressed by the epic scale of histori-
cal materialism. Instead they are 
addressed on a rather ad hoc basis by a 
variety of strategic designs that are 
not at all closely tied to the over-
riding social theory. (65). 
3. The items of both Sandbrook and Peil are both 
based on or drawn from research that has later 
appeared in greatly-extended book form. I re-
ceived these books only as I was completing this 
chapter and regret that I have been therefore 
unable to take advantage of their findings in this 
work. Sandbrook (1982) not only provides a mas-
terly survey and synthesis of research on urban 
problems and classes in Africa but ends with a 
chapter directly addressing the strategic options 
facing both African and international labour 
movements. Peil 1981b) contains a mass of survey 
data on West African cities which will certainly 
provide us with a far better basis for an under-
standing of social relations amongst the urban 
poor then heretofore. I hope on another occasion 
to give them the attention they deserve. 
4. All translation is by myself. 
5. The argument concerning Bromley and Gerry is 
largely drawn from Waterman (1981) . 
6. Curiously enough, one of the significant differ-
ences from the Arrighi-Saul model is precisely 
that replacement of a dichotomy by a spectrum that 
Saul himself had recommended (Saul 1975:310, 
f.n.13). 
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APPENDIX 1 
The Port and Dock Worker Interview Schedule 
How old are you? 
a) Less than 25? 
b) 25 - 39? 
c) 40 or over? 
Please tell us about your schooling? 
a) How many years of education have you had al-
together? 
b) What types of school or college have you 
attended? 
c) What is your highest qualification? 
What is your mother tongue (language)? 
What language do you mostly speak? 
a) At work? 
b) Other times? 
Where did you mostly live when growing up? 
a) State? 
b) Place? 
Are you married? 
How many children have you? 
If you attend church/chapel/mosque 
a) What is it called? 
b) How many times a month? 
If you are in a savings/benefit club or isusu 
a) How much do you pay in weekly? 
b) Are its other members 
i) Work mates? 
ii) Fellow tribesmen? 
iii) Neighbours? 
What is or was the work of 
a) Your father? 
b) Your senior brother? 
c) Your best friend? 
If married, what is the occupation of 
a) Your wife's father? 
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b) Your wife? 
c) Your senior child? 
12. How old wre you when you first started work? 
13. What job do you do? 
14. How would you describe it? 
a) Unskilled labourer? 
b) Semi-skilled labourer? 
c) Skilled artisan? 
d) Clerk? 
e) Supervisor? 
f) Engineer/Technician? 
9) Manager? 
h) Other (write out answer in column) 
15. How long have you been at this workplace? 
a) Less than a year? 
b) Between 1 to 5 years? 
c) Between 6 to 10 years? 
d) More than 10 years? 
16. How many different places have you worked in? 
17. Have you ever lost your job and been unemployed? 
a) I have never lost my job 
b) Unemployed up to 6 months 
c) Unemployed 6 months to 1 year 
d) Unemployed more than 1 year 
18. What is your pay rate either 
a) Per day? 
b) Per week? 
c) Per month? 
19. Outside of your regular job, do you do any tra-
ding, craft, business or other work to get extra 
money? If so, 
a) What sort of work is it? 
b) About how much weekly do you get from it? 
20. Are you a member of a trade union? 
21. What is the name of your trade union? 
22. Do you pay money to your union? 
23. If you pay regularly, how much per month? 
24. At your workplace who is 
a) The president of the union 
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b) The secretary of the union 
c) Don't know 
Is your secretary paid by the union? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Don't know 
Does your union belong to 
a) United Labour Congress? 
b) Nigeria Workers Council? 
c) Nigerian Trade Union Congress/Federation? 
d) None of these? 
e) Don't know 
If you go to union meetings 
a) How many times this year (in 1975)? 
b) When did you last go? 
Have you ever been on strike in your life? 
If you have been on strike, how many times? 
Which was the biggest strike you have taken part 
in? 
a) Which workplace? 
b) Year? 
c) Number of days? 
Have you ever taken part in any other kind of 
protest? 
If so, what was its nature? 
a) Work-to-rule or go-slow? 
b) Petition letter to management? 
c) Street demonstration? 
d) Other protest (write out)? 
In which part of Lagos do you live? 
How much is your monthly rent? 
What is your daily transport cost from home to 
work and back? 
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APPENDIX 2 
The Open-Ended Interviews 
Carried out in 1975 and 1976, these interviews were 
intended to obtain an impression of values of port and 
dockworkers, of ordinary workers and union officers. 
Selection of workers depended on the opportunity at 
place of work to speak with workers in the absence of 
supervisors. Interviews were carried out in the pre-
ferred language of interviewes, and with the help of 
the assistants who worked on the survey. The questions 
were as follows: 
1. Tell me about the work or trade you would most 
like to do if you could choose. 
2. Do you really think you have any chance to do this 
in the next five years? 
3. Do you think it is good that private contractors 
should own and control the dock labour industry in 
Lagos or do you think there should be something 
different? 
4. What about government control of NPA? Do you think 
this is alright or that something should be 
changed? 
5. Tell me what you think about the supervisors and 
senior staff in your workplace and industry? 
6. Tell me in what way you think that it might be 
possible to get workers to work better in your 
workplace and industry. 
7. Do you think that either in Lagos Port, or else-
where in Lagos, or in Nigeria, that there are 
some people who are brothers in arms to NPA/dock 
(as appropriate) workers? Who? 
8. And now tell me if you think that there are some 
groups of people in the Port, in Lagos, or in 
Nigeria, who are enemies to you and your brothers 
in arms? 
9. How do you think that the ordinary workers and 
poor people in Nigeria can get the power to get 
what they desire? 
10. Do you know of some groups of people in foreign 
countries who are brothers in arms to the Nigerian 
workers? Who? 
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APPENDIX 3 
Union Officer Interview Schedule 
Д. THE UNION 
1. Name of Union? 
2. Address of Union? 
3. When was that Union founded? 
4. Who are the principle officers? 
a. President? 
b. General Secretary? 
c. Treasurer? 
5. How did you get your position? 
a. Election by whole membership? 
b. Election at regular conference? 
c. Appointment? 
6. If the union has branches, list them with 
strength. 
7. By union rules, who are allowed to join? 
8. How much is the union entrance fee? 
9. How much is the dues monthly? 
10. What percentage or proportion of your members pay 
dues? 
a. Regularly? 
b. Irregularly? 
с Not at all? 
11. Why do you think members fail to pay dues? 
12. How does the union collect dues? 
a. Collectors? 
b. Check-Off? 
13. Does anything prevent your union getting check­
off? 
14. What official arrangements do you have for accoun­
ting of union funds? 
15. If monthly dues are distributed, what percentage 
goes to 
a. National headquarters? 
b. Branches? 
16. On joining the union, do members get 
a. Membership card? 
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b. Constitution/rules of union? 
17. What services do members get from the union? 
18. Has your union tried to amalgamate with others? 
19. If amalgamation attempts have failed, why? 
20. Do you inform members of union decisions mostly by 
a. Person to person talk? 
b. By newspaper or bulletin? 
c. At local meetings? 
21. How can members influence headquarters decisions? 
22. If your union is in NPA, has it ever taken action 
of any kind with Dock Contractor workers? 
23. If you union is for dock contractor workers, has 
it taken action of any kind with NPA workers? 
24. If your union has taken such action, was it 
a. Solidarity strike? 
b. Request for solidarity strike? 
с Declaration of support? 
d. Request for support? 
e. Donation of money or other assistance? 
f. Request for money or other assistance? 
g. Give details of this or other action. 
25. Has the union any working relationship with any 
other organised groups, such as credit unions, 
cooperatives, youth clubs, women associations, 
farmer associations, etc? If so, give details. 
B. LABOUR RELATIONS 
1. What is the procudure for settling 
a. Worker complaints in the workplace? 
b. Union complaints against management? 
2. How are wages and conditions determined in your 
workplace? 
a. Collective bargaining? 
b. Staff regulations? 
c. General orders? 
3. Which of the above three is most commonly used and 
why? 
4. Who decides which claims should be put to em­
ployers in the workplace? 
a. Union conference? 
b. Union executive? 
с General Secretary 
d. Meeting of members? 
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5. If negotiations break down, who decides on the 
form of protest action (strike, go-slow, demon-
stration, etc.)? 
a. Mass meeting of members? 
b. Union executive? 
c. General Secretary personally? 
6. What do you consider to be the main labour rela-
tions problem in the workplace? 
7. What is the solution to this problem? 
C. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CENTRES 
1. To which national centre is your union affiliated? 
2. How many years has it been so affiliated? 
3. If your union was once affiliated to another 
national centre, 
a. Give name 
b. Give date 
c. Give reason for leaving it 
4. To what other union organisation is your union 
affiliated? 
a. In the industry? 
b. Nationally? 
c. African continent? 
d. Internationally? 
e. Other 
5. Has your union today or in the past had aid, in 
money, education, advice or equipment from 
a. International Trade Secretariat? 
b. ICFTU, WFTU, WCL/IFCTU? 
c. African-American Labour Centre? 
d. Other? 
D. THE LEADER 
1. Present employer (if employed other than by the 
union)? 
2. Your trade and occupation now (if employed other 
than by the union)? 
3. Previous trades and occupations? 
4. Are you a full-time paid union officer? 
5. If answer to 4 is 'yes', what is your official 
monthly pay? 
6. If you are a parttime officer, how much do you 
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get as a fee or honorarium for union work per 
year? 
7. If you have attended trade union education, men-
tion most important courses. 
369 
APPENDIX 4 
ARCHIVAL SOURCES 
1. THE CHIEF O.A.F. BEYIOKU NIGERIAN LABOUR ARCHIVE 
(Waterman 1979b) 
Files relevant to this study are: 
K. Ports Authority Junior Supervisory Staff Associa-
tion of Nigeria Decree 53 of 1969: Matters Rela-
ting to Arbitration and Industrial Arbitration 
Tribunal (1969-74) 
L. Ports Authority Junior Supervisory Staff Associa-
tion of Nigeria First Conference (1969) 
M. Ports Authority Junior Supervisory Staff Associa-
tion of Nigeria (1970-71) 
N. Nigerian Ports Authority Craftsmen and Allied 
Workers Association: First Conference (1970) 
O. Nigerian Ports Authority Craftsmen and Allied 
Workers Association: Second Conference (1972) 
P. Nigerian Ports Authority Workers Union (1974-5) 
Q. Joint Committee for Representation, Nigerian Ports 
Authority: Meetings Management Headquarters Level 
(1973-4) 
R. Joint Committee for Representation: Udoji and 
Relevant Matters (1973-5) (Covers submission of 
demands to Udoji Commission, ULC and private 
sector strikes over Udoji award, 1975) 
S. Background reading: 
Adetule, O. 1976a. 'Meet Ifa King of Lagos', Drum, 
Lagos, July, 1975 
Adetule, O. 1976b. 'In a Second Drum Interview the 
Ifa King of Lagos Tells...Why I Turned to Tradi-
tional Religion', Drum, Lagos, August, 1975 
Beyioku, O.A.F. 1974 'A Lecture on the Struggles 
of the Trade Unions by Chief O.A. Fagbenro Beyi-
oku, Labour Relations Consultant, at the LCC 
Central Library Hall, on Friday, 30th August, 
1974, Under the Auspices of the Unity Circle Club' 
2. THE LAGOS PORT LABOUR ARCHIVE (Waterman 1979f) 
A. Nigerian Ports Authority files 
1. NPA Organisation 
2. NPA Labour 
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3. NPA Industrial Relations 
4. NPA Unions and Associations 
5. NPA Trade Unions: Miscellaneous 
6. NPA Trade Unions: Structure 
7. Nigerian Marine African Workers Union 
8. Nigerian Maritime Trade Union Federation 
9. Nigerian Maritime Workers Union 
10. Nigerian Transport and General Workers Union 
11. NPA Craftsmen and Allied Workers Association 
12. NPA Firemen, Greasers, Technical and General 
Workers Union 
13. NPA Joint Committee for Representation 
14. NPA Junior Supervisory Staffs Association 
15. NPA Officers Association 
16. NPA Sports Association 
17. Marine Engineering Staffs Association of Nigeria 
18. NPA Workers Union 
19. Railways and Ports Transport and Clerical Staffs 
Union 
20. Railways and Ports Workers Union of Nigeria 
B. Dock Labour Contractors (general) files 
21. Contractor organisation 
22. Contractor labour 
23. Contractor industrial relations 
24. Dock labour unions to 1966: general 
25. Dock labour unions 1966-78 
26. Amalgamated Dock Workers Transport and General 
Workers Union (United Labour Congress affiliated) 
1966-78 
27. Amalgamated Dock Workers Transport and General 
Workers Union (Nigerian Trade Union Congress 
affiliated) 1966-78 
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C. Biney and Co. Ltd. files 
28. Biney Organisation 
29. Biney labour 
30. Biney industrial relations 
31. Biney unions 
D. Trade unions (general) files 
32. Trade union international 
33. Trade union leaders 
34. Cargo-handling industry unions (general) 
E. NPA Publications 
35. NPA Address and Telephone List 197? 
36. NPA Annual Reports 1962-70, 1973-4 
37. NPA Approved Staff Establishment 1977 
38. NPA Classified Staff List 1968 
39. Docks and Premises Byelaws, 1955 
40. NPA General Manager's Instructions, 1976 
41. NPA Handbook 1975 
42. NPA Industrial Relations Report 1973-5 
43. NPA Lagos Port Complex Statistics 1974-5 
44. NPA Lagos Port Report 1974 
45. NPA News, March 1969, June-July 1970, July-Septem-
ber 1973, July-September 1974, January-March 1976, 
April-June 1976, July-September 1976 
46. NPA Ports Act 1961 
47. Ports Regulations, 1955 
48. NPA Staff Development Department Report 1975 
49. NPA Traffic/Operations Department Report 1975 
50. The History of the Ports of Nigeria, 1965 
51. Fourth Conference of the Port Management Associa-
tion of West and Central Africa, August 2-6, 1976 
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52. NPA Brochure, 1967 
F. Nigerian Government Publications 
53. Salubi Report 1959. Report of the Board of In-
quiry into the Trade Dispute between Elder Demp-
ster Lines Ltd. and the Nigerian Union of Seamen. 
54. Beckley Exhibits 1967. Nos. 1, 13 (Supplementary), 
16, 17, 18, 21, Appendix to 21, 24, 26, 75, 146, 
150, 151, 153, 155, 158, 160, 162, 167, 426. 
55. Beckley Proceedings 1966-7. Proceedings of the 
Tribunal of Inquiry into the Affairs of the 
NPA. Days 1-7, 10-13, 16, Visit, 43-72. 
56. Beckley Report 1967. Report of the Tribunal of 
Inquiry into the Affairs of the NPA for the Period 
October 1, 1960 to December 31, 1965. 
57. FRN Comments 1968. Comments of the Federal Mili-
tary Government on the Report of the Tribunal of 
Inquiry into the Affairs of the NPA for the Period 
October 1, 1960 to December 31, 1965 
58. Ayida Report 1969. Report on the Reorganisation 
of the Dock Labour Industry in Nigerian Ports 
59. Urhobo Report 1971. Report of the Board of In-
quiry into the Affairs of the Amalgamated Dock-
workers Transport and General Workers Union. 
G. A Dock labour study 
61. Nkamare, U. U. 1964. Lagos Dock Labour Problems. 
Ribway Printers, Lagos. 
H. Draft studies on Lagos Port labour by Peter Waterman 
62. 
63. 
64. 
65. 
66. 
67. 
68. 
69. 
Introductory chapter. 
Industrial structure. 
Labour force. 
Industrial relations. 
Portworker and dockworker unionism, 
Portworker unionism in the 1970s. 
Dockworker unionism in the 1970s. 
Labour protest action. 
1940S-1960S. 
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4. LABOUR IN THE NIGERIAN PRESS, 1976-77 (Waterman 
1980c) 
Detailed clippings from the Nigerian press, Octo-
ber 1976-September 1977, covering labour relations, 
wages and prices, rural development, indigenous capi-
talists, cement importation, shipping and Lagos Port 
congestion, radical and socialist politics, etc. 
Occasional clippings cover 1970-74, January-September 
1976, October-December 1977, and 1978. 
5. THE NIGERIAN TRADE ONION TRIBUNAL OF 1976 (Waterman 
1979e) 
The word-by-word proceedings of the public in-
quiry, concerned with industrial relations, and with 
union structure and financing, leadership and inter-
national relations. The Adebiyi Proceedings (as they 
are known after the Chairman of the Tribunal) amount to 
some two million words. They are indexed by name, 
subject and organisation. 
6. OTHER MAJOR ARCHIVAL SOURCES CONSULTED 
Association of Nigerian Dock Labour Contractors (in 
possession of U. U. Nkamare, Mainland Brothers, 21 
Payne Crescent, PMB 1057, Apapa, Lagos) 
W. H. Biney and Co. Ltd. 
International Transport Workers Federation (London) 
Ministry of Labour 
Nigerian Ports Authority; Industrial Relations Depart-
ment 
Registrar of Trade Unions 
Trade Union Congress Library (London) 
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SAMENVATTING 
'ARISTOCRATEN' EN 'PLEBEJERS' IN AFRIKAANSE VAKBONDEN? 
DE STRIJD EN ORGANISATIE VAN HAVENARBEIDERS IN LAGOS 
Deze studie behandelt de politieke verdeeldheid tussen 
'rijke' en 'arme' havenarbeiders. Het onderzoek richt 
zich op de haven van Lagos. Er is hier een duidelijk 
onderscheid waar te nemen tussen de 'rijke' arbeiders 
die regelmatig werk hebben bij de Nigeriaanse staats-
havens (Nigerian Ports Authority = NPA) en de 'arme' 
arbeiders (contract arbeiders) die onregelmatig in de 
havens werken voor particuliere koppelbazen. De NPA-
arbeiders hebben in het algemeen de lagere school 
doorlopen, hebben permanent werk, zijn verstedelijkt, 
zijn georganiseerd in vakbonden, en doen het adminis-
tratieve en technische werk dat nodig is om de indus-
triële infrastructuur in stand te houden, even als het 
onderhouds- en rekenwerk dat in de haven gedaan moet 
worden. De contractarbeiders zijn meestal ongeschoold, 
werken onregelmatig, zijn ten dele verstedelijkt, 
nauwelijks georganiseerd, en verrichten vooral het 
ongeschoolde handenarbeid, zoals het laden en lossen 
van schepen, lichters, stapels, loodsen, vrachtwagens 
en treinen. De NPA-arbeiders lijken goed geïntegreerd 
te zijn in hun bedrijf, de contractarbeiders lijken 
opstandig. Tegen het einde van de zestiger jaren 
organiseerden de NPA-arbeiders zich in toenemende mate 
in vakbonden die op het gebied van arbeidsverhoudingen 
een liberale ideologie tentoonspreidden en die ver-
bonden waren met de rechtse nationale vakcentrale. Die 
was op haar beurt weer geaffilieerd met reformistische 
Westerse vakbonden, met de Internationale Arbeids 
Organisatie en met de multinationals. In dezelfde 
periode werden de stakingen van de contractarbeiders 
steeds meer aangevoerd door radicale activisten van de 
linkse vakcentrale, die op haar beurt verbonden was met 
de internationale communistische beweging. 
Op het eerste gezicht hebben we hier te doen met 
een illustratie van de 'arbeidersaristocratie-theorie'. 
Volgens deze theorie, die voor Afrika voor het eerst in 
de zestiger jaren werd gepresenteerd, is het 'eigen-
lijke proletariaat' van industriearbeiders economisch 
bevoorrecht boven, en sociaal geïsoleerd van, de 'half-
geproletariseerde boeren', een groep van onregelmatige 
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werkende en trekkende arbeiders. De eerste groep wordt 
beschouwd als zich identificerend met de lokale elite 
en sub-elite en met het internationale kapitalisme. De 
tweede groep wordt verondersteld zich te identificeren 
met de boerenmassa's. Terwijl de eerste categorie als 
in wezen conservatief wordt gezien, wordt de tweede als 
radicaal beschouwd, tenminste in aanleg. 
Deze studie stelt niet alleen het empirische 
bewijs voor de arbeidersaristocratie-theorie ter dis-
cussie, maar ook de voornaamste gehanteerde concepties, 
de methodologie en de politieke implicaties. De 
theorie wordt hier niet zozeer als een vergissing 
behandeld alswel als een mythe. Als zodanig vertegen-
woordigd ze een denkbeeldige uitdrukking van een belan-
grijke sociale realiteit, en vormt ze een obstakel voor 
effectieve massa-actie om die realiteit te veranderen. 
Het echte probleem, zo wordt in eerste instantie betoo-
gd is dat van het Ongelijke proletarische bewustzijn 
en de industriële verdeeldheid'. Deze proletarisatie 
is - en is altijd al een kwestie geweest - van de ge-
lijktijdige verdeling en eenmaking van de loonarbei-
ders. Als we de verschillen in bewustzijn en gedrag van 
de arbeiders willen begrijpen, dan moeten we nader de 
situatie binnen de arbeidsverdeling bezien, met inbe-
grip van 'situaties in de arbeidsverdeling die bestaat 
binnen de arbeidersbeweging'. 
Deze studie kan hiermee worden geplaatst in het 
kader van een debat tussen socialistische en andere 
radicale wetenschaps-beoefenaars en eveneens in de 
contekst van de marxistische discussie. Gebruik wordt 
gemaakt van de geschriften van die hedendaagse marxis-
ten (en anderen) die getracht hebben theoretisch greep 
te krijgen op verdeeldheid binnen klassen, en binnen de 
arbeidersbeweging, en op de bijzonderheden van de 
klassevorming in de perifere kapitalistische maat-
schappij. Aanvankelijk wordt verondersteld dat de 
theorie van de arbeidersaristocratie een afwijking is 
van de marxistische traditie. In de loop van deze 
studie echter wordt deze traditie zelf ter discussie 
gesteld. De conclusie suggereert de noodzaak van een 
radicale breuk met het orthodoxe marxisme-leninisme. 
De case-study maakt een nauwkeurig onderzoek 
mogelijk naar de politieke verhoudingen tussen zowel 
ieder van de arbeiders categorieën als daarbinnen. 
Aandacht wordt geschonken aan de verhouding tussen 
vakbonden en kapitaal en staat, aan de relatie tussen 
achterban en leiders (industrieel, nationaal en inter-
nationaal), en aan activiteiten die collectief arbei-
dersprotest uitdrukken. De conclusie is dat de rijk-
arm-verdeling er slechts een is uit een hele reeks, en 
niet noodzakelijkerwijs de belangrijkste. Terwijl deze 
studie geplaatst kan worden binnen de traditie van 
socialistische studies van de Nigeriaanse arbeids-
prolematiek, wordt uiteengezet dat deze een aanzien-
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lijke verrijking daarvan is omdat ze zich bezighoudt 
met de problematiek van de organisatie van de arbei-
ders. Opmerkelijke overeenkomsten en verschillen worden 
ook vastgesteld ten aanzien van recent marxistisch en 
niet-marxisti seh onderzoek naar de Afrikaanse arbeider 
meer in 't algemeen. Er worden geen specifieke beleids-
aanbevelingen gedaan, maar de studie is er wel op 
gericht een bijdrage te leveren aan het oplossen van 
het probleem van verdeeldheid. In verband hiermee wordt 
de algemene teneur van dit proefschrift uiteengezet. 
De Inleiding beschouwt zowel de oorspronkelijke 
arbeidersaristocratie-theorie als het debat waartoe 
deze aanleiding gaf. De oorspronkelijke theoretici 
waren Marx, Engels en Lenin. Geconfronteerd met het 
niet-revolutionaire gedrag van het Europese prole-
tariaat, hanteerden zij het 19-eeeuwse concept van een 
bevoorrechte en conservatieve groep onder de arbeiders 
als verklaring hiervoor. Echter zelfs in het klassieke 
gebruik had de arbeidersaristocratie-theorie ver-
schillende bewijsvoeringen en doelstellingen. Ze werd 
toegepast op de arbeidersklasse als geheel, op een deel 
daarvan, op niet-proletarische loonarbeiders, op leden 
van bepaalde bonden, of op arbeidersleiders. De theorie 
werd gebruikt om zowel conservatisme binnen een nation-
ale arbeidersklasse te verklaren als het conservatisme 
van een hele groep van nationale arbeidersklassen. Door 
deze onnauwkeurige en theoretische niet-doordachte 
toepassing worden ook begrippen, als het 'lompenpro-
letariaat' en de 'half-geproletariseerde boeren' hier-
mee geassocieerd. De werkwijze is gelijk: eerst wordt 
de 'echte' rol van de arbeidersklasse vastgesteld, 
daarna wordt gedrag dat daarvan afwijkt verklaard in 
termen van perifere economische categorieën. Terwijl 
voor de orthodoxe marxisten 'het proletariaat an sich' 
de 'werkelijk revolutionaire klasse' blijft hebben 
anderen een andere conceptuele oplossing aanvaard. Zij 
beschouwen het hele proletariaat als een arbeiders-
aristocratie, en zoeken revolutionaire macht bij de 
boeren, het lompenproletariaat of de half-geprole-
tariseerden. Het vlak waarop deze andere theoretici 
overeenkomst vertonen met de orthodoxe marxisten is 
niet zozeer het gebruik van dezelfde begrippen, alswel 
het zoeken naar die ene belangrijke doodgraver van het 
kapitalisme en dat ene bevoorrechte kerkhof. 
Voor Afrika is de arbeidersaristocratie-theorie 
het best uiteengezet door Arrighi en Saul. Zij beweer-
den dat er een overeenkomst in belangen zou zijn tussen 
het internationale kapitalisme en het Afrikaanse prole-
tariaat, die weer gemeenschappelijke belangen hebben 
tegenover de half-geproletariseerde trek- en tijdelijke 
arbeiders. De eerste reaktie op Arrighi en Saul kwam in 
de vorm van een empirische weerlegging, maar de critici 
misten de kern van de zaak voorzover ze zich beperkten 
tot het aantonen van de empirische fouten. Weliswaar 
kan de theorie op basis van de empirie weerlegd worden: 
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de economische, sociale en politieke beweringen zijn 
eenvoudigweg onjuist, inadequaat, of misleidend. Het 
probleem dat hierachter ligt is echter dat van een 
onjuiste conceptualisering: het concept en zijn tegen-
pool (de halfgeproletariseerde boerenklasse) staan in 
een ambivalente en veranderende verhouding en vertegen-
woordigen zo veeleer een logische dan een sociologische 
tweedeling. Aan deze onjuiste concepties liggen metho-
dologische fouten ten grondslag: 1) het poneren van 
tweeledige tegenstellingen, in plaats van een dialec-
tische benadering van de arbeidersklasse als structuur 
en proces; 2) het uitgaan van een simplistische econo-
mische determinatie van gedrag en bewustzijn van de 
arbeidersklasse. De critici hebben bovendien de conser-
vatieve politieke implicaties van de theorie amper 
gezien: deze is verbonden met een etatistische op-
vatting van sociale verandering en socialisme en met 
een elitaire opvatting van leiderschap. Als een meer 
bevredigend uitgangspunt voor het werkelijke probleem 
dat de theorie en zijn critici niet hebben onderkend, 
wordt gesuggereerd dat proletarisering overal een 
kwestie is - en altijd geweest is - van de gelijk-
tijdige verdeling en eenmaking van de loonarbeiders. 
Het is daartoe noodzakelijk, niet uitsluitend de situ-
atie binnen de arbeidsverdeling te onderzoekan maar ook 
de situatie in de arbeidsverdeling binnen de arbeiders-
beweging zelf. 
Na een alternatieve oriëntatie op het probleem van 
de verdeeldheid te hebben voorgesteld, gaat de Inleid-
ing verder (in Deel 4) met het uitwerken van een funda-
menteel andere benadering, waarbij uitbuiting, onder-
drukking en de fundamenteel revolutionaire rol van de 
arbeiders-klasse binnen de kapitalistische maatschappij 
aan de orde komt. Dit wordt nader toegelicht door te 
verwijzen naar: 1) de betekenis van fundamentele econo-
mische strijd, 2) de noodzaak van aktie van de achter-
ban om de bonden te stimuleren deze strijd te boven te 
komen, 3) de noodzaak voor socialisten om onder de in 
het algemeen niet-socialistische arbeiders te werken, 
4) de noodzaak voor een georganiseerde marxistische 
politieke macht om de vereiste revolutionaire ideologie 
te verschaffen, 5) het belang van sociale protest-
bewegingen van anderen dan arbeiders om de kapitalis-
tische legitimiteit te ondermijnen, 6) de noodzaak voor 
een anti-kapitalistische hervormingsstrategie, 7) 
socialisme als arbeiderszelfbestuur in economie en 
staat. Kortom, een uiteenzetting over de werkelijke 
aard van de arbeidersklasse wordt gevolgd door een 
uiteenzetting over de eisen die aan een socialistische 
beweging gesteld moeten worden. Het is dit oorspronke-
lijke uitgangspunt dat ter discussie wordt gesteld in 
de Conclusie van deze studie. 
In Deel 5 van de Inleiding worden de methoden en 
technieken van het onderzoek behandelt. Gesteld wordt 
dat een studie die van haar onderwerp veronderstelt dat 
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zij haar eigen geschiedenis maakt, ook een geëigende 
werkwijze, persoonlijke verhoudingen en resultaten 
vereist. Deze studie maakt in feite deel uit van een 
reeks activiteiten, waarvan verscheidene ten doel 
hebben om te worden teruggekoppeld naar arbeiders-
leiders, activisten en arbeiders zelf. Bij het behand-
elen van onderzoekstechnieken, wordt de waarde van een 
benadering van diverse methoden (antropologische, 
social survey, en historische technieken) uiteengezet 
voor de bestudering van de arbeidsproblematiek. Ver-
klaard wordt hoe deze diverse methoden tijdens het 
onderzoek werden gebruikt, en welke pogingen werden 
gedaan om de gebruikelijke verhouding tussen onder-
zoeker en degenen die hij onderzoekt teboven te komen. 
Deel I van de studie toont hoe kapitaal en staat 
proberen de arbeid in de haven van Lagos te vormen. Het 
eerste hoofdstuk gaat in op de historische ontwikkeling 
en de huidige structuur van de industrie, de arbeids-
verhoudingen en de arbeidersklasse in Nigeria in het 
algemeen. Er worden drie perioden van industrialisatie 
onderscheiden, en vier verschillende sectoren van 
loonarbeid die momenteel bestaan. De geschiedenis en 
structuur van de loonarbeid wordt uiteengezet. Bedacht 
moet worden dat het gaat om arbeiders in een land 
waarin negen-tiende van de arbeidskrachten buiten 
loondienst werkt, waar twee-derde in de landbouw werk-
zaam is, waar driekwart van de stedelijke arbeiders 
buiten loondienst werkt, en waar twee-derde van de twee 
miljoen arbeiders in bedrijven met meer dan tien mensen 
in dienst van de staat zijn. Ook worden er twee belang-
rijke perioden onderscheiden in het nationale belied 
t.a.v. de arbeidsverhoudingen in Nigeria, n.l. een 
liberaal-paternalistische periode en een periode van 
een toenemend - hoewel vaag - corporatisme. Aangetoond 
wordt dat de ontwikkeling van de nationale vakbeweging 
voor een deel bepaald wordt door de eisen van een 
dergelijk beleid, en voor een deel door de ontwikkeling 
van de Nigeriaanse arbeidersklasse. Deze klasse -
verdeeld door industriële en regionale verschillen -
blijkt nauw te zijn verbonden met de kleine bourgeoisie 
op het platteland en in de steden, waaruit zij voort-
komt en te midden waarvan zij leeft. Ondanks de ont-
wikkeling van een bepaald bewustzijn en gedrag dat 
kenmerkerd is voor de arbeidersklasse, en ondanks het 
vermogen om op lokaal niveau te komen tot effectief 
protest, wordt duidelijk waarom het totnogtoe onmoge-
lijk is gebleken tot een klassebewust en representatief 
nationaal leiderschap te komen. 
Het tweede hoofdstuk behandelt de structuur van de 
haven van Lagos zelf, in het bijzonder de indeling in 
twee belangrijke sectoren, en de verdeling binnen deze 
sectoren onderling. We zien hier dat arbeiders niet 
uitsluitend verdeeld zijn op grond van eigendom, maar 
ook door schaalfactoren (een grote NPA, vele kleine 
koppelbazen), en binnen iedere sector door een veelheid 
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van factoren die bedoeld zijn om hen binnen de af­
zonderlijke structuren in te passen. Ook wordt aan­
getoond dat de verdeling in sectoren historisch bepaald 
is en nog in verandering, waarbij deze veranderingen 
grotendeels de belangen van kapitaal en staat weer­
geven, of van fracties daarvan. Het derde hoofdstuk 
houdt zich bezig met de sociale achtergrond, huidige 
netwerk en levensomstandigheden van de twee belangrijk-
sie categorieën arbeiders binnen iedere sector. Het 
wordt duidelijk dat we te maken hebben met twee 
verschillende werelden van loonarbeid, met belangrijke 
verschillen in inkomen en zekerheid, achtergrond en 
onderwijs, sociaale netwerk en levenskansen. Bewijs 
voor de kloof tussen NPA- en contractarbeiders is er te 
over, hoewel die ook binnen iedere groep te onder-
scheiden is. Er is eveneens een duidelijk verband te 
constateren tussen de levenswijze van de NPA-arbeiders 
die handenarbeid verrichten en de ervaren contract-
arbeiders. 
In de conclusie van hoofdstuk 4 wordt betoogd dat, 
terwijl proletarisering tot een zekere homogeniteit 
onder de arbeiders leidt, er tegelijkertijd op nieuw 
een heterogenisering optreedt. De heterogeniteit in de 
haven houdt verdeeIheid van velerlei aard onder de 
arbeiders in. De verdeling in rijke en arme arbeiders 
is er derhalve slechts één van een reeks verschillen 
die het Nigeriaanse kapitaal en de staat de Nigeriaanse 
arbeiders opleggen. De verdeling van de haven in twee 
belangrijke sectoren, voor wat betreft eigendom, 
schaal, technologie en zeggenschap over arbeid, bestaat 
stellig. Toch bestaat er in geen van beide een on-
dubbelzinnige verdeling tussen Proletariers en kapi-
talisten. Bovendien is ieder van de twee categorieën 
arbeiders onderling weer in sterke mate verdeeld in 
fracties, segmenten en strata. Gegeven verder de nauwe 
samenhang tussen contractarbeiders en arbeiders in 
vaste dienst - vergeleken met het hele scala van ver-
schillen soorten arbeiders in steden in perifere kapi-
talistische landen - is de vraag of deze speciale 
verdeling de meest signifikante is, nauwelijks van 
zelfsprekend. 
Deel II bestudeerd de bonden als de gangbare vorm 
van arbeidersorganisatie in de haven, met name de 
externe relaties van de bonden: de vakbondsstrategie 
t.o.v. kapitaal en staat. Kwam de aard van de verdeeld-
heid tussen de twee categorieën arbeiders al eerder aan 
de orde, dit deel betreft de implicaties hiervan voor 
respectievelijk de meer en minder geproletariseerde 
arbeiders. Binnen de NPA zien we verschillende vormen 
van vakbondslidmaatschap, en bonden die grotendeels 
gericht zijn op het bevoordelen van de eigen beroeps-
groep binnen het kader van instituties en ideologieën 
t.a.v. collectieve onderhandelingen. Toenemende factie-
strijd wordt hier echter niet slechts gezien als de 
uitdrukking van een steeds beperkter eigenbelang, maar 
ook als die van toenemende ontevredenheid met de bes-
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taande vakbondsstrategie. Dit maakt het mogelijk - en 
stimuleert ook - een meer-aggresieve en meer-omvattende 
vakbondsstrategie te ontwikkelen, die een basis ver-
schaft voor hernieuwde eenheid onder de arbeiders. De 
beperkingen van deze verandering worden aangetoond door 
het feit dat het veeleer de instituties t.a.v. de 
arbeidsverhoudingen zijn die ter discussie worden 
gesteld, dan de ideologie t.a.v. de arbeidsverhoudin-
gen: dat het eerder de strategie is die verandert dan 
de eisen. De verschillende soorten situaties en 
niveau's binnen de sector van de koppelbazen houdt een 
grotere verscheidenheid in aan mogelijke organisatie-
vormen en strategieën. Maar ook hier zien we een duide-
lijke beweging in de richting van een radicalisering. 
Zelfs de bond die het meest van de werkgevers afhanke-
lijk is, laat zijn tanden zien. De gematigd-
reformistische organisatie wordt voortdurend over-
vleugeld. De militante, niet-erkende organisatie is 
echter niet in staat om organisatorische vorm te geven 
aan het radicalisme dat zijzelf heeft opgeroepen. Hoe 
dubbelzinnig ook, het radicalisme van de NPA-arbeiders 
is in staat om de een of andere duidelijke organisa-
torische vorm aan te nemen, hetgeen het radicalisme van 
de contractarbeiders veel moeilijker weet te bereiken. 
De interpretatie van dergelijke bevindingen kan in 
hoofdstuk 8 worden gevonden. De twee laatste paragrafen 
van dat hoofdstuk bevatten de belangrijkste conclusies. 
De ene betreft de aard van de arbeidersklasse, de ander 
de aard van de vakbeweging als vorm van arbeiders-
organisatie. De eerste conclusie is dat er geen 
'werkelijke' arbeidersklasse in Nigeria bestaat, waar-
van de meer- of de minder-geproletariseerde arbeiders 
afwijkingen zijn; er is geen proletarische voorhoede 
(geen economisch gedetermineerde, natuurlijke voor-
hoede) die andere arbeiders zouden kunnen volgen. Men 
kan geen bepaald klassebewustzijn veronderstellen op 
basis van een bepaalde mate van proletarisering of een 
bepaalde mate van deprivatie. Voorzover er inderdaad 
een bepaalde vorm van bewustzijn ontstaat door een 
specifieke groepservaring, zal het radicalisme van die 
groep juist door die specificiteit beperkt worden. De 
tweede conclusie volgt uit deze eerste, door de vraag 
te stellen of de vakbonden dergelijk particularisme van 
de arbeiders niet versterken. Terwijl wordt aangetoond 
dat de bonden in de haven van Lagos een dergelijke 
verdeeldheid te boven zouden kunnen komen, wordt erkend 
dat de vakbondsorganisatie als vorm een dergelijk 
particularisme toelaat. Deze meer algemene vraag wordt 
opengelaten voor bespreking naderhand. 
Deel IIT van de studie verschaft materiaal voor 
een nadere beschouwing van dit tweede thema. Het gaat 
over de interne verhoudingen in de vakbeweging, lokaal, 
nationaal en internationaal. Het bespreekt de aard van 
de vakbondsstructuren, de relaties van de leiders met 
de nationale en internationale beweging, en hun re la-
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ties met de leden. De analyse (hoofdstuk 12) vat de 
bevindingen op dit punt samen, zij het in een andere 
volgorde. Eerst komt de relatie tussen arbeiders en 
leiders aan de orde. Niet alleen wordt hier gewezen op 
de uiteenlopende oriëntatie van de NPA-arbeiders op de 
werknemers uit de middenklasse en van de contractarbei-
ders op de kleine bourgeoisie, maar ook op hun gemeen-
schappelijke bewustzijn van hun positie als loonarbei-
ders. Dit gedeelde bewustzijn heeft geen betrekking op 
een nationale of een internationale arbeidersklasse 
(noch op elkaar) , maar het loopt parallel met dat van 
andere arbeiders. Het loopt ook parallel met de houding 
van andere niet in loondienst werkende mensen in 
Nigeria, en kan derhalve worden beschouwd als een basis 
om tot gemeenschappelijke actie te komen. Onder de 
leiders kunnen we een proces van professionalisering en 
het gevaar van bureaucratisering waarnemen. Ook wordt 
gesuggereerd dat, waar de leiders falen om het bewust-
zijn en actie van de leden te stimuleren, ze zelf 
beschouwd kunnen worden als een groep die tussen-
liggende posities in de klassenstructuur inneemt in 
plaats van leidende posities binnen de arbeidersklasse. 
Met betrekking tot de vakbondsstructuur wordt een 
gezamenlijk proces in de richting van collectieve 
onderhandelingen geconstateerd, maar zonder de nood-
zakelijke gevolgen voor bureaucratisering. Er wordt 
echter gesteld dat, waar het tot collectieve onder-
handelingen komt, die zowel als middel en als doel van 
vakbondsactiviteit worden aanvaard, de vakbonden con-
servatief worden, en actiestrijd en clientélisme zullen 
worden gestimuleerd. Deze argumentatie wordt voortgezet 
door de relaties na te gaan tussen de bonden in de 
haven van Lagos en hun nationale en internationale 
vakbondscontacten. Het is de conservatieve aard van 
dergelijke hogere organisaties, gebaseerd op oude 
compromissen met kapitaal en staat, dat hen ertoe voert 
clientélisme en factiestrijd binnen de bonden op haven-
niveau te bevorderen. De conclusie van dit hoofdstuk 
keert opnieuw terug naar het algemene probleem van de 
organisatievorm van de bonden en de verdeeldheid van de 
arbeidersklasse. Betoogd wordt dat we moeten erkennen 
dat kapitaal en staat (concurrentie en hiërarchie) 
binnen zowel als buiten of boven de vakbeweging 
opereren. Waar vakbondsleiders dat niet erkennen en er 
geen actie tegen ondernemen, zullen er hindernissen 
voor de versterking en consolidatie van de arbeiders-
klasse blijven bestaan. Er is geen bewijs dat zelfs de 
twee radicale groepen van leiders dit in woord of daad 
herkenden. Vakbonden zullen oude scheidslijnen blijven 
voortbrengen of nieuwe onder de arbeiders creëren, 
wanneer ze als gespecialiseerde structuren opgevat 
worden met een toegewezen rol in een bestaande sociale 
formatie. Indien ze opgevat worden als een beweging 
tegen het kapitalisme en etatisme van buitenaf, en 
tegen concurrentie en hiërarchie van binnenuit, kunnen 
vakbonden bijdragen aan het overwinnen van scheids-
lijnen tussen de arbeiders. 
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Maar hebben de arbeiders het vermogen om zichzelf 
in en door hun bonden zo te manifesteren? Deel IV van 
de studie houdt zich met dit thema bezig. Aangezien de 
hoofdstukken 14 en 15 voornamelijk een chronologisch 
verslag geven van stakingsactiviteiten in iedere sec-
tor, kunnen we direct naar hoofdstuk 16 doorgaan. Dit 
behandelt het bewustzijn en het vermogen van de arbei-
ders om actie te ondernemen, het leiderschap van sta-
kingen, en het probleem van eenheid onder de arbeiders. 
In de eerste plaats, het bewustzijn en vermogen tot 
actie. Hoewel de NPA-arbeiders gedurende deze periode 
hun onderlinge verdeeldheid te boven komen en militan-
ter worden, wordt er betrekkelijk weinig gestaakt. Als 
er al gestaakt wordt, gebeurd dat zeer gematigd. De 
stakingen van de contractarbeiders zijn algemener, 
frekwenter en getuigen van een grotere strijdbaarheid, 
maar dat is niet zonder meer een bewijs voor een 
grotere mate van bewustzijn en vermogen om actie te 
ondernemen. In beide gevallen kan de staking worden 
gezien als een rationele en effectieve reaktie op de 
situatie van de desbetreffende groep. Terwijl echter 
het protest van de contractarbeiders hen voerde tot de 
status die de NPA-arbeiders genoten, bracht het protest 
van de NPA-arbeiders hen hier impliciet bovenuit. 
Niettemin staakte iedere groep doorgaans voor zichzelf, 
en gemeenschappelijk optreden tijdens nationale acties 
betekende gewoonlijk niet echt gezamenlijke actie. In 
de tweede plaats, het leiderschap van stakingen. Dit 
komt in beide gevallen in handen te liggen van radicale 
vakbondsleiders. Maar het is duidelijk dat in beide 
gevallen de motieven om te staken van deze leiders 
verschillen - of te scheiden zijn - van die van hun 
volgelingen. De niet geringe veschillen tussen beide 
groepen leiders schijnen op dit punt van minder be-
tekenis dan hun overeenkomsten. Beide groepen reageren 
op verzoeken van de arbeiders om actie te ondernemen, 
beide stimuleren en leiden die, maar beide zijn ook in 
staat om acties, om eigen redenen, af te breken. Het is 
echter niet zo dat de stakingen totaal in de handen van 
de leiders liggen. Ten derde, het probleem van eenheid 
onder de arbeiders. Het is duidelijk dat we hier een 
groeiende strijdbaarheid zien, maar die vormt voor-
namelijk de uitdrukking van een tamelijk beperkt-
gedefinieerd eigenbelang. Dit moet echter niet zonder 
meer als negatief worden gezien. Door de stakingen 
komen de twee voornaamste categorieën niet tegenover 
elkaar te staan. Ze komen ook niet in conflict met de 
belangen van andere Nigeriaanse arbeiders. De NPA-
en contractarbeiders lijken bezig zichzelf te her-
definiëren, onderling collectief maar als groep af-
zonderlijk, op een beperkte maar krachtiger wijze. Het 
vraagstuk dat overblijft is om de definitie van de 
eigen situatie te verruimen en meer effectieve actie te 
ondernemen. Protestacties moeten meer fracties, segmen-
ten en strata van de arbeidersklasse gaan omvatten, 
evenals nieuwe en bredere eisen. Maar zelfs deze 
'normale' stakingen, die niet plaatsvinden in een 
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crisissituatie, tonen niettemin het vermogen van de 
arbeiders aan om zich tegenover kapitaal en staat en 
hun eigen leiders te manifesteren. 
De Conclusie (Deel 2) vat het onderzoek samen en 
trekt daaruit conclusies. Het onderzoek weerlegt de 
veronderstellingen en beweringen van de arbeiders-
aristocratie-theorie. Het laat de tastbare verschillen 
en scheidslijnen tussen de twee soorten arbeiders zien, 
die echter geen conflict vormen. Het laat andere ver-
schillen en scheidslijnen zien binnen iedere sector die 
evenzeer van belang lijken bi] het belemmeren van de 
ontwikkeling van een klassebewustzijn, als die welke 
zich aftekenen tussen 'arbeidersaristocraten' en 'de 
halfgeproletariseerde boeren'. Verder brengt het onder-
zoek een gedetailleerde beschrijving van het politieke 
gedrag van ieder type arbeider, waar dat voordien 
slechts was voorspeld in economisch-deterministisehe 
termen. Het geeft verder aan dat arbeiders het vermogen 
hebben strijd te leveren tegen kapitaal en staat zonder 
hun eigen leiders - of zelfs tegen hen in. En tenslotte 
toont het aan dat vakbonden niet onveranderlijk en 
onvermijdelijk bemiddelen in de klassenstrijd, dat er 
een dialectische wisselwerking is tussen leiders en 
achterban, en dat arbeiders de bonden kunnen gebruiken 
om controle over hun eigen omgeving uit te breiden. Het 
probleem is, hoe de scheidslijnen, hiërarchieën en 
oppositie, die spontaan de ontwikkeling van markt en 
staat vergezellen - of die bewust worden ingebracht en 
heringebracht door kapitalisten en bureaucraten - te 
onderkennen en te overwinnen. 
Deel 3 van de Conclusie bespreekt de begrippen die 
gaandeweg zijn geïntroduceerd, en de wijze waarop zij 
zijn gebruikt. Eerst wordt betoogd dat de theorie van 
de arbeidersaristocratie de aard van de kapitalistische 
verdeling van de arbeidskracht uitdrukt/weerspiegelt/ 
verduistert. Socialistische sociale analyse moet veel-
eer deze verdelingen doordringen/onthullen/teboven 
komen. Om deze taak uit te voeren, moest een aanzien-
lijk aantal nieuwe begrippen geïntroduceerd worden. 
Industriële differentiatie en uiteenlopend bewustzijn 
van arbeiders worden klaarblijkelijk bepaald door een 
verscheidenheid van krachten, in plaats van door één, 
en vereisen verscheidene instrumenten om te worden 
ontleed. Bovendien zijn deze verschillende begrippen 
eerder gebruikt in een complexe vorm van analyse, dan 
in een eenvoudige vorm die zich op een enkele factor 
concentreert. Derhalve keert hetgeen in Deel I is 
voorgesteld als een strategie van contrôle over arbeid-
ers in Deel II terug als de socio-politieke en socio-
economische contekst van vakbondsactiviteit. Scheids-
lijnen binnen de arbeiders klasse worden evenzo gepre-
senteerd als intern in Deel I (in termen van fractie, 
segment en stratum) en als extern in Deel III (in 
termen van relaties tussen de arbeidersklasse en de 
werknemers uit de middenklasse). 
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Deel 4 van de Conclusie is een hernieuwde reflec-
tie op het oorspronkelijke theoretische uitgangspunt. 
Er wordt gewezen op de veranderingen die gedurende de 
analyse hebben plaatsgevonden. Teneinde meer verfijnde 
instrumenten te ontwikkelen voor bepaalde analyses in 
de diverse theoretische hoofdstukken, worden enkele van 
de aanvankelijk als leidraad gebruikte uiteenzettingen 
ter discussie gesteld. Derhalve worden 'economisch' en 
'politiek' regelmatig tussen aanhalingstekens - die 
afstand scheppen - geplaatst. Het wordt noodzakelijk 
geacht om de anti-kapitalistische aard van 'econo-
mische' strijd te benadrukken, en om de betekenis voor 
de arbeidersklasse van 'politieke' strijd om de macht 
over de staat ter discussie te stellen. Ook wordt 
aangetoond dat zowel de communistische als de sociaal-
democratische leiders van de havenarbeiders van Lagos 
hun 'ideologie van de arbeidersklasse' moesten opgeven 
ten gunste van een of anders vorm van populisme, ten-
einde de arbeiders in beweging te kunnen krijgen. De 
oorspronkelijke veronderstelling van de in wezen revo-
lutionaire aard van de arbeidersklasse kan niet worden 
aangetoond. In plaats daarvan is eenvoudig aangegeven 
hoe arbeidersprotest kan leiden tot een bredere en 
hoger ontwikkelde eigen identiteit. Het laten varen van 
de veronderstelling van een revolutionair proletariaat 
brengt ons dan weer naar de oorspronkelijke arbeiders-
ari stocratie-theoretici - Marx, Engels en Lenin. Zij 
hadden de theorie nodig om te 'verklaren' hoe - in 
tegenstelling tot hun veronderstellingen en ver-
wachtingen - het Engelse en Europese proletariaat niet 
revolutionair werd. Indien we, zoals het andere element 
in de marxistische traditie nadrukkelijk beweerd, de 
klassenstrijd beschouwen als de motor en niet als het 
gevolg van structurele verandering, dan is het aan de 
ene kant niet nodig de voorhoederol van het prole-
tariaat te veronderste1len, en moeten we aan de andere 
kant iedere strijd van arbeiders serieuzer nemen. 
Hoewel Marx erkende dat 'communisme, de werkelijke 
beweging is die aan de huidige situatie een eind zal 
makeg, bedienden hij en zijn volgelingen zich ook van 
zulke economisch-deterministisehe termen als die van de 
arbeidersaristocratie. Met een dergelijk economisch 
determinisme hangen (soms op complexe wijze) prole-
tarisme, voorhoedepretentie, intellectualisme, een 
etatistisehe opvatting van politiek, en een wereldbeeld 
in termen van elkaar uitsluitende tegenstellingen 
samen. Samengevat ligt het alternatief in het inzicht 
dat de sociale structuur wordt bepaald door politieke 
strijd; dat klassen worden gevormd en hervormd door 
strijd; dat strijd van de arbeiders een politieke stijd 
is; dat de vijanden kapitaal en staat zijn (en racisme 
en patriarchaat) ; dat het doel de overwinning van 
uitbuiting en overheersing in de hele samenleving is; 
dat dit alleen te verwezenlijken is door het verbinden 
van de autonome eisen van de verschillende soorten 
arbeiders, van de arbeidersklasse en andere 'werkende 
klassen', en van klasse- en algemeen democratische 
eisen. 
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Deel 5 van de Conclusie vergelijkt deze studie met 
andere recente studies over Afrikaanse arbeiders. Deze 
hebben gemeen dat ze een verschuiving laten zien die 
een welkome verbreding impliceert van het arbeiders-
aristocratiedebat, maar tevens een zeker gevaar inhoudt 
van het ter zijde stellen van kernthema's die door dat 
debat worden opgeworpen. Het nieuwe probleemgebied is 
dat van de verhouding tussen degenen die goed zijn 
geïntegreerd in de loonarbeid en andere werkende men-
sen, uit dezelfde omgeving, of die anders geplaatst 
zijn op de as loonarbeiders-eigen bazen, of allen 
halfgeproletariseerd maar toch verschillend. Hier is 
van belang het inzicht in de mate van halfproletariser-
ing, kritiek op het westerse type vakbond dat drijft op 
collectieve onderhandelingen, en de impliciete vraag 
naar organisatievorm en strategieën die aansluiten bij 
de aard van de arbeid voor het kapitaal in Afrika. Het 
gevaar is dat de centrale plaats van de conflicten op 
de werkplek, die zowel in onafhankelijk als racistisch 
Afrika de kern van de anti-kapitalistische strijd 
blijft bepalen, uit het oog verloren wordt. Een andere 
tekortkoming van de nieuwe invalshoek is het ontbreken 
van een vergelijkend perspectief: de crisis van de 
traditionele vakbeweging is internationaal, en raakt 
geindustrialiseerde-kapitalistische en communistische 
landen evenzeer als Afrikaanse landen. Een derde te-
kortkoming is het algemene gemis aan inzicht om de 
aangeduide problemen te zien als een strategieprobleem 
van de arbiedersbeweging, en zich er rechtstreeks mee 
bezig te houden. 
Deel 6 van de Conclusie erkent dat het zich rich-
ten tot de bestaande vakbeweging op zichzelf prob-
lematisch is. In de eerste plaats is er de noodzaak om 
de vakbeweging te laten zien dat verdeeldheid niet 
zomaar een probleem is (d.w.z. te isoleren en op te 
lossen binnen een overigens onveranderde omgeving of 
structuur). Men moet aantonen dat het het probleem is, 
dat verdeeldheid een uitdrukking is van de onder-
drukking van de werkende mensen door het kapitaal en de 
staat. Als dit kan worden overgedragen, dan kan en moet 
het overige aan de Nigeriaanse socialisten en vakbonds-
mensen worden overgelaten. Maar dan moet het wel duide-
lijk zijn wie zich richt tot wie, en hoe dat gebeurt. 
Deze studie richt zich tot de collega's van de schrij-
ver, met het doel om hun erkenning te verkrijgen. Het 
richt zich echter ook bewust tot een nieuwe generatie 
van intellectuelen in Nigeria en elders in de derde 
wereld. En wat hen geboden wordt, is, eerlijk gezegd, 
een benadering die grotendeels gebaseerd is op Europese 
en Amerikaanse theorievorming. Maar dit moet gezien 
worden als theorievorming, ontleend aan de strijd van 
socialistische intellectuelen om de arbeidersbeweging 
en werkende mensen daar te verstaan. De schrijver hoopt 
dat het niet alleen de ervaring van een land of een 
groep van landen weerspiegelt maar de ervaring van 
proletarisering en klassevorming van de arbeiders op 
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wereldschaal. Indien het van betekenis blijkt te zijn 
voor de arbeiders- en socialistische beweging in 
Afrika, kan dat een indicatie zijn dat de voorwaarden 
voor de ontwikkeling van een gemeenschappelijke theorie 
en strategie voor een werkelijk internationale arbei-
dersbeweging uiteindelijk tot standkomen. 
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1 
STELLINGEN 
Past critics of labour aristocracy theory in Africa have 
failed to go far enough: underlying the theory are funda-
mental methodological errors and conservative political 
implications. 
There is a process of proletarianisation in Lagos Port - the 
removal of labourers' control over capital, means of produc-
tion and the labour power of others - but this is obscured 
from the labourers by 1) the absence of the classical work-
er-capitalist relationship, and 2) the heterogenieation of 
port labour in terms of industrial sectors, ownership pat-
terns, wage/skill and employment-status hierarchies, and of 
labour control strategies. 
One cannot assume, on the basis of the extent-of-prole-
tarianisation or extent-of-deprivation of worker categories, 
a certain class consciousness: insofar as a certain level of 
class consciousness is premised on the experience of a 
particular category of workers, the radicalism of this group 
is going to be also circumscribed by that particularity. 
Capital and state (competition and hierarchy) operate inside 
as well as outside or above the trade union movement: inso-
far as union leaders do not recognise and take action 
against this, obstacles to the expansion and consolidation 
of a working class will remain, factionalism and clientalism 
will be stimulated. 
Strikes in the Lagos Port case show the two major worker 
fractions to have been redefining themselves collectively 
but separately: whilst even such strikes, under non-crisis 
conditions, show the capacity of workers to impose them-
selves on capital, state and their own union leaderships, 
effective self-defence requires that such protest actions 
include wider groups of workers, and express new and broader 
demands. 
Labour aristocracy theory represents neither a distortion 
of, nor a deviation from, classical Marxism-Leninism: it is 
a revealing expression of a major trend or tradition within 
it, a trend that must be analysed, criticised and surpassed 
if Marxism is to release its emancipatory potential. 
Amongst the principles for a re-birth of working-class 
internationalism are that it should 1) imply direct contact 
between involved workers at shopf loor level, 2) require the 
personal activity or sacrifice of those involved, 3) disre-
gard political, religious or ideological identifications, 4) 
deal with immediate and daily-life problems of the workers, 
5) increase their independence from capital, state and 
patriarchy, 6) involve also the solidarity of the weaker 
with the stronger workers, 7) take up also broader democra-
tic or popular demands. (C.f. Pieter de Vries, 'Shopfloor 
International', De Rijp, DIAS, 1982; and Nigel Haworth and 
Harvie Ramsay 'Grasping the Nettle: Problems in the Theory 
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of International Labour Solidarity', Paper to BSA Confer-
ence, Swansea, April, 1983). 
The development of a new international labour studies should 
not be seen as merely a matter of a new problem area or 
theoretical approach but of a new total practice by labour 
researchers requiring, amongst other things, that 1) re-
search be carried out with and for workers, or at least in 
dialogue with them, 2) it create research capacities 
amongst them, 3) it be published or produced in forms acces-
sible to them, and 4) it reinforce internationalism amongst 
them. (Cf. Robin Cohen, 'The "New* International Labour 
Studies: A Definition', Working Paper 27, CDAS, McGill 
University, Montreal, 1981.). 
Comicbook introductions to Marxism, Freud, capitalism, 
nuclear energy, etc., should not be dismissed as simpli-
fications: they can demystify and humanise revolutionary 
figures or complex ideas and problems that have previously 
overawed or been used to manipulate the non-expert: they 
should be judged seriously for the information they carry, 
their interpretations, their aesthetic qualities, their 
capacity to communicate and the attitudes they create. (Cf. 
Richard Appinganensi (ed.), Beginners for Beginners Series, 
Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative, London). 
In arguing against permitting peasants to join Solidarnoec, 
the Polish state rightly cited Marxist definitions of the 
working class and the Leninist requirement of separate 
worker and peasant organisations. By struggling successfully 
to join Solidarnosc, the Polish peasants were not only 
potentially establishing a new organisational relationship 
between workers and peasants but re-defining the concept 
'working class' in a more modern, broader, more emancipa-
tory - and therefore more scientific - sense. 
However original, competent and subversive of earlier such 
works it might be, the study of Indian industrial labour by 
the Ramaswamys is undermined by a definition of 'industry' 
so narrow that it excludes the vast majority of Indian 
wage-earners, and by a focus on the problems of capitalists, 
bureaucrats - and industrial sociologists - rather than 
those of labourers. (E.A. and U. Ramaswamy, Indu ¡»try and 
Labour: An Introduction. New Delhi:O0P. 1981) . 
Writing of American universities in the 1970s, Aronowitz 
argues that: 1) critical theory has been degraded into 
technical intelligence; 2) universities are increasingly 
financially dependent on the provision of contract advice 
for social management and administration; 3) desirous of 
creating peace and social justice, academics are nonetheless 
becoming technocrats, providing essential services to cor-
porations and state, and thus occupying a crucial position 
in the power hierarchy. This is true not only in the US, not 
only of universities, and not only in the 1970s. (S. Arono-
witz, False Promises: The Shaping of American Working Class 
Consciousness. New York: McGraw Hill. 1973). 

This is an attempt to both refute and surpass 
the 'labour aristocracy* thesis - the notion that 
in Africa the 'proper proletariat' of industrial 
workers is economically privileged above, socially 
isolated from and politically opposed to the 
'semi-proletarianised peasantry' of casual and 
migrant labourers. The refutation and surpassing 
is both empirical and theoretical. 
The case considered is that of the Lagos 
cargo-handling industry in the 1970s. Within this 
industry, and on one site, one could find clear 
economic and social divisions between the 'rich' 
workers regularly employed by the state-owned 
Nigerian Ports Authority and the 'poor' ones 
employed casually by the private dock labour 
contractors. The NPA workers, moreover, appeared 
to be well incorporated into their corporation, 
the contract workers to be rebelling against the 
contractors. The first appearance was an illus-
tration of the labour aristocracy thesis. 
The study rejects the thesis, however, not 
only by going beyond such first appearances, but 
by questioning the key concepts employed in labour 
aristocracy analysis, its underlying methodology 
and its political implications. At the beginning 
of the work it is assumed that labour aristocracy 
theory is a deviation from the marxist tradition. 
At the end questions are raised about this tradi-
tion itself. 
The case study permits detailed examination 
of the political relations between the two worker 
types and amongst each of them. Attention is paid 
to 1) union relations with capital and state, 2) 
follower relations with leaders (industrial, 
national and international), and 3) collective 
worker protest action. The purpose is not to deny 
the existence of political divisions between 
differentially proletarianised workers but to see 
this particular one as only one of many amongst a 
working-class-in-the-making. 
The work represents a continuation of the 
author's already published history of Lagos Port 
unionism in the 1940s-60s. 
Front cover; Top left: A skilled tradesman in the 
Engineering Department of the Nigerian Ports 
Authority. Bottom right: An unskilled migrant 
jetty labourer. (Author's photos and design). 
